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ABSTRACT 
This thesis considers the English parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest (and 
other legal processes), 1603-1629. Although it is under-represented in the 
historiography, the early Stuart Commons cherished this particular privilege as much 
as they valued freedom of speech. Previously one of the privileges requested from the 
monarch at the start of a parliament, by the seventeenth century freedom from arrest 
was increasingly claimed as an ‘ancient’, ‘undoubted’ right that secured the 
attendance of members, and safeguarded their honour, dignity, property, and 
‘necessary’ servants. Uncertainty over the status and operation of the privilege was a 
major contemporary issue, and this prompted key questions for research. First, did ill 
definition of the constitutional relationship between the crown and its prerogatives, 
and parliament and its privileges, lead to tensions, increasingly polemical attitudes, 
and a questioning of the royal prerogative? Where did sovereignty now lie? Second, 
was it important to maximise the scope of the privilege, if parliament was to carry out 
its business properly? Did ad hoc management of individual privilege cases 
nevertheless have the cumulative effect of enhancing the authority and confidence of 
the Commons? Third, to what extent was the exploitation or abuse of privilege an 
unintended consequence of the strengthening of the Commons’ authority in matters of 
privilege? Such matters are not treated discretely, but are embedded within chapters 
that follow a thematic, broadly chronological approach. These include an outline of 
how the inter-relationship between privilege and the royal prerogative developed from 
the medieval period onwards, as well as analyses of significant cases. Drawing on key 
sources that include parliamentary and constitutional records, contemporary diaries, 
and edited collections from a wider period, the research supports a view that privilege 
matters imparted a striking distinctiveness, sophistication, and authority to the 
parliaments of the early Stuart period, especially the Commons. 
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EDITORIAL NOTES 
The following conventions apply:  
1. Where available, original spelling has largely been retained, but the long s (∫) 
and thorn/th (Y) have been given modern form. Where confusion about spelling or 
syntax might arise, a gloss has been inserted in square brackets, or modern spelling 
substituted. Unusual abbreviations in quotations have been silently expanded. 
2. The names of parliamentarians, other than in direct quotations, are spelt in the 
form adopted by the History of Parliament (HoP) volumes. 
3. The parliamentary seats of members of the Commons of 1604-29 are given, 
when first referred to, e.g. Thomas Morgan (Wilton). Subsequent references are given 
if the MP sat for a different constituency at the time. 
4. English dates before 1752 are shown with the new year beginning on 
1 January, rather than 24 March. 
5. Unless a particularly Scottish context applies, only the English form of the 
monarch’s title is shown, for example, James I rather than James VI & I. Non-specific 
references to sovereigns are in the masculine form, as a matter of simplicity. 
6. Lengthy titles of early books and articles are indicated in footnotes by an 
ellipsis after the main element of the title, and are given in full in the bibliography. 
7. The bibliography details the edition of works that have been directly cited, as 
well as any different edition cited by a third party author. Places of publication for 
works cited are in the United Kingdom, unless otherwise distinguished. When more 
than one city is listed for the same publisher, only the first city has been listed. The 
full titles of publishers are given for works that appeared before 1900; thereafter 
forenames, initials and descriptive phrases, such as ‘& Co.’ are usually omitted. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
Abbreviations that are commonly used in printed works are not listed. 
Add. Additional Manuscripts, British Library 
bap. baptised 
BHOL British History Online, the online database of the Institute of 
Historical Research 
BL London: British Library 
Cam. Soc. Camden Society 
CD Commons Debates 
CJ Journal of the House of Commons 
col. column 
CP Commons Proceedings 
Cotton Cotton Manuscripts, British Library 
CSPD Calendar of State Papers Domestic 
d. died 
fol(s). folio(s) 
ECCO Eighteenth Century Collections Online 
EEBO Early English Books Online 
Harl. Harley (Harleian) Manuscripts, British Library 
HLRO House of Lords Records Office 
HMC Historical Manuscripts Commission 
HoC House of Commons 
HoL House of Lords 
HoP History of Parliament 
IHR Institute of Historical Research 
LJ Journal of the House of Lords 
MS manuscript(s) 
n. footnote or endnote 
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NS New style (date) 
ODNB Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. The references are to 
the OUP online edition (2004 unless otherwise stated). 
OED Oxford English Dictionary 
OS Old style (date) 
OUP Oxford University Press 
PRO Public Record Office (now TNA) 
r  recto (front side of a folio) 
repr. reprint(ed) 
RP Rotuli Parliamentorum (Parliament Rolls of Medieval England): 
ed. Chris Given-Wilson et al. (Woodbridge, 2005). The citations 
in this thesis come from BHOL. 
s.a. sine anno (unknown date of publication) 
s.l. sine loco (unknown place of publication) 
s.n. sine nomine (unknown publisher) 
stat. statute 
TNA Kew, Surrey: The National Archives 
UP University Press 
v  verso (back side of a folio) 
States in the USA are abbreviated using the US Postal Service abbreviations, 
available from <http://goo.gl/u4Osau>. 
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JOURNAL ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AHR American Historical Review   
Bull IHR Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research (now ‘Historical 
Research’) 
EHR English Historical Review 
HistJ Historical Journal 
JBS Journal of British Studies 
JIH Journal of Interdisciplinary History 
JModH Journal of Modern History 
P & P Past and Present 
PH Parliamentary History 
TAPS Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 
TRHS Transactions of the Royal Historical Society
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I : INTRODUCTION 
Properly understood, the privileges of Parliament are the privileges of the nation, and 
the bedrock of our constitutional democracy [… but …] it can confidently be stated 
that parliamentary privilege or immunity from criminal prosecution has never ever 
attached to ordinary criminal activities by members of Parliament. […] The stark 
reality is that the defendants [… committed …] crimes of dishonesty to which 
parliamentary immunity or privilege does not, has never, and, we believe, never 
would attach.1 
The court of appeal made these observations on the operation of the parliamentary 
privilege of immunity from legal processes and freedom from arrest,2 when hearing a 
case that arose out of the parliamentary expenses scandal of the late twentieth 
century.3 Their judgment shows that even today there are controversial aspects to this 
parliamentary privilege, which were also identified in a report by a parliamentary 
joint committee, a few years earlier: 
The principle that both Houses impose upon their members an absolute priority of 
attendance is the origin of [the privilege of] ‘freedom from arrest’. […] Such 
                                                
1 England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), Between: R and David Chaytor (1) 
Elliot Morley (2) James Devine (3) Lord Hanningfield (4), [2010] 2 Cr App R 34, 
[2010] EWCA Crim 1910, in England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal 
Division) Decisions (British and Irish Legal Information Institute, 2010), at 
<http://goo.gl/i4piH>. 
2 The term ‘freedom from arrest’, also sometimes termed ‘privilege of parliament’, is used in 
this thesis to encompass a range of parliamentary immunities from legal processes 
and ‘molestations’ that could be claimed by peers, members of the Commons, and 
their respective servants. As summarised by Sir Edward Coke, privilege was to apply 
‘in case of any arrest, or any distress of goods, serving any process, summoning the 
land of a member, citation or summoning his person, arresting his person, suing him 
in any court’: in John Hatsell, A Collection of Cases of Privilege of Parliament : 
From the Earliest Records to the Year 1628 (London: H. Hughs, 1776), p. 160. 
3 The appeal court case concerned the trials of three former MPs and a peer, who had all been 
charged with false accounting in relation to parliamentary expenses. During their 
trials in the crown court, the men had argued unsuccessfully that there was no case to 
answer, because expenses claims were covered by the doctrine of parliamentary 
privilege, and could not be the basis of criminal charges. The appeal court rejected 
appeals against the crown court decision, and the men were eventually convicted. 
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justification as exists for its continuance resides in the principle that Parliament should 
have first claim on the service of its members, even to the detriment of the civil rights 
of others. The 1967 committee took the view it was wrong for the claims of 
individuals to be obstructed by use of members’ immunity from arrest, and 
considered the privilege anomalous and of little value.4 
There have been several reports from joint committees of both Houses and green 
papers on the matter during the last fifty years, the most recent of which states: ‘There 
is no obvious continuing justification for Members of Parliament enjoying different 
treatment from any other citizen in civil proceedings’.5 Nevertheless, no change has 
actually occurred. Speaker John Bercow, therefore, still referred to ‘freedom from 
arrest’ in his speech at the start of the 2015 parliament, delivered on behalf of the 
Commons:  
It is now my duty, in the name of and on behalf of the Commons of the United 
Kingdom, to lay claim, by humble petition to Her Majesty, to all their ancient and 
undoubted rights and privileges, especially to freedom of speech in debate, to freedom 
from arrest, and to free access to Her Majesty whenever occasion shall arise, and that 
the most favourable construction shall be put upon all their proceedings. 
Nor did the lord privy seal, baroness Stowell, depart from custom and practice in her 
response: that Elizabeth II did ‘most readily confirm all the rights and privileges 
which have ever been granted to or conferred upon the Commons by Her Majesty or 
any of her Royal predecessors’.6 Lady Stowell’s words might have equally well been 
spoken on behalf of Elizabeth I or her Stuart successors. Speaker Bercow’s formula 
begins with the generally best-known parliamentary privilege today: freedom of 
speech in debate. Freedom from arrest is the next privilege referred to by Speakers, 
                                                
4 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 
Parliamentary Privilege - First Report, in www.parliament.uk (UK Parliament, 
1999), at <http://tinyurl.com/n2yocm6>, Chapter 7, §326-27. 
5 Leader of the House of Commons, Parliamentary Privilege, Cm 8318, in Official 
Documents (HM Government, 2012), at <http://tinyurl.com/lc6na3f>, p. 77. 
6 Hansard, House of Lords Debates, November 1995–– in www.parliament.uk (UK 
Parliament), at<http://tinyurl.com/nvwrmuc>, vol. 762, no. 2, col. 3: 19 May 2015. 
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and its developing status within the political scene in the early Stuart years is the 
subject of this thesis.  
Claims for freedom from arrest and other legal processes predate petitions from 
incoming Speakers for liberty of speech. Freedom from molestation and legal 
processes developed to insulate members from anything that might divert them from 
the business of parliament, or prevent the personal attendance of those servants that 
were ‘necessary’, at least in theory, for a parliamentarian to fulfil his role.7 Members 
of both Houses, and their servants, could claim privilege, although this research is 
largely confined to the Commons.8 The period chosen for research was one when 
freedom from arrest took on a particular importance, as changes in the definition, 
assertion, operation, and extension of privilege contributed to the growth of 
institutional and political power, and altered the way that parliament defined itself. 
These years have been termed ‘a critical period in the political history of not just 
England, but of the English-speaking world. […] From 1604 to 1629 the House of 
Commons was at the centre of English politics as never before’.9 During this period, 
1,782 men became MPs; this research has found 191 cases relating to freedom from 
arrest or other legal processes that were raised in the Commons, although Paul 
Hunneyball gives a slightly lower figure of 183.10 John Hatsell, writing much earlier, 
highlighted 74 cases in the same period.11 The figures found by Hunneyball and in 
this research can be contrasted to just 44 cases that were identified by Bindoff for the 
                                                
7 The first case of granting personal immunity to a member may well have occurred in 1340: 
see Appendix 1, case 2. 
8 The privilege extended to the royal household, officers of both Houses, and their servants in 
turn, as all were deemed necessary to the proper working of parliament. Three cases 
exemplify this: William Hogan, servant of Queen Elizabeth: see Appendix 1, case 23; 
one of the queen’s heralds: LJ, 2, p. 240: 3 December 1601; and Sayres, servant to the 
Commons’ Clerk: CJ, 1, p. 295: 10 April 1606. 
9 Paul Langford FBA, ‘Foreword’, in Andrew Thrush, The House of Commons 1604-1629 : 
Introductory Survey and Appendices (Cambridge: UP, 2010), I, ix. 
10 The overall figure is given on the HoP website, at <http://goo.gl/Bs6uKS>. Hunneyball’s 
figure can be found in: Paul M. Hunneyball, ‘The Development of Parliamentary 
Privilege, 1604-29’, PH, 34 (1) (February 2015), 111-28, p. 116. The small variation 
in the number of cases between Hunneyball and this research perhaps reflects 
differing judgements on the categories to which cases should be assigned. 
11 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 130-89. Hatsell would have known of further cases, which 
he did not apparently consider worthy of description. 
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sixteen parliaments of 1509-58, the majority relating to the arrests of servants, rather 
than privilege for MPs themselves.12 
It is important to note that parliamentarians in the early seventeenth century strove 
to protect and preserve all their privileges, with importance attached to both freedom 
from arrest, and freedom of speech in debate. Privilege claims for freedom from arrest 
– however much they seemed individual or trivial – were accordingly considered with 
as much gravity as questions of freedom of speech, or the sequestering of members 
who had offended the crown in some way. Such was the significance of all their 
privileges to the Commons that, whereas these had previously been requested from 
the monarch at the start of a parliament, by the seventeenth century they were in 
effect being claimed as ‘ancient’, ‘undoubted’ rights and privileges, or at least being 
‘petitioned’ for in what had become almost a ceremonial sense of that word.13 Indeed, 
the Form of Apology and Satisfaction, which was drafted, but not submitted, in the 
summer of 1604, asserted that ‘Our making of request in the entrance of Parliament to 
enjoy our privilege is an act only of manners’.14 The dilemma for the Commons was 
that if it was understood that their ‘petition’ for privileges were capable of rejection, 
then they conceded that their privileges could be limited, or even denied, by the king. 
The dilemma for the king was that if he allowed his prerogative to be bypassed, 
questioned, or constrained in one particular area, then potentially all his prerogative 
powers could be limited or even denied.  
 A further difficulty appeared in the early modern period. On the one hand, 
parliamentary privilege operated properly and legitimately to safeguard the attendance 
of members of both Houses. On the other hand, there could be a distortion of 
privilege, so that it insulated the personal and financial affairs of parliamentarians and 
their servants from equally proper legal processes, for all the time that a parliament 
was in being, and for a time before and afterwards. Even though privilege of 
                                                
12 S. T. Bindoff (ed.), The House of Commons : 1509-1558, 3 vols. (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1982), I, pp. 26-27. 
13 The words, ancient and undoubted, were still included in Speaker Bercow’s request in 
2015. 
14 J. R. Tanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James I, A.D. 1603-1625 : 
With an Historical Commentary (Cambridge: UP, 1930), p. 222. 
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parliament did not confer perpetual immunity on any member, action could not be 
taken to recover debts through legal processes if a parliament lasted for any length of 
time. This was especially true of the first parliament of James I, which ran from 
March 1604 to November 1610. There was also a view that if a process to recover 
debts had been broken, for example by the release of an MP through privilege, then 
the process could not be resumed later, when the member’s privilege no longer 
applied. However, until perhaps the late twentieth century, the pursuit of profit by 
those in parliament was a perfectly acceptable activity, even if, at times, ventures 
failed, and debts were consequently left unpaid. Those who defaulted in these 
circumstances were not considered fraudulent, merely unfortunate, as were their 
creditors. Nevertheless, as a result of these tensions, the early-seventeenth century 
Commons took assiduous care to seek out precedents, particularly those recorded in 
the parliament rolls, or the journals of the House, and to work within a law, which 
was, for the most part, ‘customary’ common law, based on such precedents, rather 
than derived from statutes, or parliamentary resolutions and orders.15 Privilege cases, 
often trivial and ad hoc on the surface, seemed to be largely about protecting the 
honour, dignity, and property of individual members of the Lords and Commons, yet 
their cumulative effect was to help both Houses to define themselves and strengthen 
their institutional character. Cases were managed seriously, typically through the 
committee for privileges (first established in the reign of Elizabeth I), and then on the 
floor of the House. In this way the Commons maintained, defended, and sometimes 
clarified, stretched, or redefined parliamentary dignity and authority: such change 
was, however, evolutionary rather than revolutionary. As Sommerville observes, 
‘Privilege did not expand steadily at the expense of royal power. The idea that 
privileges grew in accordance with a master plan by which the House of Commons 
aimed to seize the reins of government from the monarch has little to recommend it. 
                                                
15 The Lords also took steps to identify precedents that would maintain the rights and 
privileges of their House, for example in relation to the sequestering of lord Arundel: 
LJ 3, pp. 558-62: 18 April 1626. 
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Very often privileges were asserted in a piecemeal fashion, as responses particular to 
circumstances had little to do with royal policy’.16  
Key research questions 
This thesis looks to reframe the privilege of freedom from arrest within the study of 
early-seventeenth century parliaments. It begins by tracing the origins and 
development of the privilege of freedom from arrest, from its medieval origins as a 
way of ensuring that those summoned to parliament were free from extraneous cares, 
through to the early seventeenth century, when privilege as an entity took on an 
importance of its own. The key contemporary issue was whether understandings 
about the privilege of freedom from arrest were certain, consideration of which 
prompted research questions that are at the heart of this thesis. The research has 
analysed and grouped all the individual cases that were raised in the Commons during 
this period. The first research question asks whether the ill definition of the 
constitutional relationship between the crown and its prerogatives, and parliament and 
its privileges, led to tensions, increasingly polemical attitudes in the Commons, and a 
questioning of the royal prerogative. Or, putting the question from a different angle, 
to what extent were there effective, common, working understandings about the 
origins, scope and operation of both the royal prerogative and parliamentary 
privileges? Second, was it important to maximise, even to modernise, the scope of the 
privilege of freedom from arrest and other legal processes, if parliament was to carry 
out its business properly? Linked to this, there is a question whether the management 
of privilege cases, despite being largely ad hoc and individual, nevertheless had the 
cumulative effect of adding to the authority and confidence of the Commons – was 
the whole greater than the sum of its parts? Third, to what extent was the exploitation 
or abuse of privilege an unintended consequence of the strengthening of the 
Commons’ authority in matters of privilege? These research questions are not treated 
discretely, but are embedded within chapters that follow a thematic, and broadly 
                                                
16 Johann P. Sommerville, ‘Parliament, Privilege, and the Liberties of the Subject’, in Jack H. 
Hexter (ed.), Parliament and Liberty from the Reign of Elizabeth to the English Civil 
War (Stanford (CA): UP, 1992), 56-84, p. 57. 
Page 17 
chronological approach, including an outline of how the privilege originated in the 
medieval period and developed thereafter, together with a presentation of significant 
cases. Consideration of these research strands helps to determine the extent to which 
privilege matters contributed to the parliaments of the early Stuart period, presenting a 
striking new ‘distinctiveness and sophistication as an institution’.17 In summary, these 
wide-ranging issues might be condensed into a single key question: where was 
sovereignty now to be found? 
Historiography 
The numerous contributions to the historiography of the early Stuart period inevitably 
reflect the changing roles of crown and parliament, and have often attempted to 
‘explain’ why the civil war(s) of the seventeenth century took place. Bibliographies 
help to identify the body of work on the early seventeenth century, but they do not of 
themselves provide an analytical frame of reference.18 Some historiographical surveys 
cover this period, for example, those by Richardson, Hexter, and Tomlinson.19 
Consideration of the historiography in this section is not intended, however, to detail 
the to and fro of the general historical debate around the early Stuart years, involving 
writers within various traditions, approaches, or ‘schools’, who often focused on the 
civil wars and their origins. Rather, the following paragraphs concentrate on locating 
material that has greater relevance for the methodology and arguments of the thesis 
and its study of parliamentary privilege, particularly the part that privilege did, or did 
not, play in the possible development of ‘oppositional’ or ‘consensual’ elements in the 
early Stuart parliaments. In this, it must be noted that freedom from arrest has 
                                                
17 David L. Smith, The Stuart Parliaments 1603-1689 (London: Arnold, 1999), p. 9. 
18 The Bibliography of British and Irish History (BBIH) is the most comprehensive work. A 
summary of the historiography and a very full bibliography are included in: Barry 
Coward (ed.), A Companion to Stuart Britain (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), 
pp. xiv-xxiv, and pp. 492-529; and Barry Coward, The Stuart Age : England, 1603-
1714, 3rd edn., (Harlow: Longman, 2003), pp. 498-504. 
19 R. C. Richardson, The Debate on the English Revolution (London: Methuen, 1977); J. H. 
Hexter, ‘Historiographical Perspectives: The Early Stuarts and Parliament : Old Hat 
and The Nouvelle Vague’, PH, 1 (1) (December 1982), 181-215; Howard Tomlinson, 
‘The Causes of War - a Historiographical Survey’, in Howard Tomlinson (ed.), 
Before the English Civil War : Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government 
(London: Macmillan, 1983), 7-26. 
Page 18 
generally received limited attention by historians, despite its significance to those at 
the time. This is possibly because this particular privilege came to be associated with 
attempts to avoid meeting debts – even if a final day of reckoning might come – and 
other abuses, so that it did not resonate with whiggish writers in particular, who were 
happier describing parliamentarians nobly promoting ‘liberty’, by asserting freedom 
of speech, or resisting any extension of the powers of the crown. The exploitation of 
privilege, which is considered in this thesis, has received limited attention, although 
Blackstone recognises that the privilege does ‘derogate from the common law, being 
only indulged to prevent the members being diverted from the public business’.20 
A. S. Turberville, whose works covered the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, did 
describe some of the specific issues that arose from protecting the servants of 
members of parliament from both Houses, in an article from 1927.21 
Chapter three below provides an extended study of the case of Sir Thomas 
Shirley, which attracted considerable contemporary attention. In the historiography, 
however, it generally receives brief mention, as a case where the Commons, through 
their own actions, finally secured the autonomous right to free members – even 
though Shirley’s release had depended in no small measure on the co-operation and 
support of James I. Prothero’s article from 1893 is an exception, in describing the 
case in some detail.22 The other case that is considered at greater length in this thesis 
concerned the MP, John Rolle, whose goods were seized after he failed to pay what 
he saw as unlawful customs duties.23 This does attract more historiographical 
attention, usually figuring within a discussion of resistance to Charles I for raising 
funds without parliamentary authority. Hatsell, writing in the mid-eighteenth century, 
includes issues that arose from Rolle’s claim for privilege.24 Whig writers generally 
                                                
20 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols. (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1765-9), I, pp. 159-61. 
21 A. S. Turberville, ‘The "Protection" of the Servants of Members of Parliament’, EHR, 42 
(168) (1927), 590-600. 
22 G. W. Prothero, ‘The Parliamentary Privilege of Freedom from Arrest, and Sir Thomas 
Shirley’s Case, 1604’, EHR, 8 (32) (October 1893), 733-40. 
23 See chapter six below. 
24 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 184-85. Hatsell briefly records the Commons’ confirmation 
of privilege in respect of a subpoena served on Rolle, which was a significant 
[footnote continues ...] 
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identified the Rolle case as a point on the development of a rule of law that preserved 
property rights and individual liberties. Samuel Rawson Gardiner was, however, 
particularly critical of the way in which Rolle’s contemporaries focused on his 
individual circumstances, rather than larger issues, thereby converting a ‘mighty 
struggle against unparliamentary taxation into a mere dispute about privilege’.25 
Popofsky, in rejecting revisionist suggestions that the Commons were largely 
impotent in the early Caroline parliaments, has identified the Rolle case as lying on a 
‘continuum of constitutional concern in the Commons over arbitrary royal taxation 
extending back into the reign of James I and culminating in a crisis over tonnage and 
poundage in the [1629] session’.26  
Writers from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries mostly provided some 
account of privilege cases, with little comment, positive, or negative. Blackstone is 
more expansive, and cautions members of the Commons of his own period to 
remember the high trust placed in them as guardians of the English constitution, 
‘bound by every tie of nature, of honour, and of religion’.27 By the nineteenth century, 
writers in what came to be seen as the ‘whig’ tradition outnumbered ‘tory’ 
interpreters, who were uneasy with the proposition that resistance to a sovereign was 
sometimes justified, or any ideas that power lay with ‘the people’, rather than the 
sovereign in parliament.28 Of significance for this thesis, however, was the whig line 
that there was tension and conflict between the first two Stuart kings and their 
parliaments. In that analysis, the crown was supposedly increasingly bent on 
strengthening its powers, even to make it absolute along continental lines. Parliament, 
especially the lower House, was consequently setting itself up to protect the liberties 
that they and the people had won over time, by asserting their rights and privileges, 
and establishing a say in matters of state and government. Pejoratively pigeon-holed 
.......................................................................................... 
contributor to the Commons’ anger over Rolle’s treatment: ibid. pp. 170-71. See also 
p. 226 below. 
25 Gardiner’s observations are quoted more fully on p. 201 below. 
26 Linda S. Popofsky, ‘The Crisis over Tonnage and Poundage in Parliament in 1629’, P & P 
(126) (February 1990), 44-75, especially p. 45. 
27 Blackstone, Commentaries, I, p. 9. 
28 Mark Knights, ‘Politics after the Glorious Revolution’, in Barry Coward (ed.), A 
Companion to Stuart Britain (Chichester: Blackwell, 2009), 455-73, p. 456. 
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as a ‘whig writer’ for a time, historians have, however, revisited Gardiner with some 
admiration: ‘the authority and the indispensable narrative [...] returning to it after 
some years I was amazed by the moderation and carefulness with which Gardiner 
unfolds the coming of the Puritan Revolution’;29 or: ‘It is a rash historian who 
disagrees with Gardiner’;30 and: ‘Gardiner was one of those inexhaustible nineteenth-
century masters whose range and command leave us awestruck’.31 He began his 
research in the 1850s, and started to question current explanations of the conflicts of 
Charles I’s reign. In the preface to the first edition of his history, he noted that: 
Certainly the politics of the seventeenth century, when studied for the mere sake of 
understanding them, assume a very different appearance from that which they had in 
the eyes of men, who, like Macaulay and Forster, regarded them through the medium 
of their own political struggles.32 
As Ronald Hutton identifies, from the mid-1920s onwards, Wallace Notestein 
followed Gardiner’s line that the House of Commons was increasingly powerful, 
pitting itself against royal attempts to retrench what the people had wrested from their 
monarchs.33 There was, however, increasing criticism through the mid- to late-
twentieth century that earlier writers had located concepts such as liberty and freedom 
backwards from their own age into the seventeenth century. Although Herbert 
Butterfield challenged what he described as ‘The Whig Interpretation of History’ as 
early as 1931, his interest was, however, more in establishing sound historical 
methods, than in providing an extended ‘revision’ of whig commentaries on 
developments in the early seventeenth century.34 Butterfield was, of course, not the 
first writer to advocate rigorous historical methods. In particular, the German school 
                                                
29 J. S. Morrill, Seventeenth Century Britain, 1603-1714 (Folkestone: Dawson, 1980), p. 33. 
30 Christopher Hill, ‘Parliament and People in Seventeenth-Century England’, P & P (92) 
(August 1981), 100-124, p. 105.  
31 Theodore K. Rabb, ‘Revisionism Revised : Two Perspectives on Early Stuart Parliamentary 
History : The Role of the Commons’, P & P (92) (August 1981), 55-78, p. 56. 
32 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James I. To the 
Disgrace of Chief-Justice Coke, 1603-1616, 1st edn., 2 vols. (London: Hurst & 
Blackett, 1863). The quotation is from the 1883 edition, I, vi. 
33 Ronald Hutton, Debates in Stuart History (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 7. 
34 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: Bell, 1931). 
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of Historismus [‘historism’, rather than ‘historicism’] tried to introduce objectivity 
and ‘scientific method’, by questioning the material, and seeking to avoid teleological 
pronouncements. Leopold von Ranke, who can be seen as its founder, wrote: 
‘Importance has been attached to history’s duty to judge the past, in order to instruct 
the contemporary for the benefit of future ages. This work does not aspire to such 
high duties: it simply tries to show how it was in essence’ [my translation].35 Prothero 
advocated that the ‘distinct, objective, methodological techniques developed by 
historians had a unique educational value and should therefore be taught as an 
intrinsic component of every university history course’.36 
An important ‘school’ to move on from whig interpretations comprised Marxist 
writers, notably Christopher Hill, particularly in the period beginning after the second 
world war. They differed from the whig analysis, by arguing that the growing 
ambition of parliament was the source of conflict in the seventeenth century, 
reflecting changing economic dynamics, which included an economically strong, but 
politically weak, gentry. Their analysis seemed, however, to offer little comment on 
matters of parliamentary privilege.  
Nearly all historical interpretations will be questioned over time, and new 
analyses and explanations offered.37 However, a particular ‘revisionism’ developed 
from the 1970s onwards in relation to Stuart studies, characterised by a rejection of 
whig interpretations that had anachronistically or teleologically presented the defence 
by parliaments of individual liberty and the rule of law as a kind of English 
constitutional exceptionalism.38 There was a similar rejection of the Marxist analysis. 
                                                
35 Leopold von Ranke, Geschichte der romanischen und germanischen Völker von 1494 bis 
1514 (s.n., 1824), vii. This was von Ranke’s first significant work. 
36 Algernon Cecil, ‘Prothero, Sir George Walter (1848-1922)’, ODNB. 
37 Revision of the historiography of the early seventeenth century is not unique: consider, for 
example, views on life and culture in the ‘The Dark Ages’, the appeasement approach 
of Neville Chamberlain, or Russia under Stalin, all of which have been subject to 
heavy revision. 
38 Burgess discusses the differences between anachronism and teleology, and accuses 
Butterfield of carelessly conflating the two terms – this can be found within his 
broader historiographical analysis of revisionism: Glenn Burgess, ‘On Revisionism : 
An Analysis of Early Stuart Historiography in the 1970s’, HistJ, 33 (3) (September 
1990), 609-27, especially pp. 614, 614n., 615. 
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Although revisionism is particularly associated with careful studies of how parliament 
worked and went about its business in the first decades of the seventeenth century, it 
reflected and drew on a more disciplined and rigorous examination of the 
relationships between Elizabeth I and the Commons. For example, Michael Graves 
used the documents to consider varying interpretations of Elizabethan parliaments, 
suggesting that such interpretations have inevitably reflected the assumptions and 
questions that have been put forward by major historians.39 Geoffrey Elton set out 
that: ‘It has been my purpose – and, I know, that of my critics as well – to consider 
only the ascertainable facts of history and the possible interpretations to be put upon 
them’.40 Elton’s particular contribution was his empirical examination of the 
Elizabethan parliaments themselves, rather than the issues surrounding their 
development. He identified that the main preoccupation of these parliaments was 
legislation, not conflict, which led him to ask: ‘why Tudor government remained 
pretty stable through a difficult century, while instability and collapse attended upon 
the government of the early Stuarts’. He answered his own question in the following 
way: 
Parliament, the premier point of contact between rulers and ruled, between the 
Crown and the political nation, in the sixteenth century fulfilled its function as a 
stabilizing mechanism because it was usable and used to satisfy legitimate and 
potentially powerful aspirations. It mediated in the touchy area of taxation; by 
producing the required general and particular laws; it kept necessary change in 
decent order; it assisted the rich in the arranging of their affairs; and it helped the 
ambitious to scale the heights of public power. What more could we ask of the image 
of the body politic? Only that it should satisfy liberal preconceptions by regularly 
undoing governments. But that was not a function which sixteenth-century theory 
ascribed to Parliament, and I can see no reason why it should have done so.41 
                                                
39 Michael A. R. Graves, Elizabethan Parliaments, 1559-1601 (London: Longman, 1987). 
40 G. R. Elton, ‘A Revolution in Tudor History?’, P & P (32) (1965), 103-09, p. 109. 
41 G. R. Elton, ‘Tudor Government: The Points of Contact: I. Parliament’, TRHS, 24 (1974), 
183-200, particularly pp. 184 and 200. 
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This thesis follows a similar line, in suggesting that the stability provided by a broadly 
consensual Elizabethan settlement was attractive to many members of the early Stuart 
parliaments, whose nature was essentially robustly conservative, rather than 
oppositional or revolutionary, at least until the late 1620s, and that this, in turn, 
influenced the way that privilege cases were approached and managed.42  
 Revisionism has been characterised as more a reasoned point of view, than an 
organised ‘school’.43 As John Morrill notes: ‘the interesting thing about revisionism 
was how a whole series of people came to the same conclusions simultaneously 
without really knowing one another [and] reacted to some extent against a previous 
generation of Oxford-trained historians’.44 A particular revisionist contribution was to 
frame the debate on first principles, advocating a careful study of the parliaments of 
the 1620s, in order to build up a ‘narrative’, rather than selecting evidence to support 
pre-formed theories of opposition and defences of liberty. A similar empirical 
approach, using the records of all privilege cases that were raised in the early Stuart 
Commons, has been adopted in this thesis. Revisionist ideas found particular impetus 
in works in the mid-1970s, including those by Mark Kishlansky,45 Morrill,46 Kevin 
Sharpe,47 and, not least, Conrad Russell, whose name is particularly associated with 
this approach. Zaller saw Russell as suggesting: ‘that the Stuart period may most 
fruitfully be regarded not as a high road to civil war but a sad and scuttling retreat 
down the back alleys of compromise’, and that the ‘Civil War was the breakdown of 
an existing consensus […] the failure of men of goodwill rather than the creation of a 
                                                
42 Two of the members who were arrested for their misbehaviour at the end of the 1629 
parliament, William Coryton and Denzil Holles, later went on to be strong supporters 
of the crown: see Appendix 4. Sir John Eliot regularly expressed his loyalty to the 
crown in his speeches. 
43 ‘With no organized school, no single founding moment, no deliberately coordinated 
method, there were and still are almost as many revisionisms as there are scholars 
identified with the label’: Cynthia Herrup, ‘Revisionism: What’s in a Name?’, JBS, 
35 (2) (April 1996), 135-38, p. 136. 
44 Interview with John Morrill, 26 March 2008, at <http://goo.gl/Etjvww>.  
45 Mark Kishlansky, ‘The Emergence of Adversary Politics in the Long Parliament’, JModH, 
49 (4) (December 1977), 617-40. 
46 J. S. Morrill, The Revolt of the Provinces : Conservatives and Radicals in the English Civil 
War, 1630-1650 (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976). 
47 See the collection of essays in: Kevin Sharpe (ed.), Faction and Parliament : Essays on 
Early Stuart History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).  
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wilful opposition or overweening tyranny’.48 Morrill has noted that: ‘Whole issues of 
several leading journals were devoted to [Russell’s] demolition of the notion that 
there was a "high road" to civil war in the early seventeenth century. There was 
misgovernment and there was incompetent kingship. There was no constitutional 
opposition, no "winning of the initiative by the house of commons", no use of the 
power of the purse to clip royal prerogative wings; and the struggles for power at 
court were amplified within the houses of parliament’.49  
Sharpe emphasised the ineffectiveness of parliament before 1629, both in terms of 
its own organisation and its capacity to finalise legislation, as well as its chronic 
inability during the 1620s to provide good advice. He suggests that, lacking effective 
leadership, the Commons – incoherent in their views, conservatively loyal – far from 
coming to dominate the political centre-stage, were dysfunctional and irrelevant to the 
major problems that had to be faced.50 Russell himself set out his position that 
historians had overrated both the powers and the ambitions of early seventeenth-
century parliaments, although he concedes that there was a ‘rapid change of political 
mood’, particularly over the course of the 1620s, and that the closing events of the 
1629 parliament were ‘a genuine act of opposition’.51 His finding, that criticisms of 
the crown needed to be set in a context of monetary pressures, not least resistance to 
fiscal demands in the localities, was in clear contrast to ‘the classic Whig explanation 
of a House of Commons aggressively defending English liberties, or the neo-Marxist 
depiction of a class struggle inexorably leading to victory for the rising "middling 
                                                
48 Robert Zaller, ‘Reviewed Work: Faction and Parliament: Essays on Early Stuart History by 
Kevin Sharpe’, Albion, 11 (2) (1979), 174-75, p. 174. The phrase ‘high road to civil 
war’ is associated with Elton, who used it in 1965, and further included it in: G. R. 
Elton, Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government, Volume II : Parliament 
(Cambridge: UP, 1982), 164-82; cf. Thomas Cogswell, ‘A Low Road to Extinction? 
Supply and Redress of Grievances in the Parliaments of the 1620s’, HistJ, 33 (2) 
(June 1990), 283-303. 
49 John Morrill, ‘Russell, Conrad Sebastian Robert, fifth Earl Russell (1937-2004)’, ODNB.  
50 Kevin Sharpe, ‘Introduction’, in Kevin Sharpe (ed.), Faction and Parliament : Essays on 
Early Stuart History (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978),  
51 Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, 1621-1629 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), 
pp. 417-33, p. 416. 
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sort"’.52 Monarchs were now no longer able to ‘live of their own’, as Edward IV had 
undertaken to do.53 James and Charles needed parliaments to supplement income 
from the traditional feudal or quasi-feudal dues, and those taxes and duties that were 
granted for the whole life of the monarch. It is a mistake, however, as Russell has 
pointed out, ‘to suppose that granting too little supply was part of the same process as 
the withholding of supply [… so that] grants remained excessively small even at times 
when members were leaning over backwards to demonstrate their eagerness to vote 
supply’.54 The Commons did not appear to appreciate the true costs of the military 
activity that they often advocated: grants in the 1620s did not come near to properly 
funding military actions for which they had clamoured. At other times, the financial 
straits in which either king found himself allowed the Commons to press for their 
privileges to be confirmed and for their grievances to be addressed before granting 
supply. Was this ‘oppositional’? Russell presented a perhaps over-restrictive notion of 
opposition, in his argument that ‘an alternative government’ under a monarchy was 
only possible if there was a pretender or other credible challenger for the throne, or if 
an army was available, and, in Russell’s view, neither element was available before 
August 1640.55 This seems an oversimplification. Opposition to the monarch could 
surely take more subtle forms, alongside delaying or refusing supply: criticism of 
perceived toleration of papism and Arminianism; a clamour for privilege, for 
example, for John Rolle and his goods; and moves to impeach counsellors, such as 
Bacon, Cranfield and Buckingham.  
Russell also seems wrong in arguing that the English parliaments of the early 
Stuart period were weak, because they had failed to seek redress before supply.56 
James and Charles found it almost impossible to obtain parliamentary supply on any 
                                                
52 Pauline Croft, ‘Review of Conrad Russell’, IHR : review no. 709 (2009) (Institute of 
Historical Research), at <http://tinyurl.com/p7vfkrk>. 
53 G. L. Harriss, ‘Reviewed Work: The Crown Lands, 1461-1536: In the Series of Historical 
Problems, Studies and Documents by B. P. Wolffe’, EHR, 88 (346) (January 1973), 
172. 
54 Conrad Russell (ed.), Unrevolutionary England, 1603-1642 (London: Hambledon, 1990), 
p. 43. 
55 Ibid., xiii. 
56 Conrad Russell, ‘Parliamentary History in Perspective, 1604-1629’, History, 61 (February 
1976), 1-27 (passim). 
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regular, predictable basis, because the Commons were determined to raise grievances, 
even if such grievances were rarely satisfactorily addressed, and this contributed to 
personal and institutional animosity. Only in 1621 and 1625 were grants made 
without conditions. This thesis shows a clear linkage between issues over the royal 
finances, including the non-parliamentary collection of tonnage and poundage, on the 
one hand; and the robust promotion of issues of privilege that followed the 
sequestration of the goods of a member of parliament who had refused to pay such 
unauthorised duties, on the other hand. The fear that parliament might be permanently 
bypassed in relation to supply gave a harder edge to protests in the late 1620s. 
New stances on what had almost become a consensus around revisionism began to 
gather pace in the 1980s.57 Whereas the revisionist view was that division and conflict 
were abhorrent to members of both Houses, fluid arguments were now put forward 
that there were multiple competing discourses, and that constitutional and religious 
conflict was ubiquitous in the early Stuart parliaments, as presented, for example, in 
the ‘post-revisionist’ work of Richard Cust and Ann Hughes,58 Cust alone,59 Clive 
Holmes,60 Johann Sommerville,61 Thomas Cogswell,62 and others. As Chris Kyle 
notes: ‘in the wave of later 1970s and 1980s revisionism, the whig orthodoxy most 
clearly articulated in Wallace Notestein’s The Winning of the Initiative by the House 
of Commons’ was pressured and broken.63 A few years later, the management of 
                                                
57 For example, Rabb, ‘Revisionism Revised’; Hill, ‘Parliament and People’, pp. 100-24. 
58 Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, ‘Introduction: After Revisionism’, in Richard Cust and Ann 
Hughes (eds.), Conflict in Early Stuart England : Studies in Religion and Politics 
1603-1642 (Harlow: Longman, 1989), 1-46. 
59 Richard Cust, ‘Charles I, the Privy Council, and the Forced Loan’, JBS, 24 (2) (April 
1985), 208-35; Richard Cust, The Forced Loan and English Politics : 1626-1628 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1987). 
60 Clive Holmes, ‘Parliament, Liberty, Taxation, and Property’, in Jack H. Hexter (ed.), 
Parliament and Liberty from the Reign of Elizabeth to the English Civil War 
(Stanford (CA): UP, 1992), 122-54. 
61 J. P. Sommerville, Royalists and Patriots : Politics and Ideology in England, 1603-1640, 
2nd edn., (Harlow: Longman, 1999). 
62 Thomas Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution : English Politics and the Coming of War, 1621-
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Cogswell, ‘War and the Liberties of the Subject’, in Jack H. Hexter (ed.), Parliament 
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63 Wallace Notestein, The Winning of the Initiative by the House of Commons, Raleigh 
[footnote continues ...] 
Page 27 
parliament had come to take centre stage, such that ‘parliament became an 
increasingly important site of discourse and a reaffirmation that successful 
parliamentary management could be the key to either stifling royal policy or bending 
it in another direction’.64  
More recently, Hunneyball has made two important contributions. First, in 2009, 
he identified that ‘in the early 17th century the House of Commons finally began to 
emerge from the shadow of the Lords, securing greater control over its own affairs 
[with] members presenting themselves as the true champions of constitutional 
freedom’.65 He describes the developments in the assertion, consolidation, and 
extension of privilege during the period (which are treated at more length in this 
thesis), and identifies greater confidence in the dealings of the Commons with the 
crown. He further argues that some of these advances were made in collaboration 
with the Lords, although ‘peers rarely hesitated to assert their superior status and 
clout’ during the early part of the period. Pressure by both Houses forced Charles I to 
accept the Petition of Right, in 1628, but at the same time this was when the 
Commons came to present themselves ‘as the true voice of the English people’.66 
Second, in 2015, Hunneyball concentrates more directly on the management of 
parliament, and the ‘dramatic expansion in the exercise and scope of parliamentary 
privilege’ in the early Stuart period. He notes that privilege had developed as a 
mechanism to facilitate the business of parliament, but argues that, by the time of the 
Jacobean and early Caroline parliaments, it ‘came to be seen as a personal benefit for 
members, or even a political weapon for use against the crown’. Such arguments 
agree with much of what is presented in this thesis. However, he also argues that, 
.......................................................................................... 
Lecture on History (London: OUP for British Academy, 1924; repr. 1949). He was 
commenting more on the winning of the initiative in respect of legislation, rather than 
in a wider, constitutional sense. However, during the early Stuart period very little 
significant legislation was enacted, and little legislative intent was controversial, 
beyond the attempt to bring England and Scotland into full union. 
64 Chris R. Kyle, ‘Managing Tudor and Stuart Parliaments : Introduction’, PH, 34 (1) 
(February 2015), 8-13, pp. 8-9. 
65 Paul M. Hunneyball, ‘The House of Commons, 1603-29’, in Clyve Jones (ed.), A Short 
History of Parliament (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2009), 100-09, p. 100. 
66 Ibid., pp. 101-05, passim. 
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whereas developments occurred in both Houses, it ‘was the Lords which normally led 
the way, continually pushing the boundaries of privilege as part of a general 
reassertion of its rights and status’.67 This thesis argues that the Commons should not 
be characterised as weak followers of the Lords, rather that there was a growing 
confidence in the Commons around the consolidation and extension of their rights, 
liberties and privileges – even if their views did not always prevail. They were willing 
to challenge the Lords directly, as when they refused the Lords’ request for a 
conference in 1610, because the Lords were apparently acting as intermediaries for 
the king.68 Somewhat later, in 1628, the Commons refused to send their Journal to the 
Lords to check an apparently hostile entry.69 This research suggests that developments 
in the lower house matched or exceeded those in the upper, within a climate of 
innovation that is acknowledged by Hunneyball.  
Elements of earlier approaches have been adopted. So, the weight given in 
German Historismus to marshalling data, the empirical approach of Neale, and the 
revisionist emphasis on building up a narrative through a careful study of parliaments, 
rather than selecting ‘helpful’ evidence, have been followed. Although there was a 
clear conservative, broadly loyal stance to be found among most members, who 
wished to preserve what might be termed the Elizabethan settlement, there is, 
nevertheless, evidence of conflict. This thesis therefore offers a nuanced view: it finds 
evidence for compromise and consensus in the management of privilege cases by an 
essentially conservative House of Commons, for example in the Shirley case, and in 
the attempts to rein in Eliot’s inflammatory speeches.70 On the other hand, it identifies 
conflict in debates leading up to the preparation of various formal statements from the 
Commons, such as the Apology of 1604, the Petitions of 1610, the Protestation of 
1621, the Petition of Right of 1628, and the Three Resolutions of 1629, all of which, 
to a greater or lesser degree, included elements that related to privilege issues. The 
Rolle case is shown to have played an important part in the defiant, if chaotic, last 
                                                
67 Hunneyball, ‘Development of Privilege’, p. 111. 
68 See pp. 125f. below. 
69 See p. 33 below. 
70 For example, see pp. 140 and 223 below. 
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days of the 1629 parliament. Conflict is, of course, two-dimensional, and evidence is 
presented of the generally robust but sometimes unhelpful responses of James I and 
Charles I to the Commons’ polemical stances.71 The historiography of the period has 
therefore inevitably shaped the approaches taken in this thesis. 
Methods and sources 
The research approach that has been adopted for this thesis is, first, to identify the 
origins of the privilege of freedom from arrest, to provide a context for other elements 
of the research. Second, the Commons’ journals and contemporary diaries have been 
consulted at length, in order to identify and analyse nearly two hundred individual 
privilege cases that were raised in the Commons between 1604 and 1629: in 
particular, the cases of Sir Thomas Shirley (1604) and John Rolle (1628-29), which 
each took up significant parliamentary time, and changed the ways in which privilege 
was viewed and treated.72 Other cases with a wider significance are also identified. 
Particular attention is paid to how participants viewed developments, by using 
contemporary materials, identified below, rather than overemphasising the 
significance of ‘great men’. The third element of the research approach is to provide a 
narrative of the key difficulties in the consolidation, management, and promotion of 
privilege. Arguments and counter-arguments arose between crown and Commons 
over the nature and status of prerogative and privilege. These exposed several issues: 
first, how to balance changing pressures over privileges and prerogatives within a 
supposedly immutable framework; second, how to ensure that both the authority of 
the Commons and the sovereignty of the monarch were respected; and, third, how to 
safeguard the interests of creditors while defending the privileges of members. At the 
same time, consideration has to be given to three broad possibilities. First, did clashes 
over privilege arise because an essentially conservative House of Commons wanted 
simply to keep both privilege and the royal prerogative as they were in 1603? 
                                                
71 The two-way traffic in protests and rejoinders is recorded in G. W. Prothero (ed.), Select 
Statutes and Other Constitutional Documents : Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth 
and James 1, 4th edn. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913), pp. 250-424, passim. 
72 Consideration is given to a smaller number of cases from the Lords, particularly those that 
related to abuses of the ‘protections’ for servants of peers. 
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Alternatively, were a couple of dozen hothead zealots using privilege issues to push 
for a wider set of grievances to be addressed? Or were those hotheads possibly 
articulating views that were actually held by a largely silent majority?  
Reflecting the tensions around privilege in the early Stuart period, the time frame 
for this thesis has been set so as to cover changes between 1603, which saw the 
accession in England of James VI and I, and 1629, which marks the end of the first 
run of Stuart parliaments.73 By the start of this period, the Commons were well on the 
way to evolving into the more important of the two Houses, and conscious of their 
privileges. The Commons were nevertheless generally welcoming of the protestant 
James, with his Tudor ancestry, albeit he had been brought up within a different legal 
and constitutional framework.74 His principal tutor, the historian and humanist 
scholar, George Buchanan, had tried to turn James into a god-fearing, protestant king 
who accepted the limitations of monarchy, as proposed in his treatise, De Jure Regni 
apud Scotos.75 That book, however, was heavily suppressed, and a limitation on his 
powers was certainly not acceptable to the young king. James also had to come to 
terms with a common law system, rather than one based on Roman law, and to 
understand the relative powers and privileges of the sovereign and a bicameral, 
heterogeneous parliament in his new kingdom. In England, he would not be able to 
manage parliament through the Lords of the Articles, who deliberated legislation 
before it reached the full Scottish parliament. He would face reminders that Magna 
Carta included what Carpenter terms a ‘sensational and revolutionary’ security clause 
‘for the observation of the peace and the liberties between king and kingdom’, i.e. 
subordinating the king to the law.76 It set out that the barons could choose twenty-five 
of their number to hold to account the king, his justiciar, bailiffs, and ministers. If the 
king did not redress any offence that was drawn to his attention, the barons and 
                                                
73 Although James I acceded on 24 March 1603, there was an outbreak of plague, so that his 
first parliament only opened on 19 March 1604. 
74 The (undelivered) Apology of 1604 set out that ‘our care is and must be to confirm the love 
and to tie the hearts of your subjects the commons most firmly to your Majesty’: 
Tanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents : James I, p. 230. 
75 George Buchanan, De Jure Regni Apud Scotos... (London: Richard Baldwin, 1689). The 
original Latin version appeared in the 1570s. 
76 David Carpenter, Magna Carta (London: Penguin, 2015), p. 325, p. 31. 
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‘commune of all the land’ could take any of the king’s ‘castles, lands, possessions 
[…] until it is redressed […] saving our person, and those of our queen and our 
children. And when it is redressed they shall obey us as they did before’.77 
The importance of respecting ‘custom’, and an emphasis on the consensual, 
contractual nature of law making, is evident in the tripartite coronation oath taken 
from at least the time of William I onwards: to preserve peace, and protect the church; 
to maintain good laws, and root out bad; and to dispense justice to all. In 1308, 
Edward II swore an additional fourth clause: to protect and strengthen ‘the just laws 
and customs that the community of the realm shall have chosen’.78 Use of the word 
‘customs’ – custumes in the French version, consuetudines in the Latin – strongly 
implies that the solemn oath was, at the very least, safeguarding concessions won 
from the king’s predecessors: an oath from which he could not resile. Despite the 
wishes of the new king for the formation of a single nation of ‘Great Britain’, the 
reality was that his accession simply marked a personal and regal union, not one that 
was corporative. The end of the period for this research is significant, being the point 
when the Commons had the confidence boldly to incite people not to pay duties and 
impositions that had not been given parliamentary authority, resolving, without 
expressed dissent, to make it a capital offence, no less, to propose the levying of non-
parliamentary duties, or to pay such duties willingly. Russell is prepared to concede 
that the closing events of the 1629 parliament were ‘a genuine act of opposition’.79 It 
was certainly the start of a period of personal rule that was to last for more than a 
decade. 
*** *** *** 
There are three main types of primary sources for this period: general collections of 
political and constitutional documents; formal records of debates and privilege cases; 
and personal works, diaries and notes for the period. The first group includes editions 
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by Gardiner;80 Prothero;81 Tanner;82 Adams and Stephens;83 Kenyon;84 Larkin and 
Hughes (relating to proclamations);85 and Coward and Gaunt.86  
Second, the records of debates in the Commons and Lords are primarily 
represented in the journals of both Houses, which were prepared and written up from 
each clerk’s notes at the end of the day. They were published in print form by HMSO 
in 1802, and are now available digitally, through British History Online (IHR). The 
records are complete for the whole period, 1604-29, with the exception of sittings 
from 16 October to 6 November 1610. The Commons’ journals were intended to 
provide a record of the business of the House, so that extraneous matters were either 
not recorded at all, or at best were given brief mention. For example, the gunpowder 
plot of 1605 was initially recorded in a bare two sentences, and the deaths of 
Elizabeth and James I were not included at all. At the start of the Jacobean period, the 
journals give some flavour of what was said, but, as the century progressed, they 
began to provide less detail. This reflected the concern, which arose during the first 
parliament of James I, that matters of privilege, conferences between the two Houses, 
and what was being said in debate, as distinct from the Commons’ decisions, were 
being relayed to the king, particularly by the then clerk, Ralph Ewens.87 As a result, 
oversight of the journals increased: for example, an order was made, in the first 
session of the 1610 parliament, for a committee to oversee the clerk’s books.88 There 
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were similar orders in 1614 and 1621.89 Within this tight control, any alteration was a 
matter of record. So, in 1626, ‘some slip and error in the clerk’s book’ was drawn to 
the attention of the Commons, and an order was made that the oversight committee 
could amend the records.90 The best-known example of outside interference occurred 
in December 1621, when James I tore pages out of the Commons’ Journal, which had 
recorded that the Commons had agreed to submit a Protestation, ‘concerning sundry 
Liberties, Franchises, and Priviledges of Parliament’. The king later gave a qualified 
apology for his actions.91 In 1628, there was a dispute between Commons and Lords, 
over whether the earl of Suffolk had said publicly that John Selden (Ludgershall) 
deserved to be hanged, for erasing an unfavourable record, and for stirring up 
sedition. Despite Suffolk’s denial, the Commons pursued their version of events, 
whereas the Lords asked for the Commons’ journal to be sent up to them. Sir Edward 
Coke (Buckinghamshire) was ‘sent up to the Lords with this Message: That there was 
no Resolution of the House in the Case mentioned; and that the Entry of the Clerk, of 
particular Men’s Speeches, was without Warrant at all Times, and in that Parliament, 
by Order of the House, rejected, and left; and therefore not thought fit to be sent up to 
their Lordships.92 At the same time, it appeared that the Commons wished to satisfy 
themselves, in respect of the Journal: ‘Upon Question, a Committee of Eight to 
survey the Clerk’s Book’.93 
Compensating for these more abbreviated journal entries, several private diaries 
began to include more extensive records of speeches in parliament, which form the 
third group of sources. The writers perhaps wanted to ensure they, or their patrons, 
would still have comprehensive accounts that they could consult. As Kyle has noted, 
parliamentary diaries before the 1620s were ‘few in number and largely 
uncontroversial jottings [which] resembled and closely followed the official 
Commons’ Journal. From the 1620s onwards, the importance of events led to MPs 
seeing themselves as central figures, and the public was hungry for more information, 
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so that diaries were more often political in style, and records of speeches’. There was 
also an implicit relaxation of the ban on any unofficial reporting of proceedings. By 
the 1620s, ‘Parliament played host to a myriad of MPs and peers who wrote as 
"journalists", recorders, and compilers of potentially dangerous information’.94 As 
David L. Smith notes, ‘the diaries (for both Lords and Commons) do not contain 
accurate transcripts of what members said on a given day’. Accounts sometimes differ 
dramatically, reflecting, at least in part, the difficulties of making a contemporaneous 
record, and, in part, the ‘biases, motives and concerns’ of the compiler, as well as 
their attitudes and working methods.95 Care must always be taken that ‘objectivity’ is 
not wrongly ascribed to a source, simply because it is first-hand.96 That said, the 
diaries, some fifty in number for the period, usually provide broadly consistent 
accounts for a particular speech, debate, or resolution for the day in question. At least 
one volume of diaries and records for each of the parliaments from 1604 to 1629 has 
been published at various times from the eighteenth century onwards, with some 
providing the work of a single diarist, others giving transcriptions of several diaries, 
as well as the entries from the official Journal for a particular parliament.97 There 
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was, until recently, a gap in the run of published material, which related to the 1624 
parliament, although the records and diaries began to be published online in 2015.98 
At the time of writing this thesis, it is understood that further material for 1624 will be 
published online and in print form. 
There are, of course, other records of debates and privilege cases, beyond the 
contemporary diaries and official journals, for example, the autobiography and 
correspondence of Sir Simonds D’Ewes, and an edition of some of Sir John Eliot’s 
writings and speeches.99 Our understanding of privilege, as it developed historically 
through to the seventeenth century, is assisted by such sources, and is reflected in this 
research. A much quoted and re-edited work, The Manner of Holding Parliaments in 
England, or Modus Tenendi Parliamentum Apud Anglos, was not a forgery, as 
previously thought, but probably written about 1321, by William Ayermin, who was 
himself almost certainly a clerk to the parliament.100 It was not, however, an authority 
on how to run a parliament, ‘more a manifesto for opponents of Edward II’.101 The 
medieval parliament rolls, available in transcribed, translated, digital form in British 
History Online (BHOL), detail a number of petitions and cases that shaped privilege 
.......................................................................................... 
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and were cited as precedents.102 Kleineke provides the records of many cases that 
arose in the long fifteenth century.103 The accounts by Sir Simonds D’Ewes of the 
Elizabethan parliaments provide valuable information on Tudor thinking and 
precedents.104 In 1625, he came upon ‘an elaborate journal of the parliament held in 
the thirty-fifth year of Queen Elizabeth’, from which he developed his parliamentary 
history of that reign, published in 1682.105 Robert Bowyer, clerk from 1610-1621, 
gave himself the task of bringing ‘order to the parliamentary records, after what he 
called the "negligence" of his predecessors’.106 His successor, Henry Elsynge, was 
clerk from 1621 until 1635, although parliament did not sit after 1629.107 Elsynge 
drew on the Modus for an unfinished treatise on parliamentary procedure, some of 
which may have been prepared by Bowyer, as described in an annotation on the 1768 
copy held in the London Library. Apparently in contemporary handwriting, this sets 
out that: 
Sir Simonds D’Ewes says in the preface to his journal ‘this treatise was compiled 
especially as I conceive by Robt. Bowyer esq clerk of parlt from the 6th to the 18th 
Jac.1 and afterwards enlarged by H. Elsing esq’ and adds in his journal p. 10 ‘first 
confusedly gathered and now lately digested into a methodical treatise’.  
The Preface to this edition sets out that: 
The following treatise was first printed in 1660, several years after the death of the 
author [Elsynge], and evidently from a very incorrect copy. However, such as it was, 
the Public received it so favourably, that is has since been reprinted more than 
once.108  
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William Hakewill was a member of parliament for three Cornish constituencies in the 
parliaments of 1601, 1614 and 1621, and then Amersham, in those of 1624 and 1628. 
He is important for having published, in 1641, a collection of materials on 
parliamentary procedure, which included his own translation of the Modus Tenendi 
Parliamentum.109 During the 1630s, John Rushworth began to document significant 
events, and in 1640, he was appointed clerk-assistant to the House of Commons. 
During the 1650s, he worked on the eight volumes of his Historical Collections,110 a 
documentary history of the civil wars, beginning in 1618, and running through to 
1641, written, he claimed in his preface, without commentary or opinions, ‘a bare 
Narrative of matter of Fact, digested in order of time’.111 An anonymous work, The 
Priviledges and Practice of Parliaments, published in 1628, was a polemical tract that 
traced back the origins of parliament to Saxon times. It defended the Petition of Right, 
as well as setting out that the king could not change the law without the consent of 
parliament, and that the judges were there solely to expound the law.112 This work 
was in turn countered by the much copied A True Presentation of Forepast 
Parliaments to the View of Present Tymes and Posterity, attributed by some to Sir 
John Doddridge, but which was almost certainly written, in about 1628, or 1629, by 
Sir Francis Kynaston (1586/7-c. 1642).113 As Smuts identifies, in this Kynaston 
showed his concern about a growing reverence for the House of Commons, and 
associated disrespect for kingship by many MPs at the time. Kynaston felt that 
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parliament’s proper function was to offer the king advice and assistance on issues that 
the latter put before them. The needs of the king, especially supply, were at the heart 
of parliamentary business – attempts by the lower House to bargain with the king 
were abominable and unjustified, as were the Commons’ pretences (i.e. claims) to 
privileges. Kynaston ‘strenuously objected to the idea that MPs were mainly 
responsible to their "countries" rather than the king, which he thought had spread 
dangerously in recent years’.114 
Some later works are also of value. William Petyt (1641-1707) favoured the 
radical ancient constitutionalist cause during the exclusion crisis, and at the revolution 
of 1688, so that his Jus Parliamentarium, written in 1739, provided a whiggish view 
of the development of parliamentary practice, rights, and liberties.115 Francis Maseres 
(1731-1824) gave a summary of the operation of parliamentary privilege that was 
published in 1764, in the climate of controversy surrounding John Wilkes.116 Sir 
William Blackstone (1723-1780) provided an extended description of the origin and 
nature of ‘privileges, of person, servants, lands and goods; which are immunities as 
antient as Edward the confessor’.117 Hatsell (1733-1820), clerk of the Commons from 
1768 to 1797, commented on individual privilege cases, some of which are 
considered further in chapter four below.118 Thomas Erskine May (1815-1886), later 
lord Farnborough, but usually referred to as ‘Erskine May’, wrote a work on 
parliamentary practices, including privileges, that has been revised many times, and is 
still used as the prime authority within parliament today.119  
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The introductions to the diaries and records of debates provide the editors’ views 
on the parliaments in question.120 Journal articles on individual cases include Bryant 
on what is arguably the earliest recorded case of immunity from arrest,121 Graves on 
the case of lord Cromwell (or Crumwell),122 and Prothero on the case of Sir Thomas 
Shirley.123 As noted earlier, Turberville provided a detailed account of some of the 
specific issues that arose from protecting the servants of members of parliament.124 In 
addition, a few years earlier, Wittke had provided an extended piece on privileges, 
whose main theme was the relation of the law of parliament and privilege, lex et 
consuetudo parliamenti, to the law of the land.125 Chafetz considers privilege cases 
from the early Stuart period within an article that focuses on the Bush 
administration’s politically motivated dismissal of nine United States Attorneys in 
2006.126 He traces the tensions between executive privilege, analogous to prerogative 
in British terminology, and the privileges of the legislature back to a number of 
English cases from the early modern period, including some that are described in this 
thesis, such as those of Ferrers,127 Arundel,128 and Rolle.129 
Available in print, and digitally on subscription, The Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (ODNB) gives the background to the lives of many leading 
figures in the early Stuart parliaments. The History of Parliament (HoP) has provided 
more extensive biographies of all the individual members of parliament, together with 
accompanying surveys, details of constituency representation, and the like. The most 
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significant volumes for this thesis relate to the period 1604-29; these were published 
in 2110, later made available digitally through BHOL, on subscription.130 Other HoP 
volumes cover earlier parliaments, and provide details of cases that were used as 
precedents.131 
*** *** *** 
The research is presented in seven chapters, the first of which provides the 
introduction, including a description of the historiography, the research approach, and 
the more important sources for the period. The next chapter sets the privilege of 
freedom from arrest and the royal prerogative within a historical and constitutional 
context, in order to illustrate how people viewed these two elements at the start of the 
seventeenth century. The development of parliamentary privileges and liberties in the 
English system from the medieval period onwards is traced, to show how these 
elements were initially the means of protecting parliamentarians from outside 
interference or distraction, but then took on a significance of their own. As James I 
and Charles I both asserted that privileges were given form and legitimacy through 
exercise of the royal prerogative, a further section describes the difficulty of defining 
the scope and limitation of that prerogative, and the implications for matters of 
privilege. The third chapter identifies issues from the case of Sir Thomas Shirley, who 
was arrested and detained in 1604 in connection with debt, and whose gaoler resisted 
at some length the orders of the Commons to release Shirley, thereby exposing 
uncertainties across a number of differing strands about the ways privilege operated. 
The fourth chapter looks at a range of privilege cases across the early Stuart 
parliaments, and suggests that these were presented and managed so as to maintain a 
nuanced range of rights, that related not just to the interests of individual members, 
but also reflected wider issues within a changing political and constitutional landscape 
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that the chapter also describes. This provides a framework for consideration, in the 
fifth chapter, of the ways in which debt, outlawry, and bankruptcy were tackled 
within the seventeenth-century legal, financial, and commercial system. The chapter 
also shows how privilege came to be exploited, with abuses sometimes perpetrated by 
a number of members of both Houses, and their ‘servants’. The penultimate chapter 
considers issues from a case at the end of the period – that of John Rolle, whose 
goods had been seized by customs officers, although the Commons saw them as being 
protected through the privilege that Rolle enjoyed as the member for Callington. The 
seventh, concluding chapter draws on the research to propose that the management of 
issues of privilege in the early Stuart period reflected and engendered a greater feeling 
of institutional confidence and importance. Appendices give the details of significant 
privilege cases that occurred before 1603, many of which were cited as precedents in 
the early Stuart parliaments; set out the dates for the early Stuart parliaments; provide 
a chronology for the Shirley case; and summarise the later lives of the members who 
had been arrested after the acrimonious last sitting of the 1629 parliament. 
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II : PRIVILEGES AND PREROGATIVES 
Introduction 
And although we cannot allow of the style, calling it, Your ancient and undoubted 
Right and Inheritance; but could rather have wished, that ye had said, That your 
Priviledges were derived from the grace and permission of our Ancestors and Us; (for 
most of them grow from Precedents, whith shews rather a Toleration than 
Inheritance:) Yet we are pleased to give you our Royal assurance, that as long as you 
contain your selves within the limits of your duty, we will be as careful to maintain 
and preserve your lawful Liberties and Priviledges, as ever any of our Predecessors 
were, nay, as to preserve our own Royal Prerogative. So as your House shall only 
have need to beware to trench upon the Prerogative of the Crown; which would 
enforce us, or any just King, to retrench them of their Priviledges, that would pare his 
Prerogative, and Flowers of the Crown: But of this, we hope, there shall never be 
cause given.1 
This extract from a speech of James I shows how the relative limits of the rights and 
privileges of the Commons, on the one hand, and the powers and prerogatives of the 
crown, on the other hand, could be unclear and sometimes contentious. Uncertainty 
led to threats, fears, claims and counter-claims that grew in intensity throughout the 
early Stuart years.  
Those parliamentary rights and privileges had developed in the English system 
from the medieval period onwards, initially as a means of protecting parliamentarians 
from outside interference or distraction, but had later come to take on a significance 
of their own. The difficulty was that privileges were based on long-standing common 
law, rather than statutes, so that theoretically no change or expansion was possible: 
‘From the fact that the privileges of the two Houses are part of the law of the land, it 
follows […] that neither House can add to, or alter, its privileges by its own 
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resolution. […] However, each House is the sole judge of its privileges’.2 A key issue 
for the Commons was what gave privilege its legitimacy. By the seventeenth century, 
they had come to claim that their privileges were undoubted, and were only the 
subject of a petition to the sovereign at the start of a parliament as a ‘matter of 
manners’. If, however, they were to accept that their privileges might be less than 
undoubted and theirs by right, then they conceded that those privileges could be 
limited, or denied by the king. Yet, James I and Charles I both asserted that privileges 
were indeed only granted through an exercise of the royal prerogative. That royal 
prerogative, like privilege, was also based on common law, and accordingly 
apparently immutable: the crown could not invent new areas of prerogative, although 
they might be adapted to changing circumstances or emergencies. In particular, the 
unwillingness of the Commons to grant supply before grievances were addressed led 
to the privy council endorsing the use of alternative means of raising funds under the 
royal prerogative, some of which were revivals of older, feudal rights, some of which 
relied on a creative interpretation of what the king could do in an ‘emergency’. There 
was a risk for James I and Charles I, which paralleled that of the Commons: if their 
prerogatives, or any novel interpretation of their prerogatives, were successfully 
challenged, then potentially all prerogative powers could be disputed. Further, once a 
prerogative power had been conceded, or allowed to decay, it could not readily be 
revived.3 
Issues of privilege and prerogative, and the tensions between them, are explored 
in this chapter, which is structured, first, to consider the origin, development and 
status of parliamentary privilege, as it was commonly understood – or disputed – at 
the time of James I’s accession. The second main section looks at the origins of royal 
prerogative powers, and the degree to which these powers were accepted or 
challenged at the time, particularly in relation to the assertion and exercise of 
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For example, since 1965 all but three new non-royal peers have been appointed as life 
peers. The exceptions are William Whitelaw, former deputy prime minister; the 
former Speaker, George Thomas; and the former prime minister, Harold Macmillan – 
thereby maintaining the prerogative right to create new hereditary peerages. 
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parliamentary privilege by the Commons. These descriptions provide a context for 
consideration in later chapters of how issues over prerogative, privilege, supply and 
grievances were inter-connected in the early Stuart period and the implications for the 
authority of the Commons and the crown respectively.  
Parliamentary privileges 
This section looks at the development of the parliamentary privilege of freedom from 
molestations (including arrests and detention), from the medieval period onwards, 
through to its position within the general constitutional settlement, as understood by 
people at the start of the seventeenth century. It begins with an exploration of what is 
meant by ‘privilege’ and associated terms, as well as consideration of the purposes of 
parliamentary privilege. This is followed by a description of how privilege was 
established and confirmed, and the three qualifications that affected its application. 
The section ends with an analysis of where people believed privilege to be positioned 
within the constitution at the accession of James I.  
Changes in the meanings of words over time have blurred the respective meanings 
of ‘privilege’, ‘liberties’, or ‘liberty’ in the context of a parliament. One usage is that 
privilege is ‘the set of rights and immunities enjoyed by a legislative body, its 
members, and officers’.4 In that sense, privilege should strictly be limited to the 
freedom from arrest and lawsuits that was afforded to the Commons and their 
servants.5 There are several meanings for liberty or liberties, but care must be taken to 
avoid an anachronistic understanding of an ancient meaning. Today, liberty would 
most often be taken in one of three senses: first, ‘the state or condition of being free’; 
second, ‘freedom from arbitrary, despotic, or autocratic control’; or, third, ‘each of 
those social and political freedoms which are considered to be the entitlement of all 
                                                
4 ‘Privilege’: OED Online. 
5 Peers were free from arrest, but not suits, when parliament was sitting, on the basis that 
commoners might be embarrassed by a lack of funds when resisting a suit, whereas it 
was assumed that ‘1st, peers have sufficient lands whereby they may be distrained 
and brought thereby into court to answer to the plaintiff’s demands; and 2dly, the 
dignity of their persons, which the law will not permit to be degraded by subjecting 
them to common arrests’: Maseres, Cases and Records, p. 4. This indicates that an 
arrest was part of a process to secure settlement of the debt, rather than a punishment. 
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members of a community – a civil liberty’.6 However, the ‘liberties’ claimed by 
Speakers of the House of Commons were meant less in any of those senses, more: ‘a 
privilege, immunity, or right enjoyed by prescription or grant’.7 The medieval 
parliament rolls include both liberties and privileges within set phrases. For example, 
entries for 1459 include in separate places both the Latin, ‘libertates, jura regalia, 
consuetudines, franchesias, immunitates et privilegia [liberties, royal rights, customs, 
franchises, immunities and privileges]’, and the original English, ‘privileges, 
libertees, immunitees and fraunchises’.8 This indicates some nuanced distinctions 
between these terms, although they have often been used interchangeably. Elton 
suggests just such a distinction: 
Privilege, in the legal sense, meant a special protection granted to a person in a court 
of law, and parliamentary privilege meant more particularly the right of every peer, 
knight and burgess (and their servants) to avoid arrest by the order of any court 
inferior to the Parliament, during the time that Parliament was sitting. Liberties, on 
the other hand, a term in later years loaded with principled meaning, at this time [the 
Tudor period] signified protection of the practices which enabled both Houses to 
discharge the functions for which they had been summoned – counselling the Crown 
and conducting legislative business. These were the liberties of the Lords and 
Commons, not the liberties of the subject against whom they might well be asserted. 
Parliamentary privilege had a pre-Tudor history; parliamentary liberties would 
appear to have had virtually none.9  
Certainly, over time, the two terms, liberties and privileges, were conflated into one: 
parliamentary privilege. A parliamentary joint committee report, from 1999, shows 
that the ancient privilege of freedom from arrest, although still claimed by the 
Speaker at the start of a parliament, should not be abused: 
Parliamentary privilege is not a licence for members of Parliament to behave in ways 
                                                
6 ‘Liberty’: OED Online. 
7 Ibid.  
8 RP, V, 345-70: November-December 1459. 
9 G. R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution : Documents and Commentary (Cambridge: UP, 1982), 
p. 260. 
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which are unacceptable to society at large. It has its roots deep in history, and as it has 
developed over the centuries it has in some respects become obscure and uncertain. It 
is full of technicalities.10 
However, in the past at least, if privilege was ‘obscure and uncertain’, this could pose 
a potential risk, for example, if the crown were to dispute, or even withhold, a 
privilege. There were, however, potential counter-difficulties in defining the terms of 
parliamentary privileges too tightly:  
If […] all the privileges of parliament were once to be set down and ascertained, and 
no privilege to be allowed but what was so defined and determined, it were easy for 
the executive power to devise some new case, not within the line of privilege, and 
under pretence thereof to harass any refractory member and violate the freedom of 
parliament. The dignity and independence of the two houses are therefore in great 
measure preserved by keeping their privileges indefinite.11 
Privilege of parliament and freedom from arrest and other legal processes has a long 
history, but probably not as far back as has been implied by writers such as Erskine 
May, who refers to the laws of Ethelbert at the end of the sixth century: ‘If the king 
call his people to him (i.e. in the witena-gemót), and any one does an injury to one of 
them, let him pay fine’.12 Blackstone found that the laws of Edward the Confessor 
included the precept: ‘ad synodos venientibus, sive summoniti sint, sive per se quid 
agendum habuerint, sit summa pax [let there be complete peace for those coming to 
the assemblies, whether summoned, or coming on their own business]’.13 The 
essential premise was that a summons to a medieval parliament had the force of a 
royal command. Attendance at a parliament was therefore the origin of the protection 
of members of the Commons and the Lords, so that they were not molested 
personally, or in the matter of their goods or servants; nor diverted or distracted, on 
                                                
10 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 1999 
Select Committee Report, vol. 3, Written Evidence : Call for Evidence, at 
<http://goo.gl/p2ZCVR>. 
11 Blackstone, Commentaries, I, p. 159. 
12 Thomas Erskine May, A Practical Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage 
of Parliament, 2nd edn. (London: Butterworths, 1851), p. 105. 
13 Blackstone, Commentaries, II, p. 321. 
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their way to or from parliament, or while attending sittings, which at that time 
included the king. Moreover, if any members were impleaded before the courts in 
civil actions, it was equally important to protect them from arrest or imprisonment, 
which would, of course, hinder their attendance at a parliament.14 In addition, 
servants, such as cooks, horse keepers, and the like were needed to meet the personal 
needs of members of both Houses, when travelling to and from parliament, or when 
living in Westminster or wherever else parliament was sitting, so that they in turn 
were not to be arrested or subject to other legal processes. Legal immunity therefore 
ensured that a member or servant: first, was not diverted by being compelled to attend 
other, lower courts as a witness or juror, or as a principal in a case; second, would be 
free from arrest and other legal processes in civil law, including having to answer to 
subpoenas; and, third, could retain his goods and property.15 These protections 
collectively ensured that he was not prevented by parochial distractions from 
attending the Commons.  
 Resistance to subpoenas had a long history, as seen in a complaint, in 1293, that 
one had been served on someone coming to seek redress from Edward I, but that this 
could not apply, as it would be a breach of the privilege of the crown, because the 
man was within the royal palace, as explained by the then lord chancellor, in 1959: 
                                                
14 Implead has two main meanings in a legal context: ‘to sue in a court of law’; and ‘to bring 
(a new party) into an action because he or she is or may be liable to the impleading 
party for all or part of the claim against that party’: Dictionary.com, at 
<http://goo.gl/6Yd0Rh>. Typically, the term arises where a third party is vicariously 
liable for all, or part of, the damages that an original plaintiff may win from the 
original defendant. In 1959, the then lord chancellor pointed out that, by the end of 
the Plantagenet period, the Commons, in addition to establishing that ‘neither they 
nor members of their household can be arrested on civil process during the sitting of 
Parliament, began to assert a claim that they cannot even be impleaded’: Viscount 
Kilmuir, (David Patrick Maxwell Fyfe), The Law of Parliamentary Privilege 
(London: Athlone, 1959), p. 9. 
15 The case of lord Crumwell (or Cromwell) from 1572 showed that the issue of a subpoena 
was not the only ‘legal process’ that might prevent a member of the Commons or 
Lords from undertaking parliamentary duties. Crumwell was accused of not obeying 
a chancery injunction, and was ‘attached, by virtue of a Writ of Attachment, 
proceeding out of the said Court of Chancery, contrary to the ancient Privilege and 
Immunity, Time out of Memory, unto the Lords of Parliament, and Peers of this 
Realm’: Graves, ‘Cromwell’, p. 11. See also Appendix 1, case 17. 
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At one time it was the Crown, not Parliament itself, that required and protected the 
independence of members. But the principle is unchanged – members are there to 
give their counsel for the benefit of the country, originally in the person of the King, 
now including the people and Parliament itself. At no time has privilege been 
accorded as an end in itself.16 
Erskine May notes that the right of MPs to resist subpoenas does not have an 
unbroken history, and cites two cases. The first involved the MP, John Beaumont, 
who had ‘a subpoena served on the Earl of Huntingdon during the Parliament of April 
1554; the Lords sent the writ down to the Commons, who apologized for the offence 
but also argued that it was not a breach of privilege [my emphasis]’. The second case, 
from January 1558, was one where two members were sent to the lord chancellor to 
ask for revocation of a subpoena – showing that at that time a release from a 
subpoena had to be requested through chancery.17 A further case concerned William 
Ward, who seemed to have obtained privilege for himself, ‘without first securing a 
warrant for it from the House of Commons and on 22 Feb. 1552 his misdemeanour 
was referred by the House […] although with what result is not known’.18 In 1621, Sir 
Edward Coke (sitting then for Liskeard) drew on a precedent from 1336-7, when 
observing that, even where the member was represented by an attorney: ‘a subpaena, 
though it restraine not the person, yet because it hinders the service is not to be served 
upon a member of this howse’.19 
Deploying privilege, as a means of securing the attendance of all members, was 
important, not just because the king had summoned the Commons, but also because 
each member was a proxy for everyone in his ‘country’ or town, and expected on 
                                                
16 Kilmuir, Law of Parliamentary Privilege. p. 21. The person who had served the subpoena, 
in a plea that was familiar in other cases, said that he did not ‘understand that he was 
doing anything which might be in any way in breach of the privilege and dignity of 
the crown, and he is prepared to acquit himself in any way it pleases the lord king’: 
RP, Roll 6 (SC 9/6), after Easter 1293. 
17 Thomas Erskine May, A Practical Treatise on the Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage 
of Parliament, 1st edn., (London: Charles Knight, 1844), I, pp. 101-10; Bindoff (ed.), 
Commons 1509-1558, I, p. 406 
18 Bindoff (ed.), Commons 1509-1558, III, p. 547. 
19 Belasyse, fol. 96, in Notestein et al. (eds.), CD 1621, V, p. 162: 13 May 1621; CJ, 1, p. 620: 
14 May 1621. 
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their behalf to raise grievances, and take decisions.20 Electors might, in extremis, take 
a view that any controversial decision did not apply to them, if, through his absence, 
their member had not spoken, or voted on a matter. Bowyer’s diary notes the opinion 
of the committee for privileges: ‘The Lords doe [re]present but themselves, viz. every 
man his owne Person, How great and honorable soever he be, but of the Commons, 
every man is a body Representative, either of a whole County, or a Burrough at 
least’.21 This absolute requirement to attend meant that deaths of sitting members led 
to by-elections. In addition, requests had to be made for leave of absence for the 
Commons, and to arrange proxies for the Lords.22 Despite such strictures, there was a 
longstanding problem with low attendances in James I’s reign, leading to a number of 
messages from the king, and debate in the House as to the most appropriate form of 
action. Beyond a difficulty maintaining the credibility of decisions if few had 
participated in the process, there were two other issues, in relation to absences from 
the Commons. First, the lawyer-members, who were the most frequent absentees, 
tended to be the more learned and experienced members of the House, so that the 
capacity to defuse tensions, and to reach decisions on a considered basis and in line 
with precedents, was affected. This issue was clearly recognised, when in 1614, Sir 
Edward Hoby (Rochester) moved that ‘the Serjeant may go to all the Courts, to move 
them, from the House, to hear those Members of the House, before any other; that so 
they may attend their Service in this House, and yet not lose their Practice’.23 Second, 
the ‘absolute requirement’ for members to attend, unaffected by legal processes and 
other ‘molestation’ of person or goods, through the invocation of parliamentary 
                                                
20 This was argued in the case of William Strickland, who had been sequestered from the 
Commons in 1571. Members then called for his return, because he was not a private 
individual, but specially chosen to represent his area. See Appendix 1, case 16.  
21 Willson (ed.), Bowyer Diary, p. 234, fol. 241: 14 March 1607. 
22 An Act of 1514-15, only repealed in 1993, provided that any of the: ‘Knights, Citizens, 
burgesses & barons […] do nott depart from the same parliament nor absent hym 
selff from the same tyll the same parliament shall be fully fynysshid endyd or 
prorogued, except […having…] lycens of the Speaker and Commons in the same 
parliament’. Infringement would lead to forfeiture of wages ‘for evermore’: An Act 
concerning burgesses of the parliament 1514-15 (6 Hen. VIII c. 16), in John Raithby 
(ed.), Statutes of the Realm ... 6 vols. (London: s.n., 1810-1819), III, p. 134, repealed 
by the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 1993 (Eliz. II c. 50). 
23 CJ, 1, p. 479: 11 May 1614. 
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privilege, would seem less justifiable, if other members were freely absenting 
themselves. It was also felt that allowing a legal process to continue, even through the 
use of attorneys, was still a breach of privilege: ‘No Processe is to be served on any of 
this House, for though his Person be not drawen from his Corporall Attendance: yet 
his minde is withdrawne, whereby the House hath no use of his Presence’.24  
The handling of privilege issues reflected the fact that, from the thirteenth century, 
parliaments were run by and for the monarch, acting directly, or through leading 
figures, such as the lord keeper or the chancellor. The protection of those attending 
parliament was first established through individual cases that then often served as 
precedents. The medieval parliamentary records show that there were a number of 
petitions to the king to correct directly any matter that hindered the attendance of an 
individual at a parliament, for example, because he was ‘molested’ when travelling 
there. There were also more generic petitions that the king should act to eliminate 
infringements of privilege. Both can be seen in petitions in the 1403-04 parliament for 
the privilege of freedom from arrest and imprisonment, and freedom from molestation 
and assaults.25 The first petition noted that ‘according to the custom of the realm’ 
those coming to a parliament, and their servants, ‘ought not to be arrested or in any 
way imprisoned in the meantime for any debt, account, trespass or other contract of 
any kind’ when going to or from a parliament. The petition asked that any who did 
carry out an arrest ‘should pay a fine and redemption to you and give the injured party 
his damages threefold’.26 The king’s response was that ‘there is a sufficient remedy 
for this case’, which, Roskell et al. suggest, ‘while not overtly repudiating the 
Commons’ claim, can hardly be said to have reinforced the privilege’.27 The second, 
more specific petition, followed an attack on Sir Thomas Brooke’s menial servant, 
                                                
24 Willson (ed.), Bowyer Diary, p. 175, fol. 200: 19 May 1606. 
25 There is a distinction: ‘To be arrested, is to be taken by the officers, by process, or 
otherwise; to be detained in prison, is either to be detained after an arrest, or after a 
commitment from the bar of some court, which is never called an arrest, although in 
truth it be one’. Identical definitions are found in Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 21; 
and Tyrwhitt (ed.), Manner of Holding Parliaments (Elsynge), p. 217. 
26 RP, III, 541, 71: January-March 1404. 
27 Roskell et al. (eds.), Commons 1386-1421, I, p. 151. This case was cited in the Lords, in 
1626, in a debate on the privilege of freedom from arrest for peers: LJ, 3, p. 559: 
18 April 1626. 
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Richard Cheddar, who had been ‘horribly beaten, wounded, blemished and maimed 
by one John Salage otherwise called John Savage’.28 The Commons petitioned for the 
drastic punishment of anyone who assaulted those who were entitled to privilege, and 
asked that they should not be pardoned subsequently. Henry IV broadly accepted the 
petition, and a statute was passed shortly afterwards, whose provisions were to apply 
‘in Time to come in like Case’.29 There were further entries in the Parliament Rolls, 
in 1432,30 1433,31 and 1446.32 There must have been regular petitions and statutes, to 
support Hatsell’s observation that:  
Notwithstanding these repeated Acts of Parliament to secure the Members of both 
Houses from any insults on their persons, such was the licentiousness of the times, or 
rather, so slow and ineffectual were the remedies given by these laws, that in a very 
few years the Commons again apply to the King for farther provisions to suppress this 
very dangerous practice.33 
According to Roskell et al., the privilege of freedom from arrest and imprisonment 
seems to have been invoked infrequently between 1429 and 1478: 
We may reasonably assume, therefore, that in occasionally asking for this particular 
privilege to be allowed the Commons were only promoting some ‘special petition’ 
made to them in the first place by the Member concerned […] Certainly, enough 
MPs were involved as defendants in the courts at Westminster […] to have benefited 
from the privilege. But however valuable it may have been for individuals, freedom 
from arrest or imprisonment was especially important in expediting the general 
business of Parliament, by ensuring the constant attendance of Members.34 
Kleineke records twenty-nine cases from 1411 to 1489, with writs and petitions 
requesting the release of members or servants, with the same formula more or less 
                                                
28 See Appendix 1, case 3. 
29 Assaulting servants of knights of parliament 1403/4 (5 Hen. IV c. 6), in Raithby (ed.), 
Statutes of the Realm, II, p. 144. 
30 Roskell et al. (eds.), Commons 1386-1421, I, pp. 148-51; RP, IV, 404: May to July 1432. 
31 RP, IV, 453 November-December 1433. 
32 RP, V, 111: March 1446; Appendix 1, case 5. 
33 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 27. 
34 Roskell et al. (eds.), Commons 1386-1421, I, p. 155. 
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repeated in each. Over time, the king became less involved in individual cases, 
responsibility being devolved to chancery, and, still later, to the Commons 
themselves. Similarly, requests at a more general level were refined down to 
formulaic ‘petitions’ by the Speaker at the start of a parliament, for confirmation of 
privileges that were increasingly characterised as ‘ancient’ and ‘undoubted, and an 
equally formulaic expression of royal consent, which was often signified by the lord 
keeper or lord chancellor, rather than the sovereign in person.35 
By the time of the Shirley case in the early seventeenth century, the Commons 
looked to six particular precedents to guide their decisions: three medieval precedents 
were those of William Larke (1430), Walter Clerk (1460) and William Hyde (1474); 
three Tudor cases related to Edward Smalleye, or Smalley (1575/6), William Hogan 
(1601) and Anthony Curwen (1601).36 William Larke was an MP’s servant who had 
been unjustly accused by one Margery Janyns, but, on advice, the king consented to 
Larke’s release. The consent made it clear that Janyns should have execution of the 
judgment she had obtained against Larke after the end of the parliament’.37 Walter 
Clerk had been imprisoned in the Fleet for multiple debts and transgressions, 
including ‘a riot’ and ‘trespass’, and outlawed at the suit of John Payne. The issue for 
the Commons was the delay to its business; as they were to do in the later case of 
Hyde, they successfully petitioned the king to have Clerk freed: ‘so that the said 
Walter may attend this your parliament daily, as it is his duty to do’ [my emphasis]. 
The Commons conceded that Clerk’s liabilities remained, and that he could be 
rearrested when his privilege ended, ‘as if the same Walter had never been arrested at 
any time for any of the things stated or committed to ward’.38 The third case affected 
William Hyde, who successfully applied for an action for debt to be stayed until the 
end of the parliament. This was again based on the assumption that all those 
summoned to a parliament had to be present if it were to transact its business.39 All 
                                                
35 As in the exchanges at the opening of parliament in 2015: see pp. 12f. above. 
36 CJ 1, p. 173: 16 April 1604; CJ, 1, p. 195: 2 May 1604. See pp. 91f. and p. 103 below. The 
cases are described more fully in Appendix 1, cases 4, 7, 9, and 18, 23, 24. 
37 Editorial notes in relation to RP, IV, 357-8: January-February 1430. 
38 RP, V-373, col. b, 9: October 1460. 
39 RP, VI, 156, 55: after June 1474: Third Roll. 
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three medieval precedents saw privilege being granted, but allowed the legal 
processes to be taken up again by creditors after the parliament was over. They also 
indemnified the sheriff and officers against actions for vicarious liability to the 
creditor. In Smalley’s case, the ‘the principle was established that the House might 
discipline, as well as protect, the servants of its Members’.40 Hogan was arrested for a 
debt, but claimed privilege as a servant of the queen. He was released, but the Lords 
ordered that ‘the Warden of the Fleete should be free from any Trouble, Damage, or 
Molestation, for Discharge of the said William Hogan’. Curwen was a servant, 
actually a solicitor, to William Huddleston, who was arrested for non-payment of a 
long-standing surgeon’s bill. He protested to the arresting serjeant that he was 
privileged by virtue of his master’s membership of the Commons; however, the 
creditor and arresting serjeant rejected this claim, in the kind of dismissive terms that 
occurred in other cases.41 There was a possibility that if the serjeant freed Curwen, he 
could find himself vicariously liable for the debt, so that he understandably kept 
Curwen in custody. Although the Commons were sympathetic to his difficulty and 
discharged him, they ordered the creditor to pay a fine for his contempt of the 
privilege of the House. There was then a debate whether Curwen should indeed be 
privileged, as he had been arrested on an execution, not mesne process, but in the end, 
it was felt that the precedents supported him being granted privilege.42 
                                                
40 Hasler (ed.), Commons 1558-1603, II, p. 241. 
41 For example, in the Shirley case: see p. 90 below; or when a common informer said that ‘he 
cared not a fart for the Parliament’: see p. 135 below.  
42 Mesne process is ‘any process issued between original and final process; that is, between 
the original writ and the execution’: Legal Dictionary : The Free Dictionary at 
Farlex, at <http://goo.gl/z3x5lQ>. Execution is ‘the act of carrying into effect the 
final judgment of a court. The writ which authorizes the officer so to carry into effect 
such judgment is also called an execution’: ibid., at <http://goo.gl/HYl91J>. In the 
medieval period, if the prisoner was held in execution, not on mesne process, ‘it was 
necessary to have an Act of Parliament to save to the parties a right of a new 
Execution after the time of Privilege’: Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 46. The 
distinction between arrests on mesne process and those on an execution was regularly 
considered in Commons proceedings over privilege in the early Stuart period. In 
1604, the Privilege of Parliament Act established that MPs held in prison on an 
execution could benefit from parliamentary privilege. In 1625, the Commons 
declared that anyone who was ‘in execution’ for debt could not serve in parliament: 
Sommerville, The Liberties of the Subject, p. 61. 
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For most medieval cases, the records show that the Commons petitioned the king 
for a writ of parliamentary privilege to be issued for a member, or his servant, and this 
was generally processed without dispute. However, four applications were denied, 
and four applicants were not released from arrest, at least initially, despite writs for 
such release having been issued.43 A key change took place in the Tudor period, when 
jurisdiction over privilege cases was transferred from the king in parliament 
(effectively chancery), to the Commons themselves. The case of Ferrers, who was 
freed in 1542 through the mace alone, marked a significant point in this 
development.44 By the seventeenth century, a number of procedures had been 
developed to cover various kinds of privilege situations. The process used to pre-empt 
freedom from arrest or detention was that a member, or someone considered to be a 
member’s servant, could obtain a warrant from the Speaker, which safeguarded the 
person until parliament was dissolved. However, in the early part of the seventeenth 
century, perhaps as early as 1611, a crucial change occurred, whereby a servant of a 
member of either House could be issued with a written protection certificate, signed 
by the master.45 Where a member was summoned to a court as witness or juror in a 
case, the Speaker would write to the justices of the particular assize, to excuse the MP 
from attendance there. In cases where a member had actually been arrested or 
imprisoned, another MP would raise the matter in the Commons, and privilege was 
usually granted immediately, often accompanied by an order that the ‘delinquents’ 
who had procured and made the arrest were to appear before the Commons, or the 
matter was referred to the committee for privileges. The privilege was not, however, 
always endorsed; in 1552, Hugh Lloyd was ordered to meet his obligations:  
It is considered that Hugh Lloyd [...] should be put from the Priviledge, and […] that 
when he had satisfied his Creditors, he should be delivered from the Counter to the 
                                                
43 Kleineke, Parliamentarians at Law, especially pp. 40-41, and pp. 70-91. 
44 See Appendix 1, case 13. 
45 Turberville, ‘Protection of Servants of Members’; see also pp. 179ff. below. 
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Serjeant of the House and discharged of imprisonment there, notwithstanding an 
action laid upon him in London, after his first imprisonment.46 
That privilege extended not just to the servants of members of both Houses, but also 
the servants of parliamentary officers. For example, in 1532, the cook of the Inner 
Temple was able to avoid arrest for debt, because he served the Speaker of that year’s 
parliament.47  
There were three qualifications to freedom from arrest. First, privilege did not 
apply if the arrest was for treason, felony, or breach of the peace, which were offences 
directly affecting the crown, and therefore had precedence over parliamentary 
privileges, which were themselves ‘granted’ through the royal prerogative. This 
qualification was generally understood and accepted. So, in 1593, John Brograve 
noted that ‘in cases of felony a man could not have priviledge though sedente 
Parliamento’.48  
The second qualification was that freedom from arrest, and enjoyment of goods 
were limited, to ‘all the time that they were on their way to the place of parliament, all 
the time of the session, and all the time that they were home again’ – eundo, sedendo, 
redeundo.49 Before the seventeenth century, there was uncertainty about the length of 
time to be allowed for privilege before and after a parliament. According to Anson, 
the convention grew up that the privilege extended for forty days either side of a 
parliament. This would protect the member for the likely maximum period of any 
journey to or from parliament on medieval roads or waterways. It was also the period 
                                                
46 Anon., The Orders, Proceedings, Punishments and Priviledges of the Commons House of 
Parliament in England (London: s.n., 1641), ch. XV. 
47 Allen D. Boyer, Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Age (Stanford (CA): UP, 2003), 
p. 31. 
48 T. E. Hartley, Proceedings in the Parliaments of Elizabeth I (Leicester: UP, 1995), p. 164. 
The distinction between felonies and misdemeanours finally came to an end in 1967 
in England and Wales, when legislation abolished felonies, and stated that all former 
felonies would be tried according to the rules of procedure and evidence that applied 
in trials and pre-trial hearings for misdemeanours: Criminal Law Act 1967 (Eliz. II 
c. 58). 
49 William John Thoms, The Book of the Court ... 2nd. edn., (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1844), 
p. 188.  
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included in the old notice of summons required in Magna Carta, article 14.50 There 
was a gradual shift downwards from the supposed limit of forty days, so that sixteen 
days later became the settled norm, as seen in the case of Sir Vincent Skinner 
(Preston), who was arrested by the sheriff of Middlesex on the sixteenth day after the 
end of the fourth session of James I’s first parliament. When parliament resumed, in 
October 1610, Skinner’s case soon led to a debate about the extent of privilege before 
and after sittings: 
And so after the question asked generally, whether the privilege of parliament did 
extend the 16 days and no more, and then whether all executions subsequent ought to 
be discharged by the privilege. Twas particularly demanded whether Sir Vincent 
Skinner should have his privilege allowed and ’twas granted. And so by habeas corpus 
the next day he was brought and delivered and the sheriff discharged because, 
although he ought to take notice of the privilege of the House, yet it being doubtful to 
ourselves and we having no precedent where the privilege had been allowed for 
16 days though for 14 days there was a precedent shown in Brereton’s case, and the 
general conceived opinion was of 16 days.51 
These findings were cited in 1625: ‘the priviledge of Parliament is 16 dayes before 
the sittinge, and 16 dayes after the end of itt’.52 This was again confirmed in 1640: 
‘that every Member of this House had Privilege for Sixteen Days, exclusive, and 
Fifteen Days, inclusive, before the Beginning and Ending of every Parliament’.53 
The third qualification related to servants: whether travelling to or from 
parliament or attending sittings, members of both Houses were entitled to have a full 
complement of servants, who could also claim privilege. The qualification was that 
they had to be ‘necessary’ or ‘menial’ servants, whom his master specially ‘caused to 
                                                
50 Sir William Reynell Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, ed. Sir Arthur 
Berriedale Keith, 4th edn., 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1935), I (Parliament), p. 165; 
Carpenter, Magna Carta, p. 45. 
51 BL, Add. 48119, in Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610, II, pp. 307-08: 30 October 1610. Roger 
Brereton (Flint) had been arrested a few days after the adjournment of November 
1605: Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, III, p. 299. 
52 BL Add. 48091 (Yelverton 100), fol. 6r: Record of Parliament: 23 June 1625. 
53 CJ, 2, p. 10: 24 April 1640. 
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use and employ’ during the sessions of parliament.54 The term ‘servant’ is generally 
used in all the contemporary documents, but is perhaps misleading. We might today 
use the terms, ‘member of staff’, or ‘colleague’, as servants were not only cooks, 
horse keepers, and the like, but came to include gentlemen who were part of the client 
network of medieval and early modern men, as well as people who did not attend the 
MP directly, such as farm bailiffs. For example, John Arundell of Trerys was 
described in a writ of parliamentary privilege of 1431 as a ‘knight, servant and 
familiar’ of Humphrey, duke of Gloucester, although we know that Arundell was of 
higher status than a ‘menial’ servant, having been sheriff of Cornwall from 1420-22, 
and that he would become a member for Cornwall in 1427 and 1432.55 Arundell’s 
status illustrates a continuing difficulty in deciding who was protected as a ‘servant’ 
of a magnate-peer, who might have hundreds of servants, most of whom could not 
remotely be deemed ‘necessary’ for the peer’s parliamentary functions and journeys. 
Although the peer might not even personally know such ‘servants’, they could, so it 
was felt, still claim privilege. As noted above, there was a procedural change in the 
early part of James I’s reign to the way in which protections for servants were 
established; this development, and its potential for abuse, is explored more fully in 
chapter five below. Even with these three qualifications, the key effect of the privilege 
during the early modern period was to provide protection from legal entanglements, 
including processes to recover debts. 
The following paragraphs locate privilege within the overall constitutional 
settlement, as it developed into the beginning of the seventeenth century. An 
important element was a refinement and formalisation of Speakers’ requests of the 
sovereign at the start of a parliament. Although commentaries cannot be relied on to 
give authoritative first dates for requests or claims for privileges, it is clear that 
Speakers came to include petitions in their first speeches on taking office that were, at 
first, personal to the Speaker, and later included requests on behalf of the Commons 
                                                
54 Menial derives from ‘post-classical Latin menialis, domestic, relating to the household’: 
OED Online. 
55 TNA KB145/4/6/9, Writ of parliamentary privilege: 28 January 1431, in Kleineke, 
Parliamentarians at Law, pp. 34-35, and p. 389. Arundell’s privilege related to his 
service to Gloucester, rather than his own status as an MP. 
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as a body. So, in 1378, Sir James Pickering made his ‘protestation’ to Richard II that 
he should be forgiven for any personal transgressions. In respect of the Commons as a 
whole, however, he did not make any general requests for privileges, such as freedom 
from arrest or freedom of speech.56 Indeed, it was quite possible for a Speaker himself 
to be imprisoned for speaking his mind too freely in parliament, as had happened to 
Pickering’s predecessor, Sir Peter de la Mare.57 In the next reign, Thomas Chaucer 
made a similar request, which received a guarded response from Henry IV: 
The speaker asked that he might speak under protestation. To which the king granted 
that he might speak under such protestation as other speakers had done before him in 
the time of his noble progenitors and ancestors, and in his own time, but not 
otherwise, because he did not under any circumstances wish to have any kind of 
novelty in this parliament, but he wished to be and to remain entirely in his liberties 
and franchises and also at liberty to the same extent as his other said progenitors or 
ancestors had been at any time in the past.58 
Moving through to the Tudor period, Thomas More, as Speaker of the Commons in 
April 1523, petitioned Henry VIII, represented by Cardinal Wolsey, in two areas: the 
first was to excuse himself if he misrepresented the Commons to the king.59 More 
then rehearsed that members of the Commons differed in character and ability, and 
were not all equally careful in their speech, sometimes being more concerned with its 
content than its formulation. Fearful of any consequent royal displeasure against the 
bold or rash, it might be that men would not speak up, so that More petitioned the 
king for liberty of speech. Neale points out that More ‘is not asking, not dreaming of 
asking, that members shall be allowed "to frame a form of Relligion, or a state of 
gouernement as tho their idel braynes shall seeme meetest" ’.60 A request by Sir 
                                                
56 RP, III, 34: October 1378. 
57 James Alexander Manning, The Lives of the Speakers of the House of Commons ... 
(London: Willis, 1851), p. 3. 
58 RP, IV, 648: November 1411. 
59 Manning, Lives of the Speakers, p. 156. 
60 J. E. Neale, ‘The Commons’ Privilege of Free Speech in Parliament’, in E. B. Fryde and 
Edward Miller (eds.), Historical Studies of the English Parliament (Cambridge: UP, 
[footnote continues ...] 
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Thomas Moyle appears in the records for 1542: ‘Postremo, supplicavit Regie 
Majestati, "Ut in dicendis Sententiis quivis libere et impune eloqui posset quid Animi 
habereti" ’ [‘Lastly, he petitioned his royal majesty "that in debate, anyone might 
freely express his opinion and judgement" ’]. In the same occasion, freedom of debate 
was granted conditionally: ‘Postremo, honestam dicendi Libertatem non negare 
Regiam Majestatem [Lastly, his royal majesty does not deny honestly expressed 
freedom of speech]’ [my emphasis].61 As the century proceeded, the Speaker moved 
from a request simply for immunity for himself, to making a wider request for the 
liberties of the House. D’Ewes records the request of Sir Thomas Gargrave in 1559, 
which provides evidence that requests were now made ‘in the usual form’, and also 
that a request for freedom from arrest ‘in former times hath always been accustomed’: 
And lastly, he came, according to the usual Form, first to desire Liberty of access for 
the House of Commons to the Queen’s Majesties presence, upon all Urgent and 
Necessary Occasions. Secondly, that if in any thing [he] himself should mistake, or 
misreport, or over-slip that which should be committed unto him to declare, that it 
might, without prejudice to the House, be better declared, and that his unwilling 
Miscarriage therein might be pardoned. Thirdly, that they might have Liberty and 
freedom of Speech in whatsoever they Treated of, or had occasion to propound and 
debate in the House. The fourth, and last, that all the Members of the House, with 
their Servants and necessary Attendants, might be exempted from all manner of 
Arrests and Suits, during the continuance of the Parliament, and the usual space, both 
before the beginning, and after the ending thereof, as in former times hath always 
been accustomed. 
The ‘royal answer’ was to grant the requests, with conditions, including the 
admonition in respect of the last that: ‘great heed would be taken, that no evil 
disposed person seek of purpose that priviledge for the only defrauding of his 
.......................................................................................... 
1970), 147-76, p. 158. The internal quotation is from the lord keeper’s speech in 
1593. 
61 LJ, 1, p. 167: 20 January 1542. 
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Creditors, and for the maintenance of injuries and wrongs’.62 By this time, the 
liberties and privileges of the Commons were shaped by custom and procedures, and 
it was during the long reign of Elizabeth that privilege was carefully positioned within 
constitutional arrangements that were understood by queen and Commons alike. The 
Elizabethan settlement was one where the sovereign enjoyed prerogative rights, and 
the right to determine policy. Although not required to put selected matters before 
parliament, the polity worked more smoothly when she did. Elizabeth’s main concern 
was to avoid according rights to parliament that might be turned against her: freedom 
of speech in debate was restricted to matters that had been properly put before 
parliament by the crown, rather than a free-for-all, in which the policies and decisions 
of the monarch might be debated, or criticised.63 By 1593, the question of freedom of 
speech was as much a matter of assertion as before, when the lord keeper returned to a 
well-trodden path in his response: 
The Queen answereth, Liberty of Speech is granted you; but how far this is to be 
thought on: […] Priviledge of Speech is granted; but you must know what Priviledge 
you have, not to speak every one what he listeth, or what cometh in his brain to utter, 
but your Priviledge is to say Yea or No.  
He went on to caution the Speaker not to receive any bills ‘which will meddle with 
reforming of the Church, and transforming of the Commonwealth’.64 To agree to 
privileges that enhanced the status and efficiency of the parliament was a wise policy, 
and the privilege of freedom from arrest was not a challenge per se to the royal 
authority. For their part, since privilege theoretically admitted no novelty, as it drew 
its very legitimacy from the past, the Commons assiduously searched for precedents 
                                                
62 Sir Simonds D’Ewes, The Journals of All the Parliaments During the Reign of Queen 
Elizabeth : Journal of the House of Lords (London: Paul Bowes, 1682; repr. 
Shannon, Ireland: Irish UP, 1973), pp. 16-17: 28 January 1559. 
63 This qualification on freedom of speech was a recurring theme, as seen in messages from 
Elizabeth I in 1559, 1571 and 1585: ibid., p. 17; ibid., Speech of Sir Nicholas Bacon, 
p. 151: 29 May 1571; William Fitzwilliam: Northants Record Soc, Fitzwilliam of 
Milton Papers, 2, in J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and Her Parliaments, 1584-1601 
(London: Cape, 1957), p. 435. 
64 Heywood Townshend, Historical Collections... (London: T. Basset, 1680), pp. 37-38: 
19 February 1593. 
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that might be relevant in particular privilege cases, in order to maintain, and 
sometimes to stretch, parliamentary dignity and authority. 
As Speakers’ petitions were routinely granted, albeit sometimes accompanied by 
warnings, by the seventeenth century the Commons came to think that customary 
privileges and liberties had become theirs by right. So, Elsynge notes: ‘The Commons 
ever enjoyed those priviledges which the Speaker now petitions for, though never 
desired by any of the antient speakers, until after the sixth year of King Hen. 8 [Sir 
Thomas Neville, 1515]’.65 He goes on to identify that a claim for freedom from arrest 
‘was never made until of late years, yet this priviledge did ever belong to the Lords 
and Commons, and to their servants also, coming to the Parliament, staying there, and 
returning home’.66 We can see these traditional requests by Speakers throughout the 
period. An example from 1624 is typical: Sir Thomas Crew’s (Aylesbury) long 
encomium on James I ended with the customary request for privileges, alongside 
equally traditional assertions of obedience, humility, and loyalty to the majesty of the 
sovereign. The lord chancellor, having conferred with the king, responded with what 
became a familiar set response: ‘And now, Mr. Speaker, what Liberties, Privileges, 
and Access, was ever yielded to any of your Predecessors, His Majesty now granteth 
it fully and freely, without the least Jealousy or Diminution’.67 This speech reflects 
the position of both James I and Charles I: that they confirmed and granted existing 
privileges, through the royal prerogative. The following section, therefore, looks at 
the origins and deployment of royal prerogative powers, and the degree to which 
these were accepted or challenged by contemporaries, particularly in relation to the 
exercise of parliamentary privilege. 
Prerogative powers 
This section considers the royal prerogative, from which parliamentary privileges and 
liberties were supposedly derived. It begins by looking at some definitions, and goes 
on to outline the main areas in which the prerogative operated, inasmuch as these 
                                                
65 Tyrwhitt (ed.), Manner of Holding Parliaments (Elsynge), p. 175. 
66 Ibid., p. 184. 
67 LJ, 3, pp. 212, 213: 21 February 1624. 
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impinged on privilege. The difficulty of delimiting the royal prerogative led to many 
questions being posed in the early Stuart period: what powers did exist definitively, 
by custom, or through the common law? What might be done legitimately, without 
the authority of an Act of Parliament? Was the royal prerogative increasingly 
encroaching on the ‘liberty’ of the subject? There was also a longstanding fear of 
tyranny and absolutism: might confirmation of parliamentary privileges be withheld 
through a negative exercise of the royal discretion? Alternatively, had privileges now 
taken on a life of their own, as it were, so that they were characterised as ‘ancient’ and 
‘undoubted’, and hence no longer dependent on the yea or nay of a king?68 Two 
concerns emerged that are relevant for this thesis: first did the Commons’ privileges 
only exist by virtue of a grant through the royal grace; and, second, was the royal 
prerogative being redefined and expanded, at the possible expense of parliamentary 
privileges and liberties, for example in the raising of finance through extra-
parliamentary means? 
A recent parliamentary select committee report reflects the difficulty of describing 
and defining the royal prerogative: 
The exact limits of the prerogative cannot be categorically defined […] There is no 
single accepted definition of the prerogative. It is sometimes defined to mean all the 
common law, ie non-statutory powers, of the Crown. An alternative definition is that 
the prerogative consists of those common law powers and immunities which are 
peculiar to the Crown and go beyond the powers of a private individual e.g. the 
power to declare war as opposed to the normal common law power to enter a 
contract. Whichever definition is used there is no exhaustive list of prerogative 
                                                
68 Certainly, developments in the United Kingdom have led parliament, rather than the 
monarch, to possess a legislative authority today which is unlimited by law, ‘and 
remains a fundamental part of the contemporary UK constitution’, even if ‘many 
scholars [are] increasingly convinced that the rule of law and basic human rights are 
too valuable to remain subject to the will of an elected legislature’: Michael Gordon, 
Parliamentary Sovereignty in the UK Constitution: Process, Politics and Democracy 
(Oxford: Hart, 2015), p. 2. In 2015, the government controversially signalled its 
intention to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 (Elizabeth II c. 42), on the grounds 
that it compromises the supremacy and sovereignty of the UK Parliament. 
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powers. Some have fallen out of use altogether, probably forever – such as the power 
to press men into the Navy.69 
That difficulty is not new, and different suggestions have been made over the years, 
including that of Cowell in the early seventeenth century: 
Prerogative of the king (prærogative regis) is that especial power, pre-eminence, or privilege 
that the king hath in any kind, over and above other persons, and above the ordinary 
course of the common law, in the right of his crown … there is not one [regality] that 
belonged to the most absolute prince in the world which doth not belong also to our 
king […] only by the custom of this kingdom he maketh no laws withough the 
consent of the three estates, though he may quash any law concluded of by them’.70 
Dicey saw the royal prerogative as ‘the discretionary authority of the executive’, 
which is everything that the king or his servants can do without the authority of an 
Act of Parliament.71 In 1610, however, the Case of Proclamations established that 
‘the King hath no prerogative, but that which the law of the land allows him’.72 
Another formulation has it that, in essence, the royal prerogative is ‘the legal exercise 
of royal authority’, in three forms.73 First, there are the special privileges accorded to 
the king in the law courts, which include creating judges, pardoning criminals through 
the royal grace, making charters, and awarding honours.74 Charles I used one feature 
                                                
69 House of Commons Select Committee on Public Administration, Memorandum from the 
Treasury Solicitor’s Department: The Royal Prerogative, in www.parliament.uk (UK 
Parliament, 2004), at <http://goo.gl/6OgHjB>, §1-3. 
70 James Cowell, The Interpreter, (Cambridge: 1607), in Coward and Gaunt (eds.), English 
Historical Documents, p. 407. 
71 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 9th edn., 
(London: Macmillan, 1945), p. 420. ‘Dicey’, whose first edition was published in 
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72 England and Wales High Court (King’s Bench Division) Decisions, Case of 
Proclamations: [1610] EWHC KB J22 77 ER 1352, (1611) 12 Co Rep 74, in England 
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73 Margaret Atwood Judson, The Crisis of the Constitution : An Essay in Constitutional and 
Political Thought in England, 1603-1645 (New Brunswick (NJ): Rutgers UP, 1949), 
p. 23. 
74 General pardons were routinely granted at the end of a parliament (but not to recusants): 
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of this element of the royal prerogative, in an attempt to neutralise opposition to 
Buckingham and himself. The prerogative allowed him to ‘prick off’ (name) someone 
as sheriff, who was required to remain within the physical limits of his shrievalty, 
unless he had royal permission to depart. This reflected the fact that, from 1403, the 
writ of summons had included a nolumus clause that disbarred sheriffs from election 
to parliament for the county of their shrievalty.75 The Commons had further decided, 
in 1614, that a sheriff might not sit, even if he was elected for a different bailiwick to 
the one where he was sheriff.76 In 1625, Charles decided to use these provisions to 
sideline ‘sticklers in the last Parliament’, who were opponents of the duke of 
Buckingham, not by arresting them, but by pricking them off as sheriffs, which he 
was perfectly entitled to do. Those who were chosen in this way included Sir Francis 
Seymour, Sir Edward Coke,77 Sir Thomas Wentworth, Walter Long,78 and Sir Robert 
Phelips.79 This desire to dampen opposition down had the opposite effect, the 
Commons being enraged by the crude manoeuvre that had been intended to prevent 
key members playing a part in the 1626 parliament.80 
.......................................................................................... 
see Cynthia Herrup, ‘Negotiating Grace’, in Thomas Cogswell, Richard Cust, and 
Peter Lake (eds.), Politics, Religion and Popularity in Early Stuart Britain : Essays in 
Honour of Conrad Russell (Cambridge: UP, 2002), 124-40. 
75 Nolumus means ‘we do not want’. The advancement of personal cases led to lawyers being 
specifically debarred from membership of the Commons in 1372, under a nolumus 
clause: Alpheus Todd, The Practice and Privileges of the Two Houses of Parliament 
(Toronto (ONT): Rogers & Thompson, 1840), xvi. Sheriffs were similarly 
disqualified from 1403. The St. Albans chronicler sarcastically commented that the 
1404 parliament was accordingly called ‘under a new style of writ, namely that no 
knights or citizens who knew anything about the law of the realm should be elected, 
but that they should be entirely unlearned (omnino illiterati); as a result of which this 
parliament was subsequently, and deservedly, given the name of the Unlearned 
Parliament (Parliamenti Illiterati)’: Annales, 391, in RP, Henry IV, October 1404, 
n. 6. 
76 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, pp. 55-56. 
77 Coke, who had been pricked as sheriff for Buckinghamshire, tried to circumvent the matter 
by contriving his election for Norfolk, despite the Commons’ decision of 1614: ibid., 
I, p. 71. This served no purpose, as it was clear a sheriff was not entitled to sit for any 
constituency. 
78 Similarly, Long procured his election for Bath, despite having been pricked as sheriff for 
Wiltshire: Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, p. 159. 
79 Ibid., VI, p. 288; III, p. 587; VI, p. 710; V, p. 159; V, p. 696. 
80 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, l. 
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Second, there are prerogatives that remain in respect of the king as chief feudal 
lord, even though many of the crown’s feudal rights had died out by the early 
fourteenth century. The capacity to raise money through the feudal system, 
particularly fees paid by an heir when inheriting property or land, was in effect 
superseded by votes from parliament of subsidies,81 or a grant of a fifteenth or tenth82 
of each secular subject’s income, granted singly, in multiples, or as fractions. 
Although medieval monarchs had been expected to ‘live off their own’, i.e. the 
income from the royal estates and feudal dues, as well as traditional ‘great customs’, 
from at least the fourteenth century, parliament had had to grant additional sums on an 
increasing scale, as such traditional royal incomes did not keep place with inflation.83 
The costs of any war naturally added to the requirement for such parliamentary 
grants, possibly up to as much as £1 million a year.84 Up to the time of Charles I, the 
Commons usually granted the sovereign multiples of subsidies, fifteenths and tenths, 
and the right to collect tonnage and poundage.85 In 1610, Salisbury tried, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to secure the ‘Great Contract’, whereby the king would be granted a 
regular supply of £200,000 per year, from land tax and excise, in return for his 
surrender of prerogative rights, including impositions. In the end, however, there was 
a serious financial gap between what the crown could raise from its lands and grants, 
and what the sovereign wished to have to spend. Moreover, leading voices in the 
country were very happy to advocate the waging of expensive wars, but far less happy 
to vote supply to the crown actually to do so, particularly if they felt that public 
money was being squandered. Cotton articulated concerns that could have been raised 
                                                
81 A tax, particularly on wool exports that was regularly granted from the 1340s. It gradually 
became a fixed sum, granted by parliament for a defined period, rather than being 
hypothecated on the value of exported goods. Confusingly, the term ‘lay subsidies’ is 
also sometimes used to describe tenths and fifteenths: see following footnote. 
82 A tax on ‘moveable’ property, regularised in the 1330s, as fifteenths on county property, 
tenths on town property, which came to yield a fixed sum of about £39,000. 
83 As noted earlier, Edward IV undertook to live of his own, although this anticipated 
continuing grants of tonnage and poundage: see p. 25 above. 
84 Smith, Stuart Parliaments, p. 54. Kishlansky gives a figure of £800,000: Mark Kishlansky, 
Charles I, An Abbreviated Life (London: Penguin, 2014), p. 20. 
85 Tunnage, or tonnage (the spelling generally used today), and poundage were duties raised 
on every tun of imported wine, and on every pound of imported or exported 
merchandise.  
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at any point in the 1620s: the ‘waste of public treasure in fruitless expeditions’; 
subsidies misused to balance the books of a profligate king, rather than being applied 
for the public good; the need to enact resumptions;86 royal abuse of forced loans and 
purveyances without parliamentary assent; the creation of ‘an Inland armie in winter 
season […] with a glorious pretence of Religion & publique safetie’; and overall, the 
‘rapine of the rich (and ruine of all)’.87 Such concerns led to serious difficulties with 
supply at the start of the reign of Charles I. The problem was that, although the 
Commons regularly granted subsidies, and tonnage and poundage to successive 
monarchs, Charles had wrongly assumed that he could collect tonnage and poundage 
from his accession under the royal prerogative, pending any such parliamentary grant. 
This then led to protests about the alienation of individuals’ property through the 
exercise of the prerogative, contrary to the supremacy of parliament in matters of 
supply. There was frequent referral to Magna Carta, where the original article 12 
provides that: 
No scutage or aid is to be levied in our kingdom, save by the common counsel of the 
kingdom, save for the ransoming of our body, and the making of our first-born son a 
knight, and for the marrying a single time of our first-born daughter; and for these 
things there is only to be reasonable aid. In a similar way it is to be for aids from the 
city of London.88 
However, this article was omitted in reissues of the Charter.89 People firmly believed 
that every subject had the right to enjoy his property absolutely, and that it could only 
be affected, for example, by taxation, if the people, through the Commons, had given 
approval, or the courts had made a judgment ‘in matters of meum et tuum’. These 
beliefs were of central importance in any consideration of the Rolle case, as set out in 
chapter six below.  
                                                
86 A return to the crown of lands granted earlier to others. 
87 Sir Robert Bruce Cotton, The Danger Wherein the Kingdom Now Standeth & the Remedie, 
Lansdowne Tracts : 10/7 (s.n., 1628), pp. 16-19. 
88 Carpenter, Magna Carta, p. 43. 
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Last, there are prerogatives for the king as head of government of the 
commonwealth, which are generally lumped together as ‘acts of state’, or ‘matters of 
state’.90 In the early modern period, these included sole control of foreign policy and 
war, regulation of overseas trade, regulation of the Church of England, and coining 
money. In relation to parliament, the crown has the prerogative right to summon, 
prorogue, and dissolve parliaments. This was acknowledged in 1614: ‘The Commons 
in all humility did acknowledge that the summoning and dissolving of a parliament 
belong only to his [the king’s] supreme power, that they would be contented with 
anything his Majesty should order, either for continuing or ending the parliament’.91 
Each House can, however, adjourn sittings at its convenience from day to day and 
over the main holidays. Dissolution ends a parliament, whereas a prorogation simply 
concludes a session, and an adjournment is a break within a session. As members of 
both Houses were expected to attend all sittings, there had to be opportunities for 
vacations of varying lengths, when unfinished legislation would be suspended rather 
than terminated. Once supply had been voted, and the legislative programme fulfilled, 
parliament could be dissolved, but dissolution liquidated all unfinished legislation. 
Parliaments had a natural rhythm, being summoned when supply was needed, or 
legislation was required, with breaks at suitable intervals, and ending with the royal 
assent to bills.92 The sovereign might act to preserve the state and the general 
wellbeing of the commonwealth, although the tacit assumption is that such action 
should reflect an emergency.93 It is, of course, difficult to define the nature and 
temporal extent of an ‘emergency’ – relevant when Charles I collected tonnage and 
                                                
90 In 1621, James I rejected an expression of opinion by the Commons on the marriage of his 
son, as ‘committing of high treason’, in direct breach of his command on such a 
matter of state (see pp. 137f. below). 
91 Anonymous Diary, Add. 48,101, BL, in Jansson (ed.), Proceedings (Commons) 1614, 
p. 425: 4 June 1614. However, this prerogative power has in effect been removed 
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Page 69 
poundage without parliamentary authority, but under a claim of ‘necessity’ in the face 
of foreign threats. 
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, despite emerging tensions, most 
people did not inherently oppose or reject the generality of the wide powers held by 
the sovereign, reflecting a common fear that unbridled liberty could soon turn into 
anarchic disorder, mob rule and even assassinations or lynchings. It was felt that the 
head of state had to be able to act independently at times, and that it would, for 
example, be nonsensical to ‘consult’ parliament on matters such as going to war. As 
Hughes describes, it was felt that: ‘It was up to kings to decide to rule justly, with 
God’s aid; subjects had no redress if they did not’. However, there was an emerging 
counter view: ‘that royal power was derived from the community who had given it up 
on conditions and could resist if these conditions were broken; the statutes of the 
realm and the coronation oaths of monarchs were surviving evidence of these 
conditions’.94 In other words, the king was not expected to do anything injurious to 
the subject, or, by extension, his property; this expectation was part of the ‘ancient 
constitution’ that many MPs wished to conserve by active means. However, change 
was perhaps inevitable after Elizabeth’s long reign, not least because the rather 
unmajestic alien, James VI and I, could not benefit from the easy, chivalrous loyalty 
that had previously been paid to a ‘glorious’ English monarch, who was also a 
woman: ‘Such an Emulation was of Love between that Senat & this Q[ueen], as it is 
questionable whether had more affection, the parl. in observance unto hir, or she in 
indulgence of the parl’.95 James, like Elizabeth, had survived potentially perilous 
early years, having being born into his mother’s ‘bloody nest’, and had reigned as 
king of Scotland since 1567, when he was one year old – a ‘cradle king’ – and was to 
die peacefully at a good age, unlike many of his predecessors. James gained full 
control of the Scottish government in the early 1580s, and had therefore been 
attending parliaments for over twenty years before he succeeded Elizabeth. Like 
                                                
94 Ann Hughes, The Causes of the English Civil War, 2nd edn., British History in Perspective 
(London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 77. 
95 Grosart (ed.), Apology & Negotium Posterorum (Eliot), I, p. 35. The views are those of Sir 
John Eliot. 
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Elizabeth, he was well read, and his personality and intellect meant that he favoured 
robust, even combative, statements on matters of principle. In 1603, he must have felt 
that he knew all there was to know about personal survival, as well as how to rule his 
government and manage relationships between crown and parliament. James rarely 
avoided an opportunity to promote his own view of his regality and powers, both in 
the two books on kingship that he wrote before he came to England, and through his 
publicly-stated unwillingness to accept the view of parliamentary privilege that had 
emerged in his new kingdom.96 English parliamentary privilege was largely based on 
a common law interpretation, whereas James was familiar with civil or Roman law, 
which was more concerned about the rights of the ruler than the liberties of the 
subject. The mainstream whig view, now generally rejected, is that James I found his 
refractory parliaments incomprehensible, set out to do without them, and thereby 
deliberately set out to destroy the innate, and already well-developed parliamentary 
liberties of England. That characterisation is wrong: James told the Spanish 
ambassador, in 1614, that ‘I am a stranger here, and found it [the House of Commons] 
here when I arrived, so that I am obliged to put up with what I cannot get rid of’.97 
Some of the difficulties ascribed to James reflected his philosophical stance that all 
laws derived from the royal grant, and that kings had existed before any law-making 
assemblies, whereas the reality was that he fully intended to follow the rule of law. 
Alan Smith has questioned whether the king was responsible for the discord and 
‘opposition’ that grew during his reign, suggesting that these were by-products, 
possibly inevitable by-products, of unpopular policies, such as the proposed 
constitutional union of ‘Great Britain’.98 It is indeed possible to suggest that James’s 
manner and approach were unhelpful. For example, he issued a proclamation that 
                                                
96 King James VI of Scotland, ‘The True Lawe of Free Monarchies ...’, in James Craigie (ed.), 
Minor Prose Works of King James VI and I (Edinburgh: Scottish Text Society, 1982), 
57-82; King James VI of Scotland, Basilikon Doron ... (Edinburgh: s.n., 1599). 
Originally written for his first-born son, Henry, James presented a copy of Basilikon 
Doron to his second son, Charles, after Henry’s early death. 
97 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James I to the 
Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642, 10 vols. (London: Longmans, 1883), II, 
p. 251. 
98 Alan G. R. Smith (ed.), The Reign of James VI and I (London: Macmillan, 1973). 
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seemed to interfere in the election process, warning sheriffs and electors that they 
should ‘avoid the choice of any persons either noted for their superstitious blindness 
or for their turbulent humours other ways […] and that an expresse care bee had, that 
there be not chosen any persons Banquerupts or Outlawed, but men of knowen good 
behaviour and sufficient livelyhood’.99 Further, in the ‘Buckinghamshire election 
dispute’, James, initially at least, supported chancery over the Commons.100 
Nevertheless, he told the Commons that ‘he had no Purpose to impeach their 
Privilege: But since they derived all Matters of Privilege from him, and by his Grant, 
he expected they should not be turned against him’.101 Nor, for their part, were some 
parliamentarians content to avoid controversy, particularly in the aftermath of the 
Buckinghamshire and Shirley cases, so that The Form of Apology and Satisfaction 
was prepared by a committee appointed on 1 June 1604. It was read in the House on 
20 June, and recommitted by order of the House, but was not reported out again 
before adjournment on 7 July. No full copy was inserted in the Journal of the House 
of Commons, but there are copies in manuscript, and a printed version in Petyt’s Jus 
Parliamentarium.102 The Apology rebutted the king’s view that privileges were 
granted through his grace, rather than held by right, and warned that ‘the prerogatives 
                                                
99 ‘A Proclamation concerning the choice of Knights and Burgesses for the Parliament, 
11 January 1604’, in Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations (James I), I, p. 68. 
100 The case turned on whether Sir Francis Goodwin or Sir John Fortescue should sit for 
Buckinghamshire. The principal issues were whether the return of Goodwin, who had 
outstanding outlawries for debt, should be rejected in favour of Fortescue, and the 
consequent competing claims of chancery and the Commons to regulate such 
disputed election returns. See Gardiner, History of England (1883 edn.), I, 
pp. 167-70; Conrad Russell, The Crisis of Parliaments : English History, 1509-1660, 
Short Oxford History of the Modern World (London: OUP, 1971), p. 271; Derek 
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England under the Early Stuarts (Cambridge: UP, 1975), p. 10; R. C. Munden, ‘The 
Defeat of Sir John Fortescue : Court Versus Country at the Hustings’, EHR, 93 (369) 
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Lindquist, ‘The Case of Sir Francis Goodwin’, EHR, 104 (412) (July 1989), 670-77; 
Andrew Thrush, ‘Commons v. Chancery : The 1604 Buckinghamshire Election 
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101 CJ, 1, p. 158: 29 March 1604. 
102 Petyt, Jus Parliamentarium, pp. 227-43. 
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of princes may easily and do daily grow; the privileges of the subject are for the most 
part at an everlasting stand. They may be by good providence and care preserved, but 
being once lost are not recovered but with much disquiet’.103 Although the Apology 
was never adopted or delivered to James, it was not forgotten, and often referred to in 
later parliaments, which used some of its language in their own protestations.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has traced the origins and purposes of the rights, privileges and liberties 
of parliament, and how these had been given form and substance through the royal 
prerogative. The English constitution of the seventeenth century was viewed as one 
where ‘the fundamental laws of the English polity [...] gave the king his prerogatives, 
and gave the subjects security in their liberties and property’.104 There was an 
apparently broad acceptance of the wide powers held by the sovereign, but a major 
difficulty lay in the ill definition of this apparently settled constitutional relationship 
between the crown and parliament, which in turn exposed two key areas of tension.  
The first area of tension related to the status of privileges, which had historically 
been petitioned of monarchs. However, by the early seventeenth century these were 
increasingly seen, not just as ‘ancient’, but also ‘undoubted’, with a legitimacy gained 
through custom – to the point where the link to grants under the royal prerogative was 
becoming almost a matter of form alone. Throughout the early Stuart period, there 
was a growing difficulty in agreeing where the relative boundaries of privileges and 
prerogative powers lay. The breakdown of apparently settled understandings can be 
seen in polemical speeches, ‘petitions’, ‘protestations’, and the like, which set out the 
differing views of the Commons and the crown on a range of privilege issues, albeit 
often with claims of mutual respect. So, in 1604, the draft Form of Apology and 
Satisfaction had complained of the growth of princely prerogatives and perceived 
assaults on privileges. This, and other declarations and protestations, might not have 
immediately led to change, yet their words and themes were often referred to in 
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speeches and documents that followed. Later chapters will show that such 
pronouncements from the Commons were invariably countered by words or actions 
from the king, the latter including the dissolution of offending parliaments; devices to 
prevent ‘awkward’ members of the Commons from sitting; the action of James I in 
tearing offending pages out of the Commons’ Journal in 1621; the circumvention of 
the terms of the Petition of Right by Charles I; and the publication of justifications for 
his actions by Charles I.105 
The second area of difficulty related to supply: since the fourteenth century, the 
Commons’ consent to taxation had become so essential that they could attach 
conditions to their grants. As will be further shown in later chapters, strain grew 
because of the chronic financial difficulties under which James I, and, particularly, 
Charles I, laboured, so that they could no longer live off traditional incomes. This 
allowed the self-declared ‘loyal’ Commons to exert a powerful leverage on both 
kings. For example, in 1606, the Commons promised James two subsidies and four 
fifteenths, but this would yield just £260,000, whereas the king was indebted to the 
tune of £734,000.106 The Commons could demand that grievances, particularly in 
relation to privileges and liberties, religion and the conduct of royal advisers, were 
addressed before any grant of supply, in the knowledge that the king was highly 
dependent on such awards. The crown countered this by ending the life of any 
parliament that was not willing to authorise supply, or which overplayed its hand over 
grievances, as the power to summon, prorogue, and dissolve parliaments remained 
unequivocally within the royal prerogative. By 1629, the Commons were so 
concerned about the collection of tonnage and poundage under the royal prerogative, 
and the associated assault on the privileges of John Rolle (described in chapter six 
below), that they used the not unfamiliar device of condemning counsellors, as 
surrogates for the king himself. This can be seen in the extraordinary declaration, in 
the second of the Three Resolutions, that ‘Whosoever shall counsel or advise the 
                                                
105 For example, ‘His Majesty's Declaration to all his loving Subjects, of the Causes which 
moved him to dissolve the last Parliament’, in Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, 
pp. 1-11: 10 March 1629. 
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taking and levying of the subsidies of tonnage and poundage, not being granted by 
parliament, or shall be an actor or instrument therein, shall be likewise reputed an 
innovator in the Government, and a capital enemy to the Kingdom and 
Commonwealth’.107 The following chapters will show how privilege matters shaped, 
and were shaped by, the interrelationship between such issues of supply, the rights 
and authority of the Commons, and the royal prerogative, and how these led up to the 
chaotic final sitting of the Commons in 1629.
                                                
107 The second of The Three Resolutions, in Kenyon (ed.), Stuart Constitution, p. 85. 
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III : SIR THOMAS SHIRLEY’S CASE (1604) 
Introduction 
This chapter considers some key issues that arose from a grant of parliamentary 
privilege in 1604 to Sir Thomas Shirley. Shirley was arrested and imprisoned for debt 
before he could take up his seat for Steyning in James I’s first parliament, and only 
released almost two months later.1 Descriptions of Shirley’s case have sometimes 
focused on how his gaoler, the warden of the Fleet prison, made the Commons look 
impotent, at times almost comically so.2 That is too restricted a view, however, as the 
case is significant for a number of interconnected issues that went beyond the release 
of a single member. In this chapter, these issues are first identified, followed by an 
analysis of how each of them was treated as the case unfolded. The final section 
summarises conclusions about the extent to which they were, or were not, resolved in 
1604; the significance and impact of legislation passed in connection with the case; 
and the growth of the Commons’ institutional confidence. 
In the historiography of the early Jacobean period, ‘Shirley’s Case’ has often 
attracted little more than a short paragraph or a footnote in many histories, explaining 
that it confirmed the Commons’ autonomous right to free members who had been 
arrested for debts, or other civil processes; and that associated legislation gave some 
protection to those who might be affected by the privilege, including gaolers and 
creditors. By contrast, there has been a tendency to focus on the privilege issues 
within the contemporary Buckinghamshire election dispute, also known as ‘Goodwin 
                                                
1 There were three members in the 1604 parliament named, variously, Shirley, Sherley, or 
Shurley. In subsequent instances, where no first name is given, the reference is to the 
principal person in the case, Sir Thomas Shirley (1542-1612). 
2 The Fleet prison was used to receive people who had been committed by Star Chamber, and 
for debtors. Such prisons were treated as a business: the warden was appointed by 
letters patent, and it became a frequent practice of the holder of the patent to farm out 
the prison to the highest bidder. In 1624, the warden of the Fleet told the Commons 
that he charged prisoners for their food and other necessities, as well as five marks 
when a prisoner was first admitted. He also allowed prisoners committed by the 
chancery courts to leave the prison upon payment of a daily fee: CJ: 26 May 1624. 
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versus Fortescue’, through which the Commons gained the right to control election 
returns. The Buckinghamshire case points up the differences in interpretation between 
whiggish writers, on the one hand, for whom it appeared to be a triumphal forerunner 
of a series of crown-parliament clashes that culminated in the civil wars, and 
revisionists, on the other hand, who found that it typified the compromises of the 
period.3 
Perhaps the lack of attention to Shirley’s case in the historiography has arisen 
because it did not lead to a struggle with the crown: indeed, James I and the House of 
Lords were amenable to most of the Commons’ suggestions for ways to secure 
Shirley’s release and to meet the concerns of the other principals. This was, after all, a 
time when James was trying to cooperate with parliament, so as to gain approval for 
the political, rather than simply personal, union of England and Scotland. Moreover, 
the case seemed ‘conclusively’ to have resolved the essentially procedural issues that 
arose, so that it sat uneasily within a teleological analysis that looked for evidence of 
a prolonged constitutional conflict. Furthermore, the rather squalid context, of a 
member trying to avoid his debts, hardly sat well with the whiggish ideal of noble 
parliamentarians asserting ancient rights and liberties – Shirley’s difficulties were not 
going to generate a ‘revolution of the saints’. Adams exemplifies the dismissive 
comments made by many writers: ‘Of far less importance [than freedom of speech] 
except in the earliest times and of scarcely any importance today [1935], is the 
privilege of members of parliament to freedom from arrest during a session and going 
to and returning from one’.4 More recently, revisionist writers have largely ignored 
Shirley’s case, perhaps taking a broad view that any issues that it raised were 
insignificant, and had been solved by the summer of 1604. The literature that did 
consider the case in detail has appeared sporadically. A curious example is a narrative 
from 1768 in The Gentleman’s Magazine, whose editor was particularly interested in 
running biographical and antiquarian articles.5 A journal article by Prothero, from 
                                                
3 For sources discussing this dispute, see p. 71n. above. 
4 Adams and Stephens, Select Documents, pp. 191-93.  
5 John Nichols, ‘Narrative of the Proceedings of the House of Commons in the Reign of King 
James the First’, The Gentleman’s Magazine, xxxviii (March 1768), 99-104. 
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1893, seemed to provide a definitive judgement that: ‘not only had the commons 
successfully asserted their privilege, but they had to all appearance established their 
right to release imprisoned members by means of their own officers, without any 
interference on the part of the crown or the law-courts’.6 Prothero included the 
relevant records and documents in a book that was first published in the following 
year.7 His descriptions and interpretations perhaps overplayed the extent and clarity of 
the developments that arose from Shirley’s case, but had an authority that led several 
later writers to adhere to his lines of argument, or at least to cite his works, thereby 
preserving the case in a kind of constitutionalist historiographical aspic.8  
Over time, collections of constitutional documents, the HoP volumes, 
contemporary diaries, and the parliamentary records have generally provided the facts 
of privilege cases, including Shirley’s, rather than offering extended interpretations.9 
In 1980, however, Lambert used the case to exemplify what she saw as the restricted 
authority of the Commons at that time.10 This thesis differs, arguing that the Shirley 
case helped to develop the institutional authority of the Commons. More recently, 
Chafetz has looked at the legal basis for several aspects of legislative privilege, in 
both the British parliament, and the USA. He has covered freedom from arrest and 
civil processes, including Shirley’s case, which, following Wittke’s earlier work, he 
has characterised as one of the strongest cases of the supremacy of lex parliamenti 
over lex terrae.11 Although one might argue with aspects of Chafetz’s conceptual 
                                                
6 Prothero, ‘Privilege and Shirley’s Case’, p. 734. 
7 G. W. Prothero (ed.), Select Statutes and Other Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the 
Reigns of Elizabeth and James I, 1st edn. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894). 
8 See, for example: Wittke, ‘History of Privilege’, which uncritically accepted the views on 
privilege of earlier writers, such as Elsynge and Erskine May. 
9 See, for example: Tanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents : James I; Kenyon (ed.), Stuart 
Constitution; Healy, CD 1604-1607; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, 
especially the introductory survey by Thrush, and the entries for Steyning 
(constituency) and Sir Thomas Shirley (biography). 
10 Sheila Lambert, ‘Procedure in the House of Commons in the Early Stuart Period’, EHR, 95 
(377) (October 1980), 753-81, pp. 770-71. 
11 Joshua A. Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few : Legislative Privilege and Democratic 
Norms in the British and American Constitutions (New Haven (CT): Yale UP, 2007), 
especially pp. 29-30, 115, 119, and 195-96. 
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framework, he has nevertheless returned freedom from arrest to the more central kind 
of position that it enjoyed in the early Stuart period. 
Such works show that Shirley’s case has a complexity that has been under-
recognised, even though it had as much contemporary importance as the 
Buckinghamshire election dispute. This can be seen in the seniority and experience of 
the members of the committee for privileges that considered Shirley’s case; the 
assiduous attention given to possible precedents; the number of times when the matter 
came before the Commons; the entries that were made in various contemporary 
diaries; the drafting of a petition to the king; and the preparation of three 
parliamentary bills. Furthermore, both the Buckinghamshire dispute and the Shirley 
case were referred to in the Form of Apology and Satisfaction, which was drafted in 
the summer of 1604, although it has to be recognised that the Apology did not receive 
sufficient support in the Commons for it to be presented to James I.12  
By the start of the seventeenth century, there was a general expectation that 
privileges would be maintained from parliament to parliament, and for some of the 
period between parliaments. So it was that Sir Edward Phelips, Speaker of James I’s 
first parliament, within a lengthy speech on 22 March 1604, included five successful 
requests to the king, the first two on behalf of the Commons, and the other three in 
relation to his own position: ‘Freedom of Speech: Protection of Bodies, Servants, and 
Goods: Free Access, for such Occasions, as the House shall have: To admit no 
Information, without calling him to answer: To pardon his Wants and Imperfections’. 
The lord chancellor responded: ‘The Petitions made before by Mr. Speaker were 
answered, and granted of Course’.13 The Apology, referred to above, includes an 
interesting assertion by at least some members of the Commons, that requesting 
rightful privileges was now merely a matter of form: ‘Our making of request in the 
entrance of Parliament to enjoy our privilege is an act only of manners, and doth 
weaken our right no more than our suing to the King for our lands by petition’.14 
Sommerville notes, however, that the combative Kynaston ‘not only accepted but also 
                                                
12 Tanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents : James I, pp. 217-30, especially pp. 224-25.  
13 CJ: 22 March 1604 (second scribe); CJ, 1, pp. 146-47: 22 March 1604. 
14 Tanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents : James I, p. 221. 
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applauded the Apology’s assertion that prerogative grew while liberty stood still […] 
He had little time for the privileges of Parliament or the liberties of the subject’.15 
Nevertheless, by the time of James I’s first parliament, there was a general 
understanding that where the Commons had decided a member, or his servant, was 
entitled to privilege of parliament, then any arrest or legal processes would cease, and 
the person in question would be released with little further discussion or difficulty. 
That must have appeared to be the likely outcome when Sir Thomas Shirley was 
arrested in 1604. 
Sir Thomas Shirley 
Some brief account needs to be given of the earlier life of Sir Thomas Shirley, 
showing he had ambitions to enhance his personal status, accompanied by a degree of 
prevarication, false accounting, and recklessness. He was not only a landowner, but 
also had interests in the important Sussex iron industry. Shirley was MP for Sussex in 
1572, 1584, and 1593, and was knighted in 1573. He held various government 
appointments, partly through his connections with the earl of Leicester, including 
becoming deputy lieutenant for Sussex, being removed in 1601; commissioner for 
recusancy (1580); commissioner for disarming recusants (1585); and joint treasurer-
at-war to Elizabeth (1586).16 These posts seemingly led to him making between 
£4,120 and £20,000 annually, but attracted the suspicions of Burghley, and his salary 
was reduced.17 At the same time, Shirley’s rising social position had led to a need for 
a larger residence, and a number of questionable deals. Not helped by very poor – 
even false – account keeping, he became greatly indebted to the crown; it may even 
have been that he owed more to the queen than he was worth. In 1588, the sheriff 
seized many of his goods, and he was made bankrupt in December 1596.18 Around 
                                                
15 Sommerville, The Liberties of the Subject, p. 82. As already noted (p. 37n. above), 
Kynaston may well have been the author of A True Presentation of Forepast 
Parliaments to the View of Present Tymes and Posterity, (Manuscript, 1629, BL, 
London), Lansdowne 213, fol. 149-179. 
16 Janet Pennington, ‘Sherley, Sir Thomas (c. 1542–1612)’, ODNB. 
17 Pennington gives the higher figure; David William Davies, Elizabethans Errant (Ithaca 
(NY): Cornell UP, 1967), p. 19, provides the lower figure. 
18 Ibid., pp. 43- 44. 
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this time, Shirley was not happy, complaining to Sir Robert Cecil: ‘a strange and most 
extraordinary course of handling […] which is that before my accounts be 
determined, or any certain debt known upon me, I should make over all my lands […] 
to be returned to me when the Queen’s Majesty is satisfied; and in the meantime no 
provision of livelihood for me, my wife and children’. He was found to owe £19,000 
to the queen: Shirley insisted it was no more than £8,000, although his indebtedness 
led to a first spell of incarceration in the Fleet prison. Shirley would not have been 
entitled to privilege after April 1593, when Elizabeth’s eighth parliament ended. The 
next parliament began in October 1597, but Shirley was not elected for any seat, and 
was therefore obviously no longer entitled to privilege. By now disgraced, he was 
probably released in January 1598, ‘poor but not yet broken’.19 A deed of 1602 shows 
the complicated nature of indebtedness, and recites that:  
The said Sir Thos. Sherley after he became accountable conveyed to John Baker of 
London, esq., the said 1/4th part of the manor of Heyghley and all other his said 
lands, messuages &c. and the said John Baker conveyed to the said Sir John Caryll 
and the other parties named; all which premises were seized for or towards the 
satisfaction of the debt to the Crown. And […] Sir Thos. Sherley had paid towards 
the satisfaction of the said debt £4086. 11. 10½ and the Queen had agreed to accept 
a conveyance of the said 1/4th part of the manor and the messuages, lands &c. before 
mentioned at and for £1200 towards satisfaction of the said debt and to regrant the 
same to John Myddleton and Anthony Foule at the like price of £1200. It was 
witnessed that the said Sir Thos. Sherley, Sir John Caryll and the other parties 
granted to the Queen the said 1/4th part of the said manor and premises.20 
Further records show that Shirley conveyed properties to Sir Edward Coke, the 
attorney general, and Sir Thomas Flemynge, solicitor general, ‘to the use of the 
queen’. On 2 October 1604, he conveyed several properties to James I.21 Shirley’s 
                                                
19 Ibid., p. 44-46; Hasler (ed.), Commons 1558-1603, III, pp. 375-76.  
20 West Sussex Records Office: SAS-F/323 [Close Roll, 44 Eliz. Pt. 28]: Archive of Frere and 
Co of London, solicitors: Abstract of attested copy of deed: 28 January 1602. 
21 West Sussex Records Office: Wiston/3637: Copy of conveyance, from Sir Edward Coke, 
kt., attorney general, Sir Thomas Flemynge, kt., solicitor general, Sir Thomas 
Sherley, snr., of Wiston, kt., Sir John Sherley of Isfield, kt., Sir Edward Onslowe of 
[footnote continues ...] 
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difficulties meant that, by the start of the seventeenth century, he no longer 
commanded the local gentry’s confidence to sit in the Commons as one of the knights 
of the shire for Sussex. The borough of Steyning, however, was more directly under 
his influence and control; he was elected for that place in 1601, and re-elected in 
1604.22 Shirley may possibly have still been an undischarged bankrupt at that point – 
it was only in July 1604 that his relatives stood surety for him.23  
The chronological summary of events in Appendix 3 shows that writs for the 1604 
parliament were issued on 31 January 1604; Shirley was re-elected for Steyning on 
17 February; and the first session began on 19 March. He had, however, been arrested 
by the sheriff of London, on 15 March, for a number of debts and sureties, apparently 
amounting to at least £8,000, with the principal suitor being Giles Simpson (or 
Sympson), a goldsmith.24 Goldsmiths were often bankers and moneylenders, gold 
being a principal form of money. Shirley’s debt to Simpson might have related to 
those kinds of services, rather than the supply of golden artefacts, even though 
Simpson was ‘his Majesty’s goldsmith’, for whom he supplied ‘fine gold and fine 
silver for the making of spangles for the rich coats for the guard’.25 The arrest was 
nevertheless made, despite Shirley telling those who detained him that he was 
privileged. On 22 March, the Commons were informed that Shirley had been arrested 
and imprisoned for debt, and a motion for privilege was put forward.26 Whereas it 
might have been expected, in line with any number of privilege cases in the past, that 
he would be released almost immediately, Shirley was only finally freed on 15 May, 
because a number of issues had arisen, which are presented next, in broadly the same 
order as they arose at the time.  
.......................................................................................... 
Granleigh, co. Surrey, kt., and Anthony Sherley of Preston to King James I: 27 July 
1604. 
22 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 320. 
23 Pennington, ‘Thomas Sherley’. 
24 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, xxxv; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, 
p. 320. 
25 Frederick Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, Being Payments Made out of his Majesty’s 
Revenue During the Reign of King James I (London: John Rodwell, 1836), p. 11. 
26 CJ, 1, p. 149: 22 March 1604. 
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Issues in the Shirley case 
A number of issues arose in Shirley’s case, the first of which was whether outlaws 
and bankrupts could lawfully be elected to parliament, and benefit from the associated 
privileges. This was relevant, as Shirley was a bankrupt, also possibly an outlaw, and 
perhaps unentitled to protection. The next issue was whether privilege existed for a 
member who had not yet sworn the oath at the start of a parliament: was Shirley even 
entitled to be treated as a member before parliament sat, or did privilege operate from 
the time that a person was declared elected? The third issue concerned the means to 
effect the release of a privileged member, and the authority of the Commons to 
enforce their own orders in such matters. The next issue concerned the 
interrelationship of liabilities and indemnification, in cases where a member of 
parliament was released despite owing money to others. Shirley’s case dragged on, 
because of considerable doubt about who precisely was responsible for meeting a debt 
where a debtor-member ‘escaped’ by claiming privilege: whether it was the member, 
the arresting parties, or might it be that the creditor’s claims simply failed?27 The fifth 
and final issue arose if Shirley’s release could only be effected through legislation: 
did the royal assent to bills automatically end a parliament, or might the assent be 
given as soon as a bill passed all its parliamentary stages? These five issues will now 
be considered in turn, in the particular context of Shirley’s case.  
*** *** *** 
The first issue was concerned with whether bankrupts or outlaws might sit as 
members, and benefit from the associated privileges.28 By virtue of earlier statutes, 
proclamations and legal judgments, an outlawed member was supposedly barred from 
being an MP, although the Commons were prepared at times to ignore such 
outlawries.29 The situation was clearly confusing, and potentially damaging to 
                                                
27 The notion of an ‘escape’, whether physically from gaol, or through a legal process, has a 
clear meaning: ‘where one that is arrested cometh to his liberty before that he be 
delivered by award of any Justice, or by order of Law’: Terms de la Ley, 1621, in the 
OED Online definition of ‘escape’. 
28 Wider consideration of this issue is provided in chapter five below, especially pp. 164ff.  
29 For example, see p. 71n and Appendix 1, case 22.  
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parliament’s reputation and credibility. It attracted a royal proclamation from James I 
urging the omission of ‘any persons Banquerupts or Outlawed’.30 Attempts to prevent 
outlaws from sitting in parliament had a particular significance for the cases of Sir 
Francis Goodwin and Sir Thomas Shirley in 1604. In respect of the former, the 
Commons’ Journal recorded the issue:  
The first Motion was made by Sir William Fleetwood, One of the Knights returned 
for the County of Buckinghamshire on the Behalf of Sir Francis Goodwyne Knight, 
who, upon the first Writ of Summons, directed to the Sheriff of Buckinghamshire was 
elected the first Knight for that Shire; but, the Return of his Election being made, it 
was refused by the Clerk of the Crown, quia utlagatus [because he was outlawed].31  
The Commons were clearly uncomfortable with the idea that outlaws could act as 
legislators, so that, a week later, they decided to ‘tender our humble Petition to his 
Majesty, for Leave to make a Law for the Banishing of all Outlaws hereafter from the 
Parliament: And pray, that we may hold all our Privileges intire’.32 A bill to exclude 
outlaws from parliament was twice read and committed, on 31 March 1604,33 and 
reached the report stage, on 13 April 1604, when it was ordered to be engrossed.34 It 
is unclear what happened next with this bill, but it was perhaps consolidated into a 
further bill ‘for Disabling of Recusants, Persons attainted of Forgery and Penury, 
Outlaws, and Contemners of the Law, to be of the Parliament’, which received a first 
reading, on 24 April 1604.35 This bill then received a second reading, on 26 April, 
when it was sent to committee.36 However the bill was not included in the House of 
Lords’ lists of bills sent up by the lower House: it appears that it cannot have been 
enacted by the time parliament was prorogued, on 7 July 1604.37 On the other hand, 
                                                
30 ‘A Proclamation concerning the choice of Knights and Burgesses for the Parliament, 
11 January 1604’, in Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations (James I), p. 68.  
31 CJ, 1, p. 149: 22 March 1604. 
32 CJ, 1, p. 158: 29 March 1604 (dated as 30 March by the second scribe). 
33 CJ, 1, p. 160: 31 March 1604. 
34 CJ, 1, p. 170: 13 April 1604. 
35 CJ, 1, p. 183: 24 April 1604. 
36 CJ, 1, p. 185: 26 April 1604. 
37 Lists of bills from the lower house are given in LJ, 2, p. 295: 10 May 1604, through to LJ, 
2, p. 341: 5 July 1604, passim. 
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as discussed further below, bankrupts were treated differently from ‘ordinary’ 
debtors, the former having a criminal character, whereas the latter were subject to 
civil processes.38 James I’s proclamation was intended to secure the election of fit and 
proper people to parliament, with a subsidiary benefit for the lord chancellor, who 
helped draft it, of strengthening chancery vis-à-vis the Commons. It included a 
command: ‘that an expresse care bee had, that there be not chosen any persons 
Banquerupts or Outlawed, but men of knowen good behaviour and sufficient 
livelyhood’. The proclamation explained that those who passed laws on taxation 
ought to have paid their own dues, something that a bankrupt would not have done.39  
Shirley was almost certainly a bankrupt when he was returned, and seemingly 
outlawed, although he claimed that: ‘as soone as he found he was outlawed did 
reverse the utlayre by a supersedias,40 the Coppy whereof he had in his hande to 
shewe under the offyceres hande’.41 Shirley’s situation reflected the more general 
confusion surrounding bankruptcy, as pointed out by Blackstone. On the one hand, 
‘none of the statutes allowed for appeal from the associated and personal jurisdiction 
exercised by the lord chancellor’; yet in practice there was the possibility that ‘the 
decision of commissioners [of bankruptcy] that a man was in fact a bankrupt […] 
could be challenged in law’.42 It should be noted that right into the nineteenth century, 
bankruptcy was no barrier to someone sitting as an MP. However, it was only from 
the mid-seventeenth century onwards that a debtor who denied bankruptcy could have 
this tested in court, so that Shirley would have needed to petition for reversal. If it was 
true that Shirley’s outlawry had been stayed, this should have been persuasive, 
                                                
38 See pp. 164ff. below. 
39 ‘A Proclamation concerning the choice of Knights and Burgesses for the Parliament, 
11 January 1604’, in Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations (James I), I, p. 68. 
40 ‘A writ that suspends the authority of a trial court to issue an execution on a judgment that 
has been appealed. It is a process designed to stop enforcement of a trial court 
judgment brought up for review. The term is often used interchangeably with a stay 
of proceeding’: Legal Dictionary : The Free Dictionary at Farlex, at 
<http://goo.gl/ynKFh>. 
41 Sir Robert Cotton’s Diary of the 1604 Session, BL Cotton MS, Titus F.IV, in Healy, CD 
1604-1607, p. 46: 27 March 1604. 
42 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, III, p. 427, in W. J. Jones, ‘The 
Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the Early Modern 
Period’, TAPS, 69 (3) (1979), 5-63, p. 10. 
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although he did not seem to have denied directly that he owed money, or even that he 
was a bankrupt: he merely contested the outlawry, perhaps recognising that the latter 
was more likely to debar him from the Commons. It was only in July 1604 that 
Shirley’s relatives stood surety for him, so that, for the period in which the case was 
active (March to May 1604), bankruptcy stood over him.43 It is nevertheless clear that 
the Commons did not consider that such a bankruptcy debarred Shirley from sitting in 
1604, nor, indeed, from claiming privilege, which would protect him from arrest and 
imprisonment for debt. Lord chancellor Ellesmere was unimpressed, as can be read in 
his later critical observations on James I’s first parliament:  
Persons outlawed were received, allowed and justified to be lawful members of the 
parliament, and thereby were privileged and protected from the ordinary course of 
law and justice. Whereas […] they have neither lands or goods of their own, nor 
liberty of their persons, and are therefore unfit to be of so grave a senate and council 
and cannot be deemed to be meet to be law makers.44 
The question whether bankrupts and outlaws could serve in parliament was not 
resolved by the cases of Shirley, or Goodwin. Indeed, the issue appeared to be one 
where the Commons were prepared at the time, and subsequently, to ignore the 
legislation and royal commandments, and to take pragmatic, inconsistent decisions, 
case-by-case.  
*** *** *** 
The second issue was whether privilege existed for a member who had not yet sworn 
the oath at the start of a parliament. In this case, was Shirley even entitled to be 
treated as a member, if he had not yet sworn the oath, i.e. before parliament sat? The 
matter is briefly recorded, in the debates of 27 March: ‘Yelverton junior 
[Northampton] sayd that […] yt was yett questyonable whether Sir Thomas was a 
                                                
43 Pennington, ‘Thomas Sherley’. 
44 Ellesmere Observations, in Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610, I, p. 277. Foster feels that 
Ellesmere’s strictures refer to Sir Francis Goodwin, but it can be argued that they 
might have also referred to Sir Thomas Shirley. Thomas Egerton, lord chancellor 
from 1603 to 1617, was created baron Ellesmere in 1603, and viscount Brackley in 
1616. 
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member of the house, or not’.45 However, the Commons did not entertain the idea that 
the member had to be sworn in order to have privilege: ‘Eundo, sedendo, redeundo, 
morando [while going, sitting, returning, remaining] the Privilege to be allowed’.46 
This makes sense, as it obeyed the principle that nothing should prevent the 
attendance of those who had been summoned by the king. The logic was impeccable: 
whether Shirley had taken the oath was irrelevant – he was meeting a royal summons. 
So: the issue was one that was raised, but quickly dismissed. 
*** *** *** 
The third issue concerned the means by which the Commons could effect the release 
of a privileged member – what force did their orders and writs truly have.47 Lambert 
notes: 
Even in matters of privilege the Commons’ ‘rights’ had no real basis in law. For most 
purposes […] of privilege cases the Commons had to rely on the clerk of the crown to 
issue all writs required: his acceptance of the speaker’s warrant for the purpose is little 
more than a legal fiction. […] The ‘orders’ made by the Commons were of little effect 
unless the party concerned consented. The Commons were unable to compel 
obedience from the warden of the Fleet in Shirley’s case.48  
By the time of the Shirley case, however, there was a fairly well established 
procedure, whereby another member would draw the attention of the House to the 
arrest of anyone subject to privilege, and the Commons then routinely granted the 
privilege. In cases where the arrest was in execution, rather than on mesne process, a 
warrant would be made out for a writ of habeas corpus directed to the warden of the 
prison where the member was held – in some cases, the matter was first considered by 
                                                
45 Diary of Sir George Manners, March – April 1604, Belvoir Castle, Rutland MS, in Healy, 
CD 1604-1607, p. 29: 27 March 1604. 
46 CJ: 27 March 1604 (second scribe). 
47 The process for peers was somewhat different: ‘a peer of the realm […] may sue a 
Certiorari in the Chancery […] testifying that he is a peer of the realm, comanding 
them to award such process against him as they ought to do against a peer of the 
realm’: Maseres, Cases and Records, p. 5. 
48 Lambert, ‘Procedure’, pp. 770-71. 
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the privileges committee. There were alternatives to writs of habeas corpus, which 
included petitioning the king to act through the royal grace; direct action by the 
serjeant-at-arms of the Commons acting on the authority of the mace; or specific 
private legislation. Direct action was more usual where a member was held on mesne 
process. Presenting a writ of habeas corpus in cases of execution had usually proved 
enough in the past, but Shirley’s gaoler refused to release him until he was assured 
that he would not be held personally liable for the debt in question, as a result of what 
was technically an ‘escape’ – as seen in the fourth issue, considered below.49 
Hatsell notes that, from 1575 onwards (Smalley’s case),50 and certainly by the 
latter part of Elizabeth’s reign, a ‘constant practice’ had developed for ‘the sending 
for persons intitled to Privilege, (when under arrest), by the Serjeant-at-Arms, and the 
committing [of] the bailiffs, and persons procuring the arrest, for their contempt to the 
House’.51 Miscreants were usually held in the Tower, which was the prison for the 
House; subsequently required to make a personal appearance, they would have to 
confess their fault, humiliatingly bareheaded and kneeling at the Bar, and then be 
pardoned, ‘paying their fees’. Over time, there were instances when the House took a 
more draconian view; more usually, it was inclined to a low-key leniency.52  
Looking more specifically at Sir Thomas Shirley: his arrest was raised in the 
Commons, on 22 March: 
This being a Motion tending to Matter of Privilege, was seconded with another by 
Mr. Serjeant Shirley, touching an Arrest made the 15th of March last, the Day of his 
Majesty’s solemn Entrance through London, and Four Days before the Sitting of the 
Parliament, upon the Body of Sir Thomas Shirley, elected One of the Burgesses for 
the Borough of Steyning in the County of Sussex, at the Suit of one Gyles Sympson, a 
Goldsmith, dwelling in Lumbard-street, London, by one William Watkyns, a Serjeant 
                                                
49 The definition of what constituted an ‘escape’ is given on p. 82n. above. 
50 See Appendix 1, case 18. 
51 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 121. 
52 Variations in the Commons’ sentences are described more fully on pp. 116ff. below.  
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at Mace, and Thomas Aram, his Yeoman; and prayed, that the Body of the said Sir 
Thomas might be freed, according to the known Privilege of the House.53 
In line with what had become customary practice when a member had been arrested 
in execution, the Speaker was ordered to seek a warrant for habeas corpus, directed, 
as was usual, to the clerk of crown in chancery: 
IT is this Day Ordered and required by the Commons House of Parliament, that a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus be awarded, for the Bringing of the Body of Sir Thomas 
Shirley Knight, one of the Members of this House, and now Prisoner in the Fleet, into 
the said House, upon Tuesday next, at Eight a Clock in the Morning, according to 
the ancient Privilege and Custom in that Behalf used. And this shall be your 
Warrant.54  
At first, things went as the Commons might have expected: Simpson, Watkins, and 
Aram appeared on 27 March in the Commons as ‘delinquents’, together with Shirley, 
who was delivered by John Trench, the warden of the Fleet prison. Crucially, 
however, Shirley was not released from Trench’s custody: this shows that the 
Commons were operating within the law, and were possibly concerned about the 
rights of the creditors to secure satisfaction if a debtor somehow ‘escaped’ at their 
behest. The opposing parties now presented their views: 
The said Offenders […] averred, that the Writ of Execution was taken forth the 
Thirtieth of January; was delivered to the Serjeant the Eleventh of February, before 
Sir Tho. was elected Burgess; […] that the Serjeant knew nothing at all of Sir 
Thomas his Election; but understood, by his Majesty’s Proclamation, that no Person 
outlawed for Treason, Felony, Debt, or any other Trespass, ought to be admitted a 
Member of the Parliament; and was thereupon induced to think, that Sir Thomas 
Shirlye, standing outlawed, should not be elected or admitted a Burgess; which if he 
                                                
53 CJ, 1, p. 149: 22 March 1604. John Shirley, or Shurley, (c.1546-1616) sat for Lewes in this 
parliament, and was connected to Thomas Shirley by marriage. A serjeant-at-law was 
‘a member of a superior order of barristers (abolished in 1880), from which, until 
1873, the Common Law judges were always chosen’, OED Online. 
54 CJ, 1, p. 149: 22 March 1604. 
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had known or suspected, he would have been very careful, not to have given Offence 
to this honourable House, by any such Arrest. 
To this Sir Thomas was admitted to answer, who affirmed, that the Arrest was made 
the Fifteenth Day of March, the Day of his Majesty’s first and solemn Entrance 
through London, at what Time he was going by Commandment to wait upon his 
Majesty; whereof, upon the first Offer to touch him, he wished the Serjeant to take 
Knowledge; as also, that he was elected a Burgess for the Borough of Steyning in the 
County of Sussex, to serve at this present Parliament; that, notwithstanding, they 
persisted in the Arrest, and carried his Body to the Prison of the Compter.55 
Sir Robert Bruce Cotton (Huntingdonshire) adds the gloss that Shirley claimed to 
have stayed proceedings for the outlawry consequent on his bankruptcy, and gave 
some colour to the scene of the arrest: 
That as soone as he found he was outlawed did reverse the utlarye [outlawry] by a 
supersedias, […] and touching their knowlyge of him to be a Burgese, he said he tould 
them that they might kise the Towere [themselves be incarcerated] for arrestynge him 
a Burges and that the Bishop of durhame coming by the same Instante to the officeres 
said also so much, but they regarded Not this havinge once laide the Executyone 
upon him.56 
Those who had arrested Shirley were on weak ground in their persistence in detaining 
him, even when he protested that he was commanded to attend the king, and that he 
was an elected member of the Commons, both of which meant, prima facie, that he 
was privileged. It appeared, however, that Watkins feared that he was already liable 
for his ‘prisoner’, and the associated debts if Shirley were to be freed – a matter that is 
the substance of the fourth issue, considered below. 
Members who spoke in the debate on 27 March considered the legitimacy of 
Shirley’s case. Anthony Dyott (Lichfield) argued that Shirley’s initial detention did 
                                                
55 CJ, 1, p. 155: 27 March 1604. The Commons would come to declare, in 1625, that anyone 
who was ‘in execution’ for debt could not be elected: Sommerville, The Liberties of 
the Subject, p. 61. A compter, or counter, was a small prison controlled by a sheriff. 
56 Cotton, in Healy, CD 1604-1607, p. 46: 27 March 1604. 
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not initially constitute a contempt, as his warning to those arresting him had been 
purely verbal; however his continued detention was a contempt, as a written record of 
his election was later available.57 Sir Henry Montagu, Recorder and a member for 
London, with connections to the lord chancellor, was active throughout the debates on 
the Shirley case, including that of 27 March. He consistently maintained that Shirley 
should have his privilege, and that those who had arrested him, and those who refused 
to release him, were guilty of contempt. It was decided to refer the issue to the 
committee of privileges, which comprised seventeen experienced parliamentarians, 
many with a legal background, seven representing county seats, and ten boroughs, 
‘with Authority to examine all the Doubts and Questions of that Case, and to hear the 
Counsel and Witnesses on both Parts’.58 They gave an interim report on 5 April: 
They found, that Simson was guilty of the Contempt wittingly; that Lightbone [sic], 
the Serjeant at Mace, made the Arrest wittingly, willingly, and wilfully: Which both 
were made appear by these Circumstances: It was found, that […] Sir Thomas, being 
first arrested upon a Latitat,59 said, he was a Burgess of Parliament, and therefore 
willed the Serjeant to beware. The Serjeant answered, That Mr. Simson knew that, 
and he himself knew it well enough. Sir Thomas, being in the Compter, and the 
Execution laid upon him, sent again to Simpson, and told him, as before. Simpson 
answered, he could but lie by it.60 
The second scribe’s version dates the report to 11 April.61 Both versions record that 
the Commons immediately resolved that Simpson and his yeoman should be 
committed to the Tower, ‘the proper prison of the House’.62 However, they learned 
that the lord chancellor, Ellesmere, ‘before the sitting of the House, had committed 
them’: this might well have been a flexing of the muscles of the chancellor, vis-à-vis 
                                                
57 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 138. 
58 CJ, 1, p. 155: 27 March 1604. 
59 Latitat: a writ allowing a sheriff to arrest a fugitive or supposed fugitive in a county 
different to the county where the court with jurisdiction sits: paraphrase of entry in 
Legal Dictionary : The Free Dictionary at Farlex, at <http://tinyurl.com/o3v87v9>. 
60 CJ, 1, pp. 167-68: 5 April 1604. 
61 CJ: 11 April 1604 (second scribe).  
62 The yeoman, Aram, was later released, presumably as he was not a principal, nor had he 
acted knowingly in contempt of parliament. 
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the Commons. Sir Edward Hoby and Francis Moore (Reading) ‘were appointed to 
acquaint his Lordship with the Judgment of the House, for their Remove to the Prison 
of the Tower’.63 The Commons were later told that Ellesmere had acted on his own 
initiative, supposedly to prevent the solemnity of the king’s entrance into London 
being disturbed by disputes over the arrest of a member.64  
On 13 April, counsel for the warden of the Fleet and for Shirley each produced 
precedents that differed over whether a writ of execution, taken out before parliament 
sat, invalidated a claim for privilege. Reference was made to Ferrers’ case, when the 
Commons dispatched their serjeant-at-arms, claiming that the Commons’ mace was 
sufficient authority to secure Ferrers’ release.65 The Commons were subsequently told 
of the contrary legal opinion, presented in 1576: ‘[That there is] no Precedent for 
setting at large by the Mace any Person in Arrest, but only by Writ’.66 The House 
decided that further arguments, including those from Simpson’s counsel, should be 
heard on 16 April.67 The House considered two matters on that date: ‘Justice of 
Privilege, and Justice to the [creditor] Party’. Three precedents were presented: those 
of William Larke (1430), Walter Clerk (1460), and William Hyde (1474).68 All three 
precedents had seen privilege being granted, but with the legal processes permitted to 
be taken up again after the parliament was over; they also indemnified the sheriff and 
officers against actions by the creditor. On that basis, the House decided that Shirley 
should have privilege immediately, and considered: ‘Whether we shall be Petitioners 
to his Majesty, for the Securing of the Debt to the Party, and saving harmless of the 
Warden of the Fleet, according to the Precedents’.69 There were concerns: for 
Simpson, that he might never see his money if Shirley were released; and for the 
warden, that he might be held liable for an ‘escape’ if the House had no legal right to 
                                                
63 CJ, 1, pp. 167-68: 5 April 1604. 
64 CJ, 1, p. 171: 13 April 1604. 
65 See Appendix 1, case 13. 
66 CJ, 1, p. 195: 2 May 1604. 
67 CJ, 1, p. 171: 13 April 1604. 
68 CJ 1, p. 173: 16 April 1604. The cases are described more fully on pp. 53f. above, and in 
Appendix 1, cases 4, 7, 9. These precedents were further referred to a month later: 
CJ 1, p. 195: 2 May 1604; see p. 103 below. 
69 CJ: 16 April 1604 (second scribe). 
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free Shirley, and, further, that he might be vicariously liable to Simpson, for the debt 
due from an ‘escaped’ prisoner. Indeed, it is clear throughout that the warden was 
concerned that he would not be ‘safe’ from such liability, if he simply yielded to the 
writ(s) of habeas corpus, or any direct activity by the Commons’ serjeant-at-arms to 
secure Shirley’s release. 
The Commons now decided on a specific bill to free Shirley, which was 
introduced on 17 April, ‘for securing Simpson’s debt and the safety of the Warden of 
the Fleet in Sir Thomas Shirley’s case’, and immediately passed to the committee that 
had been established on 27 March.70 In an attempt to avoid confusion, this is termed 
‘the first bill’ in this chapter. The bill set out the background, and asserted that 
Shirley’s arrest was ‘contrarie to the liberties, priviledges, and freedomes accustomed 
and dewe to the commons of your highness Parliament, who have ever used to enjoy 
their freedome in coming to and returning from the Parliament, and sitting there 
without restraint or molestacion’.71 Crucially, the bill asked that the king should order 
the chancellor to issue a royal writ to the warden of the Fleet, which would in effect 
free Shirley, so that the latter could attend parliament. The bill also provided that 
Simpson could seek recovery of the debt, and indemnified the sheriff, warden of the 
Fleet, and others in similar positions of authority, against vicarious liabilities. The 
issue of indemnification is considered below, as the fourth issue in this section. 
However, within a month, as Prothero identifies, the Commons ‘began to see that if 
the [first] bill became law they would seriously imperil their privilege, or, at all 
events, practically surrender their right to enforce it. The [first] bill invoked the aid of 
the king and the lord chancellor, and the prisoner would have owed his liberty, not to 
the direct action of the house, but to the potent intervention of the chancery’. Prothero 
notes the difficulty of invoking the aid of chancery so soon after the Commons’ 
triumph over that court in the Buckinghamshire election dispute.72 On 8 May, the 
House considered a number of possibilities: whether to attempt enforcement under the 
mace; whether to issue a still further writ of habeas corpus; whether to press for 
                                                
70 CJ: 17 April 1604 (second scribe). 
71 The full text is given in Prothero, ‘Privilege and Shirley’s Case’, pp. 738-39. 
72 Ibid., p. 735. 
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immediate royal assent to the bill; or whether to punish the warden for contempt, even 
if the royal assent were granted.73 Some legislation was always likely to be necessary 
to indemnify those involved in the arrest, as the warden of the Fleet steadfastly 
refused to free Shirley until the king assented to a bill that would ‘save’ Simpson and 
the warden himself. Initially, the House had preferred to petition for Shirley’s release, 
rather than proceeding through the mace, i.e. using its own direct authority, in line 
with the counter-precedents of Ferrers (1542), and Smalley (1576), when they had 
used the authority of the mace.74 But now, there was a crucial shift: ‘to protect its role, 
the House needed to secure Shirley’s release by itself […] and that is what it did’.75 
So it was that eventually two orders were made: first, to commit the warden to the 
Tower, close prisoner, confinement to the ‘terrifying’ Little Ease dungeon being 
stayed for one day;76 and, second, to send the serjeant to the Fleet to require the 
delivery of Shirley, i.e. under the authority of the mace.77 On 9 May, the serjeant duly 
went to the Fleet with his mace, but the mission turned into a near-circus, because of 
the actions of the feisty wife of the warden: 
The Serjeant returneth from the Fleet: Said, he demanded the Body of Sir Tho. 
Shirley three times, and called upon him at his Chamber Window. That the 
Warden’s Wife had taken all the Keys, and discharged her Servants from Attendance 
on the Prisoners: Cried out. That if they would call her Husband, he would satisfy the 
                                                
73 CJ, 1, p. 203: 8 May 1604. 
74 See Appendix 1, cases 13 and 18. 
75 Chafetz, Democracy’s Privileged Few, p. 30. 
76 The Little Ease lies twenty feet below ground in the White Tower of the Tower of London. 
Just four feet cubed, any prisoner was compelled to serve his sentence in a cramped 
and crouching position – literally, conditions of little ease: William Benham, The 
Tower of London (London: Seeley, 1906). Camus also referred to it: ‘To be sure, you 
are not familiar with that dungeon cell that was called the little-ease in the Middle 
Ages. In general, one was forgotten there for life. That cell was distinguished from 
others by ingenious dimensions. It was not high enough to stand up in, nor wide 
enough to lie down in. One had to take on an awkward manner and live on the 
diagonal; sleep was a collapse, and waking a squatting. Mon cher, there was genius – 
and I am weighing my words – in that so simple invention. Every day through the 
unchanging restriction that stiffened his body, the condemned man learned that he 
was guilty and that innocence consists in stretching joyously’: Albert Camus, The 
Fall (La Chute), translated at <http://goo.gl/OIqleh>, §109-10. 
77 CJ: 8 May 1604 (second scribe). 
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House. – He was loth to use Violence, neither had he any such Commandment [to 
use physical force], therefore returned without him.78  
Another account notes that the serjeant could ‘force no doors open at the prison, and 
the serjeant attended by a numerous crowd of merry spectators returned to 
Westminster and reported his reception’.79 Some members wanted further discussion 
of the legal points: for example, William Hakewill (Mitchell) ‘preferred a short bill to 
induce the warden of the Fleet to release his prisoner’, which left Sir Henry Montagu 
unimpressed, claiming that: ‘it helpeth not’, and that: ‘this was not a time to treat 
about matters of law, but how to deliver Sir Thomas Shirley’.80 Those requiring action 
prevailed at first. The House, on a vote of 176 to 153, decided to send six members, 
with the serjeant and mace, to the Fleet, to require Shirley’s delivery, ‘and if denied to 
press to his chamber, and, providing for the safety of the prison and prisoners, to free 
him by force’. However, the Speaker suggested that members proceeding in this way 
might be acting unlawfully, so that, in the end, none came forward to form the action 
party. Of greater satisfaction, Sir John Herbert (Monmouthshire), a privy councillor 
and second secretary of state, reported that: ‘his Majesty, upon the Reading of the 
Precedent of Ferrers [when the privilege was enforced through the mace], was 
graciously pleased to leave it to their Liberty, to proceed in the Case of Sir Tho. 
Shirley, as they thought fit; with Care and Caution for the other Prisoners’.81 This 
provides a good example of James I’s conciliatory attitude in this case, possibly 
linked to his wish to secure parliamentary approval of a formal union of England and 
Scotland. James might also have felt somewhat insecure in his grasp of English 
practice in relation to freedom from arrest. As Rait sets out, although ‘a safe conduct 
to [the Scottish] Parliament was given in 1389 […] there is no instance of the 
assertion [of the claim of the members of the Scottish parliament to freedom from 
arrest] before the year 1639 […] when the Lords of the Articles […] forbade the arrest 
                                                
78 CJ, 1, p. 204: 9 May 1604. 
79 Nichols, ‘Proceedings of the House of Commons’, p. 101. 
80 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, p. 371; Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 154. 
81 CJ, 1, p. 205: 9 May 1604. 
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of a member of Parliament "during the time of Parliament and forty-eight hours 
thereafter" ’.82 
On 10 May, there had been some thought, generated by Francis Moore, who sat 
on the privileges committee and was a close associate of the chancellor, that the latter 
might release Shirley, de bene esse.83 However, a new bill, here termed ‘the second 
bill’ – for ‘securing the debt of Simpson and others and the safety of the Warden of 
the Fleet in Sir Thomas Shirley’s case’ – was brought in on that date.84 This was 
generated by Sir Henry Montagu, and used much the same text as the first bill, in 
relation to Simpson and the others, but with one important omission. Crucially, it did 
not refer to any action by the king or chancellor to issue a writ to the warden of the 
Fleet, but again rehearsed the right of members to proceed to and from parliament 
unmolested.85 The second bill rapidly cleared the Commons, and was sent up to the 
Lords.86 Yet, as described below, in relation to the fifth issue of this section, the 
timing of the royal assent to this bill was problematic. 
By 11 May, the Commons found their own authority in tatters, after a second 
abortive mission by the serjeant-at-arms. The warden was again brought to the 
Commons, reminded of his contempt, threatened with further punishment, and asked 
if he would yield. He nevertheless remained ‘perverse’, and was told by the Speaker 
that he had increased his contempt; he was now to be ‘terrified’, by being put into the 
Little Ease.87 He was, however, additionally informed that legislation was in hand to 
indemnify him. There were two developments on the following day, 12 May. First, 
the Commons decided to send five members to ascertain whether the warden was 
indeed in the Little Ease. Second, in a positive turn of events, the lieutenant of the 
Tower wrote: 
                                                
82 Sir Robert Sangster Rait, The Parliaments of Scotland (Glasgow: Maclehose, 1924), p. 526. 
83 A conditional ending, or stay, of proceedings; in Shirley’s case; this might have been like a 
release on bail. 
84 CJ: 10 May 1604 (second scribe). 
85 The full text is given in Prothero, ‘Privilege and Shirley’s Case’, pp. 739-40. 
86 The Lords gave the bill its first and second readings on 10 May, and a third reading on 
12 May, after which it was returned with some amendments to the Commons, who 
sent a message in reply, thanking the Lords for the expeditious passage of the bill: CJ 
and LJ, May 1604, passim. 
87 CJ, 1, p. 207: 11 May 1604. 
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The Warder, of the Fleet […] now hath some Feeling of his own Error and 
Obstinacy; and because, as he now apprehendeth, it pleased you Yesterday to open 
unto him the Grace, which he received from both the Houses of Parliament, in 
providing for his Security; his humble Desire is, that by some of the House (namely 
Sir Francys Hastinges and Sir Nathaniel Bacon) he may be resolved therein; 
whereupon he will, as he saith, most humbly submit himself, upon Monday in the 
Morning, to deliver the Body of Sir Thomas Sherley unto the Serjeant, if it shall 
please you to send him.88  
Events began to turn more rapidly: on 14 May, Sir Herbert Croft (Herefordshire) 
reported on the members’ visit to the Tower, noting ‘the Warden's insolent Carriage’, 
and ‘Great Fault in the Lieutenant, that he did not make clean and ready the Place 
called Little Ease (being reported to be very loathsome, unclean, and not used a long 
Time, either for Prison, or other cleanly Purpose) as the Order of the House might 
have been performed in Time’. The House was in angry mood: many members spoke, 
and Sir Thomas Hoby (Scarborough) and others advocated issuing a writ of habeas 
corpus to the lessee of the Fleet, Sir George Reynolds. Reynolds was called in, but he 
told the House that he had had a lease of the Fleet ‘for divers Years, and the now 
Warden had a Lease from him for Two Years yet enduring; and that he was thereby 
absolute Warden’.89 In other words, Reynolds was not in an executive position 
directly to arrange Shirley’s release.  
The House considered motions for a fine of £1,000 to be imposed on the 
lieutenant for not doing his duty, and a fine of £100 a day on the warden: ‘for every 
Day from henceforth, that Sir Tho. Shirley is detained’, as well as debarring the 
warden from holding any office. Significantly, the Commons noted that there had 
already been two cases of privilege in this parliament – ‘remora, a little fish stayeth 
great ships’.90 In the end, the House did not pursue some of the extreme ideas, but 
                                                
88 CJ, 1, p. 208: 12 May 1604. The dating of this concession is curious, as it is placed 
chronologically in the Commons’ Journal before further attempts to force the hand of 
the warden. 
89 CJ: 14 May 1604 (second scribe). 
90 The other case was that of the disputed Buckinghamshire election. Remora is the 
suckerfish, popularly believed to be able to prevent the forward motion of a ship 
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took four decisions. First, a warrant was to be directed [to the clerk of the crown] for a 
new writ of habeas corpus cum causa. Second, the serjeant should go to the Fleet 
with the writ. Third, that the warden was to be ‘brought to the Fleet door by Mr. 
Lieutenant himself, and there the Writ be delivered unto him, and the Commandment 
of the House, by the Serjeant, for the Executing of it’. Fourth, that the Warden should 
‘be committed to the Dungeon in the Tower, called Little Ease’. It appears that the 
Commons decided on a discreet approach to the king, rather than presenting a formal 
petition: ‘It was observed, that Mr. Vice-chamberlain to the King, was privately 
instructed to go to the King, and humbly desire, that he would be pleased to command 
the Warden, on his Allegiance, to deliver Sir Tho. not as petitioned by the House, but 
as of himself found fit in his own gracious Judgment’.91 It is not entirely clear 
whether the warden was consequently instructed by the king to yield, or whether he 
was persuaded by the stick and carrot approach of the Commons; in any case, he had 
apparently already indicated his willingness to deliver up Shirley. Lambert 
conjectures that the former is more likely,92 although the warden would surely have 
still required some kind of guarantee, royal or otherwise, that he would not be liable 
for the debt. In any event, the Speaker reported on 15 May that he had received 
correspondence from the warden, ‘both expressing his Penitency for his former 
Obstinacy, and his Willingness to deliver the Prisoner; desiring withal, that he might 
be spared from the Dungeon until this Morning; that he might lie in the Fleet the last 
Night, for providing some Money, which he had to pay the next Day’. They included 
the poignant sentence: ‘I remain still in Little Ease: I have come in no Bed these 
Three Nights; my Wife is barred Access to me, and no Servant of mine to minister to 
my Wants’. The Speaker wrote back that ‘if the Warden would yield the Prisoner 
presently, he would take upon him, that he might be spared from the Dungeon till this 
Morning. Upon that Answer, he caused Sir Tho. to be delivered’. On his release, 
Shirley came to the House ‘and, after the Oath taken, he was instantly admitted to sit 
.......................................................................................... 
through its adherence. 
91 CJ, 1, p. 210: 14 May 1604. 
92 Lambert, ‘Procedure’, p. 771. 
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in the House’.93 Shirley might now be sitting in the House, but the Commons were not 
immediately prepared to forgive. The warden of the Fleet was released from the Little 
Ease, but remained in the Tower until 19 May, when he, ‘being called in, kneeling, 
confessed his Error unfeignedly, to have offended this honourable House: That he was 
sorry he had offended. And thereupon was pardoned, and discharged by the House, 
paying his Fees’.94 On 9 June, Sir Edward Hoby proposed: ‘that Simpson, a Prisoner 
in the Tower, for arresting Sir Tho. Shirley, might be brought into the House on 
Monday; and that the House would extend Mercy towards him, paying his Fees’.95 On 
11 June, Simpson, somewhat curiously, asked why he had been ordered to appear, and 
was told this was with a view to releasing him. Whereupon, he ‘fell into a fit of an 
infirmity’, and was ordered to reappear on the following day.96 Perhaps because of 
this incapacity, he did not appear on 12 June, and had to remain in the Tower until 
19 June. Finally, Simpson was released ‘to his former Liberty without further 
Impediment or Restraint’, after petitioning the House, and paying his fees. Simpson 
was also informed of the bill for his indemnity, touching Shirley’s debt: in other 
words, his right to pursue the debt once Shirley was no longer an MP.97 In June 1604, 
an arrangement was reached through the royal agency, whereby the manors and lands 
of the Shirleys would be restored to them, at an annual rent of about £2,000, payable 
to the king.98 
Prothero exemplifies the mainstream view of Shirley’s case as one that is 
generally regarded as having finally settled the question of privilege of freedom from 
arrest in the Commons’ favour.99 However, that settlement followed considerable 
uncertainty by the Commons, in terms of the method by which it could exert its 
authority – habeas corpus, or direct action under the mace, or a petition to the king, or 
a specific piece of legislation. Obtaining Shirley’s release was a messy business, 
which required one of the principals to be put into a dungeon in the Tower. Certainly, 
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96 CJ, 1, p. 236: 11 June 1604. 
97 CJ, 1, p. 242: 19 June 1604. 
98 Davies, Elizabethans Errant, p. 46. 
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if the warden of the Fleet had been confident that, if he released Shirley, he would not 
be liable for the large sum of money involved, things might have been concluded 
much more quickly, and with far less challenge to the Commons’ authority. The issue 
of where liability for the debt of a person released under privilege lay is therefore 
considered next. 
*** *** *** 
The fourth issue reflected considerable doubt about who precisely was responsible for 
meeting a debt, if a debtor-member ‘escaped’, by claiming privilege: was it the 
member, or the relevant sheriff, or the gaoler; did the creditor have to stand a loss, or 
could he reactivate the processes to recover the debt, once the member was no longer 
entitled to privilege? The problem was that a gaoler was held liable for any escape, 
not just where a prisoner had absconded, but also situations where the gaoler had 
released someone before his case had been dealt with in the courts.100 Although 
writing in the 1760s, Blackstone identifies key legal points that would have obtained 
at the time of Shirley’s arrest: 
THE writ of capias satisfaciendum is an execution of the highest nature, inasmuch as it 
deprives a man of his liberty, till he makes the satisfaction awarded; […] When a 
defendant is once in custody upon this process, he is to be kept in arcta et salva custodia 
[in close and safe custody], and, if he be afterwards seen at large, it is an escape; and 
the plaintiff may have an action thereupon against the sheriff for his whole debt. […] 
Escapes are either voluntary, or negligent. Voluntary are such as are by the express 
consent of the keeper, after which he never can retake his prisoner again, (though the 
plaintiff may retake him at any time) but the sheriff must answer for the debt. 
Negligent escapes are where the prisoner escapes without his keeper’s knowlege or 
consent.101 
                                                
100 See the definition of an escaper in p. 82n. above. 
101 William Curry (ed.), The Commentaries of Sir William Blackstone, Knt. On the Laws and 
Constitution of England (London: W. Clarke & Son, 1796), III, p. 413. ‘Capias ad 
satisfaciendum is ‘a writ of execution issued upon a judgment in a personal action, 
for the recovery of money, directed to the sheriff, or coroner, commanding him to 
take the defendant, and him safely keep, so that he may have his body in court on the 
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An early statute had placed the responsibility for the safe keeping of any prisoner on 
the gaoler, who became liable for the debt if the prisoner ‘escaped’.102 A further 
medieval statute attempted to address the ‘great Mischief and Undoing of many 
People’, by enacting that ‘a prisoner by judgement shall not be set at large’. The act 
set out that prisoners at the Fleet prison ‘be oftentimes suffered to go at large by the 
Warden of the Prison, sometime by Mainprise [surety] or by Bail, and sometimes 
without any Mainprise with a Baston103 of the Fleet […] and be long out of Prison 
Nights and Days, without the Assent at whose Suit they be judged’. The statute 
established that, unless the prisoner was freed by order of the king, ‘the Plaintiffs 
shall have their Recovery against the same Warden by Writ of Debt’.104 Releasing a 
prisoner who claimed parliamentary privilege was therefore none the less an ‘escape’.  
 This issue had a long, continuing history, including the cases of Larke, Clerk, and 
Hyde, which were presented as precedents on 16 April 1604, and were to be referred 
to again on 2 May: all had involved a petition from the Commons to the king.105 
These precedents maintained the right of privilege for the member, but allowed the 
legal processes to be taken up again, after the parliament was over; they also 
indemnified the sheriff and officers against actions by the creditor. It is important to 
note that in each of the precedents, the prisoner was held in execution, not on mesne 
process, so that ‘it was necessary to have an Act of Parliament to save to the parties a 
right of a new Execution after the time of Privilege’.106 Moreover, in the Fitzherbert 
case, Coke, at that time Speaker and solicitor general, had proposed that ‘it is no 
.......................................................................................... 
return day, to satisfy (ad satisfaciendum) the plaintiff’: in Legal Dictionary Online, at 
<http://goo.gl/Gd2iO>. 
102 Statutum Mercatorum [Statute of Merchants] 1285 (13 Edw. I). 
103 A tipstaff. ‘Prisoners were allowed to go at large by bail, or with a "baston" (tipstaff), for 
nights and days together […] confirmed by a rule of court during the reign of 
James I’: in BHOL, at <http://tinyurl.com/o88pzr3>. 
104 Prisoners for Debt 1377 (1 Rich. II c. 12), in Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, II, p. 5. 
The statute also penalised those who feigned having debts to the king, thereby 
delaying the pursuit of suits for debt by private individuals. 
105 See pp. 53f. above; and Appendix 1, cases 4, 7, and 9. 
106 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 46. The nuances between arrests on mesne process and on 
an execution were partly clarified in 1625, when the Commons declared that anyone 
who was ‘in execution’ for debt could not be validly elected: Sommerville, The 
Liberties of the Subject, p. 61. 
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escape in the Sheriff, nor would the person lose his action of doubt, though 
Fitzherbert should be delivered’.107 In the Shirley case, it was felt to be clear that the 
‘Remedy [for the debt was] against the Debtor, and not against the Sheriff’, an 
apparent contrary precedent notwithstanding: ‘35 H. VIII. [1543–44] the Gaoler 
delivered a Prisoner; the Party sued the Gaoler’.108  
 In an earlier debate, in March 1604, the Commons had heard from a number of 
leading members, including several serjeants-at-law. This debate is highly significant, 
in that it shows how uncertain the law was in relation to this issue, and the danger of 
members avoiding rightful financial obligations. There was a view ‘that the House 
should so proceed as they gave not Way and Encouragement to others to practise to 
be arrested upon Execution with a Purpose, by Pretence of Privilege, to discharge the 
Debt’ [nullify any process for recovery at some future point].109 Two members, 
Anthony Dyott and Lawrence Tanfield (Oxfordshire), thought that, if Shirley were 
released, the creditor would be unable to execute the same arrest warrant again, no 
matter how much his grievance was justified, and would therefore lose his money.110 
Many who spoke were dissatisfied with this potential legal difficulty. Sir John 
Doddridge (Horsham) suggested that ‘Shirley’s release from prison by order of the 
Commons would have the unwanted effect of discharging his debt, but "wished that 
conference might be had with the judges" to settle the matter’.111 Robert Hitcham 
(King’s Lynn) suggested that ‘the creditor might obtain another writ of execution 
after the session, but that no penalty should be imposed on the sheriff’.112 Humphrey 
Winch (Bedford) apparently argued that the writ for Shirley’s release would simply 
put the arrest warrant for the debt on hold, with the creditor being able to reactivate 
                                                
107 Appendix 1, case 22; Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 108. 
108 CJ: 27 March 1604 (second scribe). This was the case of William Trewynnard: 
Appendix 1, case 14. 
109 CJ, 1, p. 155: 27 March 1604. 
110 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 138, and ibid., VI, p. 492. 
111 Manners, in Healy, CD 1604-1607, pp. 25, 28: 24 March 1604. 
112 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 707. This was in line with a more 
accommodating principle: that a sheriff is not necessarily acquainted with all nuances 
of the law, and is also obliged to comply with legal writs and processes, although he 
should not capriciously or ‘boldly’ set a prisoner at large, and could be amerced if he 
did so: Maseres, Cases and Records, pp. 60-61. 
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the recovery process after the end of the session.113 George Snygge (Bristol) was 
clearly aware of Shirley’s character, suggesting that he might have had himself 
elected expressly to avoid his debts: ‘yf Sir Thomas procured him selffe 
extraordynarylie to be a burgesse he ought not to have his priviledge’.114 In a later 
debate, on 5 April, there was continuing concern that Shirley should not be released 
before the arguments on both sides were heard in respect of the debt.115 The issue was 
raised yet again, on 16 April, when it was decided: ‘That he [Shirley] was to have 
privilege: but because the creditor might not loose his debte, nor the Warden of the 
Fleete be in danger for an escape, ordered that he should not be delivered till peticion 
made according to former presidents for the saveing of them’.116 
Both the ‘first bill’ and the ‘second bill’ did not simply provide for Shirley’s 
release, but also addressed the difficulties and anomalies that the lawyers had 
identified in the Commons’ debates and their deliberations in committee. As already 
recorded, the first bill had made provision to petition the king for Shirley’s release. 
However, it also established that ‘the said Sheriffe of London, the nowe Warden of 
the fleete, and all others, that have had the said Thomas [Shirley] in Custodie, since 
the said first arrest, theire executrs or administratrors any of them maie not be in any 
wise hurt, endamaged or greeved, because of the said dismissing at large of the said 
Thomas’. It further set out that Shirley was not excused his debts, simply on the 
grounds that he had enjoyed privilege at some prior point. Simpson and other 
creditors could proceed to recover what they were owed, after the dissolution of the 
parliament, as the bill allowed for: ‘theire and any of theire execucions and suits at all 
tyme, and tymes after the dissolving of this present Parliament, to be taken out and 
persecuted as if the said Thomas had never bene arrested or taken in execucion’.117 
                                                
113 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 804. 
114 Manners, in Healy, CD 1604-1607, pp. 28-29: 27 March 1604. 
115 CJ, 1, p. 167: 5 April 1604. 
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The Commons remained unclear on the issue of liability, and on 2 May, they were 
presented with some recent precedents: those of Smalley, Curwen and Hogan, 
together with ‘three precedents out of the Tower; Two of them in English and one in 
French’, which they had already considered, on 16 April.118 Smalley’s case implied 
that Shirley could be freed, but at the risk of punishment from the House, or an order 
for him to pay the debt. Curwen’s case had seen the arresting serjeant threatened with 
vicarious liability for the debt, whereas in Hogan’s case the warden of the Fleet was 
indemnified for any such vicarious responsibility. As Hogan’s case occurred at the 
very end of Elizabeth’s reign, it perhaps served as a model for what the warden of the 
Fleet expected for himself in Shirley’s case. The precedent of requiring the privileged 
person to enter into a surety for any sum in dispute might reasonably have been 
followed. 
There was a significant difference between the two bills in other areas: the second 
bill again provided that Simpson could seek recovery of the debt, and indemnified the 
sheriff, warden of the Fleet, and others in similar positions of authority.119 On the date 
of the introduction of the second bill, the Speaker read out a letter from the wife of the 
warden of the Fleet, in which she made a suggestion for legal guarantees: 
If it seem pleasing unto you to certify me, under the Hand of the Three Chief Justices, 
that it is no Escape; or to send for Simpson, and persuade him to release all Escapes; 
or Sir Thomas Sherleye, to put in good Security for his true Imprisonment; or to 
invent any Ways for my Safety, whereby I and mine perish not in the Street; I am, in 
all Willingness, ready to obey, and discharge him in an Hour’s Warning.120  
.......................................................................................... 
Debte of Simpson and others, and save harmles the Warden of the Flete in Sir 
Thomas Sherleye’s Case 1603 [1604] (1 Jas. I c. 10, private act): Raithby (ed.), 
Statutes of the Realm, IV part II, p. 1017. 
118 CJ, 1, p. 195: 2 May 1604. The three new cases are described more fully on p. 53 above, 
and in Appendix 1, cases 18, 24, and 23. A footnote in CJ explains that the unnamed 
precedents related to William Hyde, William Larke, and Walter Clerk, referred to on 
16 April: see p. 91 above. 
119 Prothero, ‘Privilege and Shirley’s Case’, pp. 739-40. 
120 CJ, 1, p. 206: 10 May 1604. 
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The Commons were clearly not in a position to secure any such guarantees. The first 
bill and the second bill referred specifically to the circumstances of Shirley’s arrest, 
so, in order to generalise the position, what was at first described as ‘The Bill for the 
Relief of Plaintiffs in Writs of Execution, where the Defendants in such Writs have 
been arrested, and set at Liberty by the Parliament’ was introduced on 20 April. This 
was not a purely private measure, and was enacted as the ‘Privilege of Parliament 
Act’ in the summer of 1604. It provided that: 
If any person being arrested in Execution, and by priviledge of either of the Houses of 
Parliament set at libertie […] that from henceforthe noe Shiriffe Bayliffe or other 
Officer from whose Arreste or Custodie any such person so arrested in Execution 
shalbe delivered by any such Priviledge, shall be charged or chargeable with or by 
any Action whatsoever for deliveringe out of Execution any such priviledged person 
so as is aforesaide, by suche Priviledge of Parliament set at Libertie. 
Further, any creditor who had been thwarted from debt recovery, through the 
invoking of privilege, could arrange for a new writ ‘after such tyme as the priviledge 
of that Session of Parliament in which such priviledge shall be so graunted shall 
cease’. Lastly, the Act provided that those arresting a member of either House could 
still be punished for their breach of privilege.121 In other words, privilege of 
parliament did not give any member a perpetual immunity from debt recovery. The 
1604 Act was a major advance in clarifying that parliamentary immunity only 
provided a stay in proceedings involving members, although there were still some 
ambiguities. So, at the end of James I’s first parliament, the issue of ‘escapes’ arose in 
a different form, in the case of Sir Vincent Skinner. The Commons had granted 
Skinner privilege, but held that:  
                                                
121 Privilege of Parliament Act 1603 : An Acte for New Executions to Be Sued Againste Any 
Which Shall Hereafter Be Delivered out of Execution by Priviledge of Parliament, 
and for Discharge of Them out of Whose Custody Such Persons Shall Be Delivered 
1604 (1 Jas. I c. 13), in Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, IV, part II, p. 1029. The 
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contemporary legal fiction that parliamentary legislation was dated to the first day of 
a parliamentary session, however long, and regardless of when the royal assent was 
given: C. R. Cheney (ed.), A Handbook of Dates : For Students of British History, 
2nd edn. (Cambridge: UP, 2000), p. 108. 
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This was an escape in the sheriff to suffer the prisoner to go into Hertfordshire (the 
sheriff may make his prison where he will in the county but not in some other county). 
And such an escape that the sheriff is not only by this subject to an action by the 
creditors, but he cannot after justify the taking or detaining of the prisoner, but the 
prisoner may have an audita querela in such case to be discharged of execution, because 
the escape is voluntary.122  
On the other hand, the protection for creditors was recalled, when, in 1621, the sheriff 
of Middlesex was ordered to free a servant of the chancellor of the duchy of 
Lancaster, and was told: ‘And there is an act of parliament that dischargeth you and 
keepeth the party plaintiff from prejudice by giving him power to renew his 
execution’.123 The protection for sheriffs can be seen in an eighteenth-century work 
on the law: ‘for if no default or laches124 can be ascribed to the sheriff there can be no 
reason to charge him with the debt; and there seems to have been no default in him 
[…] and the law supposes him to be a lay person, and not to have knowledge of the 
law; and he is therefore unable to argue or dispute whether any writ that he receives 
comes to him with or without sufficient authority’.125 However, when the plague was 
threatening London in 1625, prisoners in the Fleet Prison petitioned the House of 
Lords, ‘whereby they humbly desired to have the Benefit of His Majesty’s Writ of 
Habeas corpus, etc. (heretofore used but now denied), in this Time of Infection’.126 
This was referred to the Commons, whereby misgivings were expressed, particularly 
over freeing prisoners through habeas corpus, as this would be ‘directly an escape in 
law’. Although sympathetic to the prisoners’ case, the Commons decided ‘To deliver 
to the Lords, as the Opinion of this House, that an Habeas Corpus, as now used, is 
                                                
122 Add MS 48119, in Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610, II, p. 307: 30 October 1610. Audita 
Querela is ‘a writ applicable to the case of a defendant against whom a judgment has 
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against Law, and an Escape. 2ly, To deliver it to the Lords, as the Opinion of the 
House, that this being an Escape, a Creditor, consenting, shall never take him more in 
Execution; for, if he do, the Prisoner may have an Audita Querela’.127 
In summary, legislation arising from Shirley’s case indemnified sheriffs and 
gaolers from any vicarious liabilities for the debts of members who had been released 
by claiming privilege.128 However, later events showed that members, and their real 
or sham servants, still used privilege of parliament to hold off creditors, at least over 
the period during which parliament sat.129 
*** *** *** 
The fifth and final issue was whether the royal assent to all bills from the session 
automatically ended a parliament – or might exceptional assent be given to a single 
bill that had passed all its parliamentary stages? As Cheney sets out: ‘In the sixteenth 
century […] there was an opinion […] that a session was automatically determined by 
the royal assent to a bill (which for centuries past had normally taken place on the last 
day of a parliament)’.130 Cheney refers to the Commons’ Journal of 1554, which 
records: ‘Upon a Question asked in the House, if, upon the Royal Assent, the 
Parliament may proceed without any Prorogation; It is agreed by Voices, that it 
may’.131 That decision reflected a situation a situation that arose in 1553, when Mary I 
was so delighted by the speedy passage of a bill that embodied her religious policies 
that she came in person to give her immediate assent, with the loss of other pending 
legislation, not least the bill that would have granted her supply. Whether the royal 
assent could only be given at the end of a session was a question that, in different 
ways, nevertheless exercised the Commons and the warden of the Fleet in 1604. The 
Commons had failed to obtain Shirley’s release through writs of habeas corpus, or 
                                                
127 CJ, 1, p. 808: 9 July 1625. 
128 A number of pieces of legislation followed through into the eighteenth century, which 
increasingly strengthened the right of a creditor to renew a suit for his debt after 
someone ceased to be an MP. 
129 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, pp. 90-91, details some of the abuses. The issue of abuses is 
also considered more fully in chapter five below. 
130 Cheney (ed.), Handbook of Dates, p. 107. 
131 CJ, 1, p. 38: 21 November 1554. 
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using the serjeant-at-arms directly. However, the alternative of specific legislation had 
the drawback that the royal assent was only given at the end of a parliament, so that 
Shirley would not sit before that time. Equally, the warden was not prepared to 
release Shirley, simply on the basis of a bill that might not, in the end, be passed in a 
form that protected him. Was there any way out of the impasse? In sending the first 
bill up to the Lords on 21 April, the Commons asked them ‘to move the King’s 
Majesty for His Royal Assent to be speedily granted unto the Bill concerning Sir 
Thomas Sherley; signifying that, if it should depend till the End of the Parliament, the 
Desire and Purpose of their House by this Bill would be frustrate’.132 On 28 April, the 
Lords considered issues over the manner and timing of the royal assent:  
Which being to be done but by Two Ways, videlicet, either by His Majesty’s presence 
or by Commission, the Lords do hold the first unfit, that His Majesty should be 
moved to come in Person purposely, for the giving of His Royal Assent to any one 
private Bill; and for the second, concerning the Royal Assent by Commission, some 
Doubt is conceived, whether the King’s Royal Assent to one Bill apart, do not 
conclude a Session.133  
On the same day, Sir Edward Hoby told the Commons about the Lords’ uncertainties, 
and a possible solution: 
For his Highness’ Royal Assent to the Bill; whether the King should come in Person, 
or be done by Commission, they doubted: Both too much in the Case of a private 
Person: but this a Matter of Privilege, concerning the whole House. It were fit a 
Petition were exhibited to his Majesty from the House, that he would be pleased to 
give his Royal Assent; leaving the Manner to himself.134  
Consequently, the Commons dispatched Sir John Herbert ‘with divers others’, to ask 
for a conference with the Lords on a number of matters, including ‘Furtherance and 
Expedition to the Bill for Sir Thomas Sherley’. Although the Lords went on to give 
the bill a third reading on 30 April, the problem remained: would the royal assent end 
                                                
132 LJ, 2, p. 283: 21 April 1604. 
133 LJ, 2, p. 286: 28 April 1604. 
134 CJ, 1, p. 189: 28 April 1604. 
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the session, or, put another way, would it only be given at the end of a session, such 
that the warden would not feel able to release Shirley to take his seat before that 
point? Interestingly, however, Shirley had already, on 26 April, ‘suggested a way of 
overcoming this difficulty himself. In a letter to Cecil, he proposed that the king 
should merely promise to give his assent. That way the Commons need not worry that 
it would lose its legislation, and he might then be released’.135 This suggestion was 
followed up, when, on 4 May, the House considered the draft of a petition to the king, 
asking him to pass the bill to secure Shirley’s release. Having rehearsed the 
background to the case, the draft petition went on to request: ‘for that the Service of 
the said Sir Thomas Shirley is needful in the Commons House, during this present 
Session of Parliament, that Your Majesty would vouchsafe, out of Your Grace and 
Clemency, to signify under Your Highness’ Hand, upon this Petition, that Your 
Majesty will give Your Royal Assent to the said Bill, in the End of the Parliament’. 
However, it appeared that the House feared that its rights to independent action might 
be compromised, so that the draft petition ‘was not approved, nor thought fit by the 
House to proceed in that Manner, being, as was conceived, some Impeachment to the 
Privilege of the House’.136 Nevertheless, some more discreet approach must have 
been made, as, on 9 May, the Commons were told that the king was prepared ‘to leave 
it to their Liberty, to proceed in the Case of Sir Tho. Shirley, as they thought fit’.137 A 
day later, the Commons received further news that James was prepared to be helpful: 
‘Sir Roger Aston [Cheshire] delivereth from the King, that, in verbo Principis, he will 
give his Royal Assent at the End of the Session’.138 
The issue of whether the royal assent to a bill automatically ended a parliamentary 
session remained unresolved at the end of the case, as Shirley was eventually released 
after the warden ended his resistance. Nevertheless, the weight of opinion appeared to 
be that the royal assent terminated a session. In 1621, at a time when a distinction was 
being drawn between adjournments and prorogations, a bill was introduced that the 
                                                
135 HMC Hatfield, xvi. 71-2, in Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 321. 
136 CJ, 1, p. 198: 4 May 1604. The wording of the draft petition is given in the second scribe’s 
record for that date. 
137 CJ, 1, p. 205: 9 May 1604. 
138 CJ, 1, p. 205: 10 May 1604. 
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particular ‘session shall not determine by his Majesty’s Royal Assent to some 
Bills’.139 There was, however, a clear exception, when in 1625, during a plague 
epidemic in London, parliament was likely to be adjourned. The issue of whether all 
bills would be lost was addressed by the passage of a bill, which rehearsed the 
background: that unfinished ‘weightie’ business might be aborted, because of the 
adjournment owing to the plague. It specified that: ‘His Majesties Royall assent unto 
one or more Acts of Parliament will not be a determination of this present Session’. 
Any bills receiving the royal assent were to take effect immediately.140 As a result, 
before the adjournment and subsequent regathering at Oxford, ‘Mr. Speaker went up, 
attended by divers of the House; where, in his Presence, the Royal Assent was given 
unto some Bills; and then he, and the House, came down’.141 By the time of the Long 
Parliament, it seemed that the royal assent might be given in the middle of a session, 
when the king agreed to a bill that provided for triennial parliaments, as well as to the 
bill of attainder of the earl of Strafford.142  
Conclusions 
In some areas, uncertainties that were exposed in Shirley’s case were largely resolved 
by the summer of 1604: for example, there was a brisk, unequivocal decision that 
privilege of freedom from legal processes and arrest applied to people who had been 
declared elected, but who had not yet taken the oath at the start of the parliament. 
There was an equally clear understanding that the royal assent to bills ended the 
parliament, so that it was not possible to give the assent to any individual measure 
during the course of a session. The case had exposed differences of opinion about 
whether arresting officers and gaolers were vicariously liable for the debt of any 
member who was released through privilege of parliament, and whether creditors lost 
their rights when a member was so freed. As a result, both specific and general 
                                                
139 CJ., 1, p. 633: 31 May 1621. The bill was not enacted: there were only two statutes in 
1621, and both concerned supply. 
140 An Act, that this Session of Parliament shall not determyne by his Majesties Royall assent 
to this and some other Actes 1625 (1 Car. I c. 7), in Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the 
Realm V, pp. 21-22. 
141 CJ, 1, p. 809: 11 July 1625. 
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legislation indemnified the former, and allowed the latter to pursue their claims once a 
member was no longer privileged. Importantly, the case, and the legislation passed in 
consequence, clearly established that the Commons could directly obtain the release 
of privileged members, with no need for any specific legislation, or exercise of the 
royal grace. This was reinforced in 1626, when the Commons declared: ‘the House 
hath power, when they see cause, to send the Serjeant immediately to deliver a 
prisoner’.143 Such pronouncements, and the handling of later cases, show a certainty 
about the management of privilege that grew from the time of Shirley’s case onwards, 
as seen through the work of senior members, lawyers, and the committee for 
privileges. In relation to bankruptcy, however, there was far less clarity. Although 
James hoped to prevent outlaws and bankrupts from sitting, Shirley was not debarred; 
the issue remained, and the Commons continued to act quite inconsistently. It might 
reasonably be argued that such inconsistencies contributed to the abuses of the 
privilege of freedom from arrest seen in cases that arose at later points in this period, 
and which were to exercise the king and both Houses. 
As the case ended, and after some bruising encounters, where the main difficulties 
lay with the warden of the Fleet, rather than a king who had been discreetly helpful, 
the Commons were more confident in their own strength as an institution. They were 
increasingly sure that their privileges were ‘ancient and undoubted’, and in 
accordance with precedents. They had been careful to work within the law. They had 
defended their right to free members who had been arrested and imprisoned for civil 
matters. The abandonment of the ‘first bill’, which would have relied on an 
intervention by crown and chancery to break the impasse of Shirley’s continuing 
detention, provides evidence, not of some teleological ‘turning point’, but of a 
recognition that the Commons could use their own strength to maintain their rights 
and privileges: this was evolutionary, rather than revolutionary. The Form of Apology 
and Satisfaction, dated 20 June 1604, includes a section on Shirley’s case that 
provides an appropriate endpoint for this chapter: 
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In the delivery of Sir Thomas Shirley our proceedings were long; our defence of them 
shall be brief. We had to do with a man, the Warden of the Fleet, so intractable and 
of so resolved obstinacy as that nothing we could do, no, not your Majesty’s royal 
word for confirmation thereof, could satisfy him for his own security. This was the 
cause of the length of that business: our privileges were so shaken before, and so 
extremely vilified, as that we held it not fit in so unreasonable a time and against so 
mean a subject to seek our right by any other course of law or by any strength than by 
our own.144
                                                
144 Tanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents : James I, p. 225. 
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IV : DEVELOPMENTS AND CASES 1603-1629 
Introduction 
This chapter looks at a range of privilege cases across the early Stuart parliaments, set 
within a context of varying parliamentary landscapes.1 Change over this period had three 
aspects: first, privilege and grievances became increasingly interlinked; second, some 
individual cases moved privilege into new, sometimes contentious, areas; third, 
‘privilege’ was treated as an entity, encompassing freedom from physical and verbal 
molestations; arrests and detentions, the safeguarding of servants and property, and 
immunity from most other legal processes. Each parliament not only saw privilege cases 
of a familiar type, such as when members or servants were arrested, or issued with 
subpoenas, but also witnessed stronger, extended, or novel interpretations of the scope of 
the privilege of freedom from arrest and legal processes, for example, in its extension to 
those having business with the Commons, such as petitioners; in the matter of punishing 
and pardoning transgressors; or the challenge to the court of high commission. The 
Commons took a particularly robust stance in the both the Shirley case, and the 
exchanges of 1629 that followed the seizure of a member’s goods by customs officials, 
which are considered separately, in chapter six below. Progress was not, however, even, 
and it will be seen that there were both advances and setbacks in the Commons’ moves to 
maintain their privileges, set against to the crown’s equally strong desire to maintain its 
prerogative rights. So, whereas it is clear that many members wanted the Commons’ 
privileges and the royal prerogative ‘to stand well together’, by the 1620s there was 
increasing, palpable concern that the ‘freedom of ancient parliaments’ was under threat.2 
Moreover, whenever periodic clashes over privileges occurred, both James I and 
Charles I tended to restate their commitment to the maintenance, but not the extension, of 
privileges that had been granted by their predecessors. The Commons were increasingly 
concerned across the period that grievances, including alleged assaults on their privileges, 
                                                
1 This research has identified 191 cases that were raised in the Commons during this period. 
2 The quoted phrases come from a speech by Sir John Eliot: Diary of John Pym, fol. 8v, in Baker 
(ed.), Proceedings 1624: 27 February 1624. 
Page 114 
should be addressed before any grant of supply, fearing that if they did not achieve this, 
the king would dissolve the parliament as soon as supply had been secured. For their part, 
both kings were anxious to see the Commons deal with supply issues more expeditiously, 
and to spend less time preparing ‘protestations’, or talking about matters that they 
considered to be literally none of their business. 
The chapter is structured along broadly chronological lines: the key developments in 
each of the early Stuart parliaments are presented, as these related to, or affected, 
privilege matters, with descriptions of significant privilege cases, particularly those which 
illustrate the interplay between privilege, prerogative, grievances, and supply.3 As has 
been set out earlier, privilege was meant to ensure that men could contribute to the work 
of a parliament, unaffected by ‘molestation’ – a term that covered physical assaults, 
physical detention and other legal entanglements that might affect themselves, their 
servants, or their property. The descriptions in this chapter make reference to Hatsell’s 
grouping of privilege cases that fall within this broad area: 
 
1. The commitment [to prison] of members, or their servants by the Privy Council, or 
by any court of justice, or other magistrate.4 
2. The arrest and imprisonment of members, or their servants in civil suits.5 
3. The summoning of members, or their servants, to attend inferior courts, as witnesses, 
jurymen, & co.6 
4. The prosecuting of suits at law, against members, or their servants, during the time of 
Privilege.7 
5. Taking the goods or effects of a member in execution, or otherwise.8 
6. Assaulting or insulting a member, or his servant, or traducing his character.9 
                                                
3 Privilege issues in the 1628-9 parliament are mainly considered within chapter six below. 
4 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 131-53. 
5 Ibid., pp. 153-65. 
6 Ibid., pp. 165-71. 
7 Ibid., pp. 171-82. 
8 Ibid., pp. 182-85. 
9 Ibid., pp. 185-89. 
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The early Stuart parliaments 
The 1604 parliament 
As has been shown in chapter three above, the arrest and imprisonment of Sir Thomas 
Shirley, in breach of his presumed privilege, took up considerable parliamentary time in 
the first months of the initial Jacobean parliament, and raised many important issues. In 
his own extended description of the Shirley case, Hatsell, perhaps harshly, identifies an 
inconsistency in the views of Sir Edward Coke, concerning the appropriate procedure for 
freeing an arrested member. He referred to the Fitzherbert case of 1593.10 Coke, at that 
time both Speaker and solicitor general, had proposed: ‘That, before a Writ of Privilege 
should be granted, it would best suit the gravity of the House to grant a Habeas Corpus 
cum causa, returnable in Chancery, the Sheriff to appear, and the whole matter being 
transmitted out of the Chancery, the House then to judge upon the whole Record’.11 In the 
Shirley case, Coke had shifted, or perhaps developed, his thinking, so that he now 
proposed that privilege was to apply ‘in case of any arrest, or any distress of goods, 
serving any process, summoning the land of a member, citation or summoning his person, 
arresting his person, suing him in any court’. The privilege was to be enforced through a 
letter from the Speaker, with the penalty of ‘censure at the next session’.12 The Shirley 
case can be seen to have strengthened privilege in two key areas. First, the Commons 
were now more confident about deploying their own authority to free members, using 
either the authority of the mace, or a Speaker’s warrant, albeit one that had to be 
processed through the clerk of the crown. Second, members were to have privilege in 
civil suits. Shirley’s case had produced the Privilege of Parliament Act 1603, which had 
established that parliamentary immunity only provided a stay in proceedings involving 
members.13 This is reflected in the comparatively simple case, from 1607, of Sir Robert 
Johnson (Monmouth Boroughs), who was granted privilege in the matter of an exchequer 
suit over titles to certain lands, brought by Sir Robert Brett. Brett petitioned the 
Commons to lift the privilege, on the grounds that Johnson was delaying the hearing, 
                                                
10 See Appendix 1, case 22. 
11 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 108. 
12 Ibid., p. 160. 
13 See pp. 104f. above. 
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hoping to gain a half-year’s rents for the disputed lands. Brett’s petition set out that he 
hoped that: ‘the Absence of One Man will be no great Hindrance to the Business of this 
House’. However, ‘This Petition being read, and understood; the former Order of the 
House, in Point of Privilege for Stay of the Trial, was notwithstanding affirmed’.14 Less 
than a month later, Johnson informed the House that Brett had ‘entered upon his House in 
Question, and his Goods, and keepeth Possession by Force and Violence’. However, ‘no 
Order ensued upon this’.15 Three days later, the exchequer ordered Brett to leave the 
property, in return for Johnson’s assurance that he would allow the cause to be heard next 
term. If he continued to invoke parliamentary privilege, the hearing would proceed 
anyway. The case dragged on until October 1608, when the earl of Worcester and other 
arbitrators declared that possession should be given to Brett, in return for an annuity for 
Johnson and his wife.16 
The circumstances of Shirley’s case were far from unique, and further privilege cases 
arose in relation to the arrest and imprisonment of members or their servants in civil suits. 
The case, from 1607, of Richard James (Newport, Isle of Wight), who was arrested by 
Hutchins, a serjeant, on a writ of execution ‘on the Procurement of one Bateman, an 
Attorney’, includes elements that were common in most privilege cases. An arrest is 
made, or sometimes merely attempted, during which the member advises the arresting 
parties that he is privileged; but the arresting parties ignore the claim. The case is then 
brought to the attention of the Commons, who next order those who had infringed 
privilege to appear before them, usually degraded by having to kneel, bareheaded, at the 
Bar of the House. Sentence is then passed that the arresting parties should be held, usually 
in the Tower, ending some days later with a fulsome apology and release of the 
delinquents, ‘paying their fees’. So, in this case, James told Hutchins that he was a 
burgess, but the serjeant told James that he must answer the writ. The Commons followed 
usual practice, and ordered that the arresting serjeant and the attorney that had procured 
the writ should be brought before them. They were committed to the custody of the 
serjeant for a month – ‘which judgment was pronounced against them, kneeling at the 
                                                
14 CJ, 1, p. 382: 13 June 1607. 
15 CJ, 1, p. 390: 4 July 1607. 
16 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29 
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Bar, by Mr Speaker’. Bateman was brought to the Bar, when he confessed that he had 
‘rashly and unadvisedly procured a Write of Execution […] and ‘acknowlegeth himself 
faulty, and therefore the Censure of this honourable House to be justly and favourably 
inflicted upon him: yet, […] he humbly prayeth, that this honourable House would 
vouchsafe to release him of his Imprisonment; for the which he shall be bound, for ever 
hereafter […] to be more respective and dutiful towards so honourable a State, and the 
Members thereof’. Bateman was duly released, and Hutchins shortly afterwards, well 
short of the month originally imposed as a sentence. There were, however, a couple of 
unusual features to the case. First, the men were committed to the custody of the serjeant-
at-arms, rather than being lodged in the Tower, which was the prison for the House. 
Second, Bateman was given leave for a few days during his detention to carry out his 
business as an attorney, as the Commons did not wish to punish Bateman’s clients for 
their attorney’s faults.17 
There was, however, a later case which significantly deviated from the generally 
forgiving attitude of the Commons towards transgressors: in 1621, Thomas Johnson, a 
servant of Sir James Whitelocke (New Woodstock) was arrested upon an execution, but 
successfully sought privilege. It was ordered that the serjeant who had arrested him was 
to be sent for.18 However, it was revealed that the two bailiffs had been told that Johnson 
was a privileged servant, but they had nevertheless arrested him. The question of 
punishment arose. Sir Nathaniel Rich opined: ‘that because they are poore men and base 
that they maye be committed not to the Towre (because t’is to good a prison) but to 
Newgate for a weeke’. Sir Samuel Sandys (Worcestershire) felt that the Commons should 
be merciful and ‘leave no bitter remembrance behind us’, as it was the last day of the 
parliamentary session. In the end it was ordered that: ‘they shall aske forgivenes at the 
barr upon ther knees of the howse and [of] Sir James Whitlock, and to ryde as before 
[back to back bareback on one horse], with papers with this inscription for arrestinge of a 
servant to a member of the Commons howse of parliament, from Westminster to the 
Exchange, and presentlie to be delivered to be executed by the sheriffe of Middlesex, 
presentlie and a warrant to be made to him, which was so made and openlie reade in the 
                                                
17 CJ, 1, pp. 332-38: 10 February to 20 February 1607, passim. 
18 CJ, 1, p. 629: 28 May 1621. 
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howse.19 These men might have been unlucky in the timing of their offence, as both 
Houses were becoming sensitive about privileges during the course of 1621, as described 
in chapter five below. 
There were, nevertheless, some occasions when direct action to free a member or 
servant was unnecessary, as in 1607, when the Speaker informed the House that Nicholas 
Hawkins had been apprenticed to William Towerson, a merchant; they had fallen out, and 
Hawkins had been taken in as a servant by Sir Warwick Hele (Plympton Earle). 
Towerson then had Hawkins arrested ‘upon an Action of 8000 l’. The Commons decided 
that a warrant for a writ of habeas corpus should be prepared; but later the same day, the 
matter was ‘reported to be stayed and appeased by Mediation’.20 
In general, during most of James I’s first parliament, once Shirley had been released, 
and the Buckinghamshire election dispute had been resolved, privilege matters were not 
at the forefront of Commons business. Cases mainly related to individual members, and 
were generally resolved without difficulty, including those where someone had been 
arrested for debt, or had been ordered to attend inferior courts, as principal or witness 
(often on a subpoena), juror, and so on. The matter of excusing a member from attending 
court as a juror appeared uncommon, although it might be that the courts excused any 
privileged person in advance of any possible referral to the Commons. The records do 
show that, in May 1607, Sir Thomas Bigg (Evesham), and Sir Thomas Lowe (London) 
were named by the sheriff of London to serve as jurors in the court of king’s bench. They 
were granted privilege, and the serjeant-at-arms ‘commanded to go with his Mace, and 
deliver the Pleasure of the House to the Secondary [deputy] of the King’s Bench, the 
Court then sitting’.21 Some years later, Sir William Alford (Beverley) was summoned as a 
juror; this time a letter was sent from the Speaker to the judges, confirming Alford’s 
privilege, and expressing the expectation that he would not be amerced for his non-
                                                
19 Belasyse, fols. 117-18; in Notestein et al. (eds.), CD 1621, V, pp. 196-97: 4 June 1621. 
20 CJ, 1, pp. 338-39: 20 February 1607. 
21 CJ, 1, p. 369: 6 May 1607. Sir John Tracy was granted privilege in 1597, because he had been 
put on a jury at the court of common pleas during a session of the House. In this case, the 
serjeant-at-arms was sent with the mace to obtain Tracy’s release from the court: Sir 
Simonds D’Ewes, The Journals of All the Parliaments During the Reign of Queen 
Elizabeth : Journal of the House of Commons (London: Paul Bowes, 1682; repr. 
Shannon, Ireland: Irish UP, 1973), p. 560: 22 November 1597. 
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appearance.22 Much more common were cases where a subpoena was issued, as this was 
classed a contempt, inasmuch as the member would be diverted from attending the ‘high 
court’ of parliament, as is neatly encapsulated in the Commons’ Journal of 1604, ‘a 
[court] Appearance must necessarily withdraw [the Member’s] Presence and Attendance 
upon the Service of the said House’.23 Hunneyball has found that: ‘as late as 1585, the 
Commons was denied the right to freedom from subpoenas, but this privilege, too, was 
secured by the end of Elizabeth I’s reign’.24 There was a steady stream of routine cases of 
privilege against subpoenas across all the early Stuart parliaments, as recorded in the 
Commons’ journals. Two particular clusters occurred, in 1604 and 1606. In May 1604, 
seven members were granted privilege against subpoenas.25 One of these was Sir Edward 
Montagu(e), who informed the House that he was ‘warned to appear upon a Trial at 
Guildhall tomorrow’ and asked what was the pleasure of the House in the matter. After 
debate, it was ordered that Montague was to have his privilege. The associated Order 
from the Speaker shows the formula that was employed in such matters, giving the 
justification for the privilege, and what should happen to the person who served the 
subpoena on the member:  
WHEREAS the Commons House of Parliament was this Day informed by Sir Edw. 
Mountague Knight, One of the Members of the said House, that he had Warning to 
appear at the Guildhall Tomorrow, upon a Trial between one ..... Hollowell Plaintiff, and 
himself Defendant; because his said Appearance must necessarily withdraw his Presence 
and Attendance upon the Service of the said House; it is thought fit, and so ordered, That 
he be excused in that Behalf, according to ancient Custom of Privilege; and that the said 
Hollowell, as also the Party that brought the Warning, be commanded by the Serjeant, in 
the Name of the House, to appear at the Bar Tomorrow Morning, that they may 
understand the Pleasure of the House accordingly.26 
                                                
22 CJ, 1, p. 898: 15 May 1628. 
23 CJ, 1, p. 208: 14 May 1604. 
24 Hunneyball, ‘Development of Privilege’, p. 114. The reference is to the case of Richard Cooke: 
see Appendix 1, case 21. 
25 The cases are recorded in: CJ, 1, p. 203: 8 May 1604; CJ: 10 May 1604 (second scribe), four 
cases; CJ, 1, p. 208: 14 May 1604; CJ, 1, p. 210: 15 May 1604. 
26 CJ, 1, p. 208: 14 May 1604. 
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In February 1606, six further members successfully applied for privilege in respect of 
subpoena processes.27 Alban Stepneth (Pembrokeshire) informed the Commons that he 
had received a subpoena to appear in the Star Chamber, delivered seven days before the 
forthcoming session of parliament, at the instigation of a William Warren; the two had, 
apparently, been pursuing legal actions against each other. At the Bar of the House, 
Warren admitted that he knew that Stepneth was a member, but believed that the latter 
was not entitled to privilege, as he was then sheriff for Pembrokeshire, and therefore not 
allowed to leave the county without royal permission.28 Warren’s argument was 
presumably that if Stepneth could not travel to Westminster, protecting him from actions 
that would prevent or delay such travel was otiose. Stepneth had indeed not attended the 
short parliamentary sitting of November 1605, curtailed by the gunpowder plot, but his 
period as sheriff had ended in February 1606, and he subsequently returned to 
Westminster. Warren also asserted that there was another, older suit that he had brought 
against Stepneth in the Star Chamber, which remained to be determined. Presumably, 
Warren was (correctly) of the view that a suit that had begun before Stepneth was elected 
might take its course, but not while parliament was sitting. The House concluded that 
Warren’s defence was truthful, but inadequate. The difficulties encountered in the cases 
of Cooke,29 and Stepneth meant that ‘the Commons found themselves obliged to take the 
punishment of this [claimed] breach of their Privileges into their own hands, whereas, till 
that time, the mode of redress had been different’.30 However, as he had merely sought to 
have Stepneth respond to points to be put to him in the Star Chamber, possibly through an 
attorney, rather than a direct appearance, Warren was not confined to the Tower, but 
placed in the custody of the serjeant-at-arms for three days.31 This exemplifies the 
relatively lenient treatment of many delinquents by the House. 
A gloss on the matter of subpoena processes is recorded by Bowyer, in relation to the 
case of Sir Richard Bulkeley (Anglesey), who was served a subpoena out of chancery, in 
                                                
27 The cases are recorded in: CJ, 1, p. 266: 11 February 1606, four cases; CJ, 1, p. 268: 
13 February 1606, two cases. 
28 See p. 65 above for the origin of this prohibition. 
29 See Appendix 1, case 21. 
30 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 165. 
31 CJ, 1, p. 268: 14 February 1606; CJ, 1, p. 269: 15 February 1606; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), 
Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 433; Willson (ed.), Bowyer Diary, p. 37: 14 February 1606. 
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May 1606.32 There was some question over whether Bulkeley had to appear personally. 
The Speaker pointed to a possible difference between a ‘Sub Poena to answer, and a Sub 
Poena to reioyne, for in the former, the Defendant is to appeare personally, and putt in his 
Answer, whereby he is drawn from attendance in this House: But he may reioyne by 
directions to his Attorney without his owne Personall Presence’. However, the House was 
reminded of the earlier opinion: ‘that no Processe is to be served on any of this House, for 
though his Person be not drawen from his Corporall Attendance; yet his minde is 
withdrawne, whereby the House hath no use of his Presence’.33 The party who served the 
subpoena was brought to the House on 20 May, and committed to the serjeants.34 The 
session then ended without any further action being recorded. 
There was a difficulty in granting a request for privilege, if a subpoena related to a 
serious offence. Therefore, in May 1607, the case of Sir Edmund Ludlow (Hindon) was 
referred to the Committee for Privileges and Returns, as the writ ‘appeared to be at the 
Suit of Mr. Attorney-general [and thereby for the king]; which made the Question [of 
granting privilege] disputable’.35 The case might well have related to the ‘savage assault 
on a servant named Joel King, who had secretly married his [Ludlow’s] daughter. […] 
Ludlow had also had King arrested after the latter identified his assailants, an action 
described as "barbaric" by Star Chamber’. Ludlow escaped censure, although the jury was 
unhappy that the servants, rather than the principal, were sentenced.36  
The approach in cases where a subpoena had been issued is exemplified in a letter 
written by the Speaker to the lord chief baron, later in the same parliament. This shows 
that the Commons were by now using their own authority to free any member who had 
been served a subpoena: 
W H E R E A S it hath been informed in the Commons House of Parliament, that a 
Subpoena ad comparendum, hath been lately, during this Session, served upon the Person of 
Sir Rich. Pawlett Knight, One of the Members of the said House, contrary to ancient and 
known Privilege; because the personal Attendance of the said Sir Rich, is here necessarily 
                                                
32 CJ, 1, p. 305: 6 May 1606; CJ, 1, p. 308: 12 May 1606. 
33 Willson (ed.), Bowyer Diary, p. 175: 19 May 1606. 
34 Ibid., p. 177: 20 May 1606. 
35 CJ, 1, p. 371: 8 May 1607. 
36 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, p. 187. 
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required, during the Time of Parliament, and that he feareth, his Cause may receive 
Damage, or himself incur Contempt, by his Want of Liberty to attend it: I thought good 
(out of the Duty of my Place) as well to make known the Privilege and Pleasure of the 
House unto you, as to pray your Lordship, in his behalf, that there may be Order given, 
that no further Process issue against him, until he may have Time and Leisure to follow 
his own Cause.37 
Another kind of case arose when a member was assaulted, or insulted, or his character 
was traduced: in other words, he was ‘molested’ somewhat more literally, either inside or 
outside the House. The first case of this type arose on the first day of the initial 
parliament of James I: Sir Herbert Croft, who had sat in three previous parliaments, and 
now represented Herefordshire, pressed into the crowded House of Lords to hear the 
speech from the throne.38 However, one of the yeomen of the guard, Bryan Tash, ‘gave 
uncivil Terms to Sir Herbert Crofts, and another Gentleman of the House, in saying, 
''Goodman Burgess, you come not here"’. This was assumed to be a ‘great contempt’.39 
Tash was placed in the custody of the Commons’ serjeant, and, immediately after hearing 
the king’s speech, moderation was urged, as Tash was one of the king’s guard, and 
thereby possibly himself accorded privilege.40 On the following day, Tash appeared 
before the Commons, confessed his fault, and was then pardoned, although the Speaker 
‘gave him Advice and Warning, for his better Care and Carriage hereafter, upon any the 
like Occasion, in the Course of his Service and Attendance’.41 The case illustrates the 
care taken publicly to tackle any action that affected the dignity of members: it would 
have been possible, after all, for Croft simply to have raised the matter privately with 
Tash’s commanding officer. The importance of maintaining personal dignity can be seen 
in the fact that, in addition to entries in the Commons’ journals, no fewer than three 
contemporary diaries record the incident and aftermath, viz those of Sir George Manners, 
                                                
37 CJ, 1, p. 369: 5 May 1607. 
38 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, p. 26. 
39 CJ, 1, p. 142: 19 March 1604. 
40 CJ, 1, p. 150: 22 March 1604. Cotton’s diary notes that Tash ‘was pardoned in Marcy not in 
Justyce, the kynge being partly meanes for his favore’: Cotton, in Healy, CD 1604-1607, 
p. 44: 23 March 1604. 
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Sir Robert Cotton, and Sir Edward Mountagu.42 
Further cases potentially affected the dignity of the House or its individual members. 
For example, in 1604, Sir John Savile (Yorkshire) complained that a furrier had abused 
him in ‘slanderous and unseemly Terms, upon his Proceeding as a Committee, in the Bill 
touching Tanners, Curriers, &c’.43 In 1607, Sir Robert Johnson complained to the House 
‘of a turbulent Clamour and Outcry of certain Women against him, and upon him, as he 
walked the Streets, for speaking against the Bill touching Wherrymenn and Watermen, 
&c. handled in the Committee’. The outcome was that the Speaker was to write to the 
justices of Middlesex ‘to prevent Disorder or Violence in the Matter’.44 Disorder with 
violence was a particular adjunct to the employment by many members of pages, who 
tended to gather on the steps of the House, or at other times took themselves off to 
taverns, as well as engaging in activities that infringed the dignity of the House and its 
members. A difficulty was that these pages were, of course, subject to privilege by virtue 
of their service to members. This dilemma was apparent in 1604, when the innocent 
parties were punished, rather than any of six pages, who, it seemed, had taken a cloak 
from a boy-servant of one of the members, in order to meet a tavern reckoning for wine 
and cakes. The cloak was torn; the vintner’s man then refused to return the cloak to its 
rightful owner, but the Commons ordered him to do so. The vintner and his man were 
held in custody, but subsequently released, paying their fees to the clerk and serjeant-at-
arms.45 The Commons’ pages were clearly a difficult bunch, and, in 1606, information 
was given that: ‘the Pages upon the Stairs had much abused the Passengers, and had beat 
down Two Clerks of the King’s Bench; so as the Judges there had taken Knowledge, and 
committed them’. This posed a dilemma: the pages clearly could not behave in this way, 
but action had been taken by the judges that affected the Commons’ authority, so that 
‘this House sent the Serjeant to clear the Stairs, and to demand the Prisoners to be taken 
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43 CJ, 1, pp. 240-41: 26 June 1604. 
44 CJ, 1, p. 348: 5 March 1607. Johnson was involved in a further privilege issue in 1607: see 
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into his Custody, and to bring them into the House Tomorrow in the Morning’.46 On the 
following day, the two pages in question were brought to the Bar: one was ordered to be 
whipped ‘in the Townhouse by the Beadle of Westminster’, and the other’s case was 
dismissed, as it seemed that he had tried to calm matters down.47 In 1621, the same 
difficulty over who was to punish miscreants arose, when the judges of the king’s bench 
were made aware that some servants to members had abused ‘poor men and clients’ of 
the courts on the stairs. Edward Alford (Colchester) moved that they should be punished 
by the House, which the judges agreed to, pointing out that they ‘would have indicted 
them for Stroke in Face of the Court: And many, for less Offences, have lost their Hands’. 
In the end, the offender denied the accusation, and, as no witness was forthcoming, ‘was 
at liberty upon his master’s word that he should be forthcoming if any proof come against 
him’. At the same time, the House was reminded that there was a longstanding 
arrangement that the warden of the Fleet should station two of his men on the stairs, to 
ensure that no such misdemeanours arose.48 Further, in 1610, there was a complaint that 
certain pages on the stairs had dragged the servants of some members down the stairs and 
taken their cloaks. It appeared that the master of the Prince’s Arms tavern had then 
received the stolen goods. On the same day that this complaint was made, Sir Henry 
Poole (Cricklade), reporting on his examination of Thomas Reely, servant to one Davyes, 
exposed a racket, in which members’ cloaks were pawned by a number of pages of 
members of both Houses, in order to pay tavern reckonings. There was the usual 
difficulty: it was possible to order the pages of members of the Commons to appear, but 
would the Commons be infringing peers’ privileges if they called for the servants of the 
latter to appear before them?49 It appears that matters were not taken further, as no 
subsequent entry can be traced in the journal of either House. 
Matters involving pages were insignificant, in comparison to an insult, in July 1610, 
offered to Speaker Phelips by Sir Edward Herbert (Merioneth). Herbert apparently 
challenged the Speaker on the stairs, regarding the passage of a bill. Phelips complained 
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on the next day, that Herbert: ‘put not off his hat, put out his tongue’ and ‘popped his 
mouth with his finger in scorn’. Herbert’s friend, Sir Robert Harley (New Radnor 
Boroughs) offered to go and persuade Herbert to come before the House voluntarily, to 
save him from the indignity of being summoned by the serjeant. When he appeared, 
Herbert rather disingenuously said that ‘he had no intent of scorn’, and Sir Julius Caesar 
(Westminster) suggested that ‘Mr Speaker would hold himself satisfied’ by this apparent 
apology. However, Phelips was ‘worse satisfied than before’, perhaps because of the 
limited, even insincere, nature of the apology, and threatened to take the matter to the 
king, for which he was attacked by John Tey (Arundel), who was then himself called to 
account. Herbert unsurprisingly left the country shortly afterwards.50 
The Commons were careful to observe due forms in matters of privilege: a significant 
case that illustrates this concerned Roger Brereton, arising from his commitment by the 
judges of the king’s bench for contempt, in November 1605, when parliament was 
prorogued. The matter was referred to a committee, which later recommended that he 
ought to have privilege, but ‘it was ordered that he should not be sett at libertie by a 
Serjeant at Mace, because he was imprisoned by order of judiciall court viz. the Kings 
bench: but that therefore he should be discharged by a writt’.51 Accordingly, a writ of 
habeas corpus was ordered, which led Francis Moore to declare in the House that 
provision of habeas corpus for Brereton ‘witnesseth that my lord chancellor will not 
infringe the privilege of the House’.52 Brereton did not, however, help matters, by then 
absenting himself from the House, which ran contrary to the argument for his release – 
that his service in the Commons was necessary. In 1610, Robert Berry (Ludlow) 
unsuccessfully asked for privilege for his son, who had been imprisoned for an altercation 
with the night watch. This son was supposedly also the servant of Berry senior – a 
somewhat curious state of affairs, and one, if it had been widely adopted, would surely 
have been seen as an abuse of privilege.53 Also in 1610, the Commons took exception to a 
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message from the Lords, requesting a conference, whereby they could ‘impart unto us 
some things which they had receaved from His Majestie’. Members asserted: ‘that it was 
unusuall and derogatory from the ancient liberties of the Howse to receave a message 
from His Majesty by the higher Howse (as thoe they were interposed betweene the King 
and his subjects)’. The Commons declared their agreement to a conference if ‘theyre 
Lordships did desyre this meeting upon intent onely to communicate unto theyme theyre 
owne conceipts on anythinge which they had receaved from his Majesty, they were come 
hither with all willing readines to receve it’. On the other hand, ‘if theyre Lordships were 
imployed herein as messengers onely to the Howse of Comons from his Majesty, […] 
then this course was contrary to the ancient orders, liberties, priviledges, and graces of the 
Howse’.54 
One of the common types of privilege case in this period concerned the prosecuting of 
suits at law, against members of the Commons, or their servants, during the time of 
privilege. It should be noted that the situation for peers in relation to legal processes was 
somewhat different. ‘The person of a peer was "for ever sacred and inviolable" from 
arrest for debt or any claim arising out of property, it being an assumption in law that 
there would always be sufficient goods in the barony available for distraint in satisfaction 
of any debt’.55 Hatsell notes that claims for privilege in the Commons to avoid 
.......................................................................................... 
them telling him that he might use better manners, he gave evil words, whereupon, being 
brought before the constable, he was examined whither he went. He said to his lodging, 
and being asked whom his lord was, he said his master, and whom his master, his lord. 
Well, quoth the constable, if you use no other answer, you are like to kiss the Counter. I 
would see, said he, the proudest constable in London send me to the Counter, and the 
constable did send him to the Counter. Both parties being heard, the House concluded 
that the constable had but done his duty and that the young man should pay the aforesaid 
20s. and the constable’s charges during his custody within the serjeant’s house’: Petyt, 
537/14, in Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610, II, pp. 57-58. 
54 Gardiner (ed.), Debates, 1610, Old Series, lxxxi, p. 51: 11 June 1610. 
55 J. R. Tanner (ed.), Tudor Constitutional Documents, A.D.1485-1603, 2nd edn. (Cambridge: UP, 
1948), p. 578; Maseres, Cases and Records, p. 4. Privilege for peers today is expressed in 
Standing Order 79: ‘The privilege of the House is that, when Parliament is sitting, or 
within the usual times of privilege of Parliament, no Lord of Parliament is to be 
imprisoned or restrained without sentence or order of the House, unless upon a criminal 
charge or for refusing to give surety for the peace’: Leader of the House of Commons, 
Green Paper on Privilege, 2012, p. 77. This disparity may reflect the fact that, at the start 
of a parliament, the Speaker seeks the privilege for all members of the Commons 
[footnote continues ...] 
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prosecutions of suits were not pursued strongly in the Tudor period: only one arose in the 
period of 125 years between Atwyll’s case of 1478,56 and the end of Elizabeth’s reign. He 
observed that this must have been either because no such cases arose, or ‘that if such 
prosecution had existed, the House of Commons should acquiesce in it’.57 Hatsell goes on 
to suggest that: 
The principal object of the House of Commons, in the preservation of their Privileges at 
this time [the Tudor period], was, the securing of the persons of the Members, and of 
their menial servants from arrests, and not the permitting of the attendance of the 
Members to be interrupted by the Summons of any inferior Court; but as to the 
inconvenience which might arise to Members, from suits being carried on against them 
during the time of Privilege, they do not seem to have adopted the idea in so large an 
extent, as was maintained after the accession of James I.58 
The usual practice was that if a member, or his servant, was involved in a trial of some 
sort, the Speaker would write a letter to the justices at the assizes, asking for the trial to be 
stayed, but not struck out. The 1607 case of Sir John Bennet (Ripon) gives a typical 
example: 
My very good Lords, IT hath been informed in the Commons House of Parliament, that 
one John Denham hath taken down Two several Writs [… against …] Sir John Bennett 
Knight[…] And because it is conceived, that it may be a Means to withdraw him, the said 
Sir John Bennet, from his Service here, or otherwise endanger the Success of the Cause; 
therefore the House hath thought fit, that he should have Privilege, for Stay of the Trial, 
as in other the like Cases hath been usual; and have commanded me to make known their 
Order and Resolution unto you; praying you will be pleased to stay the Proceeding 
accordingly, until the said Sir John may be freed of this Service, and be at Liberty to 
follow and attend his own Cause.59 
.......................................................................................... 
throughout that parliament, whereas there is no similar request from the lord speaker 
(formerly the lord chancellor) for the Lords. 
56 See Appendix 1, case 11. 
57 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 122-23. 
58 Ibid., p. 123. 
59 CJ, 1, pp. 342-43: 26 February 1607. 
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There was continuing ambivalence throughout the early Stuart period on the question of 
whether the institutional dignity of the House required privilege to be applied so as to 
prevent a member attending court, even if it might be in his personal interest to be given 
leave to pursue legal matters, in effect by waiving his privilege. In 1606, John Baxter 
(Derby) was given leave of absence ‘for some special Occasions urging him to attend at 
the next Assizes’, but ordered to return before the end of the session.60 In 1607, Sir 
Thomas Holcroft (Cheshire) asked the House’s permission ‘to answer and to sue’. It was 
unclear ‘whether it were fit to dispense with Breach of Privilege’, but this, 
notwithstanding, leave was given for him to attend to his legal affairs.61 The case of 
Herbert Pelham (Reigate) illustrates the kinds of confusion that could arise when staying 
a legal action that might, or might not, be to the advantage of the member concerned. 
Pelham had become ‘embroiled in legal troubles’, possibly arising from an unsuccessful 
attempt to pay off his debts and ‘advance his grandchildren’ through legislation in the 
1607 session. On 26 April, Pelham moved for parliamentary privilege, concerning a suit 
that was being heard in the exchequer, whereupon the serjeant-at-arms was sent to stay 
proceedings. On his return, however, the serjeant reported that the lawyers for the 
prosecution were determined to proceed if called upon by the court. There was a view 
that, because Pelham had recently given his consent to the hearing of the suit, and his 
opponents had retained counsel, the case should be allowed to proceed. The Commons 
remained unwilling to waive Pelham’s privilege, but informally asked Pelham’s 
opponents to halt proceedings, which they agreed to do. A little later, however, Pelham 
had evidently withdrawn his objections to the suit, as permission ‘for Mr. Pelham to 
proceed in the Exchequer notwithstanding a former stay’, was requested by Anthony Irby 
(Boston).62  
The Commons never did establish unequivocally whether a member might waive his 
privilege: for example, in 1610, Sir Francis Goodwin (Buckinghamshire) and Sir Jerome 
Horsey (Bossiney) were granted stays of trial, whereas, for Sir Timothy Whittingham 
(Thirsk), and Robert Askwith (York), it was ordered that they ‘may proceed to Trial, 
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without Stay – they both assent’.63 In 1621, the Commons decided that: ‘If a subpoena be 
delivered to any of the House sitting in parliament, he may challenge his privilege if he 
will, otherwise he may waive it if he please’.64 Despite a reluctance to see a member 
waive his privilege, this was allowed to Sir William Cope (Banbury), in 1621. Cope was 
a colourful character, who had seemingly not paid the widow of Sir George Coppyn for 
land he had bought from her late husband. The Commons ordered that she might proceed 
to sue Cope, who had waived his privilege.65 The issue of waiving privilege also arose in 
1628, when Sir Simeon Steward (Aldeburgh), asked the House for five days’ leave, ‘as he 
has a subpoena ad audiendum judicium in the Star Chamber by Mr Attorney and he 
bound in a recognizance of 500 l. not to take benefit of his privilege by being a member 
of the House’. He explained that preparing for the case was lengthy and arduous, ‘then, so 
it might be deferred, I agreed not to claim any privilege of the House, and I was to enter 
bond not to claim any privilege. I refused it. The Attorney pressed me in it, and still I 
refused. He said he would move the Lords in it, so I yielded’. Sir Edward Coke was 
unimpressed: ‘There was a fault on all sides. The recognizance is upon record. He is now 
bound not to make any use of his privilege. A man elected cannot refuse; he must serve 
his trust. He can make no proxy; he sits for many a thousand. It was ill done to do this. 
Let us send for the recognizance’. As Johnson identifies: ‘in considering Steward’s 
request that he be permitted to stand trial through waiving his privileges, the Commons 
had to choose between defending its traditions and seeing a deputy lieutenant brought to 
book for misconduct’.66 The House ordered that ‘that Sir Simeon Steward, 
notwithstanding his recognizance, ought to have the privilege of the House’.67 There were 
further thoughts, and, on 30 April, three decisions were reached: (1) ‘he, that served the 
Subpoena upon Sir S. Steward, for the Hearing in the Star-chamber, to be sent for, to 
answer his Contempt in it’; (2) ‘Referred to the Committee for Privileges, to consider, 
what Course fit to be taken about Sir S. Steward’s Recognizance; and to report to the 
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House, what fit to be done therein’, and (3) ‘Sir S. Steward enjoined by the House to 
attend the Service of the House, and not to attend the Hearing of his Cause in the Star-
chamber’.68 
Cases that involved taking the goods or effects of a member in execution, or 
otherwise, did not solely arise in the 1628-9 parliament, although that was when they took 
on a wider significance. One case of this type arose in 1607, when Sir William Kingswell 
(Petersfield) was granted privilege in respect of goods seized by the sheriff of Hampshire, 
probably on behalf of his neighbour Sir Richard White.69 Shortly afterwards, Thomas 
James (Bristol) was granted privilege after his horse had been requisitioned from an inn 
by the postal authorities. When told by the ostler that the horse belonged to an MP, the 
post servant said, ‘It makes no Matter […] my Master will justify what I have done’.70  
The 1604 parliament ground to a halt, not because of any specific difficulty, but 
largely because James I lost patience over the issue of supply. Salisbury had suggested 
the Great Contract, as a way of putting the royal finances on an appropriate footing for 
the time. However, negotiations with the Commons over the detail proved unsuccessful, 
and on 6 December 1610, James, having finally run out of patience, brought the session 
to an end, with a dissolution on 9 February 1611.  
The 1614 parliament 
Following the dissolution of 1611, James avoided another parliament, until financial 
pressures gave the king little choice.71 It is possible to identify a change of attitude in the 
Commons during this period, whereby parliamentarians saw privilege as an entity that 
could not, and should not, be violated. As Jansson notes, the 1614 parliament 
‘emphasized procedure in all their maneuvers as a protection of the privilege they claimed 
by custom and right due to the Lower House […] self-consciously confirming the 
institutional identity of parliament, irrespective of whether institutions were in real 
                                                
68 CJ, 1, p. 890: 30 April 1628. 
69 CJ, 1, p. 343: 26 February 1607. 
70 CJ, 1, p. 352: 12 March 1607. 
71 The marriage of princess Elizabeth in 1613 had associated costs, and the death of the prince of 
Wales in 1612 had meant that no marriage could be arranged, accompanied by a suitable 
dowry 
Page 131 
jeopardy’. Perhaps less happily, she makes the apparently anachronistic suggestion: that 
‘the English parliament of 1614 […] anticipated the concern with procedure and privilege 
that is evident throughout the sessions of the 1620s’.72 We can, however, agree with her 
general thrust: ‘that the manner of proceeding in almost every kind of business in the 
House was questioned and defined; the reiteration of procedures peculiar to the Commons 
provided the collective membership with a conscious sense of identity as well as practical 
knowledge of its inner workings’.73 A difficulty, as identified in HoP, was the failure of 
the inexperienced Speaker, Ranulph Crewe (Saltash), to control the House. Having only 
previously sat in the 1597-98 parliament, he was particularly susceptible to challenges by 
members who were more familiar with current procedure. In addition, he was frequently 
not treated with due deference or courtesy; for example, he was at times jostled in the 
rush to leave the chamber at the end of a day’s business.74  
Privilege cases did arise during the short course of this parliament. An internal assault 
on the dignity of the House and one of its members occurred when Sir John Semmes 
(Maldon) and Sir Henry Widdrington (Northumberland) were members of a committee 
on undertakers, chaired by Sir Roger Owen (Shropshire). They drew attention in the 
House to violent abuse that Owen had suffered, although Owen was himself loath ‘to 
name any man till he was compelled by the House’. Sir William Herbert 
(Montgomeryshire) then confessed that he was the perpetrator of the abuse. Despite some 
concerns that such disorder had become more common, and that the Speaker might even 
be in danger of being ‘plucked’ from his chair, the House was inclined to view Herbert’s 
confession as a mitigating element in any punishment that might be imposed. In the end, 
he was allowed to apologise from his place in the House, rather than at the Bar. It then 
emerged that Sir Robert Killigrew (Helston) had also laid his hand upon Owen and the 
chair, and ‘said that he would see him out of it, and told him he should put no more tricks 
upon them, with other hot words’. This was thought worthy ‘of the deepest censure of the 
House’, but Killigrew’s acknowledgement of his fault counted in his favour, and Owen 
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thereupon pardoned Killigrew, who, like Herbert, was not required to apologise further at 
the Bar of the House.75 
The care taken by the Commons to observe due forms in matters of privilege has 
already been noted in claims that arose in the 1604 parliament. In a later case, Sir William 
Bampfield (Bridport) was elected to parliament in 1614 while simultaneously pursuing a 
chancery suit, for which lord chancellor Ellesmere committed him to the Fleet for 
contempt of court. The Commons ordered a writ of habeas corpus ‘forthwith […] 
according to the ancient privilege and custom in that behalf used’, and the warden of the 
Fleet delivered Bampfield up.76 The assertion that this was ‘by ancient privilege and 
custom’ is interesting, in that the Commons only began independently to order the release 
of its members in the mid-Tudor period. Nevertheless, the subsequent case of Sir Henry 
Stanhope (East Retford) would show that the Commons were careful to respect the 
qualifications on privilege. In 1628, Sir John Stanhope (Leicester), Sir Henry’s uncle, 
moved for the latter’s privilege, as he had been: ‘imprisoned by the lords [of the council], 
neither for treason, felony, or refusing the surety of the peace’. Debate then arose 
‘whether a habeas corpus should be granted him to come to a hearing in the House, or 
whether he should be fetched by the serjeant with the mace. The latter was resolved upon: 
to come himself and his keeper’. It was noted he had been committed by a warrant from 
the council, for having issued a challenge to a duel.77 When the warden of the 
Marshalseas was brought to the Bar of the House, he said that he acted on the authority of 
‘a warrant, dated 4 May, where the cause was expressed: breach of the peace and 
contempt of the king’s command [forbidding a duel]’.78 John Pym (sitting then for 
Tavistock) argued for a neat solution: ‘That he thinks the warrant from the lords for 
commitment of Sir H. Stanhope, being for the peace, is no breach of parliament[ary 
privilege]. Doubts whether this House can take security for the peace or no. We must 
commit him […] to some prison, as the Tower. He is of the opinion we must remand 
him’. In other words, the Commons could not unconditionally free someone held for 
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breach, or potential breach, of the peace, but could take him into their own custody, 
thereby preserving the veneer of privilege. The warden was then ordered to take Stanhope 
back to the prison, but to return with him the following day. This gave the Commons time 
to consider the precedents, and to decide whether to take action against Richard Herbert, 
who had sent the challenge to Stanhope, which may have been seen as an attempt to 
molest him.79 Stanhope was freed when he gave security that he would not breach the 
peace.80 It is not clear whether he returned to the Commons.81  
The 1614 parliament was blighted by difficulties over the levying of impositions by 
the king, and perceived slights on the Commons’ privileges, in particular the claim by the 
bishop of Lincoln that impositions were a matter for the royal prerogative alone. James 
rejected a suggestion that he give up impositions in return for a grant of supply, which 
would have left him worse off financially.82 On 4 June, the Commons went so far as 
inform James that until ‘it shall please God to ease us of these impositions wherewith the 
whole kingdom doth groan, we cannot without wrong to our country give Your Majesty 
that relief which we desire’.83 In the end, James I lost his patience at the concentration on 
prerogatives and privileges. He therefore dissolved the Commons, who had sat for barely 
two months, and had passed no legislation; four of the most outspoken members were 
sent to the Tower.84 Given the political obstacles facing parliament in 1614, the loss of 
control by the Speaker, and the ineffectual leadership of the official government 
spokesmen in the Commons, it is difficult to see how even a more experienced Speaker 
than Crewe could have prevented the early dissolution of what came to be characterised 
as the ‘addled parliament’.85 James expressed his frustration to the Spanish ambassador: 
The House of Commons is a body without a head. The members give their opinion in a 
disorderly manner; at their meetings nothing is heard but cries, shouts and confusion. I 
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am surprised that my ancestors should ever have permitted such an institution to come 
into existence.86 
The 1621 parliament 
James I reluctantly had to call a parliament in 1621, because of fresh calls on the royal 
finances, despite some rationalisation in the period since the 1614 parliament had been 
brought to an end. These new requirements arose chiefly in relation to a moral, 
financially significant requirement for James to support his daughter and son-in-law, in 
their attempts to regain the Palatinate, and possibly the throne of Bohemia. The 
parliament started well enough, with the Commons freely voting two subsidies. A number 
of privilege cases were processed, although not always without controversy. One arose 
out of a quarrel between members, which occurred at a meeting of the grievances 
committee. During an argument with Clement Coke (Dunwich), Sir Charles Morrison 
(Hertfordshire) ‘fell into an old rhyme [...] and he repeated the Two last Verses, of "Asses 
and Glasses" ’. As HoP records, Coke ‘took it ill, the Mentioning of Judges riding upon 
Asses’, which was an apparent aspersion on his father, Sir Edward Coke, chairman of the 
committee. Outside the committee, Clement Coke hit Morrison, who in turn obtained a 
sword from his servant, and drew on Coke in Westminster Hall. Both were suspended 
from sitting, although there was a general wish to play down the affair. Coke was initially 
lodged in the Tower, but out of respect to his father, permitted to remain in the charge of 
the latter. In the end it was ordered that: ‘Clement Coke, for the offence committed to the 
house in strykynge of Sir Charles Morryson with his hand on Munday sennight on the 
parliament steeres, was to remayne at the pleasure of the house. But for the repayre of the 
particular party that was stroke, that resteth for hereafter. And called into the house, did 
on his knees at the barre receyve his Judgment accordyngly’. Morrison subsequently 
declared that ‘nothing was ever so great an honour to me as to be chosen by my country 
to serve here’, and pleaded that he had ‘never intended the least provocation to Mr. 
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Coke’. Both were restored to their places, and Morrison waived his right to an apology 
from Coke.87 
The Commons continued to be assiduous in acting against those who traduced or 
threatened members outside parliament. In 1621, Sir Henry Lovell (Bletchingley) had 
spoken against one Henry Dorrell in a debate; when Dorrell heard this, he threatened 
Lovell with imprisonment ‘if not during the Parliament yet presently after’. Summoned to 
appear at the Bar of the House, Dorrell at first denied having made the threat, but when 
Lovell produced witnesses, Dorrell was committed to the serjeant’s custody, and ordered 
to acknowledge his fault before the House, or else be sent to the Tower.88 Lovell himself 
incurred the censure of the House, when, in 1624, he was accused of a variety of 
misdemeanours in procuring his own election, as well as not having taken communion. 
The Commons committed him to the Tower, but after apologising two days later, he was 
released.89 Also, in 1621, Sir Francis Seymour (Wiltshire) complained that a common 
informer had threatened that ‘he would have out a supersedias against Sir Edward Francis 
[Steyning], notwithstanding he is a member of this House, and that he cared not a fart for 
the Parliament’. The informer was ordered to appear, but did not submit lightly, at first 
‘denieth with damnable oaths that he ever said such words’, but eventually confessed to 
the offence.90 
Hatsell describes a group of cases where the main concern was to ensure that 
privilege of parliament protected members or their servants, if they had been committed 
to prison by the privy council, or ‘by any court of justice, or other magistrate’ in the 
absence of just cause, or due process of law. However, as noted earlier, it was not 
possible to escape legal processes for serious crimes, such as treason or felonies. In 1621, 
the Commons were reminded by serjeant Ashley that ‘the King’s prerogative is that he 
may sue for whom he will, specially in parliament’, even though at least one member, 
John Carvile (Aldborough), somewhat stretched matters in thinking that: ‘At the King’s 
                                                
87 CJ, 1, p. 616: 9 May 1621; CJ, 1, p. 619: 11 May 1621; John Smyth, fol. 102, in Notestein et al. 
(eds.), CD 1621, V, p. 372: 9 May 1621; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, 
p. 433. 
88 Tyrwhitt (ed.), CP 1620 and 1621 (Nicholas), I, pp. 31-32; CJ, 1, p. 520: 13 February 1621. 
89 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, p. 167. 
90 Nicholas Diary, in Notestein et al. (eds.), CD 1621, I, pp. 348-50: 28 April 1621. 
Page 136 
suit a parliament man cannot be sued for capital crimes. […] But capital crimes must be 
punished here, for this is the highest court’.91 Carvile was wrong, although he was 
perhaps a forerunner of those who, in 1649, decided that the Commons had the right to 
put even the king on trial for ‘capital crimes’. 
The warden of the Fleet had figured predominantly in the Shirley case. Difficulties 
with the warden arose again in March 1621, during a spat between chancery and the court 
of wards. The latter had ordered that a Mr Fuller and Sir John Hall, who were involved in 
litigation, should be held in the Fleet prison. Both men were given leave by the lord 
chancellor to attend the Commons, ‘to open their grievances’. However, although the 
warden of the Fleet gave liberty to Hall, he refused either to allow Fuller to instruct 
counsel in person, or to release him to attend the Commons, which was a breach of 
privilege. As Sir John Finch (Canterbury) observed, the lord chancellor (his own patron) 
was ‘as much discontented with [this] as any’. The warden of the Fleet countered, by 
complaining that Sir John Hall had made two ‘escapes’ from him, ‘and the Recovery cost 
Blood’, but he was nevertheless ordered to give liberty to both men ‘to go abroad to 
solicit [i.e. plead their affairs]’.92 When the Commons returned to the Hall case some two 
weeks later, they ordered: ‘That this House conceiveth it fit, that both Sir John, and Tho. 
Fuller, Clerk, should be absolutely freed from their Imprisonment; and the Causes be 
dismissed out of both the said Courts; and either of the said Parties to take his Remedy at 
the Common Law’.93  
The records for 1621 include some general statements, in relation to court attendance 
and stays of legal processes. The Commons had first ordered that: ‘Where any Member of 
the House hath Cause of Privilege, to stay any Trial, a Letter shall issue, under Mr. 
Speaker’s Hand, for Stay thereof, without further Motion in the House’.94 The issue was 
revisited a little later, when the committee for privileges reported ‘that they have found, 
in the King’s Time, 2d, 3d, and 4th Sessions, several Precedents, upon Motions and 
Orders in the House, and Letters thereupon written to the Justices of Assise, for Stay of 
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Trials for Members of the House. These recorded in the Journal Book. That it belongeth 
to the Clerk to make them’.95 This led to an Order: 
Diverse Members of the house of Commons having tryalls at the next Assizes, ‘twas 
Agreed that the Course is and hath been allwayes to defer the Tryall but not by way of 
restraint and inhibicion to the Judges, for that were against Law, since the Stat. of 2 E. III, 
Ca. 8 provydes, quod neque propter Sigillum Magnum neque partum differatur Ius 
[loosely translated: justice under the great seal is not to be deferred]. But the Speaker 
directs a Letter to the Justices of Assize in the Name of the house, to request them to defer 
the tryall for that present. But a warrant by way of Inhibicion may be directed to the 
party in the suite to restrain him from proceeding, if the other party which is a member of 
the Parliament will require it. 96 
Before an adjournment from 4 June until 14 November 1621, there was a debate over 
whether privileges held during such longer adjournments. As a result, ‘It was ordered that 
if any member of this House or his servants be distrained, arrested, served with a citation 
or sued any way during the time of this recess, Mr Speaker shall have authority to send 
for the gaoler, bailiff, sheriff, prosecutor or party and require them to free and discharge 
them’.97 In other words, the outgoing Speaker could now take steps to free a member on 
his own initiative, using the authority of this enabling Order, rather than needing to have a 
direct resolution of the House in respect of an individual member. 
The 1621 parliament was also affected by the exposure of exploitation and abuses of 
parliamentary privilege, as described in chapter five below, although these do not seem to 
have led to significant involvement of the crown. However, in terms of relationships 
between the king and the Commons, after the second session of parliament began, matters 
began to turn very awkward: in early December, worried about a possible Spanish match, 
the Commons petitioned James I for prince Charles to be ‘timely and happily married to 
one of our own religion’.98 The king rejected any expression of opinion on the marriage 
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of his son as ‘committing of high treason’, by ‘foul-mouthed orators of the House of 
Commons’, in direct breach of his command on the matter. He concluded: ‘And although 
we cannot allow of the style, calling it, Your ancient and undoubted Right and 
Inheritance; but could rather have wished, that ye had said, That your Priviledges were 
derived from the grace and permission of our Ancestors and Us; (for most of them grow 
from Precedents, whith shews rather a Toleration than Inheritance)’.99 Subsequent 
discussion then led the Commons to agree a Protestation, which was entered in their 
Journal on 18 December, claiming that: 
The Liberties, Franchises, Priviledges, and Jurisdictions of Parliament, are the ancient and 
undoubted Birth-right and Inheritance of the Subjects of England, and that […] every 
Member of the house of Parliament hath, and, of right, ought to have freedom of speech, 
to propound, treat, reason, and bring to conclusion the same.100  
James’s reaction was dramatic: he summoned the privy council, six judges, and the clerk 
of the Commons, who was ordered to bring his journal. The king then said that he did 
confirm and preserve the Commons’ privileges, whether derived from statute or custom, 
but that the Protestation, ‘so contrived and carried as it was, his Majesty thought fit to be 
rased out of all memorials’. When the clerk appeared, ‘His Majesty did […] in full 
assembly of his Council, and in the presence of the judges, declare the said Protestation to 
be invalid, annulled, void, and of no effect. And did further, manu sua propria [with his 
own hand], take the said Protestation out of the Journal Book of the Clerk of the 
Commons house of Parliament’.101 As in 1614, punishments followed.102 A little later, 
James, in a ‘most gracious manner’, justified his removal of the offending pages. Not 
untypically, he expressed the view ‘that he never meant to deny the house of commons 
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any lawful privileges that ever they had enjoyed; but whatsoever privileges or liberties 
they had by any law or statute, the same should be inviolably preserved unto them; and 
whatsoever privileges they enjoyed by custom, or uncontrolled and lawful precedent, his 
maj. would be careful to preserve’.103 Although a number of cases during this period had 
spawned a more consistent and coherent approach to privilege matters, this last episode 
represented a significant blow to the Commons, and on 6 January 1622, the king 
dissolved a parliament whose disastrous sitting had lasted less than a year. 
The 1624 parliament 
By 1624, James had become more conciliatory, mainly out of yet further necessity to 
secure supply, so that his speech at the opening of parliament in February included the 
following typical mix of concessions and qualifications: 
For Matters of Privileges, Liberties, and Customs, be not over-curious;104 I am your own 
kindly King, ye never shall find Me curious in these Things; therefore do what you ought, 
and no more than your lawful Liberties and Privileges will permit, and ye shall never see 
Me curious to the contrary: I had rather maintain your Liberties than alter them in any 
Thing; shew a Trust in Me, and go on honestly, as you ought to do, like good and faithful 
Subjects; and what you shall have Warrant for, go on; and I will not be curious, unless 
you give Me too much Cause.105 
On the larger stage, there were attempts in meetings with potential leaders of the 
Commons to stir up bellicosity against the Spanish, who had humiliated Prince Charles in 
the matter of the ‘Spanish match’. Three subsidies were voted for military operations, 
with three more promised for the autumn. Moreover, privilege for an individual member 
was rarely removed from an intent to safeguard privilege for the institution. This can be 
seen very clearly, when Sir Edward Giles (Totnes) successfully requested privilege for Sir 
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John Eliot (sitting then for Newport, Cornwall), to stay a trial at the Exeter assizes.106 
Some argued that suits for debt should not be amenable to privilege.107 However, Eliot, 
present in the Commons at the time, then started a ‘lengthy and unexpected’ debate, 
characterised as his first great coup de théâtre:108  
That we had lost the freedom of ancient Parliaments. The jealousy between us and the 
King the cause, and our want of secrecy the cause of that jealousy. Some, perchance, that 
were instruments in that discovery did but serve the turn of others that had worse ends 
than themselves. If there were not false glasses between us and the King, our privileges 
and his prerogative would stand well together. To consult and deliberate, do not include 
only restraint of his supreme power. […] We are the representative body of the kingdom, 
the King of us, and all that we do is both under him and for him. So it concluded with a 
3-fold motion: (1) that some general obligation might be invented of trust and secrecy; (2) 
that his Majesty would not respect such whisperers and thinks the enemies to parliaments 
could not be any good servants to him; (3) to frame a petition for the privileges.109 
Sir Edward Nicholas (Winchelsea) records in his diary: ‘He [Eliot] would have us to seek 
to the King for our particular sureties, the promise we have had from the King being but 
in general’.110 Eliot might have thought his words would resonate with those favouring a 
restatement of privilege, and certainly Sir Francis Seymour was in favour of revisiting the 
contentious Protestation of the previous parliament. John Pym (sitting then for 
Chippenham), however, realised that a successful parliament depended on avoiding such 
a debate, and noted in his diary that ‘Divers were afraid this motion would have put the 
House into some such heat as to disturb the great business’. The ever-eloquent Phelips 
warned against stirring up a hornets’ nest over past matters, and successfully 
recommended remission to a committee, after which the matter was quietly dropped.111 
                                                
106 CJ: 27 February, 1624 (second scribe). Giles returned to the matter on 2 March, when the 
House decided that a letter should go from the Speaker, staying any suit or trial against 
Eliot: Diary of Edward Nicholas, fol. 39v, in Baker (ed.), Proceedings 1624: 2 March 
1624. 
107 Diary of John Holles, fol. 83v in ibid.: 27 February 1624. 
108 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 184. 
109 Diary of John Pym, fol. 8v, in Baker (ed.), Proceedings 1624: 27 February 1624. 
110 Diary of Edward Nicholas, fol. 28v, in ibid.: 27 February 1624. 
111 Pym, fol. 8v in ibid.: 27 February 1624. 
Page 141 
Another privilege case showed that freedom from molestation, of person and goods, 
applied not just to members of both Houses and their servants, but supposedly extended 
to those having business with parliament. So, in 1624, the matter was raised that the 
Master of the Feltmakers, who came to ‘prefer’ a bill in the Commons, had been taken by 
a serjeant, and committed to the Fleet prison. Despite offering a huge bond of £2,000, the 
Master was detained.112 On 12 May 1624, a petition was presented to the Commons, 
asking that those who had been imprisoned should be ‘enlarged’ [released from 
confinement], in order to allow them to present their bill to the House. The issue, of 
whether privilege had been breached, was referred to the committee for privileges.113 
However, a couple of weeks later, the committee reported that ‘they had no time to 
examine it [the petition]’, and it was resolved ‘to let it rest in statu quo, till next 
Session’.114 During the course of the Rolle case, the Commons clearly asserted that any 
people having business with the Commons, for example, the merchant-petitioners, were 
entitled to privilege, because parliament might need them to appear in person, and they 
should not be diverted from such a summons by extraneous concerns.115 This initiative 
was, nevertheless, challenged by Charles I, in his speech at the dissolution of 1629, so 
that the issue remained open. 
Before proroguing parliament on 29 May 1624, James remained concerned about his 
own position, when he ‘vowed, that all the Subsidy (for which He heartily thanked them), 
though it had not been so tied and limited, shall be bestowed that Way [to wage war on 
Spain]. His Majesty remembered them, that nothing was given to relieve His own Wants: 
which He expects at the next Session, in the Beginning of Winter’. However this 
parliament never resumed, being automatically dissolved when James I died on 27 March 
1625. 
The 1625 parliament  
Charles I was some ten years younger on accession to the English throne than his father 
had been, and self-evidently without the benefit of any prior experience as a ruler, such as 
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James VI and I had uniquely enjoyed, even though, as prince of Wales, Charles had 
attended the House of Lords from 1621 onwards. Kishlansky relates varying views of 
Charles as a monarch:  
In the mildest version, Charles was ineffectual and incompetent. […] He was ‘the shy 
man afraid of seeming shy’ who receded in the presence of powerful personalities like 
Buckingham, Laud, and Strafford and was putty in the hands of his strongwilled wife with 
whom he was sentimentally in love’.[1] He understood little of the art of government at 
which he remained an aesthete rather than a connoisseur despite a quarter century of 
rule. In the strongest version, Charles was a man of blood, a tyrant bent on subverting the 
constitution of his kingdom, destroying the liberties of his subjects and establishing a 
continental style absolutism. In this guise he was ‘perfidious, not only from constitution 
and from habit, but also on principle’.[2] He was vindictive toward his opponents and 
ruthless toward his enemies, ‘a stubborn, imperious and dangerous man’ who ‘inspired 
fear’.[3] 116  
Eliot, perhaps surprisingly, identified several positive qualities in Charles: ‘his pietie, his 
religious practise & devotion, […] the innate sweetnes of his nature, the calme habit & 
composition of his minde: […] the order of his house, the rule of his affaires’.117 Even 
then, Charles’s qualities of loyalty and bravery had unintended, unwelcome 
consequences, for example in his protection of Buckingham, and his later unwillingness 
to disown the actions of the customs collectors in the Rolle case. However, this was an 
age of personal monarchy, and the new king expected to be obeyed: ‘Charles thought 
purely in terms of descending authority, never ascending authority’.118 Sommerville 
suggests that Charles believed that he was accountable only to God, and not his subjects, 
although he might, as with his justifications of the dissolutions of 1625 and 1626, choose 
                                                
116 Mark Kishlansky, ‘Tyranny Denied: Charles I, Attorney General Heath, and the Five Knights' 
Case’, HistJ, 42 (1) (March 1999), 53-83, pp. 53-54. The cited passages are from: [1] J. P. 
Kenyon, The Stuarts. A Study in English Kingship (London: Batsford, 1958), p. 64; [2] 
Thomas Babington Macaulay, Critical, Historical, and Miscellaneous Essays and Poems 
(London: s.n., 1885), III, p. 375; [3] Michael B. Young, Charles I (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1997), pp. 49-50. 
117 Grosart (ed.), Apology & Negotium Posterorum (Eliot), I, pp. 39-40. 
118 Young, Charles I, p. 81. 
Page 143 
to provide explanations.119 Another view suggests that Charles was neither naïve nor a 
tyrant; rather that he was principled and astute, although dogged by bad luck and his own 
commitment to maintain moral principles come what may.120 Any negative aspects to 
Charles’s character would seem likely to have exacerbated difficulties over key issues, 
such as religion, supply, the place of privilege in the constitution, and the nature of 
government: weakness would be exploited by the Commons, whereas perceived 
tyrannical or absolutist tendencies would inevitably lead to a contrary reaction. Moreover, 
it would appear that Charles did not have his father’s carefully tuned antennae and supple 
skills of statecraft when matters became problematic. Difficulties would become apparent 
when his first parliament assembled in May 1625, with the royal finances under particular 
pressure. There was the expenditure on Charles’s marriage to Henrietta Maria; costs for 
James I’s funeral; the expenses associated with commitments, or near commitments, to 
military activity on the continent, and subsidies to England’s allies; as well as 
inefficiency and leaching of funds through corruption, or incompetence. Despite a 
desperate need for supply, the parliament only lasted until August, having transacted no 
significant business, some giving it the title of the ‘useless parliament’.121 
Even so, privilege referrals do seem to have been quite numerous, as Sir George More 
observed that he had ‘above twenty petitions about privileges’; he was ordered to ‘bring 
them sealed up, and delivered to the Clerk; with a Note of the Order, wherein they were 
received’.122 One particular privilege case concerned Sir William Cope, who had been 
arrested for debt a month after the prorogation of James I’s last parliament, and placed in 
Oxford castle, on a suit from Lady Coppyn to recover £3,000 – not the first litigation 
involving these two parties.123 There were petitions and counter-petitions at the start of 
the parliament, but on 22 June 1625, Cope’s petition for privilege was ‘by a general voice 
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rejected’.124 On the next day, Robert Hitcham (sitting then for Orford) reported that the 
privileges committee found that Cope was taken in execution 33 days after the end of the 
last parliament, outside the now-conventional time limit for privilege to apply, of 16 days 
before and 16 days after a session.125 However, as a prisoner, he had not been eligible for 
election anyway: 
A man in exequution is not eligible, for though he come out by Habeas Corpus, the law 
intendes him to bee a prisoner, and not able to serve, and therefore, although he should 
have payd the debt and bene discharged before the appearance, yet must ther bee a new 
election; for that which was voyde att first, cannot be made good by any post fact right. 
Soe priviledge and elegibility are convertible; whatsoever may be chosen ought to have 
priviledge; the law gives no priviledge where the creditor is deprived of all further 
remedye, as in this case, which is not provided for by the Stat. 1 Jacob.126 
Cope was ‘discharged the House, and a warrant issued for a new election’; Cope did not 
sit again in parliament.127 A further case involved Arthur Bassett, who had been elected 
for Fowey, despite being in prison on mesne process, as he could not raise the necessary 
sum for bail in respect of a huge debt. Sir John Eliot presented a petition from Bassett, 
which was referred to the committee for privileges; his case was further raised by John 
Delbridge (Barnstaple).128 A few days later, the committee reported back, and the House 
decided that Bassett should have privilege, as he had been arrested on mesne process, not 
‘true debt’. As such, he was: ‘well elected. No Common Law, nor Statute Law against 
it’.129 Nevertheless, there were voices against granting Bassett privilege: ‘If this be 
allowed, wee shall empty the prisons and fill the Parliament with such members as will 
take more care of how to shift off their owne debts then to provide good lawes for the 
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Commonwealth’.130 At the same time, as Sommerville records, it was argued that if all 
who were committed for debt were rendered ineligible to serve as MPs, political 
opponents might initiate a process involving a spurious debt to render the other party 
ineligible. Granted, privilege could be abused, but was ‘nevertheless a vital safeguard of 
Parliament’s proper functioning and consequently of the subject’s freedoms’.131  
A failure to grant supply arose largely because the Commons were more concerned 
with high politics and grievances. The upshot was that they voted an inadequate two 
subsidies, and drew up a bill that would have given the king tonnage and poundage for 
only one year to 25 March 1626, despite reassurances by the solicitor general, Robert 
Heath (East Grinstead) that the king would address their grievances.132 The Commons’ 
attitude had been hardened by the knowledge that tonnage and poundage had continued to 
be collected since the death of James, without parliamentary authority, albeit Charles’s 
shortage of funds had left him little choice in the matter, and, further, he might have 
expected the usual retrospective authority to collect those duties to be backdated to his 
accession. The tonnage and poundage bill moved from the Commons to the Lords, where 
it received a first reading, on 9 July, but was then allowed to ‘sleep’, probably because the 
more loyal Lords were unhappy at the time-limited nature of the grant. In the Lords’ list 
of bills from the session, it is shown as having received only a first reading.133 Contrary to 
certain histories, it is therefore clear that Charles I was not authorised to collect tonnage 
and poundage in 1625, even for just one year. The collection of the duties without 
parliamentary authority would in fact lead, in 1628, to a refusal by some merchants to pay 
up, the consequent impounding of their goods, and, in particular, a claim for privilege for 
his goods by the MP, John Rolle. The Commons resolved: ‘to draw a Petition to his 
Majesty, comprehending the Heads of all those Things, whereof the House shall think fit 
                                                
130 Gardiner (ed.), CD 1625, p. 61. 
131 Sommerville, The Liberties of the Subject, p. 62. 
132 CJ, 1, p. 800: 22 June 1625. Russell has it that John Rolle, Sir Edward Coke (elected for 
Norfolk in 1625 and 1626, and Buckinghamshire in 1628), and Sir Robert Phelips 
(Somerset) were behind this limitation, leading to disfavour with the king and the seizure 
of Rolle’s goods in 1628: Russell, Crisis of Parliaments, p. 300. HoP cautions that ‘it 
cannot automatically be assumed that Rolle was already becoming involved in issues 
which were to dominate his career three years later, such as Tunnage and Poundage’: 
Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29: VI, p. 87. 
133 LJ, 3, p. 490: 12 August 1625. 
Page 146 
to inform his Majesty’; the committee charged with the task presented the outcome on 
8 August.134 Charles tried to expedite matters with a message, delivered by the chancellor 
on 10 August, which acknowledged the Commons’ good intentions, but ‘desired them to 
consider his Affairs require a speedy Dispatch [and] desireth a present Answer about his 
Supply. If not, will […] make as good Shift for his present Occasions, as he can’.135 Sir 
Robert Phelips (sitting then for Somerset) clearly recognised the subtext in the message: 
if adequate supply was not granted, the king would use the royal prerogative of action in 
an emergency, which Phelips recognised as a ‘dangerous precedent’.136 A further 
committee was set up, to consider the response to the royal message.137 What resulted 
was outwardly loyal and dutiful in tone, but with a meatier core, as seen in this extract:  
We are all resolved, & doe heerby diclare, that we will ever continue most loyall & 
obedient subjects to our most gratious Soveraigne, K[ing] Charles, & that we wilbe readie 
in convenient time, & in a parliamentarie waie, freelie and dutifullie to doe our utmost 
indeavor to discover & reforme the abuses, & greivances of the realme & state, & in the 
like sort to afford all necessarie supplie to his most excellent majesty upon his present, & 
all other his just occasions and designes.138 
Having somewhat threateningly been made aware that supply would only be granted in a 
‘convenient time’, and ‘a parliamentary way’, and concerned about the nature of the 
Commons’ grievances, not least the opposition to the duke of Buckingham, Charles had 
had enough. The parliament, which had begun business sessions in the Commons on 
21 June ‘in a mood of grudging goodwill’, was now abruptly dissolved on 12 August, ‘in 
a mood of resentful bewilderment’.139 
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The 1626 parliament 
Desperate for money grants, Charles I was soon obliged to call a fresh parliament, which 
began on 6 February 1626, and, as was often the case, some routine privilege cases were 
brought up early in the Commons’ first session. Privilege also surfaced as a serious issue 
in the Lords, but in their case, matters were far from routine. They had been outraged by 
Charles’s attempts to neutralise Buckingham’s fiercest critics, when he denied John 
Williams (bishop of Lincoln) his proxies, and imprisoned the earls of Bristol and 
Arundel.140 These actions were to have significant consequences for the debates over 
parliamentary privilege and royal prerogative, in the period from around March 1626 
through to early June of that year. Despite employing a variety of delaying tactics and 
obfuscations, Charles was faced with the implacable resolve of the Lords to reinforce 
their privilege of freedom from arrest, particularly in respect of Arundel. In the end, the 
king had to capitulate, sending a message: ‘to take away all Dispute, and that their 
Privileges may be in the same Estate as they were when this Parliament began, His 
Majesty had taken off His Restraint of the said Earl [of Arundel], whereby he hath 
Liberty to come to the House’.141 
Having previously impeached Bacon and Cranfield, the Commons’ main efforts were 
to pursue Buckingham, potentially also through impeachment, as he was suspect in 
religion, and because of his incompetence as a military leader, and, rather less overtly, 
because of his supposed malign influence on the king.142 For them it was essential to have 
their grievances satisfied before any grant of supply, as Christopher Wandesford 
(Richmond) remarked: ‘Parliaments have of late met, saluted, given money, and so 
departed with promise to do something the next parliament’.143 For his part, the king was 
hardly in a position to dissolve this fresh parliament, even to protect his favourite, 
because of his urgent need for supply to mount a second expedition against Spain. 
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Charles found a need to speak directly: ‘And you, Gentlemen of the House of Commons 
[…] I must tell you that I am come here to show you your errors, and, as I may term 
them, unparliamentary proceedings in this Parliament. […] Remember that Parliaments 
are altogether in my power for their calling, sitting and dissolution’.144 Not for the first 
time, he warned the Commons that it must turn its attention to supply, or else he would be 
forced ‘to take other resolutions’.145 A standoff resulted between a king who was 
determined to have supply and to protect Buckingham; and the Commons, who were 
equally determined to see grievances addressed. The charged atmosphere in both Houses 
meant that supply was never discussed during May and June 1626, and a dissolution 
seemed increasingly likely.146 Despite conciliar advice to the contrary, the king remained 
adamant, seeing the Commons’ refusal to grant supply as a concerted attempt to 
undermine the monarchy, and he dissolved the parliament on 16 June. However, the 
Commons ensured that every member had a copy of a lengthy intended remonstrance that 
they had prepared. This set out that they were not responsible for delays in providing 
supply to the king, to which they were committed; that tonnage and poundage always 
required ‘a special Act of Parliament, and ought not to be levied without such an Act’; 
and that they would provide supply once their grievances had been redressed.147 The lord 
keeper’s speech, on behalf of Charles, tellingly claimed: ‘As never king was more loving 
to his people […] so there was never king more jealous of his honour’.148 The king 
offered his own explanation of events, when he assured the Lords that the termination had 
not come ‘for any cause gyven by your l[ordships] but proceeding from the Commons’.149 
In a case of shutting the stable door, a royal proclamation was issued, on 16 June, 
‘prohibiting the publishing, dispersing and reading of a Declaration or Remonstrance’ 
from the Commons to ‘his Majestie’.150 
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By the time of this parliament, the Commons were also prepared to challenge the 
workings of the prerogative courts, seen in a case involving Sir Robert Howard, which 
culminated in an assertion of the authority of the Commons over the high commission, 
and an associated determination to abolish ex officio oaths.151 Howard was a generally 
undistinguished MP who was elected for Bishop’s Castle in all the parliaments of the 
1620s. He became involved in a number of legal proceedings that began on 1 March 
1625, when he was summoned to the high commission to answer an accusation of 
adultery, which was an offence against the sacrament of marriage. He was ordered to take 
the oath ex officio before giving evidence, but claimed parliamentary privilege allowed 
him to refuse.152 Howard was then committed to the Fleet prison, but freed on a writ of 
habeas corpus cum causa, and after he had shown a copy of his return to parliament. The 
commission then reconvened to hear Howard’s evidence, declaring somewhat 
surprisingly that the chancery certificate of his return to parliament was ‘of no worth, 
being no record’. However, the commission could only punish Howard by using ‘the 
rusty sword of excommunication’, which sentence was pronounced, and then publicly 
announced at St Paul’s Cross.153 The excommunication continued beyond the dissolution 
of 12 August 1625 that had followed James I’s death. Although Howard was again 
elected to sit in the first parliament of Charles I, the Commons do not appear to have 
considered the apparent breach of privilege. Howard was re-elected for Bishop’s Castle 
for Charles I’s second parliament, which first sat on 6 February 1626, and on 
16 February, the excommunication was lifted. On the following day, it was agreed by the 
Commons that a breach of privilege could be punished in one parliament, in respect of an 
offence that had taken place during the time that an earlier parliament was sitting. 
Excommunication may have been an archaic procedure to force someone to give 
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evidence, but at a time when religion was of paramount importance, there was a wider 
threat that, Howard being ‘under excommunication major’,154 the entire House could be 
liable under canon law to the penalties of ‘excommunication minor’155 for keeping his 
company. The matter was therefore referred to the committee for privileges.156 That 
committee reported a month later, when the Commons unanimously agreed that Howard 
had claimed privilege before the commission in ‘due manner’, and that he should have his 
privilege. MPs who had sat on the high commission when it passed sentence against 
Howard were ordered to attend hearings to explain themselves, with a threat expressed by 
some that those who had rejected Howard’s privilege claim should themselves be made to 
declare their errors at St Paul’s Cross, where Howard had been publicly degraded.157 
Several commissioners claimed that they were unaware that Howard was claiming 
privilege at the time, or that they had not actively voted for Howard’s punishment. The 
House decided, first, that Howard should have privilege for all legal proceedings from 
1 February 1625 onwards, and these should be ‘declared to be void, and ought to be 
vacated and annihilated’. Second, ‘a Letter to be written by Mr. Speaker to the Lord of 
Canterbury, and the rest of the Lords, and others of the High Commissioners, for 
annulling of the said Proceedings’. Third, the commissioners’ registrar should be 
instructed to raze the proceedings against Howard from his records – an order that was 
carried out before the dissolution.158 The Howard case was important in three respects. 
First, it led to confirmation that a breach of privilege in one parliament could be punished 
in another. Second, it exposed the inappropriateness of ex officio oaths, particularly in a 
climate where some religious groups refused to take any kind of oath.159 Third, it showed 
that the associated penalty of excommunication, which potentially affected any or all of 
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the Commons, through their association with Howard, had threatened the authority of the 
House of Commons, and the right of its members to privilege in legal suits. The outcome 
had been a clear counter-assertion of the authority of the Commons and their privileges 
over a prerogative court. The Commons also declared their intention to legislate against 
the use of ex officio oaths, but this had not been accomplished before the period of 
personal rule began.160 
Another significant case in this parliament concerned the servant of Sir Thomas 
Bagehott (Stockbridge), arrested on a mesne process ‘at his master’s heels’ after the start 
of the parliament. The issue was whether someone taken on a mesne process could be 
freed by the dispatch of the serjeant-at-arms to the prison in question, or whether a writ of 
habeas corpus was required.161 The committee for privileges were asked to look at the 
case, and reported their opinion that the servant ‘should be delivered by Habeas Corpus, 
by Warrant from the House’. The old precedents of Ferrers,162 Shirley,163 and Skinner164 
were referred to. Accordingly, the House ordered the Speaker to prepare a warrant to the 
Clerk of the Crown for the purpose.165 A rider was added: ‘notwithstanding the said 
opinion of the Committee, the House hath power, when they see cause, to send the 
Serjeant immediately to deliver the prisoner’.166 The man was brought to the Bar of the 
House; but the keeper of the Gatehouse had made an error in making out his return, which 
he was ordered to correct, and the servant was then freed.167 
Also in 1626, it emerged that Sir Emmanuel Giffard (Bury St Edmunds) had been 
arrested for debt on 23 January, and imprisoned in the Gatehouse: an apparently clear 
breach of privilege. When parliament assembled, Sir Benjamin Rudyard (sitting then for 
Old Sarum) applied for privilege for Giffard. The keeper of the Gatehouse explained that 
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Giffard had been arrested on two executions. The House then ordered the Clerk of the 
Crown to attend the next day ‘with the return of Mr Gifford’.168 It emerged that the 
indenture of the election return for Giffard had erroneously been dated 30 January, which 
would have meant that he was not entitled to privilege on the (earlier) date of his arrest. It 
was agreed that the committee for privileges should examine the matter of fact, i.e. the 
date from which Giffard could be said to have been elected.169 A few days later, the 
committee reported that Giffard had apparently been elected on 11 January, but that the 
town clerk had dated the indenture 30 January, ‘as conceiving it was to bear Date the Day 
of the next County: So as he was arrested after his Election, but before the Return: his 
Arrest being 23 January’.170 A number of differing views now emerged, among which, 
the neat point was made that: ‘The Time of the Election to be respected, not the Date of 
the Indentures of the Return; for then may be in the Power of a Sheriff, or other Officer, 
to defeat our Privilege’. Despite some contrary voices about the legitimacy of such a 
move, the House finally resolved that the indenture should be amended to show a date of 
11 January for the return, rather than 30 January. It was further ordered that Giffard 
should have privilege and be delivered out of execution; and a warrant was issued to the 
Clerk of the Crown, for a habeas corpus to bring Giffard up the next day.171 In due 
course, Giffard was brought in, the writ and return were handed to the Clerk of the 
Commons, who read them; the Speaker then discharged Giffard, wished him to take the 
oath, and his seat in the House.172 
As well as determinedly protecting members’ privileges, the Commons were equally 
assiduous in punishing those who acted in an unparliamentary fashion. So, in 1626, the 
Commons became concerned about the actions of Richard Dyott, who was a regular 
defender of Buckingham, and provoker of puritan members. Dyott had attended a joint 
conference with the Lords to hear charges laid against the duke of Buckingham. Many 
had been angered by Buckingham’s cocksure demeanour, but Dyott suggested that the 
Lords would have censured Buckingham if his behaviour had been unacceptable – unless 
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they had been too cowed to do so, going on to remark that: ‘it is an indignity to the Lords 
to think them thus poor and pusillanimous’. This was too much for many of the 
Commons, who censured Dyott and, on 9 May, ordered him to be sequestered from the 
House.173 The ban was only lifted on 23 May, after a ‘very submissive petition’ from 
Dyott, who ‘said he was infinitely obliged to the favor of this House. He could offer no 
more for himself but to make this error of mine an instruction to me of more temperate 
and inoffensive carriage hereafter’.174 
In 1626, the matter of the arrest of Sir John Eliot (sitting then for St Germans) arose. 
Eliot had summed up the case for the impeachment of Buckingham, making remarks that 
were ‘a tour de force of colourful invective’, but on the next day the king counter-
attacked, ordering the arrest of both Sir Dudley Digges, and Eliot, who had handled the 
summing-up in a way that Charles felt was insulting to his honour. There was a clear 
tension between claims of privilege for the two men, and a degree of acceptance that the 
king had powers to arrest people for lese-majesty. The Commons nevertheless threatened 
to refuse to transact any ordinary business, and on 19 May, Eliot was released; Digges 
had been freed some three days earlier. On 20 May, a Commons motion was made, 
‘concerning Sir Jo. Ellyott; whether he be to come and sit here, having been accused of 
high Crimes, extrajudicial to this House’. Eliot was sent for, ‘to give him Occasion to 
discharge himself of whatsoever might be objected against him, for any thing passed from 
him at the Conference’. After he had made a speech defending himself, a motion was 
passed: ‘Sir Jo. Ellyott hath not exceeded the Commission given him by the House, in 
anything passed from him in the late Conference with the Lords. The like for Sir D. 
Digges. - Both, without One Negative’.175  
A contrasting case was that of John More (Lymington), which was raised at the same 
time as Eliot’s case. John Pym moved for privilege for More, who had been arrested in 
February 1625, when he was entitled to privilege of parliament, because he had refused to 
answer a summons to attend the assizes, and had not arranged for representation by an 
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attorney. The Commons agreed that a letter should be written to the judges of the king’s 
bench, desiring a stay of judgment there, until the Commons, through the privileges 
committee, determined whether More was indeed entitled to privilege.176 The committee 
apparently did not make a report on the case. However, events now took a new turn, 
when, on 3 June, at a grand committee, which had been arranged to prepare a conference 
on the impeachment of the duke of Buckingham, ‘More caused a scandal by declaring 
impulsively that it would be "impossible for a tyrant to bring this land to subjection, like 
that of France"’. These words could be interpreted as treasonous and were reported to the 
House. It was accepted that More’s tongue had run away with him, and after some debate 
he was committed to the Tower by the Commons.177  
There was thus a contrast between Eliot, who was seen as having spoken in line with 
what was expected of him, at the impeachment hearing concerning Buckingham, and then 
been improperly imprisoned on the king’s command, and More, whose words had been 
found to be offensive by the Commons, so that they, not the king, properly ordered his 
imprisonment. A few days later, More petitioned for his release, whereupon the 
chancellor of the exchequer notified the House that: ‘His Majesty is well pleased to remit 
Mr More if the House shall think fit’, and he was then released from the Tower, and 
restored to the House.178 
*** *** *** 
The dissolution of 1626 had done nothing to help the king’s circumstances, in which 
finance was urgently needed to pay for the continuing war with Spain; to secure the rights 
and safety of his sister; and to meet other commitments, such as his assurance of 
assistance to Denmark.179 Charles did receive some income after the 1626 dissolution: 
crucially, in July, a privy council commission set out that tonnage and poundage were 
traditional duties, and ‘specially ordered’ that they should continue to be collected, until 
such time as parliamentary authority was obtained. There is a neat symmetry in the 
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Commons’ view that their privileges were now theirs by custom, and no longer dependent 
on a grant by the king; although for his part the king might argue that tonnage and 
poundage were now the sovereign’s by custom, and no longer dependent on a grant by 
the Commons. The council also ordered that anyone refusing to pay the duties should be 
committed to prison until they did so.180 The council further proposed that a free 
benevolence, or a loan from the king’s subjects, should be requested, ‘tyme not admitting 
the way of a Parliament’.181 As Cust explains, ‘it was well established that in an 
emergency the king was entitled to request a general aid from his subjects. If this was 
refused, then necessity compelled him to resort to the prerogative, and he could 
legitimately request a loan or a benevolence’.182 Letters accordingly went out in July 
1626, setting out that the Commons had unanimously agreed to grant the king four 
subsidies and three fifteenths, although the measures had not gone through all the 
parliamentary stages before the dissolution of June 1626. On that basis, the king felt that 
it was appropriate to ‘desire all our loving subjects […] lovingly, freely and voluntarily 
[…] to give unto us a full supply answerable to the necessity of our present occasions’, in 
other words, a benevolence or free loan.183 However, those letters did not have the desired 
result, so in the autumn instructions went out to local commissioners to collect a forced 
loan, which it was felt would be ‘readily and cheerfully be lent unto us by our loving 
subjects, when they shall be truly informed from us of what importance and of what 
necessity that is which we now require of them’.184 Charles published a document that 
accounted for his actions, by describing how a small, but powerful group of MPs had 
corrupted the House, forcing the king to dissolve the parliament prematurely.185 A further 
proclamation reassured people that ‘we are fully prepared to call a Parliament soe soone 
as conveniently wee maie and as often as the Commonwealth’s and state occasions shall 
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require it’.186 The use of the term ‘loan’ meant that the Commons could not claim that a 
tax was being levied without parliamentary approval, even if few may have supposed that 
this loan would ever be repaid. However, there was a significant counter-cost, in terms of 
the resentment of those forced to pay what they saw as an imposition of dubious legality, 
and a number of those who were supposed to be collecting the loans induced people not 
to pay. The degree to which there was an ‘emergency’ that justified the forced loan was 
also questioned. Soldiers began to be forcibly billeted on less wealthy refusers, and the 
more prominent were imprisoned.187 In particular, five knights were summoned before the 
council, and imprisoned for refusing to pay the forced loan.188 When they sought habeas 
corpus, the judges ruled that a man jailed by special command of the king had no relief in 
common law, despite judicial disquiet about arbitrary imprisonment as an instrument of 
government.189 By treating the king’s right permanently to imprison as exceptional, as 
well as somewhat doubtful in law, the judgment had the effect of shaking Charles’s 
authority in the matter considerably. In February 1628, there was an attempt to raise 
extra-parliamentary supply through a levy of ship money, which was technically not a 
tax, but a cash payment of feudal origin, in lieu of physical provision of a ship.190 The 
proclamation levying ship money made it clear that a parliament was not ruled out, but 
that it would have to meet on the king’s terms. The courts narrowly endorsed the view 
that the king could take an executive decision to levy ship money, and could take action 
against those refusing to pay.191 However, several inland counties refused to pay for what 
                                                
186 A Declaration of his Majesty’s clear intention, in requiring the aid of his loving subjects, in 
that way of loane which is now intended by his Highness: ibid., p. 219. 
187 Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, pp. 331 and 334; David L. Smith, A History of the 
Modern British Isles, 1603 - 1707 : The Double Crown (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 
pp. 70-71. 
188 Sir John Corbet, Sir Thomas Darnel(l), Sir Walter E(a)rle, Sir John Heveningham, and Sir 
Edmund Hampden. 
189 T. B. Howell (ed.), A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason 
and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors ... , by William Cobbett, 21 vols. (London: 
Longman, 1816), III, pp. 51-59, especially p. 59. 
190 Alan Cromartie, The Constitutionalist Revolution : An Essay on the History of England, 1450-
1642 (Cambridge: UP, 2006), p. 236. 
191 Bulstrode Whitelocke, ‘Ship Money’, in Henry Craik (ed.), English Prose : Selections (s.l.: 
Macmillan, 1916), . 
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was supposedly a coastal protection measure, and the demand for ship money was 
withdrawn. 
The 1628 parliament 
The need for supply in the face of the difficulties outlined above made it increasingly 
likely that Charles I would have to call a parliament, which happened on 31 January 
1628. Before it met, he made some conciliatory moves: all loan refusers were released 
that month, and a proclamation was issued, putting on hold the raising of monies from the 
people directly, despite what was seen as the urgent necessity for funds for defence. 
Instead, the king was prepared ‘wholly to rely upon the love of Our people in Parliament, 
and not to deferre their assembling’.192 The first session began on 17 March, and, as was 
usual, some privilege cases were soon raised. However, as in each of Charles’s earlier 
parliaments, the pressing issues were the securing of supply and redress of grievances, 
with many of the Commons concerned about the potential for an arbitrary, even 
absolutist, exercise of royal powers and prerogatives, and the perceived growth of 
Arminianism and catholicism. A particular grievance concerned the continuing collection 
of tonnage and poundage without parliamentary authority, and this had led to some 
London merchants refusing to pay the duties, whereupon their goods were seized, 
pending payment. One of the difficulties for Charles I was the rise of more critical 
members at the same as the loss of some moderate voices. William Coryton (Cornwall), 
Sir John Eliot (Cornwall), Sir Peter Heyman (Hythe), Sir Miles Hobart (Great Marlow), 
Denzil Holles (Dorchester), Walter Long (Bath), John Selden, William Strode (Bere 
Alston), and Benjamin Valentine (St Germans) all became more strident in their advocacy 
over a range of grievances, including the perceived attitude of Charles I towards the 
House of Commons and its privileges and rights. Privy councillors were few in number, 
and, in December 1629, the now loyalist Wentworth had moved to the Lords, and been 
appointed president of the Council of the North. Even so, it is wrong to suggest that the 
Commons were united in refusing supply. For example, Sir Benjamin Rudyard 
(Downton), while fearing for the future of parliament, was prepared to support the king, 
                                                
192 Larkin (ed.), Proclamations (Charles I), II, pp. 187-88. 
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by pointing out the illogicality of withholding supply for the king to carry out actions that 
the Commons had advocated: 
This is the crisis of parliaments, by this we shall know whether parliaments will live or die 
[...] His Majesty has [… proclaimed …] that he relies wholely upon our Loves; which if 
we do not answer in our Actions, we are worse than unworthy of his. The Cause why we 
are called hither is, to save ourselves. […] Mr. Speaker, we are not now upon the bene esse 
of the kingdom, we are upon the very esse of it, whether we shall be a kingdom or no […] 
Seems it a small Thing unto you that we have beaten ourselves more than our enemies 
could have done? And shall we continue so by our divisions and by our distractions? 
[…]193 Let us, Mr. Speaker, give the king a way that he may come off like himself […] by 
giving the king a large and ample supply proportionable to the greatness and importance 
of the work in hand, for counsel without money is but a speculation.194 
Cases that involved taking the goods or effects of a member in execution, or otherwise, 
did not solely arise in 1628-29, although that was when they took on a wider significance. 
John Rolle applied for privilege for the goods of John Delbridge in 1626,195 and in 1628, 
Thomas Bray, servant to Sir John Coke (Cambridge University), was given privilege for 
his goods ‘seized and distrained in the country while he is here in the service of his 
master’.196 
 However, by far the most important claim in this category was that of John Rolle, one 
of the merchants whose goods had been seized for non-payment of tonnage and 
poundage. However, as member for Callington, he would have expected to enjoy 
privilege for his goods and himself. Having failed in legal moves to regain his property in 
late 1628, his case was raised in the Commons in early 1629 as a matter of privilege, at a 
time when difficulties over ‘the king’s business’, matters of religion, the authority of the 
Speaker of the Commons, and the character of Charles I were so intertwined as to affect 
the general tone of the parliament, through to its dramatic and chaotic conclusion in 
                                                
193 Anon., The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England from the Earliest Times to the 
Restoration of King Charles II, 2nd edn., 24 vols. (London: Tonson & Miller, 1763) VII, 
pp. 336-37. 
194 Johnson et al. (eds.), CD 1628, II, pp. 58-59: 22 March 1628. 
195 CJ, 1, p. 850: 27 April 1626. 
196 Stowe MS 366, fol. 165, in Johnson et al. (eds.), CD 1628, IV p. 407. 
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March 1629. The Rolle case and other events in the 1629 session have such significance 
for consideration of privilege of person and property that these are considered in separate 
detail in chapter six below. 
Conclusions 
Parliamentary privilege clearly mattered in the early Stuart period, with a growing 
recognition that coherent procedures contributed to the development of privilege as an 
entity, and provided a conscious sense of identity for the House. Individual claims were 
managed with increasing care and consistency, with the result that, over time, the 
Commons were able to consolidate, and sometimes extend, the ambit of the privilege of 
freedom from arrest and other legal processes into new, sometimes contentious, areas. 
One example of such extension was to exempt members from any kind of involvement in 
suits, whether or not these required the personal attendance of the member in court, 
because there should be no extra-parliamentary distractions. A greater institutional 
confidence can be seen, for example, in the disfavour shown to members who wished to 
waive their privilege; the extension of privilege to those having business with the 
Commons; and the challenge to the prerogative court of high commission and its use of 
ex officio oaths. 
 At the start of James I’s first parliament, the Shirley case centred on an individual 
member, but had a wider significance, in that it established that the Commons had clear, 
independent authority to free members who had been arrested or detained, indemnified 
gaolers who freed privileged members, and also gave some rights to creditors. Yet, over 
time a clear distinction was maintained between effecting the release of members 
imprisoned in civil suits, as against those imprisoned by the order of a court, where it was 
felt the Commons should proceed by commissioning a writ of habeas corpus. Succeeding 
cases where a member or his servant had been imprisoned in civil suits were generally 
resolved satisfactorily, as the inevitability of severe punishment for those who had 
offended against privilege was a powerful deterrent. However, in most cases the sentence 
that had been pronounced against the ‘delinquent’ was quietly reduced, reflecting an 
emphasis in privilege matters on outward forms and outcomes, and a confidence that 
allowed justice to be tempered with mercy. 
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 This period saw regular claims for privilege when a subpoena had been issued, which, 
if granted, avoided a need to attend court. Similarly, the Commons established the right to 
avoid jury service. It was also decided that privilege applied, even if a member had 
instructed an attorney, and was therefore not required in court to answer a subpoena 
personally, on the grounds that the suit could nevertheless distract him from due attention 
to matters in parliament. There was, however, continuing ambivalence whether the 
institutional dignity of the House, and the need for every part of the kingdom to have a 
voice in parliament, required privilege to be applied to prevent a member attending court, 
even if he wished to waive his privilege – an issue which remained unresolved during this 
period. The time limits during which privilege applied before and after a session were 
confirmed as sixteen days. The Commons enhanced the procedure to be followed if 
privilege was claimed during an adjournment. As the matter could not be raised in the 
chamber, the outgoing Speaker was empowered to use his own authority to have a 
privileged member freed. In addition, it was decided that breaches of privilege that 
occurred during one parliament could be addressed in a later parliament. The danger of 
physical attacks on members or their servants persisted to some degree into the 
seventeenth century. Political discourse could be robust, yet the Commons took care to 
punish any assaults, physical or verbal, on members and servants. This was seen as an 
important element in maintaining the dignity of the House, not least if one member 
attacked another. The emphasis on outward forms retains its importance today, as seen in 
the ban on ‘unparliamentary language’.197 The Commons increasingly took into their own 
hands the punishment of those who had breached privilege in some way or other, or who 
had offended the Lords or the king, thereby pre-empting imprisonment by another 
agency, which might have raised some awkward questions about whether privilege could 
                                                
197 ‘Words to which objection has been taken by the Speaker over the years include blackguard, 
coward, [snivelling little] git, guttersnipe, hooligan, rat, swine, stoolpigeon and traitor’: 
House of Commons, Unparliamentary Language, in www.parliament.uk (House of 
Commons Information Office, 2009), at <http://tinyurl.com/n666hhn>. The Speaker’s 
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Parliamentary Debates, 1803-2005, in Millbank Systems (History of Parliament Trust), 
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be invoked. The Commons were also prepared to punish those who used intemperate 
language about the monarch or peers, thereby strengthening their role in dealing with 
cases of lese-majesty, or contempt of the Lords. One group did however cause some 
difficulty: pages attending upon members might be able to claim to privilege by virtue of 
their service, yet their behaviour was sometimes unacceptable, even criminal.  
 Moreover, although time was still spent on individual cases, there was a greater 
emphasis in the Commons on the wider constitutional impact of the privilege of freedom 
from arrest in all its forms, such that matters of privilege and grievances were becoming 
increasingly interlinked. The failure to grant the crown adequate supply was a major 
factor in Charles I turning to extra-parliamentary means to raise revenue, which 
inevitably infringed the ‘ancient freedom of parliaments’, particularly the Commons’ 
rights, liberties and privileges, which included the control of supply to the king. This 
engendered a change of attitude in the Commons, whereby parliamentarians saw the 
different elements of privilege as an entity that could not, and should not, be violated, and 
led to the preparation of polemical statements. The Commons’ view was that their 
privileges were now theirs by custom, and no longer dependent on a grant by the king; 
whereas the king might reasonably think that tonnage and poundage were the sovereign’s 
by custom, and no longer questionable by the Commons. However the Commons robustly 
asserted their rights, in particular stressing that the crown could only raise money through 
traditional feudal levies, or on the back of parliamentary approval, rather than by the use 
of novel powers that supposedly lay within the royal prerogative. Linked to this 
restatement of their power to control supply, the Commons were prepared to support the 
claims of John Rolle for parliamentary privilege in respect of his goods. The Commons’ 
assiduous preservation of customary privileges came to benefit not just individual 
members, but also the institution as a whole, thereby giving the Commons greater 
corporate confidence to defend ancient freedoms, not least through a succession of 
‘protestations’, petitions, and ‘apologies’. These generally provoked James or Charles to 
remind the Commons that privileges were a ‘donature’ through the royal grace, 
accompanied by a restatement of the willingness of the monarch to grant such privileges 
‘as were ever enjoyed’. There was a continuing tension between the Commons’ wish to 
begin parliamentary sessions by setting out their grievances, and awaiting their resolution 
before making any grant of supply, and the monarch’s wish to secure supply speedily, 
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after which grievances might – perhaps – be considered. Later chapters will show how 
privilege matters contributed collectively to the changing dynamics of the period in two 
key areas. First, the privilege of freedom from arrest made it easy to exploit the system, 
and is the subject of the next chapter. Second, the assertion of privilege to protect the 
goods or effects of a member was at the centre of the Rolle case, which is considered in 
chapter six below.
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V : EXPLOITATION OF PRIVILEGES 
Introduction 
Privilege can be, and has been, abused. […] It has never been, and is not now, 
designed to benefit M.P.s personally.1  
Parliamentary privilege is not a licence for members of Parliament to behave in ways 
which are unacceptable to society at large.2  
The exploitation of privilege was not new in the early Stuart period, nor did it end 
then, as can be seen in these two statements from the second half of the twentieth 
century. The ‘parliamentary expenses scandal’ of the early twenty-first century has 
seen spurious and unsuccessful claims for parliamentary privilege, lodged by MPs 
and peers who were found to have improperly manipulated claims for expenses and 
fees, and who were, in some cases, prosecuted in the courts.3 If unacceptable 
behaviour by MPs has a long history, the exploitation of privilege was a particular 
feature of parliamentary life in the early seventeenth century, linked to changes in the 
presentation, management, and operation of privilege. These changes somewhat 
perversely generated greater institutional confidence and strength, especially in the 
Commons, but at the cost of reducing the former certainties about what was, and was 
not, acceptable behaviour in relation to privilege. Over the period, privilege came to 
be seen less and less as a tool to preserve the rights of an individual MP, and rather 
more as a means to increase the institutional integrity and strength of the Commons. 
So, the Shirley case was mainly about one man – the extension of privilege and 
                                                
1 Kilmuir, Law of Parliamentary Privilege, p. 21. 
2 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 1999 
Select Committee Report, vol. 3, Written Evidence : Call for Evidence, at 
<http://goo.gl/p2ZCVR>. 
3 England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), R and David Chaytor and Others 
(2010). The ‘others’ were Elliot Morley MP, James Devine MP, and the peer, lord 
Hanningfield. 
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greater autonomy for the Commons were incidental to the main issue of securing 
Shirley’s release – while associated legislation gave some satisfaction for creditors 
who were affected by the privilege. However, without making an overly whiggish 
claim of ‘burgeoning constitutional conflict’, by the time of the Rolle case, privilege 
had become increasingly politicised and polemical, and bound up with broader 
questions of liberty that went beyond the rights of a single MP.  
Issues around debt recur frequently in this thesis, and have a particular relevance 
when considering how privilege was exploited, so that this chapter is structured, first, 
to provide the context in which debts were viewed, with the possibility of outlawry or 
bankruptcy for defaulters. It then goes on to look at the changing composition of 
parliament, associated with a variety of motives for seeking election, and an 
increasing exploitation of privilege across both Houses. Such exploitation will be seen 
to have been facilitated, in part, by changes to the way in which protections were 
arranged for members, peers, and particularly their servants, real and supposed – an 
exploitation that could be benign in some cases, blatantly abusive and self-serving in 
others. 
Debt, outlawry and bankruptcy 
As issues around debt recur in this thesis, some appreciation is required of the ways in 
which commercial and financial affairs were safeguarded in the early seventeenth 
century, and of the limits on personal financial conduct. This section describes how 
the law included provisions for possible outlawry, bankruptcy, or arrest and 
imprisonment, if someone failed to meet their obligations. This helps us understand 
two particular developments. First, how and why privilege was used by a significant 
number of members of parliament, and their real, or supposed servants, to avoid the 
penalties for financial default. Second, how, as a consequence, institutional protection 
– intended to ensure that parliament could function with a full complement of 
members – was distorted to provide an excessive and unwarranted degree of 
individual protection. 
The extreme sanctions might appear to be outlawry, which, in the medieval period 
mostly comprised criminal outlawries, consequent on indictments for serious crimes, 
such as treason, rebellion, homicide, or other felonies. By the early modern period, 
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the process had developed from being the ‘last resort of criminal law’, towards civil 
outlawries. If a defendant to an action for debt failed to appear in court, it was the 
sheriff’s duty to apprehend him. If the man could not be found, did not appear in 
court, or had no goods in the county that could be seized, the sheriff was directed to 
make a proclamation on five occasions. If the man still failed to appear by the fifth 
proclamation, he was declared an outlaw. If a debtor who continued to owe monies 
did surrender, he would be committed to prison, pending court action, or satisfaction 
of the debt. There were other consequences: medieval statutes, and a specific 
judgment from 1456/7, debarred anyone who was outlawed from sitting as a burgess 
in parliament, as outlaws could ipso facto not be freemen of their borough.4 As 
Thrush records, ‘shortly before the 1597 parliament met […] the sheriffs of each 
county were ordered [by the privy council, strongly influenced by lord keeper 
Egerton] to ensure that no "unmeet" men were returned as borough members’.5 There 
was continuing confusion over the rights of outlaws to be elected, or to take up seats, 
so that in 1604 a royal proclamation ordered: ‘that an expresse care bee had, that there 
be not chosen any persons Banquerupts or Outlawed, but men of knowen good 
behaviour and sufficient livelyhood’.6 The question whether bankrupts or outlaws 
might sit as members arose in relation to the Shirley case, when the issue was left 
unresolved.7 James issued a further proclamation, in November 1620, which set out 
that a ban on bankrupts was required; else the Commons would be filled with 
‘necessitous persons that may desire long parliaments for their private protection’.8  
Bankruptcy, in contrast to outlawry, has a shorter history. This is perhaps because 
until at least Tudor times the structure of trade and finance, with any associated law, 
had been erected by the landed classes, for whom the system of contracts, and 
settlement for land, animals, or crops that had been traded was reasonably clear, 
equitable, and effective. However, as England became more mercantile, and less tied 
                                                
4 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, p. 67. Although referred to in CJ, 1, p. 158: 29 March 1604, 
the judgment has not been identified further. 
5 Thrush, ‘Commons v. Chancery’, p. 302. 
6 ‘A Proclamation concerning the choice of Knights and Burgesses for the Parliament, 
11 January 1604’, in Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations (James I), p. 68. 
7 See pp. 82 ff. above. 
8 Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations (James I), I, p. 494. 
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to land as the creator and repository of wealth, there was a tension between 
reasonable, even commendable, risk-taking in the search of profit, and reckless, or 
imprudent ventures, in which the merchant or trader might find it difficult or 
impossible to meet his obligations. A necessary constraint on recklessness would be 
supplied through the threat of bankruptcy. Bankrupts were quite narrowly defined as 
insolvent subjects of the sovereign, engaged in trade or business, both wholesale and 
retail. Concerns included the risk that a bankrupt person might flee the realm, leaving 
his debts behind; or barricade himself in his dwelling house, which by law could not 
be forcibly entered; or transfer his assets, either to a third party before the law took its 
course, or sometimes to just one of the creditors.9 The first specific legislation, 
enacted in 1542, had two prongs. The first was that all of a debtor’s assets could be 
taken by the authorities, and sold to pay creditors, ‘a portion, rate and rate alike, 
according to the quantity of their debts’. It became an act of bankruptcy to have 
oneself arrested, or to procure one’s goods to be attached prior to an act of 
bankruptcy, so that there was nothing left for the creditors.10 The second element 
covered situations where the debtor no longer had sufficient goods, property or lands 
to be sold by the sheriff to meet the debt. The man would be arrested and remain 
confined, until he or his friends paid the debt, although the creditor had to provide 
food and water if the debtor was destitute. However, statutes did not identify the 
debtor as a criminal, nor interpret debt itself as a crime at common law.11 Bankruptcy 
was apparently becoming widespread in the seventeenth century, as seen in an Act of 
1623, which set out that: 
Daily Experience showeth, that the nomber and multitude of Bankrupts do increase 
more and more […] to the great Incouragement of evill minded persons, the 
hinderance of Traffique and Commerce [… and that …] if such Trader shall by 
himself, or others by his Procurement, obtain any Protection or Protections, other 
                                                
9 A writ of trespass would lie against a sheriff who broke into a house to make execution on a 
writ of fieri facias: Francis J. J. Cadwallader, In Pursuit of the Merchant Debtor and 
Bankrupt, (1965, UCL, London) PhD Thesis: Faculty of Laws, p. 407. 
10 Ibid., p. 20. 
11 Margot C. Finn, The Character of Credit : Personal Debt in English Culture, 1740-1914 
(Cambridge: UP, 2003), p. 110. 
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than such protection or protections as shalbe lawfully protected by the Privilege of 
Parliament [he] shall be adjudg’d a Bankrupt.12  
This is highly significant, as noted by Goodinge: ‘This is plain, All Protections are 
within this Statute, except Parliament Protections duly obtain’d’.13 Imprisonment for 
insolvency ended in 1828, with an erroneous but common belief that imprisonment 
for personal debt ended completely in 1869: in reality, small debtors could continue to 
be imprisoned for up to six weeks, and there were still 3,594 imprisoned debtors in 
1929.14 Only in the nineteenth century were bankrupts disqualified from sitting as an 
MP.15 Today, it is felt that ‘the main purpose of disqualification is to ensure that 
Members are fit and proper people to sit in the House, and are able to carry out their 
duties and responsibilities free from undue pressures from other sources’.16 Bankrupts 
are therefore disqualified from being returned as a member of parliament, sitting in 
the Lords, or, if already an MP, from sitting and voting, ‘irrespective of any 
Parliamentary privilege [my emphasis]’.17  
Increasing exploitation of privilege 
As noted earlier, the privilege of freedom from arrest had a clear purpose from the 
medieval period onwards: to ensure that men would not be hindered from attending 
the king at his ‘high court of parliament’.18 It was not intended to protect members 
                                                
12 An Acte for the Discription of a Bankrupt and Reliefe of Credytors 1623 (21 Jas. I c. 19), 
§1-2: Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, IV, part II, p. 1227. 
13 Tho. Goodinge, The Law against Bankrupts : Or a Treatise Wherein the Statutes against 
Bankrupts Are Explained, 3rd edn., (London: John Nutt, 1713), p. 28. 
14 Erik Berglöf, Howard Rosenthal, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, The Formation of Legal 
Institutions for Bankruptcy : A Comparative Study of the Legislative History, 
(unpublished research, 2001, Mannheim, Germany), at <http://goo.gl/9zV3ZN>, 
p. 22. Imprisonment for debt today is restricted to defaults on fines or orders imposed 
by courts. 
15 May, Parliamentary Practice, p. 12. 
16 Oonagh Gay, SN/PC/3221: Disqualification for Membership of the House of Commons 
(House of Commons Library, 2004), at <http://tinyurl.com/npkavmb>. 
17 Insolvency Act 1986 (Eliz. II c. 45), §426-27, in legislation.gov.uk (TNA), at 
<http://goo.gl/gosdnW>. These provisions were confirmed in the Enterprise Act 2002 
(Eliz. II c. 40), §266: in legislation.gov.uk (TNA), at <http://goo.gl/cAu4r>. 
18 ‘It was during the 14th century that the notion of a "High Court of Parliament", 
distinguished from other royal courts by its omnicompetence, began to take root’: 
[footnote continues ...] 
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and their servants from having to meet their financial obligations, nor did it appear to 
do so to any significant extent before the later Tudor period. To some degree, there 
was greater motivation and opportunity to become an MP in the early Stuart period, 
with the Commons coming to represent a wider cross-section of the population than 
simply members of leading families and prominent merchants or lawyers. 
Membership was not always beneficial: there were costs in elections and maintaining 
a presence in London, and members were supposed to be ever-present in parliament, 
even if not everyone complied with this stringent requirement to attend.19 
Nevertheless, it is clear that many still sought election out of a sense of duty, perhaps 
associated with an expectation that those from leading local families, or holding 
certain offices, such as town clerk or recorder, should serve. The shire members had 
always had a high status, but seats in the larger boroughs became more prestigious 
and sought after. There were, for example, eight candidates for two seats in Reading 
(1628), nine in Sandwich (1620), and ten in Nottingham (1624).20 Such contests 
marked a ‘great suing, standing and striving’ for seats.21 Gardiner notes that, for 1625: 
‘never within living memory had there been such competition for seats in the House 
of Commons’.22 Kishlansky nevertheless takes the view that, until the civil war, 
choices of MPs were honour-laden selections that reflected virtually unanimous 
choices by neighbours, rather than elections that might offer a genuine political 
choice; indeed, there was a prejudice against contests.23 Others might seek to become 
.......................................................................................... 
Chris Given-Wilson, ‘The House of Lords, 1307-1529’, in Clyve Jones (ed.), A Short 
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contests in 1604, around 33 in 1624, and at least 35 in 1628: Thrush, Commons 1604-
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perhaps 34 in 1628: Hirst, The Representative of the People?, pp. 217-22. 
21 J. Spedding (ed.), The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, 7 vols. (London: Longmans, 
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Jason Peacey, ‘Tactical Organisation in a Contested Election’, in Chris R. Kyle (ed.), 
[footnote continues ...] 
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an MP in order to advance the interests of the client group of a patron or relative, 
sometimes by keeping a seat warm for someone unable to serve at the time. Many 
members, particularly burgesses, found that membership of the Commons benefited 
them in their occupations – in the law, or commerce, or trade of some sort – some of 
which might be performed on behalf of constituents. Parliament offered special 
opportunities for members to network with those who had legal, political, and 
financial power, and perhaps to gain influence for themselves.24 Some might have 
wanted to fulfil an ambition to gain personal prestige, a ‘badge of rank’. Status and 
outward show were important: for example, Sir Thomas Shirley’s difficulties arose 
because of large debts to a leading goldsmith, at a time when lavish displays of gold 
and silver were a feature of entertaining in the home, and mere pewter was scorned. 
There were also those who were less concerned about the dignity of parliament, or 
their own honour, and more about personal advantage. For some, at least, there was a 
clear benefit in using parliamentary privilege as a way of forestalling creditors.25 Even 
in the sixteenth century, there were occasions when the Commons apparently valued 
their protections and privileges more highly than any rights for creditors, and this 
produced more than one royal admonition. So, in 1559, as noted earlier, the Commons 
were told that ‘great heed would be taken, that no evil disposed person seek of 
purpose that priviledge for the only defrauding of his Creditors, and for the 
maintenance of injuries and wrongs’.26 There may well have been further cases of 
attempts to defraud creditors under a cloak of privilege, because, in 1593, the lord 
keeper, Sir John Puckering, ‘having received instructions from the Queen’, answered 
the incoming Speaker’s ‘three demands’ for privilege by saying: ‘To your Persons all 
Priviledge is granted, with this Caveat, That under colour of this Priviledge, no man’s 
.......................................................................................... 
Parliament, Politics and Elections, 1604-1648 (London: Cam. Soc., 2001), 5th series, 
volume 17, 237-72, pp. 237-38. 
24 The medieval bar on lawyers becoming members of the Commons no longer applied, 
whereas a nolumus clause still applied to sheriffs, who were not permitted to leave 
their shrievalty, as exploited by Charles in 1625: see p. 65 above. This restriction was 
also a feature of the Stepneth case: see p. 120 above. 
25 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, pp. 73-93. 
26 D’Ewes, Lords, p. 17: 28 January 1559. 
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ill doings, or not performing of duties, be cover’d and protected’.27 Neale found a 
different version of the same speech: ‘the proteccion of your house be not worne by 
any man as a cloake to defraude others of their debtes and duties’.28 Further, in 1601, 
the Commons were told that debtors should not avoid their obligations: ‘Her 
Majesties Pleasure is, you should not maintain and keep with you notorious persons 
either for life or behaviour, and desperate Debtors who never come abroad, fearing 
Laws, but at these times [i.e. when parliament was sitting]’.29 These admonitions 
show that the abuses were becoming a matter of continuing royal concern – a concern 
that was to be shared by James I, and his lord chancellor, Ellesmere.30 Indeed, at the 
start of the seventeenth century, it had become clear that the limits of privilege were 
ill defined, with a consequent uncertainty about what was acceptable practice. The 
possibility that MPs and their servants could use privilege to shield themselves from 
their creditors was attractive to unscrupulous members and potential members of the 
Commons. The Shirley case showed how the selection of precedents and the 
management of privilege favoured the MP, rather than his creditors. However, Shirley 
was clearly not alone in his exploitation of privilege, and the 1614 parliament saw 
several people getting themselves elected, in order to avoid their obligations, 
including Shirley’s own son, also named Thomas.31 Thrush comments: ‘Just how 
many men were driven to seek election primarily to escape their creditors is never 
likely to be known, but in 1614 around eleven members may have done so’.32 Of 
                                                
27 Townshend, Historical Collections, p. 38: 22 February 1593. The account is also given in 
D’Ewes, Lords, p. 460: 22 February 1593. 
28 J. E. Neale, ‘The Lord Keeper’s Speech to the Parliament of 1592/3’, EHR, 31 (121) 
(January 1916), 128-37, p. 137. Neale found the text of the speech in Harl. 6265, 
fols. 111-14. 
29 D’Ewes, Lords, p. 602: 30 October 1601. 
30 See pp. 84f. above. 
31 Although the death of his father left the younger Thomas Shirley heir to a ruined estate, it 
also assured him of election at Steyning in 1614, which provided him with protection 
against his creditors. He was again imprisoned for debt in 1616 – the privilege he 
enjoyed during the short, addled parliament of 1614 having come to an end: Thrush 
and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 323. Shirley was re-elected for Steyning 
in 1621. 
32 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, pp. 90-91.  
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these, six were more or less insolvent before seeking election.33 Of the others, Sir 
Thomas Gerrard (Lancashire) was tainted with recusancy, so that he purchased a 
baronetcy in order to demonstrate his loyalty, but without sufficient funds for the 
purpose.34 Sir William Sandys (Winchester) was also tainted with recusancy, and 
acted as surety for one of the gunpowder plotters. Because of the need to show his 
loyalty, and after making some unwise investments, he fell disastrously into debt. He 
may nevertheless have sought election to parliament to secure a piece of private 
legislation, rather than to benefit from parliamentary privilege.35 Finally, three of 
those identified by Thrush got into financial difficulties chiefly through involvement 
in lengthy and costly litigation.36 A twelfth individual, Sir Henry Goodyer (West 
Looe), was driven by debt to seek re-election in 1614, but failed in the attempt.37  
An increase in the number of cases may have been associated with the possibility 
of a parliament lasting a long time, as with the first parliament of James I.38 Later, 
although each of the parliaments of the 1620s did not last long, the overall time that 
those parliaments were in being filled much of that decade. A long period of 
parliamentary activity might see some members chafing to get back to their estates 
and businesses. By contrast, a lengthy parliament could be most convenient for 
someone trying to avoid meeting his debts or being summoned to a court, as privilege 
was deemed to apply during adjournments, which must have led creditors to question 
whether a debtor would ever not be eundo, sedendo, or redeundo. This was 
recognised in a debate in June 1621, when it was known that parliament was about to 
                                                
33 Sir William Cavendish (Derbyshire), Sir Cuthbert Halsall (Lancashire), Sir Theophilus 
Finch (Great Yarmouth), Robert Wolverston (Cardigan Boroughs), Sir William 
Lovelace (Canterbury), and Sir Thomas Shirley the younger (Steyning): Thrush and 
Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, III, p. 464; ibid. IV, p. 521; ibid., IV, p. 279; ibid., VI, 
pp. 837-38; ibid., V, pp. 164-65; ibid., VI, p. 323. 
34 Ibid., IV, pp. 356-57. As a mark of loyalty, many with strong recusant leanings purchased 
baronetcies, which were open to both protestants and catholics. 
35 Ibid., VI, p. 209. 
36 Edward Savage (Petersfield), Sir John Bourchier (Kingston-upon-Hull), and Rowland 
Meyrick (New Radnor Boroughs): ibid., VI, p. 217; ibid., III, pp. 262-63; ibid., V, 
pp. 322-23.  
37 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, pp. 90-91. 
38 The parliament of 1604-10 sat for about thirty months, representing around one third of the 
total extent of those years. 
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be adjourned for some time.39 Even then, Sir Robert Phelips was not sympathetic to 
those who were confronted with bona fide protections for members or servants during 
vacations:  
For priveledg, we must consider protections in generall and protections in particuler. 
For the particular, theay are ipso facto nullified that are not given to members of owr 
howse. But for members of the house, ther Goods and estates are protected in the 
vacation as well as ther persons, and so ther servants; and so lett them be if this 
cessation [adjournment] continew 7 years. Lett all undew protections be called in, but 
let us maynetayne all just one[s] to us and our posteryty.40  
Sir Dudley Digges suggested that: 
Provision might be made for upholding the priviledges in the Recesse, for the 
Limittacion thereof; That it might not be extended to any other than the members of 
the howse and their necessarye servants; And that it might be declared howe farr 
aswell the goods and Lands as the persons were under this Parliamentary Course of 
Protection.41  
The resolution that the Commons finally decided upon neatly encapsulates the scope 
of the privilege and the way in which it was operated and managed: privilege of 
parliament was to apply for their persons, lands, goods and servants during the 
forthcoming recess, as this was by adjournment not prorogation. Moreover, the 
Speaker was empowered to issue a letter, without the need for any additional 
authority, requiring the release of any member, or servant who had been arrested, or 
detained, ‘as if the parliament were sitting’. Any delinquent would be dealt with when 
parliament next resumed.42  
                                                
39 The adjournment ran from 4 June 1621 to 14 November 1621. 
40 Barrington Notes, fols. 75-76, in Notestein et al. (eds.), CD 1621, III, p. 380: 1 June 1621. 
Only a few months later, Phelips had come to the view that the use of protections was 
leading to abuses: Barrington Notes, fols. 5-11: 20 November 1621, in ibid., III, 
p. 409. 
41 Pym, fol. 156, in ibid., IV, pp. 400-401. 
42 Book of Orders, fols. 86-87, in ibid., VI, pp 477. 
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Moving on to 1624, Thomas Charnock and Edmund Breres arranged their election 
for the Lancashire borough of Newton to avoid their creditors. Charnock was from an 
ancient Lancashire family that contained a number of recusants, including his own 
father-in-law. He became involved in numerous debt cases, having stood surety for 
his brother and Breres.43 Breres himself was from a minor gentry family, who was 
bound in numerous debts that involved his father-in-law. The failure of the latter to 
repay what he owed ‘resulted in an escalation of further debts and bitter litigation’ for 
Breres. Despite various attempts to clear what he personally owed, Breres was faced 
with impending bankruptcy when elected in 1624, but died the following year.44 The 
number of cases, as a proportion of the total number of MPs, was fairly small, so that 
cynical, self-serving exploitation of privilege to avoid the financial obligations of 
oneself, or one’s supposed ‘servants’ did not appear to be prevalent. However, the 
records show that the censure of the House over time was more likely to be directed at 
individual members who had behaved badly in the House, for example by ‘hissing’ 
during a speech,45 or showing disrespect to the Speaker,46 rather than those whose 
actions outside the House might reflect badly on the Commons’ good name, not least 
those who were avoiding their financial obligations.  
Although privilege was rigorously maintained in the early Stuart parliaments, 
those creditors, arresting serjeants or sheriffs who had failed to respect privilege 
rarely served the full term of any sentence imposed by the Commons, as, after a few 
days’ imprisonment, ‘delinquents’ were usually recalled to the Commons, or 
themselves asked to be heard, when they would offer a fulsome apology. Their status 
as supplicants was reinforced by a degrading requirement that they kneel, bareheaded, 
at the Bar of the House. They would then usually be ordered to pay any requisite fines 
and gaolers’ fees, before being freed. Three exceptions can be found, however. First, 
                                                
43 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, III, pp. 493-94. 
44 Ibid., III, pp. 296-97. 
45 For example, ‘Mr. Hext moveth against Hissing in the House; as not beseeming the Gravity 
of the Assembly, derogating from the Dignity of it, and from the Privileges, more 
than any other Abuse whatsoever’: CJ, 1: 26 March 1604 (second scribe). 
46 For example, ‘Sir Edw. Herbert challenged [the Speaker] on the Stairs: That he popped his 
Mouth with his Finger in Scorn : Did again this Morning do it in the Street on 
Horseback’: CJ, 1, p. 451: 18 July 1610 
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an exasperated House of Commons ordered the refractory warden of the Fleet in the 
Shirley case to be incarcerated in the four-foot cube that was the Little Ease cell 
within the Tower, without early relief.47 Second, in 1621, it was ordered that two men 
should ride bare back on one horse, from Westminster to the Exchange, with papers 
on their breasts, identifying that they were being punished for having improperly 
arrested a member’s servant.48 In the third example, a man who had counterfeited a 
protection had to stand on two separate days in the pillory, and was then to be kept 
perpetually in the Bridewell and put to work.49 In some cases, a whipping was 
specified.50 It was really only when the issue of the misuse and forgery of 
‘protections’ mushroomed in the 1620s that severe punishment was more certain, and 
the limits of privilege more tightly defined, with both Houses increasingly intent on 
projecting their authority and status.  
Before concluding this section, it has to be recognised that resisting legal 
processes was not always unfair, or prejudicial to the good name of parliament. It 
would appear that there were times when political opponents would deliberately 
engineer legal actions, often across different locations, sometimes clandestinely, so 
that the potential MP might be outlawed or arrested, before he was covered by 
parliamentary privilege, and without being able to resist a process of which he might 
not even have been aware. The wearing down of a man through multiple suits can be 
seen from two cases from as early as the fifteenth century. The first involved Richard 
Dygon, servant of the MP, John Wyke, who was subject to ‘six actions of debt and 
various other actions of trespass’.51 The second concerned Edmund Chymbeham, who 
was granted privilege, but this was followed by an allegation of a felony, which kept 
him in prison.52 Another case, from 1601, concerned William Vaughan, servant to the 
earl of Shrewsbury, who was held in Newgate prison on an execution. It appeared that 
one William Crayford had ‘fraudulently and malitiously taken out and laid upon the 
                                                
47 See p. 93n. above. 
48 CJ, 1, pp. 637-38: 4 June 1621. 
49 LJ, 3, p. 172: 27 November 1621. 
50 CJ, 1, p. 260: 25 January 1606. 
51 See Appendix 1, case 8. 
52 See Appendix 1, case 10. 
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said Vaughan divers Writs of Execution and Outlawry of many years past, and utterly 
without the privity and knowledge of most of the parties to whom the said Suits 
appertained, of which parties some were avowed to have been a good while since 
Deceased’. The Lords ordered his release by virtue of his privilege, and specified that: 
‘the said Sheriff shall be free from any trouble, damage or molestation for his said 
discharge [of Vaughan]’.53 As Thrush suggests, there was sympathy in the 
seventeenth century for men who may have been outlawed behind their backs, and a 
reluctance to see creditors, rather than electors, determining who would sit in 
parliament. So the Commons decided, in 1628, that: ‘Ferdinando Huddleston, Knight 
for Cumberland […] may serve, notwithstanding he be outlawed’; in fact, there were 
twenty-four outlawries against him. The debate on the matter paid particular attention 
to the possibility that Huddleston might have been outlawed behind his back, as might 
happen to ‘the best man in a county’, and that ‘it was no little prejudice to the 
commonwealth so to be deprived of the possibility to be served by the worthiest 
persons’.54 
This section has shown that in the early Stuart period, the privilege of freedom 
from legal processes operated in ways that did not reflect the original purpose. 
Concerns arose about the exploitation of privilege, and the way that it benefited three 
kinds of men who ran up debts: first, recusants, or those with catholic connections, 
who wanted to provide a costly show of loyalty; second, those who had stood surety 
for family or friends; and, third, those who had acted more unscrupulously, and with a 
blatant disregard for their obligations. The changes in the composition of the 
Commons may have meant that some members were more concerned about personal 
gain and advancement than the dignity and honour of themselves and the institution. 
The Commons were always at pains to maintain, or even to extend, their privileges, 
even during lengthy parliaments, so that there was growing tension between 
maintaining the privilege in a form that met its original purpose, and making some 
                                                
53 D’Ewes, Lords, pp. 607-09, December 1601. 
54 CJ, 1, p. 714: 28 May 1628; Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, p. 68. The question of ‘secret 
outlawries’ (not only in relation to MPs) had previously led to the passage of 
legislation, including The Avoidance of Secret Outlawries Act 1588 (31 Eliz. I c. 3). 
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adjustments to safeguard the rights of creditors and others who had reason to use the 
law against MPs, or their servants. 
Privilege for servants 
This section looks at the operation of privilege for servants of members of both 
Houses of Parliament, who were covered by the privilege of freedom from arrest, 
imprisonment, or legal processes, in the same way as their masters.55 This privilege 
became increasingly exploited or abused during the early seventeenth century, 
although it had its origins in the medieval period, when it developed to protect those 
servants that were necessary for a member when travelling to and from parliament, 
and carrying out his functions there. However, the definition of whether a servant or 
class of servants was ‘necessary’ was open to different interpretations. Abuses were 
seen in the protection of servants who had engaged in unseemly behaviour, even 
though a breach of the peace was not amenable to a privilege claim. As described 
below, there was growing abuse after the way in which a ‘servant’ could be protected 
from legal processes and arrests was simplified in the early part of the seventeenth 
century. He could now carry a document – a ‘protection’ – signed by his master, not 
validated by any third party, which confirmed his status.56 Several attempts, with 
varying degrees of success, were made to reduce, or eliminate malpractice, by 
restricting the use of such protections to servants who were truly both ‘menial’ and 
‘necessary’.  
 The operation of privilege of parliament, to include members’ servants, was long-
standing. In 1404, the Commons asked the king for privilege for themselves, and that 
‘their men and servants with them at the said parliament, who are under your special 
protection and safekeeping, ought not to be arrested or in any way imprisoned in the 
meantime for any debt, account, trespass or other contract of any kind’.57 This request 
shows how privilege grew out of the protection given by kings to those involved in 
parliaments. Over time, the definition of a ‘necessary servant’ came to include a wider 
                                                
55 The exemption did not cover treason, felonies, or breaches of the peace. 
56 See pp. 179ff. below. 
57 RP, III, 541, 71: January-March 1404. 
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group, such as estate bailiffs, on the grounds that a member or peer needed to be 
spared the diversion of resolving legal matters that might involve any kind of servant. 
This extension can be seen as exploitative, rather than abusive. More direct abuse of 
the system of protection for servants occurred whereby an unscrupulous or corrupt 
member of either House would name someone as a servant, who was in reality simply 
a friend, client, or associate. So, in 1454, a certain Derykson purported to be the 
servant of John Toke, ‘whereas God and all the world knows that the opposite is true 
and thus the [petitioner] is delayed and barred from his said action’.58 Some other 
petitions for privilege were unsuccessful, so that Sir Laurence Reynford, servant of 
Henry, earl of Essex, was not granted privilege of parliament for sums owed to an 
otter huntsman, arising out of long-standing contracts running, presumably, over more 
than a single parliament.59 John Walshe, another servant of the earl of Essex, was not 
granted privilege, as he had been ‘impleaded’ (brought into a suit as a third party); the 
judges decided that such cases had never been amenable to privilege of parliament:  
There is not nor ever was such a custom that [… those …] coming to parliaments by 
royal summons and the members of their households should not be impleaded by 
reason of any trespass, debt, account, convention or other contract whatsoever while 
they so abide in royal parliaments, as is specified and recited in that writ.60 
By the early seventeenth century there was a rising number of cases involving 
servants: seven cases were brought to parliament’s attention between 1549 and 1603, 
fourteen arose in James I’s reign, and thirty-two across Charles I’s whole reign.61 
Some of the privilege cases from James I’s reign that involved servants did not 
always show the principals in a good light. In 1604, Sir Edward Hoby (Scarborough) 
asked ‘That a Man of his, for fighting, being committed by my Lord Chief Justice, 
                                                
58 TNA C1/22/101, Petition to the chancellor: March 1454, in Kleineke, Parliamentarians at 
Law, pp. 40-41. 
59 TNA E13/158, roll 26, Writ of parliamentary privilege: June 1472 to November 1473, in 
ibid., pp. 70-81.  
60 Ibid., pp. 82-85. This case took place towards the end of the Plantagenet period, by which 
time, the Commons ‘began to assert a claim that they cannot even be impleaded’: 
Kilmuir, Law of Parliamentary Privilege, p. 9. 
61 Turberville, ‘Protection of Servants of Members’, pp. 591, 593. 
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might be [sic], for other Actions, have the Privilege of this House’. This was ‘yielded 
unto’.62 Two years later, a writ of habeas corpus was issued for some of Sir Edwyn 
Sandys’ (Stockbridge) servants, who had been committed to Newgate by Sir Robert 
Leigh, a justice of the peace, for rioting and wounding while drunk. Leigh’s fault 
chiefly lay in his refusal to grant bail to the men, and the Commons found him ‘guiltie 
of endeavoring to enfrenge and breake the priviledges of the howse’. However, they 
were inclined to mercy, judging that Leigh had acted more out of ignorance than 
malice, and had been in custody for some time before the Commons heard the facts. 
Leigh then prayed ‘the Favour of the House, if he had offended’. This was taken as 
only a qualified acknowledgement, and led to ‘Great Trouble and Confusion’ over 
whether Leigh had submitted himself appropriately. He was then ‘Called in again; and 
to expound his conditional Submission, and to speak it absolutely’. Having apologised 
absolutely and unconditionally, he was then discharged.63 This account perhaps 
confirms the view that the Commons were often more concerned about outward 
appearances, rather than substance, and the maintenance of privilege to protect their 
servants, rather than the exercise of justice, and that they were prepared to protect 
even those who had committed a breach of the peace. A fourth case, from 1610, 
involved a servant of Nicholas Steward (Cambridge University), who had got a 
woman with child, at a time when ‘the justices are empowered to punish the reputed 
father, and to make provision for the care of the child and to charge such father with a 
weekly payment of a sum of money, which, if he refuses to pay, then to commit him 
to the common gaol’.64 The situation was muddied because the warrant was issued 
before the parliament began, but only executed after the start of the session, so that 
the matter was referred to the privileges committee.65 The House subsequently 
                                                
62 CJ: 24 May 1604 (second scribe). Presumably, he feared some kind of action for 
compensation from the aggrieved party. 
63 Willson (ed.), Bowyer Diary, p. 50: 23 February 1606; CJ, 1, pp. 272-73: 22 February 
1606; Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 131-32. 
64 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 132. 
65 CJ, 1, p. 438: 14 June 1610. 
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ordered that the servant should have privilege, but that he, rather than the constable, 
should bear the charges.66 
The number of recorded cases where privilege was invoked was surely smaller 
than the overall total, as there must have been many occasions where a member’s 
servant avoided arrest or imprisonment, simply by proving that he was under 
protection of privilege through his master, perhaps by showing a protection document. 
Where a case did come before parliament, importance was attached to an outward 
show of maintaining the privilege, even though penalties for infringement of privilege 
were usually not severe: as noted previously, the ‘delinquent’ who had arrested the 
servant was usually brought to the Bar of the House, reprimanded, apologised, and 
made to pay any necessary fees.  
A change in the procedure for invoking privilege may have contributed to the rise 
in the number of cases. In the Tudor period, a servant wishing to benefit from 
parliamentary privilege could obtain a warrant from the Speaker, which safeguarded 
his person until parliament was dissolved. This was a development of the approach 
taken in the Smalley case of 1574, to secure the release of a servant ‘by warrant of the 
Mace, and not by [chancery] writ’.67 If someone had actually been arrested, the matter 
would be raised in parliament, which usually led to the issue of a writ to free the 
servant, with the arresting parties being summoned to appear before the House. If 
there were any difficulty, the Commons’ serjeant with the mace would be used to 
enforce the authority of the House. However, in the early part of the seventeenth 
century, perhaps as early as 1611, a crucial change occurred, whereby a servant of a 
member of either House could be issued with a written protection certificate, signed 
by his master, rather than the Speaker.68 As Turberville identifies: ‘If the servant was 
to be secure in the effective enjoyment of his privilege, the issue of a written 
certificate was a great advantage, perhaps almost a necessity. He needed at least a 
card of identity. So he was given a protection certificate, in which any persons whom 
it might concern were strictly charged "under the ancient privileges, laws, and 
                                                
66 Titus, fol. 124, in Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610, II, p. 379; CJ, 1, p. 440: 16 June 1610. 
67 See Appendix 1, case 18. 
68 Turberville, ‘Protection of Servants of Members’, p. 592. 
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customs of the realm", not to "arrest, attack, impress, stop, hinder, or molest" XXX 
during the time of parliament’.69 An alternative version can also be found: 
Whereas John Rogers, gent., is my servant, for whom I have special employment, 
these are to require you and every of you to forbear to molest, arrest, or imprison my 
said servant, during this present parliament and 15 days after, as you will answer to 
the contrary at your utmost peril. Given under my hand and signet at [blank] the 
[blank] day of December 1610. To all mayors, bailiffs, and other his Majesty’s 
officers, to whom it shall appertain.70 
This pre-emptive certification saved time and helped avoid confusion about who was 
and was not a ‘servant’, but only if the supposed masters exercised restraint in their 
issuing of protections. Written protections might also have been intended to reduce 
confusion about the status of servants, and consequent challenges to parliamentary 
authority, such as occurred in the Curwen case of 1601, when a creditor and arresting 
sergeant gave contemptuous replies to a servant’s claim that he was privileged.71 In 
the event that a protection failed in its purpose, The Privileges gives ‘The forme of a 
Letter to bee directed to the Sheriffe of L. for discharge of a Servant that is Arrested 
upon Execution, and during the time of the Parliament notwithstanding his 
Protection’. A peer, or county or borough member of the Commons could use the 
following formula, and there is also a version to be used by a peer alone: 
Wherepon by the ancient Priviledges, Lawes and Customes of this Realme heretofore 
used and approved, The Lords Spirituall and Temporall, the Knights, Citizens and 
Burgesses of the Parliament, have alwayes had their servants and followers priviledged 
and free from any molestation, trouble, arrest or imprisonment, for some certain 
dayes, both before the beginning and after the ending of the same. […] I understand 
notwithstanding, that you or some of you, have now in your hands some Processe, 
Writ or Warrant, to molest, arrest, imprison I.B. my household Servant in ordinary72 
                                                
69 Ibid. 
70 A Commonplace Book, V.a.321, Folger Shakespearean Library fol. 66v, in Foster (ed.), 
Proceedings 1610, II, p. 6n. 
71 See Appendix 1, case 24. A similar contempt for privilege was evident in the Shirley case. 
72 Ordinary had the sense of staff in regular attendance or service: OED Online. 
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whose attendance I have special cause to use and employ in matters which doe much 
concerne and import my estate, and other occasions to bee followed and solicited by 
him during this Sessions of Parliament. These are therefore to Charge and Command 
you, and every one of you, both to withdraw the same Processe, Writ or Warrant, if 
any such bee; As also, if thereby you or any of you, have molested, arrested, or 
imprisoned him, the said I.B. within the compasse of the foresaid dayes of priviledge; 
That then upon sight hereof, you presently set him at Libertie, as you or any of you 
will answere to the contrary. Given under my hand and Seale the XX. day of 
XXX.73 
These documents have a number of points of interest. First, there is an assertion that 
the claim for freedom from arrest for a servant is based on ancient privileges, laws, 
and customs. It can be seen that statutes were indeed enacted in 140374 and 1433,75 to 
protect ‘any that come to Parliament’ and their servants from assault or affray; 
transgressors could be fined.76 Second, there is confirmation that the privilege obtains 
for some certain, but undefined, days, before the beginning, and 15 days after the 
ending, of a parliament, although the position that obtained between prorogued 
sessions is not explicitly stated. The 1512 case of Richard Strode provided a 
precedent, as the stannary courts had imprisoned him during a time that parliament 
was prorogued, for words he had used within parliament. A writ was issued that he 
should be delivered ‘safe and sound’ to parliament, which was followed by the 
enactment of Strode’s Act: The Privilege of Parliament Act 1512 (4 Hen. VIII c.8).77 
Third, the certificate should be sufficient to secure the release of the servant. 
 One key issue merits more extended treatment: who actually was a ‘servant’, or 
indeed a ‘follower’, a term used in one of the documents? The material cited above 
give at least some expectation that the servant had to be ‘a household servant in 
ordinary’, or someone whom his master specially ‘caused to use and employ’ during 
                                                
73 Anon., Privileges and Practice … (1628), pp. 20-21. The version for use by a peer alone 
can be found on p. 22. 
74 5 Hen. IV c. 6. 
75 11 Hen. VI c. 11. 
76 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 16-17. 
77 See Appendix 1, case 12. 
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the sessions of parliament. Holinshed records that Henry VIII had expressly referred 
to ‘their servants, even their cooks and house-keepers [an alternative reading is horse-
keepers]’.78 Even so, two of the above documents refer respectively to a ‘gent.’, and 
‘gentlemen’. The servant might also be used and employed ‘in matters which doe 
much concerne and import my estate’, both of which descriptions suggest men above 
the level of ‘menial’ servants, or those in personal attendance on the master. The issue 
of how to define a ‘servant’ recurred across the period. In 1584, the Lords decided 
that viscount Bindon’s servant was not ‘a menial Servant, nor yet ordinarily attendant 
upon the said Viscount’.79 In 1607, the Commons heard of the arrest for debt of 
Thomas Finch, ‘servant’ to Sir Michael Sondes (Queenborough). As was usual, the 
arrest was ‘conceived to be a great contempt to the privilege of the House’: a writ of 
habeas corpus was ordered. The arresting serjeant affirmed that the creditor had 
assured him that Finch was not a servant to a member, and that he, the serjeant, knew 
that Finch was working as an attorney.80 However things were not as simple as they 
seemed: ‘the Party arrested had bene Servant to Sir Michael Sandys [Sondes] long 
time, and now of late was become a sworne Attorney of the Common Pleas, and yet 
Sir Michael Sandys affirmed to the House, that the Party notwithstanding his being 
such an Attorney, doth still continue his household meniall Servent, and receives 
Wages of him’.81 Finch was delivered up under the writ of habeas corpus, but the 
House asked itself whether privilege applied to all servants, or only to ‘menial and 
necessary servants’. Sondes declared that Finch ‘lay in his House, solicited his 
Causes, received Wages’, and the House was told of the precedents by which 
privilege had been granted on earlier occasions: first, to the solicitor of William 
Huddleston,82 and, second, to the solicitor of the baron of Walton.83 The House 
maintained the privilege for Finch, and ordered that the serjeant should be held for a 
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month, but excused any fine, because of the muddled circumstances of the case. This 
was clearly unsatisfactory, so that ‘afterwards Mr Speaker said openly, "That he 
would move the Lord Chief Iustice of the Common Plase, That Provision might be, 
that no Attorney sworne of that Court, should serve any man": So it was agreed that 
every man at his Perill must take Notice of Persons priviledged’.84 On at least one 
occasion, privilege was claimed for the son of an MP.85 However, privilege was not 
always maintained, as in a case that involved the wealthy, ruthless, and violent Sir 
Edmund Ludlow, whose huge belief in his own powers may have alienated fellow-
members.86 In 1610, it emerged that he had attempted to protect one of his former 
servants, by claiming that he was still in his employ. Exposure of this flagrant abuse 
meant that the servant was not granted privilege, and a referral to the committee for 
privileges was made. No further record can be traced in the Commons’ Journal, so it 
might be that the matter was allowed to drop quietly.87  
It was possible, of course, for someone to assert falsely that he possessed a 
protection: ‘one George Crippes, Mariner, giveth out speeches that he hath a 
protection from one of the Members of this Howse, and that therfore he will not 
appeare nor answere to any Accion or Suite in law, and yet refuseth to disclose what 
the name of the party by whome he is soe protected’. The House believed the claim to 
be false, ‘to the wrong and scandell of the House’, and ordered the serjeant-at-arms to 
bring Crippes before them.88 1621 was a year when a number of malpractices were 
exposed that brought the reputation and authority of both Houses into question, and 
illustrated the abuses to which a system that used written protections was prone. In 
March, the Commons became concerned about the issue of protections for servants, 
or supposed servants, and their abuse, surrounding a case involving a fraudulent 
bankrupt: James Lasher (Hastings) drew attention to the activities of a London grocer, 
Francis Lovell, who not only failed to satisfy his ancient creditors, but also falsely 
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held goods on a promise – unrealised – to make future payment. Threatened with 
arrest, he had shown protections from Sir Thomas Jermyn (Bury St Edmunds), and Sir 
Richard Grosvenor (Cheshire), who protested that they had been misled by Lovell’s 
friends into believing he was a gentleman, who only needed protections for a week or 
so, in order to allow him to acquire funds to meet his obligations. Both Jermyn and 
Grosvenor then withdrew their protections.89 The House ordered ‘that noe man should 
protect any but his ordinarie servants, And that the service itselfe was a Protection, 
And That noe member of the Howse could make any Protection in writing, but onely 
a Declaracion of his service’.90 A few days later, John Whitson (Bristol), a merchant, 
complained that Sir Thomas Shirley junior (Steyning) had protected someone ‘being 
none of his servants or attendants’. Others were indignant: Sir Warwick Hele wished 
‘to have this examined and punished’. William Hakewill (sitting then for Tregony) 
stated that the king had specially recommended that protections should apply only to 
servants in attendance in Westminster, not ‘the country’. He reminded the House that 
‘noe member of this howse can protect any but his servant and ought not to declare it 
in writeinge, and that so ruled last Parliament and such servants only as attend upon 
our persons’. However, Sir Edward Coke took an expansive view: ‘Ther ought to be 
no writeinge, but all those whose service [is] necessary are priviledged whether they 
waite uppon our persons or serve us in the countrye. A Bailiffe of more use that is 
trusted with the orderinge of a man’s estate in the country than a page or footman 
attendinge on our persons’.91 The House endorsed this view, when it resolved: 
That the Members of this house are to have priviledge as well for their Bayliffes, 
Cookes, Butlers, husbandmen and other their necessary and meniall servants and 
attendants which in their absence in the service of this house live and continue in the 
Country as for their attendance and servants upon their persons here in and about the 
City because without such priviledge for them these members of this house cannot 
performe there service herein with that freedome for distraction and other prejudice 
as is fittinge. But it is also further resolved and declared […] that none of the 
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Members thereof cann order or grant any priviledge or proteccion to any by any 
writeinge under his hand or seale but the same proteccion is meerely voyd if the party 
to whome the said proteccion is granted bee not truly and really his Meniall servant 
or attendant in which Case noe proteccion by writeing is necessary.92  
The Commons clearly showed continuing concerns, during a further debate in 
November 1621. Mr Brooke felt that the extent of privilege for servants, as decided in 
the previous March, might be too wide: ‘the Burgesses of Parliament have priveledges 
for ther servants familiars, […] and the Country complains of our protections and of 
the upper house more. Somm of this house have protected Knights who are no 
servants to them nor fitt to be so. Lett all disavow such undew protections and be 
censured if theay revoke them not’.93 Sir Edward Coke put forward a balanced view: 
‘A citation or subpaena not to be served on servants. All servants as well lookeinge to 
our estates at home in the country as attendinge on our persons are priviledged. [… 
but …] Lett us not abuse our priviledges to the grievance of our countrye. Protections 
are royall priviledges and but good in some cases’.94 The reference to protections 
being a royal privilege should be noted. Coke went on to say that: ‘he hath disavowed 
a Servant of his, that hath served him 22 Years’. Sir Robert Phelips suggested that the 
committee for privileges should consider which protections were ‘fit’ and which were 
‘unfit’, and cautioned: ‘We ought to be carefull of nothing more than the honor of this 
howse, and the priveledges of it are the matters of moment. It is the universall crye of 
the kingdom that we have graunted that which is abusive, vzt. protections’.95 
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Moreover, it was reported that blank protections were sold for five shillings a piece.96 
The Commons resolved: ‘that all Protections, granted by any Member of this House 
to any, not his menial Servant or Attendant, are void. And Ordered, That, if any shall 
hereafter avow any such Protection, unlawfully given, or shall, after this Time, give 
any, he shall incur the Censure thereof’.97 
There was a matching debate in the Lords, in December 1621.98 Although the 
Commons’ resolutions might have put down a marker, they still did not closely define 
who was to be considered a ‘menial servant or attendant’. In contrast to cases 
involving higher-born supposed servants, in 1628 it was servants of low status whose 
privilege was questioned, when James Elcocke, servant of Sir Edward Dennys 
(Yarmouth, Isle of Wight), was arrested at the behest of one, Skynner, an attorney. 
Skynner admitted that he knew that Dennys was a member of the Commons, but 
asserted that only ‘attendants upon his person’ should be privileged, rather than any 
‘scullion-boy and kitchen-boy’ into which category he clearly placed Elcocke.99 
Elcocke’s rights were maintained, Sir James Perrott going so far as to say he ‘thought 
it fit to use him [Skynner] as a man was, for arresting a servant of Sir James 
Whitelocke, caused to ride with the face to the horse[’s] tail, backwards’.100 
Difficulties over the protection of servants persisted through the seventeenth and 
will into the eighteenth century. In 1641, a report from the Lords’ privileges 
committee recommended that only those who were menial servants, or ‘necessarily 
employed in their affairs’, should qualify for a peer’s protection. However, the 
ambiguity in the definition of necessarily employed led to a referral back to the 
committee.101 The Commons restated the ban on the issue of protections for any but 
menial servants on more than one occasion, until they decided, in 1661, that no 
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written protections were to be provided to servants, and that their release from arrest 
should, in a return to earlier procedures, be secured through an Order from the 
Speaker.102 The Lords did not go so far, again limiting the ban to those ‘that are not 
now their Lordships' menial Servants, or Persons necessarily employed about their 
Estates’.103 Even so, the Commons seemingly still needed to restate the ban on 
protections through their standing orders, in a number of sittings between 1670 and 
1695, while the Lords passed resolutions on the matter between 1690 and 1718.104 It 
was clear that abuses were not going to be avoided simply through a resolution or 
Order of either House, despite public and parliamentary concern, both when 
protections were forged, and when servants were in reality neither ‘menial’, nor 
‘necessary’. As a consequence, statutes were introduced in the eighteenth century that 
progressively reduced the scope of the privilege afforded to servants, culminating 
with an act of 1770, which ended the exemption for servants from court actions, 
arrest, or imprisonment during times of privilege, in connection with suits for debt.105 
Servants were no longer free to escape their obligations, although until 1892 the 
Speaker continued to include an otiose claim at the start of a parliament for exemption 
for servants from arrests or molestations.106 
This section has shown how the privilege of parliament was being increasingly 
abused in the early Stuart period, in respect of ‘servants’ of members of both Houses. 
There was a continuing difficulty in defining what kind of servant was intended to be 
covered by the privilege, and there was a wider acceptance that people like estate 
bailiffs were entitled to privilege as much as body servants. There was also a change 
in procedure, so that a ‘servant’ could produce a written protection to forestall any 
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arrest or legal process. In general, the immunity was recognised as problematic by 
contemporaries. Nevertheless, it is hard to differ from an analysis that: ‘The privilege 
of freedom from arrest and molestation was no doubt essential to the authority and 
dignity of the House of Commons, but the extension of the privilege to members’ 
servants and estates became a source of grave injustice’.107 
Protections and the Lords 
This section looks at some specific abuses that were brought to the Lords’ attention in 
the 1620s, particularly in relation to the protection of servants. Although this thesis is 
primarily about the Commons’ privileges, both Houses were increasingly concerned 
about the misuse of written protections, so that debates in one House might reflect 
difficulties identified in the other, with a concern that public confidence in the probity 
of parliament as a whole was being compromised. It is important, therefore, to look at 
the cases of abuse or malpractice that were raised in the Lords, in order fully to 
understand how the privileges of both Houses were viewed by contemporaries. The 
extension of privilege to a wider group of servants had particular significance for 
magnate peers, who tended to have a larger group of clients, or followers, and more 
than one estate outside London with is own establishment, so that they would be hard 
pressed to determine who exactly was a necessary servant, and thereby properly 
entitled to privilege. So, it may be that the emergence of cases surrounding peers 
heightened concern in the lower House that parliament as a whole was being brought 
into disrepute by the misuse of protections. The most serious concerns were, first, that 
blank protections were being signed by peers, i.e. without the inclusion of the 
servant’s name; and, second, that the seals or signatures of peers were being forged 
onto counterfeit protections. Both types of protection might then be sold on, with the 
name of someone who was not a servant of an MP or peer inserted at some point. This 
section describes such issues in more detail, and also shows that the Lords recognised 
that they needed to act, not just on a case-by-case basis, but also to tackle the issue 
more comprehensively and effectively, in order to maintain their honour. 
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Around 1621, the Lords began to concern themselves over the counterfeiting of 
protections for servants. Counterfeiting obviously carried the risks of detection, and of 
severe punishment. Even so, peers, especially the magnates, were more susceptible to 
this crime than members of the Commons, as they would be more likely to sign a set 
of several blank protections, with the details being added separately, perhaps by a 
secretary or steward. In November 1621, the Lords learned of a number of alleged 
forgeries, with lord Stafford108 and lord North separately complaining that their 
protections had been counterfeited. Eight alleged perpetrators were summoned to 
appear before the House.109 Three, Peare, Blunt, and Warynges, were brought to the 
Bar of the Lords, where Peare denied the counterfeiting of a protection, affirming that 
‘he received the same from one Denton, the which Protection was for himself; and 
that the said Denton received of him Three Shillings for the same’. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Peare was then ‘acquitted and set at Liberty’. Blunt ‘confessed that he 
counterfeited the Lord Stafford’s Seal, to One Protection only’. His sentence was 
severe, as it appeared that he was a hardened criminal. A paper was to be placed on 
his head in the pillory, reading: ‘John Blunt, for having counterfeited the Seal of a 
Peer of this Realm to a Protection, being before-time convicted for notorious Offences 
of like Nature in other Courts, is, by the Lords of the Upper House assembled, besides 
this his publick Punishment, To be perpetually imprisoned in Bridewell, and There to 
be employed in Work for his Living’. Warynges denied counterfeiting, and affirmed 
that: ‘he received Six Protections from the Lord Stafford, with Blanks, of[f] one 
Mathew Watson’. He was remanded to appear a fortnight later, and to bring in 
Watson at the same time, which he failed to do.110 Warynges then confessed that he 
wrote the protections, claiming that he did not counterfeit lord Stafford’s hand and 
seal, but later admitted the counterfeiting as well, for which he was ordered to stand in 
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the pillory for one day, with papers on his head, showing his offence.111 Another 
alleged counterfeiter of Stafford’s protections was John Stephen Buck, who was 
brought to the Lords on an occasion when Stafford was not present. An order was 
then made for Buck to be brought back later, but it is uncertain whether this actually 
happened.112 It was not just Stafford’s and North’s protections that were being forged: 
the Lords were informed that one, Con Connor, had ‘counterfeited the Hand and Seal 
of the Lord Viscount Rochford’; he was ordered to be brought before their 
lordships.113 Connor told the Lords that he had received the protection from a Lyonell 
Johnson, following which Connor was released on recognisances of £140, in order to 
‘search for and produce the said Lionell Johnson’.114 It seems that this did not happen 
before the end of the session. 
A further case had a number of twists: William Cowse, servant to lord Stafford, 
submitted a petition that he should be freed from Ludgate prison, as a matter of 
privilege. He had been arrested and his goods seized, on the suite of ‘one Mr Goade 
and William Jennynges’, and detained in prison, so that he could not pay his rent, and 
the lease of his house, worth £300, had been sold. Cowse’s petition noted that Goade 
had shown contempt to the Lords, saying that: ‘He neither regarded the Protection, 
nor your Lordships Orders, nor any Thing else your Lordships could do, no more than 
he regarded a Rush’. When Cowse and the others appeared before the Lords, the 
evidence of the sheriff’s officer introduced a new element, affirming: ‘that he had not 
arrested the said William Cowse, but that he first had Leave from the Lord Stafford 
(whose Servant he is) so to do; and produced a Writing, under the Lord Stafford’s 
Hand and Seal, of disclaiming the said William Cowse to be his Servant, if the 
Information given his Lordship be true, that the said William Cowse intends to 
defraud William Jenninges and William Goade of their due Debt’. Goade’s use of 
contemptuous language was corroborated through the evidence of two others, and he 
was ‘committed to the Prison of The Fleet, there to remain during the Lords Pleasure’. 
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Although present, Stafford did not speak on the matter, which was remitted to the 
committee for privileges, with Cowse remaining in Ludgate prison for the time being. 
The Lords finally ordered that the privileges committee might determine whether 
Cowse should be released, although it is unclear whether this happened.115 
The Lords clearly recognised that they had to adopt a more comprehensive 
approach that addressed the issue of protections for servants in general. In addition, 
they may have recognised that they needed to align their approach with that of the 
Commons.116 So, in December 1621, the lord privy seal, the earl of Worcester, 
presented the views of the committee for privileges on: ‘How far it is conceived the 
Privilege of the Nobility doth clearly extend, concerning the Freedom of their 
Servants and Followers from Arrests’. The committee recommended that servants and 
family members who were ‘employed necessarily and properly about their Estates as 
well as their Persons’ should have privilege twenty days before and after every 
Session. Peers were put on their honour to limit their protections to those properly 
within the defined limits of privilege. Moreover, they were to submit to the judgment 
of the House on individual cases, and accept both any personal reproof, as well as any 
withdrawal of privilege for anyone not found to be a true servant, ‘[for] the Justice of 
the Kingdom must be preferred before any other personal Respect, and none to be 
spared that shall offend after so fair Warning’. These trenchant words were interesting 
in their reference to justice, but must nevertheless have been too much for some, as 
‘this was read the Second Time, and directed to be entered as delivered to the House, 
as the Opinion of some of the Lords of the Committee for Privileges, &c. but 
suspended by the House to be entered as an Order of the House till they had taken 
further Consideration thereof’.117 Although the matter was in effect put on hold in 
1621, the words alone, or possibly the punishments meted out to offenders, may have 
had the desired effect for the immediate future, as the next case is not recorded until 
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1624.118 This latter claim occasioned a further report from the committee for 
privileges, when they referred to the findings of the 1621 committee. The committee 
now recommended adoption of exactly the same form of words, with the minor 
change, that the scope of privilege was to ‘begin with the Date of the Writ of 
Summons; and to continue Twenty Days after every Session of Parliament’.119 
However, the abuse still did not go away entirely, and, in March 1626, the Lords 
ordered George Gardner and George Buttrice to appear at the Bar of the House, ‘to 
answer their Contempt, for counterfeiting Protections, under the Hand and Seal of the 
Earl of Huntingdon’.120 When they appeared, Gardner denied the forgery, ‘affirming 
that he had many such Protections from one Tymothy Chastleton [sometimes 
Castleton] and that he sold them unto divers [people]’; Chastleton was ordered to 
appear before the Lords. Buttrice denied forgery, but confessed that he ‘bought one of 
the said Protections of the said Gardyner, not knowing that it was forged; and denied 
that he knew of any more’; he was committed to the Fleet prison.121 Chastleton did 
not appear, despite a warrant for his arrest having been provided to Gardner.122 
Gardner subsequently ‘confessed that he had bought and sold Ten of these Protections 
[supposedly those authorised by the earl of Huntingdon]; for which he humbly craved 
Pardon, and expressed his hearty Sorrow and Repentance for the same; but he 
absolutely denied that he did insert any Name in any one of the said Blank 
Protections’. The Lords decided that he was to be put in the pillory in both 
Westminster and Norwich for two hours, ‘with a Paper on his Head, declaring his 
Offence: videlicet, For Buying and selling of counterfeited Protections, Under the 
Hand and Seal of a Peer in Parliament’.123 The sentence against Gardner was put on 
hold until after Easter, and an order was made that five others, named by Gardner as 
counterfeiters, were to be arrested.124 Four of them were brought to the Lords to 
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answer Gardner’s allegations of ‘buying and selling divers Protections, counterfeited 
under the Hands and Seals of Lords of Parliament’. However, the Lords decided that 
the accusation was false; confirmed their earlier sentence that Gardner should stand in 
the pillory; and, further, ‘that he should not be discharged until he had re-paid unto 
the aforesaid [guiltless men] their Charges’.125 
Further offences were identified, two years later, in 1628: the first of these 
concerned a servant of lord De La Warr, Thomas Willoughby, who had been arrested 
after the dissolution of June 1626. A writ of habeas corpus led to his appearance 
before the Lords, who ‘did not think fit to punish’ his principal creditor for the breach 
of privilege. However, it appeared that there were ‘other debts and executions’ laid 
upon Willoughby, which were possible breaches of privilege. The Lords remitted the 
case to a committee to consider whether he should be privileged in respect of these, as 
there was some doubt whether the actions had been more than the customary twenty 
days or so after the dissolution, when privilege no longer obtained.126 The Lords later 
learned that Willoughby had satisfied his creditors, and no further action was taken.127 
In the second case, John Mayne was alleged to have counterfeited a protection from 
lord Mountague.128 However, there was a twist to the story, when a petition from 
Mayne was read, in which he claimed privilege as a servant of Henry Parker, 
fourteenth baron Morley and Mounteagle. The serjeant-at-arms told the Lords that 
when his man tried to arrest Mayne, the latter had: 
Contemned [scorned] the Order of this House, and offered him Violence; yet his 
Man at last apprehended him, and brought him to Town; and Mayne making an 
Excuse to see one George Pridee, an Acquaintance of his, the said Pridee and one 
John Waller do detain him out of his Custody. All which was justified by, the 
Serjeant’s Man, upon his Oath, in the open House.  
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The Lords concluded matters for the day by ordering that Mayne, Predee, and Waller 
were to be brought before them.129 They were duly brought in, but other business 
being pressing, the matter was referred to the committee for privileges, with Mayne 
detained, and Predee and Waller set at liberty.130 At a later point, a letter from lord 
Morley was read to the Lords, confirming that Mayne was his servant, upon which he 
was freed. The Journal nevertheless records that Mayne had been apprehended for 
allegedly forging lord Montague’s protections, and had resisted the serjeant’s man.131 
Lord Morley was involved in a second case that arose at this time, when the Lords 
were told that he had issued a protection for someone who was not employed in his 
household business, but in the survey of his woods in Essex.132 
This section has considered abuses that were drawn to the Lords’ attention, 
including those involving the counterfeiting of written protections supposedly issued 
by peers. It has shown that the Lords recognised that they needed to act forcefully, not 
just on a case-by-case basis, but also to tackle the issue more comprehensively and 
effectively, in order to put the ‘justice of the kingdom’ above any considerations of 
personal honour or the privileges of peers.  
Conclusions 
The privilege of freedom from legal processes for members of both Houses, and their 
servants, was increasingly exploited in the early Stuart period, to the point of abuse in 
some situations. A rise in the number of cases may have reflected the fact that the 
Commons now contained a number of ‘new men’, some of whom were less 
concerned with upholding the spirit of parliamentary privilege, or even their own 
honour, and rather more with using privilege to avoid their financial obligations, or to 
hamper litigation against them.133 They were helped by the fact that parliaments were 
now sitting for longer periods, and that their privilege obtained over the whole extent 
                                                
129 LJ, 3, p. 717: 9 April 1628. 
130 LJ, 3, p. 735: 12 April 1628. 
131 LJ, 3, p. 773: 28 April 1628. 
132 BL Add. 40091 (Elsynge), Minute Book of the House of Lords 1628, fol. 109v: 28 April 
1628.  
133 Between 1500 and 1629, the membership of the Commons rose from 296 to 493: Thrush, 
Commons 1604-29, I, pp. 43-44. 
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of a parliament, in contrast to the medieval period, when parliaments usually ran for a 
single session of no more than a few weeks. There was also a growth in the abuse of 
protection provided to servants, exacerbated by the effects of a simplification in the 
early years of the seventeenth century of the way in which protections were provided. 
Further, there was a continuing difficulty in defining what kind of servant was 
covered, with acceptance over time that MPs and peers should not be diverted from 
parliamentary business by becoming involved in supporting a much wider group of 
people ‘in the country’, rather than simply those who were needed to attend directly to 
the master when he was at Westminster, or travelling. Some protections were 
certainly provided to men who were faced with legal processes, but who could not on 
any reasonable basis be said to be close, or ‘necessary’ servants, such as farm bailiffs, 
friends, people such as lawyers to whom the MP or peer had paid fees, or even family 
members. The value of a protection thereby became high enough to tempt people 
either to obtain and to sell on blank, but genuinely signed, protections, or to 
counterfeit seals or signatures on bogus protections. 
Some conclusions can be drawn following consideration of the growing 
exploitation of privilege in the early Stuart period. First, the extension of privilege to 
a much more fluidly defined group of ‘servants’ shows the same kind of elasticity to 
the limits of privilege that were identified in the Shirley case, and were to become a 
feature of the Rolle case. Second, a system of privilege that was essentially self-
regulated by each House was open to abuse: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? It is clear 
that debts and unwelcome litigation might be avoided if a man secured election to the 
Commons, or obtained a certificate of protection, or even a forgery of one, as a 
supposedly ‘necessary’ servant. Censure was more likely to be directed at individual 
members who had behaved badly in the House, rather than those whose actions 
outside the House might reflect ill on the Commons’ good name, not least those who 
were avoiding their financial obligations. Last, reform of the system was slow, despite 
obvious abuses, as there was a tension between preserving privileges, against 
allowing creditors and others access to justice. Irrespective of whether the rise in the 
number of cases was abusive, it cannot be suggested that the authority of parliament 
in relation to the conduct of its members was weakening. In reality, both Houses were 
becoming more strident and protective in relation to their privileges, as can be seen in 
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the various ‘protestations’ generated by the Commons, leading to a generally more 
combative stance in the 1620s. Holdsworth noted that ‘the Houses of Parliament were 
prepared to assert, in the name of privilege, a power to override the law [… which 
was …] most dangerous from the point of view of constitutional principle […] both 
Houses in the exercise of their undoubted privileges, inflicted considerable injustice 
on the private citizen’.134  
Criticism of the exploitation and abuse of privilege was likely to originate from 
three directions. First, it might come from those who were directly affected as 
creditors, or litigants. Although it is difficult to identify directly what the views of 
such people were, it is clear that some of those seeking to make arrests were inclined 
to disparage the privilege, more so in respect of servants, especially if they had been 
engaged in rowdiness of some sort. Second, criticism might, to a degree, come from 
the crown: Elizabeth and James I had from time to time expressed their concerns 
about the exploitation of privilege.135 However, unlike his two predecessors, Charles I 
does not seem to have offered direct criticisms, perhaps because he was trying to find 
ways to work with his parliaments. His concern was more about the way that the 
Commons were claiming that privilege was an inherent right, and no longer 
dependent on the royal prerogative and grace. Issues of privilege were undoubtedly 
becoming bound up with wider political issues, so that challenges to the ‘liberties’ of 
parliament were increasingly seen as challenges to the ‘liberties’ of citizens in 
general. Third, both Houses became increasingly aware of the negative impact of 
privilege, albeit slowly. During the early part of this period, internal criticism was 
sporadic, and action against people who secured election to avoid personal 
obligations, or their servants, was always more likely to be on a case-by-case basis. 
Leading figures in both Houses only really started to take the matter seriously in the 
1620s, when the Lords were warned that ‘the Justice of the Kingdom must be 
preferred before any other personal Respect’, and the Commons were told that ‘it is 
                                                
134 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2nd (1937) edn., 12 vols. (London: 
Methuen, 1903), X, p. 544. 
135 D’Ewes, Lords, p. 17: 28 January 1559; Townshend, Historical Collections, p. 38: 
22 February 1593; Ellesmere Observations, in Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610, 
I, p. 277; Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations (James I), I, p. 494. 
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the universal cry of the kingdom that we have granted that which is abusive, viz. 
protections’. Nevertheless, there were still peers who did not wish to see their rights 
and privileges constrained, so that the Lords took some three years to order limits on 
the issue of protections. Despite repeated resolutions of both Houses to limit the use 
of protections for servants, the issue did not go away until well into the eighteenth 
century. It seems that Taswell-Langmead was right, when he said that ‘the extension 
of the privilege of peers and members from arrest, so as to protect, not only their own 
persons, but their property, their servants, and their servants’ property, […] gave rise 
to very grave abuses, and the commons even took up the position that they and their 
servants were immune from civil proceedings of every kind’.136
                                                
136 Theodore F. T. Plucknett (ed.), English Constitutional History ... by Thomas Pitt Taswell-
Langmead, 10th edn. (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1946), p. 648. 
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VI : JOHN ROLLE’S CASE (1628-29) 
Introduction 
This chapter considers a case, which began in 1628, and is significant within a series 
of events that changed and extended the nature of the Commons’ views of their 
powers. It concerns a request for parliamentary privilege that concerned John Rolle, 
who was a London merchant, as well as member for Callington.1 The case arose at a 
time when difficulties over royal finances, matters of religion, the authority of the 
Speaker of the Commons, and the character of Charles I were so intertwined as to 
affect the general conduct of the 1628-9 parliament through to its dramatic and 
chaotic conclusion. The particular circumstances were that, in 1628 customs officials 
had taken the trading goods of Rolle and about thirty other principal merchants, 
mainly involved in the Levant trade. This followed the merchants’ refusal to pay 
duties of tonnage and poundage, because the Commons had not authorised their 
collection for the king. It appears that Richard Chambers, rather than Rolle, was 
probably the leading figure in that group of merchants, but there was one significant 
difference between the case of Rolle, and that of Chambers and the wider group of 
traders.2 Whereas they had all asserted that there was no obligation to pay 
unauthorised duties, Rolle’s position meant that he could additionally pursue a claim 
that parliamentary privilege protected him and his property, and that goods that had 
                                                
1 Callington was in Cornwall, and a number of awkward members held seats in that county at 
one time or another, including William Coryton, Denzil Holles, Sir John Eliot, and 
Benjamin Valentine: Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, II, pp. 45-81. 
2 Chambers, who was not a member of parliament, was a prominent opponent of the exercise 
of royal powers to raise supply without parliamentary authority. He resisted the 
collection of tonnage and poundage in 1628, and ship money in 1637. In June 1629, it 
was ordered that neither he nor his goods should be released until he had paid both 
the tonnage and poundage and a Star Chamber fine. His imprisonment continued for 
six years, and it has been observed that: ‘His fidelity to constitutional principle may 
be contrasted with the resolutions of the majority of merchants, whose response to the 
common call to desist from trading if this involved payment of illegal duties was 
predictably short-lived’: Robert Ashton, ‘Chambers, Richard (c. 1588-1658)’, ODNB; 
Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, pp. 639ff. 
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been seized should be returned to him. These claims gave rise to four key questions. 
First, did privilege extend to all of a member’s goods, as well as to his person? 
Second, did the privilege still hold during times when parliament was adjourned or 
prorogued? A third ancillary issue was whether privilege of parliament applied for 
petitioners to the Commons, not just MPs and their servants. The fourth issue had two 
strands: were those collecting tonnage and poundage – or seizing goods in lieu – 
acting directly on royal authority; and, if so, could parliamentary privilege still be 
invoked to recover the goods? Did privilege apply against the king? There was then a 
further, tactical, issue: whether the assertion of ‘ancient and undoubted’ rights of 
privilege for Rolle alone might divert attention from wider issues of principle that 
warranted the Commons’ attention in the 1629 session, namely concerns that ‘true 
religion’ was being assailed by the growth or toleration of Arminianism and popery. 
Moreover, any unlawful collection of duties, without parliamentary sanction, was 
something that affected Englishmen in general, and not only MPs. As if these issues 
were not enough, Charles I’s manipulation of the printing and distribution of the 
Petition of Right had soured the atmosphere in 1628-9. All these matters were so 
interwoven that it would be wrong to view Rolle’s case as somehow separate from, or 
subservient to, issues in the late-1620s concerning wider constitutional rights and 
privileges. That centrality can be seen in the fact that Rolle’s case was raised on the 
second sitting day of the 1629 session, 22 January, and was then considered at length 
on several subsequent occasions – on the floor of the House, and in committee – 
through to the penultimate sitting day, 23 February. This case can be viewed 
alongside the earlier one of Sir Thomas Shirley: the ‘plasticity of the idea of privilege 
and the extent to which it could be exploited for political purposes’ in 1629 echoes a 
similar plasticity in the Commons’ assertions of 1604.3 
Although an increasing number of members of the Commons, and, at times, the 
Lords, brought the treatment of Rolle and the other merchants, as well as the actions 
of the customs officers, into arguments about the style and scope of the exercise of 
royal powers, the historiography has not always assigned that kind of importance to 
                                                
3 The phrase is from Smith, Stuart Parliaments, p. 118. 
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the Rolle case.4 Rushworth, writing just before the Restoration, gives an extended 
account of the case of the merchants, including Rolle, but with little comment: ‘I 
pretend only in this Work to a bare Narrative of matter of Fact, digested in order of 
time; not interposing my own Opinion, or interpretation of Actions’.5 The author of 
the work published in 1707 as The Proceedings and Debates of the House of 
Commons in the Sessions of Parliament begun the Twentieth January 1628 (Old 
Style) is named as Sir Thomas Crew[e], supposedly a member of the Commons in 
that parliament: Sir Thomas was Speaker in the parliaments of 1624 and 1625, but did 
not sit in 1628-29, whereas his son, John did.6 Whoever the author was, he must have 
drawn on some of the contemporary diaries: the preface claims that the account is 
preferable to Rushworth’s version. Hatsell picks out the issues that arose from Rolle’s 
complaint to the Commons about the seizure of his goods, and the Commons’ 
resolutions.7 Gardiner sets the Rolle case within the wider context, by arguing that, in 
the parliament of 1628-9, ‘it was most unlikely that, until the ecclesiastical difficulties 
had been settled, any arrangement satisfactory to both parties could be made on the 
question of tonnage and poundage’.8 He condemned contemporaries who had missed 
the opportunity to make the Rolle case a milestone on what was later characterised as 
the ‘high road to civil war’: 
It was hardly possible to dwarf a great question more completely than to convert the 
mighty struggle against unparliamentary taxation into a mere dispute about privilege. 
Yet this was what the House seemed disposed to do. ‘Let the parties,’ said Lyttelton, 
‘be sent for that violated the liberties’. The Commons did not notice that in so doing 
they were leaving a strong position for a weak one. In resisting the King’s claim to 
                                                
4 For a treatment of the wider historiography, see chapter 1 above. 
5 Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, Preface. 
6 Parkhurst (ed.), Crew : 1629 Proceedings; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, III, 
p. 731, p. 736. 
7 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 184-5. Hatsell also briefly records the Commons’ 
confirmation of privilege in respect of a subpoena served on Rolle, which was 
nevertheless a significant contributor to the Commons’ anger over Rolle’s treatment: 
ibid., pp. 170-1. See pp. 226f. below.  
8 Samuel Rawson Gardiner, History of England from the Accession of James I to the 
Outbreak of the Civil War, 1603-1642, new edn., 10 vols. (London: Longmans, 
Green, 1899), VII, p. 59. 
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levy duties without consent of Parliament, they were guarding the purse of the subject 
from encroachments to which no limit could be placed. In resisting his claim to seize 
the goods of a member of Parliament, they gave a direct advantage to a merchant 
who happened to be a member of the House over one who was less fortunate. In 
point of fact, the claim of privilege for goods in the case of legal proceedings is one 
which has long ago been abandoned by a triumphant Parliament.9 
Russell’s position was given in the title of an edited collection of articles that 
appeared in 1990: Unrevolutionary England, 1603-42, although in 1979 he had 
recognised the importance of the controversy over tonnage and poundage: ‘Parliament 
again attempted to use the right to withhold supply as a political weapon’, and he 
accepted that the 1629 privilege dispute was the result of ‘spontaneous combustion at 
Westminster’, and a ‘genuine act of opposition’.10 This chapter offers a nuanced gloss 
on Russell’s views, and shows that events at the end of the 1629 parliament extended 
parliamentary privilege in the light of the Rolle affair, and gave the Commons the 
confidence to acclaim resolutions, ‘with a loud yea’, which characterised those who 
paid, or induced others to pay, extra-parliamentary duties as guilty of capital 
offences.11 
There are also matters of contingency, relating to the leadership of the Commons, 
and the personality of the king. A later section of this chapter considers whether the 
Speaker, Sir John Finch, was equipped to manage an increasingly fractious House. 
More significant was the effect of the combative nature of some leading members of 
the Commons on the conduct of the 1629 session. Lockyer suggests that the 
Commons were ‘in no mood to be conciliatory [over tonnage and poundage]. One 
reason for this was the absence of moderate and constructive leaders’. The absence of 
Sir Edward Coke12 and the then Sir Thomas Wentworth13 ‘left the Commons under 
                                                
9 Ibid., VII, p. 32. 
10 Russell (ed.), Unrevolutionary England, title and p. 40; Russell, Parliaments and English 
Politics, pp. 416-17. 
11 Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, p. 670: 2 March 1629. 
12 Coke sat in seven parliaments through to 1628. He did not attend in 1629, perhaps partly 
because of old age, partly because he had decided to concentrate on writing his 
treatises on the laws. 
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the influence of hotheads such as Sir John Eliot, Denzil Holles and Benjamin 
Valentine’.14 Moreover, there were just four privy councillors in the 1628-29 
parliament to support and promote the king’s position.15 The complex nature of 
Charles I’s character has been considered above (pp. 142f.). One of his qualities was 
loyalty: in the Rolle case, his principled, honourable refusal to disown those who had 
seized the merchants’ property scotched the deal that would have allowed the 
Commons to legitimise the king’s collection of tonnage and poundage. If the king and 
the courts condoned and authorised the seizure of Rolle’s goods, the route of 
parliamentary privilege would have to be pursued. 
Popofsky, in an extended review of the 1629 crisis, rejects the revisionist view 
that the Commons’ refusal to vote tonnage and poundage was both futile and 
irrational, and that the chaos of the final events of that parliament was a disgraceful 
demonstration of impotent anger. She places the Rolle case as lying on a ‘continuum 
of constitutional concern in the Commons over arbitrary royal taxation extending 
back into the reign of James I and culminating in a crisis over tonnage and poundage 
in the [1629] session’.16 The introduction to the HoP volumes for 1604-29 argues that 
there was a determined view in 1629 that two key areas of serious discontent had to 
be addressed before any grant of supply: the king’s continuing extra-parliamentary 
levy of tonnage and poundage, and ‘the continued favour shown by Charles towards 
Arminian clergy’.17 To this might be added the fear of tolerance of popery: Charles I 
had married the catholic Henrietta Maria of France, in 1625, with a marriage treaty 
.......................................................................................... 
13 Wentworth sat in the Commons between 1614 and 1628. His early years saw him as one of 
the critics of the politics of the court. Later, he became a leading loyalist, but having 
been created baron Wentworth in July 1628, and viscount Wentworth in December 
1628, he did not sit in the Commons in the 1629 session. He was granted the earldom 
of Strafford in January 1640. 
14 Roger Lockyer, Tudor and Stuart Britain, 1485-1714, 3rd edn., (Harlow: Pearson 
Longman, 2005), p. 307. Further detail is provided in Appendix 4 below on the 
members arrested following the dissolution of 1629. 
15 Sir John Coke (secretary of state), Sir Humphrey May (chancellor of the duchy of 
Lancaster), Sir Thomas Edmondes (clerk of the crown), and Sir Francis Cottington 
(who was only admitted to the privy council in November 1628): Thrush and Ferris 
(eds.), Commons 1604-29, III, p. 598; V, p. 292; IV, p. 169; III. p. 689. 
16 Popofsky, ‘Tonnage and Poundage Crisis’, especially p. 45. 
17 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, lv. 
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that included commitments about the religious rights of the queen, her children, and 
her household; while, in a separate, secret document, Charles promised to suspend 
operation of the penal laws against catholics. To the horror of many, Charles sat alone 
at his coronation: Henrietta Maria would not agree to kneel in front of a protestant 
bishop. The queen also abused her rights to hear catholic masses, by opening up her 
chapel to large numbers of English catholics, and her suite of catholic Frenchmen was 
very much on public view.18 However, a lack of agreement between different leaders 
of the Commons over the line to be taken on matters of religion led to a refocusing of 
attention on tonnage and poundage, including the question of privilege for Rolle. The 
Commons’ grievances came to a head in the rowdy, ill-tempered, confrontational 
sitting of 2 March 1629, and the acclamation of three resolutions, after which the 
ringleaders were arrested, and parliament was dissolved, not sitting again until 
February 1640.19 
This chapter will show how Rolle’s case arose in a context where relationships 
between sovereign and parliament had deteriorated. Difficulties over supply, the 
direction of the government over religion, foreign and military affairs, and assaults, or 
perceived assaults, on liberties, rights, and privilege, led to eleven years of personal 
rule by Charles I. It will inform our understanding of the 1628-29 parliament, by 
showing that the Rolle case was far from being a kind of secondary sideshow, and by 
highlighting ways in which the Commons were extending the scope of privilege of 
parliament. The first of the following four sections places the parliament of 1628-29 
within a context of tensions, arguments, and counter-arguments over religion, royal 
policy, supply, and privilege that had grown during the early Stuart period. The 
second describes the ways in which the case of John Rolle and his fellow-merchants 
unfolded through 1628, and particularly during the 1629 session, ending with a 
dissolution that was to last until 1640. The third section considers some of the key 
issues and themes relating to privilege. The last provides conclusions that can be 
drawn from consideration of Rolle’s case. 
                                                
18 Caroline M. Hibbard, ‘Henrietta Maria (1609-1669)’, ODNB. 
19 The text of the three resolutions is given on pp. 236f. below. 
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The parliament of 1628-29 in context 
The events of 1629 have to be seen in the context of earlier developments: across the 
course of the early Stuart period, tensions, arguments, and counter-arguments over 
religion, royal policy, supply, and privilege were interrelated, and had become more 
frequent. In considering supply, the key point of conflict between the Commons and 
the new monarch, Charles I, concerned tonnage and poundage, which had been a 
significant source of regular crown income since the medieval period.20 Many recent 
histories uncritically follow seventeenth-century references, in stating that they were 
granted for life only from the time of Henry VII onwards. In fact, as early as 1415, 
Henry V received tonnage and poundage for life, having previously had fixed term 
grants.21 There was then a reversion to provision for fixed terms in the reign of 
Henry VI. However, Edward IV was ‘to have and receive the said subsidy of 
poundage yearly’.22 In January 1484, Richard III received a grant ‘from the said first 
day of this present parliament during your natural life’.23 The backdating of the grant 
to Richard III to the start of his reign is significant, as this provided a precedent for 
backdating and legitimising continuous collection of duties from a monarch’s 
accession, but before parliament had made any grant to the new ruler. Henry VII was 
then indeed granted tonnage and poundage for life, again backdated to the start of the 
reign, but with the proviso: ‘these grants are not to be taken as a precedent by the 
kings of England in time to come’.24 The other Tudor monarchs were treated 
similarly, but there was some flexing of muscle when James VI and I came to the 
English throne, with a warning that a grant of tonnage and poundage was a ‘gratuity’, 
not a ‘necessity’, and that it would be wrong to ‘pre-judicate our Assent or Dissent [to 
                                                
20 These duties were first levied in the fourteenth century, and were in effect made perpetual 
by the Lotteries Act 1710 (9 Anne c. 6), the National Debt Act 1714 (1 Geo. I c. 12), 
and the National Debt Act 1716 (3 Geo. I c. 7). They were consolidated into a single 
set of customs and excise duties by the Customs and Excise (Consolidation) Act 1787 
(27 Geo. III c. 13). 
21 RP, IV, 63-4: 6 November 1415. 
22 RP, V, 508: April 1463. 
23 RP, VI, 238: January 1484. 
24 RP, V, 268-9: 10 November 1485. 
Page 206 
such a grant]’.25 At Charles I’s accession, there would nevertheless still have been a 
reasonable expectation of a backdated grant for life, not only on the general basis of 
the precedents, but also because of a promise by the Commons to the late king that 
there would be financial support for open war with Spain. However, not for the first 
time in parliamentary history, the Commons wanted to withhold supply until they had 
satisfaction for their grievances, which included persistent criticism of the role and 
actions of the duke of Buckingham, and fears over a perceived tolerance of 
Arminianism and catholicism. The difficulty, from the Commons’ standpoint, was 
that any grant of supply might well be swiftly followed by a dissolution; from the 
king’s point of view, discussion of grievances might both affect his authority, and 
delay or even prevent the grants of supply he needed. These difficulties had been 
apparent in the parliaments of 1625 and 1626, together with the devices used to raise 
finance by non-parliamentary means that are described in chapter four. However, 
once it became clear that the sums raised by such means would be insufficient for the 
king’s needs, a parliament was of necessity called, to begin on 17 March 1628. There 
were three distinct phases to this parliament: March to June 1628, June 1628 to 
January 1629, and January to March 1629. The first session took place from 17 March 
to 26 June 1628; there was then an adjournment before a second session began on 
20 January 1629;26 the last day that the Commons sat was 2 March, and parliament 
was dissolved on 10 March 1629. It is necessary to look at all three periods in order to 
understand the Rolle case. 
In the first phase, the initial moves from the king were conciliatory: before the 
start of the parliament, a proclamation was issued, putting on hold the raising of 
monies from the people directly, despite what was seen as the urgent necessity for 
funds for defence. Instead, the king was prepared ‘wholly to rely upon the love of Our 
people in Parliament, and not to deferre their assembling’.27 This made sense: that 
tonnage and poundage were traditionally available to each monarch on a continuing 
                                                
25 CJ: 14 June 1604 (second scribe); CJ, 1, pp. 244-45: 22 June 1604. 
26 The original intention had been for the second session to start on 20 October 1628, but this 
was put back to January 1629, for reasons that are set out below. 
27 Larkin (ed.), Proclamations (Charles I), II, pp. 187-88. 
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basis might have been true factually, but it was nevertheless politically unwise to levy 
the duties without parliamentary authority. However, when parliament assembled in 
March 1628, the session started badly: the Commons were minded not to attend the 
king in the House of Lords, because Black Rod had not come in person to summon 
them, but in the end they did so, out of respect to the sovereign.28 Charles may 
possibly have wanted his opening speech to be regal, forceful, and brave, but its tone 
is ill judged, patronising, and peremptory to the point of rudeness, as these extracts 
show: 
These Times are for Action; […] for tedious Consultations, at this Conjuncture of 
Time, is [sic] as hurtful as ill Resolutions. […] I, therefore, judging a Parliament to be 
the ancient, speediest, and best Way, in this Time of common Danger, to give such 
Supply as to secure ourselves, and to save our Friends from imminent Ruin, have 
called you together. […] If you (which God forbid) should not do your Duties in 
contributing what this State at this Time needs, I must, in Discharge of My 
Conscience, use those other Means which God hath put into My Hands. […] Take 
not this as a Threatening (for I scorn to threaten any but My Equals) …29 
Next, on 19 March 1628, Sir John Finch was chosen as Speaker. As he was to play a 
key role in events less than a year later, it is perhaps helpful to consider his character 
at this point. He was a lawyer, from a family active in Kent politics, and had benefited 
from the patronage, from 1614 onwards, of Sir Francis Bacon, whose impeachment 
Finch vigorously contested in 1621, the year when, as recorder for Canterbury, he 
first entered parliament.30 After Bacon’s fall, Finch tied himself closely to the king, 
and to Buckingham, for whom he was one of the chief defenders and counsel, in the 
Commons generally, and during the impeachment proceedings more particularly. For 
the 1628 parliament, in accordance with contemporary custom, Finch would have 
been identified to the Commons as the king’s choice. On being put forward, he gave a 
                                                
28 CJ, 1, p. 872: 19 March 1628. 
29 LJ, 3, p. 687: 17 March 1628. 
30 Louis A. Knafla, ‘Finch, John, Baron Finch of Fordwich (1584-1660)’, ODNB, which 
incorrectly states that he was elected for Canterbury in 1614; Thrush and Ferris 
(eds.), Commons 1604-29, II, p. 192. 
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flowery, extravagantly flattering speech of acceptance, in which he expressed his 
personal conviction that the Commons would willingly grant supply to the king, from 
affection to his person and the honour of their country. The following extract 
indicates a tone that may well have irritated those who had anxiously identified 
arbitrary, or absolutist tendencies in the current regime: 
[…] I bow my knees unto you most excellent Majesty […] having been by your 
gracious beams drawn up from earth and obscurity. [… in parliament …] I find a 
lively representation of that true happiness, which, under your Majesty’s gracious 
government, we all at this time enjoy. […] Here, in the fulness and height of your 
glory, like the sun in the exaltation of his orb, sits yor most excellent Majesty.31 
The role of the Speaker was changing: traditionally, he had managed the Commons’ 
business, for example choosing the bills, motions, and other matters to be put to the 
House, and deciding whom he would call upon to speak. The Speaker did not, by 
custom, vote when in the chair: ‘He was foreclosed of his Voice [by becoming 
Speaker] and was to be indifferent to both parties’.32 However, by the 1620s, his 
authority was being diluted: for example, the House was more frequently forming 
itself into a grand committee of the whole House; a senior member, such as John 
Pym, rather than the Speaker, would then take the chair, and members could 
contribute to a debate as often as they liked.33 The Speaker would sit there as an 
ordinary member, unable to manage the House, although able to contribute to debates 
as if a private member. Nevertheless, he was still expected to act as a conduit between 
Commons and ministers, keeping the latter in touch with proceedings. He might also 
                                                
31 Manning, Lives of the Speakers, pp. 306-7. 
32 Townshend, Historical Collections, p. 321: 12 December 1601. 
33 For example, on 20 April 1626, Christopher Wandesford took the chair: Whitelocke, in 
Bidwell and Jansson (eds.), Proceedings 1626, p. 34. This kind of arrangement was 
formalised in 1690, when the Commons decided that supply would be considered by 
a committee of the whole House, chaired by its ‘own man’, rather than the Speaker, 
who was seen as the King’s spy. Richard Hampden was appointed the first chairman 
Of Ways And Means, a role that was combined with that of deputy Speaker in the 
mid-nineteenth century. The terms have come to be used interchangeably, although 
the committee of Ways and Means was abolished in 1967: UK Parliament, The 
Chairman of Ways and Means/Deputy Speakers, in www.parliament.uk (UK 
Parliament), at <http://goo.gl/rOqaqb>. 
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be summoned by the king, either to discuss Commons’ business, or to receive a 
message for the House. Another difficulty was discontinuity in the Speakership: it had 
become customary from 1559 onwards, with rare exceptions, for each Speaker not to 
seek re-election to the Commons after a parliament had been dissolved.34 Finch as a 
lawyer ‘had a high standard of forensic evidence, argued cases on the facts, and was 
seen by many contemporaries as a pillar of justice and mercy’.35 However, was he up 
to the task of being Speaker? After all, three predecessors had had problems that 
reduced the authority of the office that Finch would assume, and only the experienced 
Thomas Crewe had fulfilled the role reasonably well during this period.36 First, 
Ranulph Crewe’s inexperience in the Commons was exposed when there were 
procedural wrangles during the short-lived ‘addled’ parliament of 1614, where he also 
found himself jostled by members when leaving the chamber: Ranulph Crewe only 
sat in the parliaments of 1597 and 1614. Second, Sir Thomas Richardson (St Albans) 
all but lost control of the parliament of 1621-22, perhaps unsurprisingly, as he only 
sat in that single parliament. The difficulty for Speakers of being placed between king 
and Commons was seen in the command from the king to Richardson that the 
Commons were not to present their Protestation, despite which it was entered into the 
Journal, and sent to the king through a deputation of twelve members.37 Third, Sir 
Heneage Finch, Speaker in 1626, found himself in a near-impossible position: 
whereas the king expected to receive an early grant of subsidies to pay for the war 
with Spain, many members of the Commons were determined to impeach 
Buckingham before making any such grant. Sir Heneage did at least have the 
advantage of having sat in the three preceding parliaments. In the 1628-29 parliament, 
Sir John Finch (cousin to Sir Heneage) was given to tears, which might be seen as 
reflecting an underlying weakness, or possibly a device to win the sympathy of the 
House. For example, in 1628, he was required to inform the House, on behalf of the 
                                                
34 Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, pp. 221-23, passim.  
35 Knafla, ‘John Finch’. 
36 Sir Thomas Crewe was, exceptionally, Speaker in both the last parliament of James I and 
the first of Charles I (1624 and 1625, respectively). 
37 See pp. 138f. above. When the members appeared, James called for twelve chairs, as there 
were ‘twelve kings a-coming’: Manning, Lives of the Speakers, p. 291. 
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king, that they must stop attacking Buckingham: ‘there is a command laid upon me to 
interrupt any that should go about to lay aspersion on the ministers of state’.38 Aware 
of the anger this provoked, he declared: ‘I protest before God I mean all well. If you 
knew what I have done you would not blame me, for I am sure I have used all my best 
faculties to do you service’. Soon afterwards he tearfully declared that he was no 
longer able to behold ‘so woeful a spectacle in so grave a senate’, and left to take a 
steer from the king.39 It is therefore important to bear Finch’s character traits and 
loyalties in mind, when considering the degree to which members were able to 
question and oppose the king’s wishes and directives during the course of the 1629 
parliament, and confront the authority of the Speaker, particularly during the final 
day’s sitting. Notably, during the course of the debate on 2 March 1629, Sir Peter 
Heyman ‘bitterly inveighed’ against Finch, saying that he was ‘a disgrace to his 
country [Kent] and a blot to a noble family’ for seeking ‘to pluck up our liberties by 
the roots’. Unless Finch was called to the Bar and another Speaker chosen in his 
stead, Heyman warned, ‘we shall annihilate the liberties and dignity of Parliament’.40 
The 1628 parliament was able to give some early comfort to the king, voting five 
subsidies on 4 April, in recognition of the foreign threat. The king was reported to be 
particularly pleased to hear that there were no dissenting voices to the proposal.41 
There was a risk, however, that the grant would stall when going through the requisite 
parliamentary stages, as the more general mood of the Commons in the parliament of 
1628 was to assert privileges, and question the prerogative and actions of the king, 
leading to repeated messages from Charles that a grant of supply should be expedited. 
There were also attempts to reassure the Commons about the king’s intentions. For 
example, on 26 April, Sir Thomas Wentworth, in one of his last contributions in the 
Commons, hoped that ‘it shall never be stirred here whether the King be above the 
law or the law be above the King’.42 Two days later, there was ‘A Conference Desired 
                                                
38 In Knafla, ‘John Finch’. 
39 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 276. 
40 Ibid., IV, p. 683. 
41 Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, p. 525: 7 April 1628. 
42 Johnson et al. (eds.), CD 1628, p. 98, cited in Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: 
Allen Lane, 2010) p. 18. 
Page 211 
by the Lords and Had by a Committee of both Houses, Concerning the Rights and 
Privileges of the Subjects’, which heard contributions from Sir Dudley Digges (sitting 
then for Ludgershall), Sir Edward Littleton (Caernarvon Boroughs), John Selden and 
Sir Edward Coke. Digges spoke on property rights and the rights of redress open to 
anyone who felt they had been wrongly treated: ‘It is an undoubted and fundamentall 
point of this so antient common law of England, that the subject hath a true property 
in his goods and possessions, which doth preserve as sacred that meum & tuum is the 
proper object’.43 Coke argued further that: ‘The Common Law hath so admeasured 
the Kings Prerogative, as he cannot prejudice any man in his inheritance and the 
greatest inheritance a man hath, is the liberty of his person, for all others are accessary 
to it. [...] All judgements against Magna Charta are void’.44 Sir Robert Heath, the 
attorney general, provided detailed and technical rebuttals of the precedents provided 
by the Commons, and Sir Thomas Coventry, the lord keeper, reported that: 
His Majesty out of his great and princely care, hath thought of this expedient to 
shorten the business, by declaring the clearness of his own heart and intention: and 
therefore hath commanded me to let you know, That he holdeth the statute of Magna 
Charta, and the other six statutes insisted upon for the subjects’ liberty, to be all in 
force; and assures you, that he will maintain all his subjects in the just freedom of their 
persons, and the safety of their estates; and that he will govern according to the laws 
and statutes of this realm; and that you will find as much security in his Majesty’s 
Royal Word and Promise, as in the strength of any law ye can make; so that hereafter 
ye shall never have cause to complain.45 
May and June 1628 saw a positive rash of privilege cases in Lords and Commons, in 
respect of arrests or subpoenas, shortly before parliament was prorogued on 26 June. 
Those identified were: Allen Figes, servant to the Bishop of Worcester; 46 Sir John 
                                                
43 Anon., A Conference Desired by the Lords and Had by a Committee of Both Houses, 
Concerning the Rights and Privileges of the Subjects (London: Matthew Walbancke 
and Richard Best, 1642), p. 3. 
44 Ibid., p. 69. 
45 Cobbett, Parliamentary History, II, p. 332. 
46 LJ, 3, p. 860: 17 June 1628. 
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Danvers (Oxford University), apparently for a chancery case;47 Thomas Mannes, 
servant to Mr Wylde (probably John Wylde, member for Droitwich);48 Sir George 
Gresley (Newcastle-under-Lyme), in respect of a subpoena;49 and Bolto and Talbot 
Benbrigge, servants to Sir Edward Osborne (East Retford).50 Such cases typify an 
ever-present concern to preserve privileges. 
At various times in the first few months of the parliament, there were speeches or 
debates in the Commons condemning new directions in religion; the mismanagement 
of affairs by Buckingham and other ‘evil counsellors’; the use of forced loans and the 
sanctions meted out to those who refused to pay these; and the attempt to collect 
tonnage and poundage without parliamentary authority. In the face of unresolved 
grievances, a Petition of Right was presented on 28 May 1628, and passed on 7 June, 
with, crucially, the backing of both Houses of parliament – the Lords had been 
affronted by the incarceration of the earls of Bristol and Arundel in 1626, and the 
king’s subsequent evasiveness in providing explanations.51 The Petition cited the 
requirement, given statutory force in the reign of Edward I, that no ‘tallage or aid’ 
should be levied without parliamentary approval.52 It also set out objections to forced 
loans or benevolences and associated penalties without the consent of parliament; 
imprisonment without cause shown or by special royal command; disinheritance or 
execution without lawful judgement by peers or the law; forced billeting; and the use 
of martial law to oppress subjects and to exempt the military from ordinary law. 
Although only a petition, the measure was, after some manoeuvring by the Commons, 
treated as a statute and printed for public distribution.53 David L. Smith rightly points 
                                                
47 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 19. 
48 CJ, 1, p. 915: 20 June 1628. 
49 CJ, 1, p. 917: 21 June 1628. 
50 CJ, 1, p. 919: 25 June 1628. 
51 The Petition Exhibited to His Majestie by the Lords Spirituall and Temporall and 
Commons in this present Parliament concerning divers Rights and Liberties of the 
Subjecte: with the Kings Majesties Royall Answere thereunto in full Parliament 1627 
1628 (3 Car. I c. 1): Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, V, pp. 23-24. 
52 A similar provision is given in Magna Carta, §12. 
53 There is continuing uncertainty about whether the Petition was merely a petition, or had a 
larger statutory force. It has been considered a declaratory act, a private bill, or 
simply a petition. Reeve proposes that ‘the Petition was a legislative act of statutory 
character and effect, rather than a judicial measure which did not bind the king at law. 
[footnote continues ...] 
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out that the Petition, as well as other parliamentary protestations and remonstrances, 
needs to be set in the context of the time, rather than being characterised as a 
constitutional signpost on a whiggish ‘high road to civil war’. He suggests that the 
Petition ‘was a very practical document, born of mistrust of one particular monarch 
and prompted specifically by the royal policies of 1626-27’.54 After the submission of 
a remonstrance from both Houses seeking a favourable response, Charles agreed to 
the Petition, at which ‘the Commons gave a great and a joyful Applause’.55 The 
subsidy bill then passed through all its Commons’ stages.56 A second remonstrance 
was nevertheless prepared, which acknowledged that grants of tonnage and poundage 
for life had been the norm since the time of Henry VII, and that Charles I might have 
expected the same, were it not for his likely curtailment of the parliament.57 There 
was a clear warning, however, that any collection of tonnage and poundage, unless 
granted by parliament: 
Is a breach of the fundamental liberties of this kingdom, and contrary to your 
Majesty’s royal answer to the said Petition of Right. And therefore [the Commons] do 
most humbly beseech your Majesty to forbear any further receiving of the same, and 
not to take it in ill part from those of your Majesty’s loving subjects, who shall refuse 
to make payment of any such charges, without warrant of law demanded.58  
This was a key moment: the Commons were both calling on the sovereign to honour 
his undertakings, and inciting English merchants not to pay tonnage and poundage, or 
.......................................................................................... 
If […] the Petition was legislative, […] it achieved its purpose and anchored the 
political and ideological concerns of the commons in contemporary legal reality’: L. 
J. Reeve, ‘The Legal Status of the Petition of Right’, HistJ, 29 (2) (1986), 257-77, 
p. 258. Although it is included as a statute (3 Car. I c. 1) in both the TNA database of 
legislation and The Statutes of the Realm, the king’s response is given as ‘soit droit 
fait come est desiré’, in this instance this reflecting the notion that Charles regarded 
the Petition as a private bill, i.e. one that did not require printing, which was one of 
the points of dispute. 
54 Smith, Stuart Parliaments, pp. 116-17. 
55 LJ, 3, p. 842: 7 June 1628. 
56 CJ: 12 June 1628 (second scribe). 
57 The duties had in fact been awarded for life to every sovereign from Edward IV onwards, 
as described on p. 205 above. 
58 Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, p. 630: 16 June 1628. 
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similar impositions – a call that would be answered by a significant number of such 
merchants, crucially including John Rolle. It is easy to see how Charles saw an 
inducement not to pay a royal levy as an assault upon his dignity and powers, and that 
he was mightily frustrated by the Commons’ intransigent failure actually to pass 
legislation that would legitimise the collection of tonnage and poundage. On the final 
day of the 1628 session, Charles kept the Speaker at Whitehall for two hours, to 
prevent the Commons from passing the remonstrance.59 Instead, he summoned the 
Commons to attend him in the Lords, where, in a forthright speech, he said that he 
would end the session earlier than intended. He gave his reasons, although asserting 
that he was only obliged to account for his actions to God, being particularly 
concerned about the constructions being put on the Petition of Right, as well as the 
tenor of decisions by the Lords and the Commons: 
It is known to every one, that a while ago the House of Commons gave me a 
Remonstrance; how acceptable, every Man may judge; and, for the Merit of it, I will 
not call that in Question, for I am sure no wise Man can justify it. Now since I am 
certainly informed, that a second Remonstrance is preparing for me, to take away my 
Profit of Tonage and Poundage (One of the Chief Maintenances of the Crown) by 
alleging, that I have given away my Right thereof, by my Answer to your Petition; this 
is so prejudicial unto me, that I am forced to end this Session some few Hours before 
I meant it, being not willing, to receive any more Remonstrances, to which I must 
give a harsh Answer.60 
As the Commons had not granted sufficient supply, the king had little alternative but 
to collect tonnage and poundage without parliamentary authority. The council 
directed that those who resisted the customs officers in the execution of their duty 
should be imprisoned ‘until this Board give other order, or they be delivered by order 
of law’.61 However, as Burgess suggests, it is wrong to suggest that the king was hell-
bent on claiming that tonnage and poundage were part of the royal prerogative. 
                                                
59 Nevertheless, the remonstrance was certainly circulated; for example, a copy exists in the 
Hampshire Records Office: Hampshire Records Office, 44 M69/L39/19, Jervoise. 
60 CJ, 1, p. 920: 26 June 1628. 
61 Council Register, 31 August 1628, in Gardiner, History of England (1899 edn.), VII, p. 4. 
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Rather, he was arguing that by custom and practice the duties were now granted for 
life, and collected with implicit parliamentary authority – as Charles’s predecessors 
had gathered it from their accession, before any relevant parliamentary vote.62 There 
may even have been an unspoken nod in the direction of the Commons’ assertions 
that their privileges were similarly legitimised by custom and practice. Even so, 
resistance to the collection of the duties continued, so that Richard Chambers was one 
of a group brought to the Star Chamber, on 28 September 1628, for refusing to pay 
‘moderate duties […] and the raising and publishing of undutiful and false speeches, 
which may tend to the dishonour of the King or the State, or to the discouragement or 
discontentment of the Subject, or to set discord or variance between his Majesty and 
his good People’. Chambers was found to have: ‘utter[ed] these undutiful, seditious, 
and false words, That the Merchants are in no part of the world so screwed and 
wrung as in England; That in Turkey they have more encouragement’, fined £2,000, 
and committed to the Fleet for his seditious words and actions. The twenty-two 
councillors present had differed as to the sentence, some arguing for a fine of £500 to 
be accompanied by an apology to the king, others that the fine should be as high as 
£3,000, and with commitment to prison.63 With no parliamentary grants of supply, 
and faced with the refusal of about thirty principal London merchants, including 
Chambers and Rolle, to pay duties, the privy council authorised the seizure of untaxed 
goods.64 This was despite the merchants’ offer to give security for any sum that they 
might ultimately be obliged by law to pay. As will be described more fully below, the 
merchants tried unsuccessfully to regain their property, after which resistance to 
paying tonnage and poundage weakened somewhat, although there were certainly 
those who persisted in their refusal, not least Rolle. Difficulties over the legality of 
the collection of tonnage and poundage were part of an overall volatility at the time, 
linked to a range of other problems and disasters, such as the growth of Arminianism 
and its apparent tolerance by some senior clergy and councillors; tolerance of 
catholicism, particularly following the royal marriage; punitive, forcible billeting on 
                                                
62 Burgess, Politics of the Ancient Constitution, p. 190. 
63 Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, p. 672. 
64 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 88. 
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civilians, with the costs being borne by the civilian concerned; Buckingham’s 
position; and the fall of La Rochelle. Taken together, these were seen by many in the 
Commons as the result of a weakening of true religion, and pointed to the need for 
retrenchment and reform.65  
Only one of these issues had resolved itself before the 1629 session: a disgruntled 
army officer had assassinated Buckingham on 23 August 1628. This had the potential 
to reduce tensions between crown and Commons: with no need to manoeuvre to 
prevent the Commons attacking his friend, Charles could now summon a parliament. 
At the same time, however, there was now no obvious ‘evil counsellor’ to attack as a 
surrogate for the king himself. However, Buckingham’s absence did not resolve other 
fundamental grievances, for example the king’s treatment of the Petition of Right, 
which had been seen as a success for the 1628 parliament, ‘yet the Petition itself 
rested most insecurely on the interpretation Charles chose to give it’.66 Some 
members were clearly going to feel affronted by these developments, and seek to 
reassert the Commons’ authority when parliament reassembled on 20 October, the 
date previously announced for the resumption. Despite all these difficulties, or 
perhaps because of them, Charles and his councillors determined to achieve a settled 
government, by avoiding a too hasty recall, so that on 1 October parliament was 
further prorogued by proclamation, from 20 October 1628, until 20 January 1629.67 
Without Buckingham, or any replacement, Charles was now taking a more proactive 
approach, in the hope of securing greater parliamentary cooperation, particularly for a 
grant of tonnage and poundage. According to Cust, the postponement of the new 
session would allow ‘Charles I’s "patriot" privy councillors, apparently with the 
blessing of the king, to put together a "new deal" for cooperation between crown and 
people. This was based on settling grievances over Arminianism and tonnage and 
poundage, relaunching the war against Spain, and re-establishing a harmonious 
relationship with parliament […] Had it succeeded it could have provided the basis 
                                                
65 D. Clark, ‘Thomas Scott and the Growth of Urban Opposition to the Early Stuart Regime’, 
HistJ, 21 (1) (March 1978), 1-26, passim. 
66 Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, p. 399.  
67 Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, p. 638. 
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for an alternative to Charles I’s Personal Rule’.68 A January 1629 start for this next 
session would conveniently still give enough time for new subsidies to be voted, and, 
hopefully, for the Commons to give backdated authority for the collection of tonnage 
and poundage, along with a grant of the duties for life, reflecting the king’s ‘strong 
attachment to the proper, traditional, and legal way of doing things’.69 During 
December 1628 and early January 1629, there were reports of almost daily meetings 
of leading councillors, with the king hoping ‘for a fair and loving meeting with his 
people’. Councillors agreed on measures to intensify the campaign against papists, 
and to tackle Arminianism, the latter being more problematic in the light of the king’s 
anti-Calvinist position. Even so, a running sore was the continuing refusal by some 
merchants to pay tonnage and poundage, despite assurances that parliament would be 
able to determine the matter.70  
Yet, after all the generally high hopes and seemingly careful preparation, things 
were nevertheless to go badly wrong in 1629. Russell summarises the lines that would 
be taken by different groups within the Commons: 
The basic struggle of 1629 was between two rival groups in the Commons, each 
working for a different bargain. That led by Pym and Rich wanted to vote tonnage 
and poundage in return for Charles’s abandonment of Arminianism. In accord with 
Eliot’s longstanding ideas on ministerial responsibility, the group led by Eliot and 
John Selden would vote tonnage and poundage once the king had agreed to the 
punishment of those who had collected it without legal authority. Their hand was 
greatly strengthened when the customs officers seized the goods of John Rolle, who 
was an MP, and so turned a general issue of liberties into a specific dispute about 
parliamentary privilege.71 
                                                
68 Richard Cust, ‘Was There an Alternative to the Personal Rule? Charles I, the Privy Council 
and the Parliament of 1629’, History, 90 (299) (July 2005), 330-52, p. 330. 
69 Russell, Parliaments and English Politics, p. 395. 
70 Cust, ‘Was There an Alternative to the Personal Rule?’, p. 341. 
71 Conrad Russell, ‘Eliot, Sir John (1592-1632)’, ODNB. Russell’s positive views on the focus 
on Rolle are in contrast to Gardiner’s criticisms of such a narrow approach: see 
pp. 201f. above. 
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This section has shown that in the 1628 parliament, issues of religion, and the conduct 
of the government, alongside matters of finance and parliamentary authority, were 
factors in a growing parliamentary disaffection. A backdated grant of tonnage and 
poundage for life had been a reasonable expectation for the new king, yet some 
leading figures in the Commons were not prepared to authorise this until their various 
grievances had been properly addressed. The king’s need to tap into what was a major 
source of royal income at the time had led to a continuing collection of the duties 
without parliamentary authority. The consequent discontent of the Commons was 
evident in the presentation of the Petition of Right, on 28 May 1628. The ‘spin’ that 
Charles I subsequently put on his eventual acceptance of the Petition exacerbated 
tensions in the interval between the parliamentary sessions of 1628 and 1629. There 
were moves, after the death of Buckingham, to reduce those tensions: the planned 
return of the Commons in autumn 1628 was postponed to the following January, in 
the hope that a deal could be brokered in the meantime, which would secure supply 
through parliamentary means. Nevertheless, there was a continuing requirement for 
funds when parliament was not sitting, and this, tautologically, could only be met 
through non-parliamentary means, such as the collection of ship money, voluntary 
and forced loans and benevolences, and the continuing collection of tonnage and 
poundage. Testing the legitimacy of the collection of tonnage and poundage, a group 
of London merchants, including Chambers and Rolle, refused to pay up, and customs 
officials seized their goods. This was to precipitate claims of parliamentary privilege, 
for Rolle and his goods, and, more obliquely, for those of the other merchants who 
decided to present petitions to the Commons – developments which would play a 
large part in shaping the 1629 session. 
John Rolle and the 1629 parliament 
This section sketches Rolle’s own background, and then gives an account of the ways 
in which his case, and that of his fellow merchants, assumed increasing importance up 
to the end of the 1629 session of parliament. Robert Rolle had two sons who sat for 
Callington, a Cornish borough where he controlled one of the nominations: his second 
son, Henry, was elected there in the 1621 and 1624 parliaments, and his less 
illustrious fourth son, John, became member there in 1626 and 1628. It is sometimes 
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difficult to identify which ‘Mr Rolle’ is the subject of contemporary records, when 
brothers were sitting in the same parliament; many entries without a forename 
probably refer not to John, but to Henry, who was a ‘notable lawyer and […] a 
respected figure in the House, experienced in procedural matters and the handling of 
weighty legislation’. John Rolle was more narrowly concerned with matters of trade, 
and became a member of the Levant Company in 1624.72 One of the brothers started 
to become involved in matters relating to tonnage and poundage as early as the 1626 
parliament, when ‘Mr Rolles’ (probably John) successfully moved for privilege for 
John Delbridge.73 John Rolle was active in a number of trade-related matters in the 
1628 parliament, and both he and Henry were named on 7 June to help draft the 
subsidy bill’s preamble.74 It was certainly John Rolle who was the eponymous subject 
of the privilege case, which turned on the refusal, in October 1628, by a group of 
London merchants, including Rolle, to pay tonnage and poundage, because collection 
of those duties had not yet been voted by parliament.75 Customs officials then seized 
merchandise from this group; the silks and other goods taken from Rolle were worth 
£1,517. He claimed that this was above the value of what was demanded, and 
undertook to settle what was owed, as and when the duties received parliamentary 
sanction.76 However, as will be described more fully, the offer was rejected, with the 
customs officers asserting that they were acting through a commission given under 
the Great Seal. Rolle tried to claim privilege for his goods, as well as his person, a 
                                                
72 John also sat for Truro in 1640, and Henry for Truro in 1625, 1626, and 1628. Robert’s first 
son, Sir Samuel Rolle, sat for Grampound in the 1625 parliament, and Callington in 
1640, but did not have a seat in the 1628-9 parliament, when John Rolle’s case arose. 
Unless otherwise stated, references in this chapter are to John Rolle: Thrush and 
Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, pp. 79-90, passim. 
73 CJ, 1, p. 850: 27 April 1626. 
74 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 87. 
75 Rolle was not the only member of the Commons who refused to pay tonnage and poundage. 
John Delbridge had successfully sought privilege in 1626, to stay a suit in London 
involving his goods. In March 1629, he was brought before the privy council ‘upon 
complaint made of some undutiful carriage of his towards His Majesty, not only in 
refusing himself but in persuading others to refuse to pay any duties to the king for 
goods exported and imported’. However, under examination, he convinced the 
councillors of his innocence, and discouraged them from sending for his accusers: 
ibid., IV, p. 43. 
76 W. A. Shaw and Robert Ashton, ‘Rolle, John (1598-1648)’, ODNB. 
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claim that was denied, as the customs officers believed that privilege did not apply to 
the goods of a member of the Commons, despite precedents to the contrary. As 
parliament was not in session, this matter of privilege could not be raised immediately 
in the Commons. A further route that was, however, open to Rolle and the other 
merchants, was to use writs of replevin,77 the first of which was issued on 
12 November 1628 in the chancery court. One of the London sheriffs (Acton) delayed 
the process of implementing the writ, and the customs collectors then persuaded the 
attorney general to obtain a stay of proceedings. The barons initially ruled that Rolle’s 
goods should remain impounded until parliament settled the whole issue, and on 
27 November, they concluded that replevins were not a proper way of removing 
goods from the king’s possession. A further writ of replevin was nevertheless put 
forward on 5 January 1629, but this was equally unsuccessful. Yet more of Rolle’s 
stock was seized on 20 January, which was the first day of the new parliamentary 
session.78 John Selden raised the failure of the replevin in the Commons on the 
following day, when he proposed that a committee should examine whether ‘the 
liberties have been infringed’.79 More specific reference to Rolle’s circumstances was 
made on the day after that: ‘Mr Rowles reports how his goods were taken for not 
payment of custom as was usual, though he offered security to pay what was due by 
law or adjudged by parliament, but his proffere was refused, and [blank] said if Mr 
Rowles had all the House of Commons in him he would [do] what he did’.80 As a 
longstanding parliamentarian, Phelips described how, in the first year of James I’s 
reign (when he was representing East Looe), parliament was prorogued because of the 
plague, yet tonnage and poundage duties were collected, and the Commons 
consequently told the collectors that they had had no right to do so.81 Edward Littleton 
was, along with men such as John Selden, and the now absent Sir Edward Coke, a 
leading lawyer; he had supported the parliamentary campaign for the Petition of 
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Right, and was to play a prominent part in the Rolle case.82 He identified the issues: 
whether tonnage and poundage were payable without parliamentary authority; and 
whether a member of parliament was to have privilege for his goods as well as his 
person.  
There were long-standing precedents whereby privilege was extended to a 
member’s ‘goods and estate’, and these are set out more fully in Appendix 1. The first 
was as long ago as 1289-90, when the Master of the Temple, sitting in parliament as 
primus baro (a first baron of the realm), had successfully petitioned for his 
‘distrainable goods’, in the face of an attempt by the bishop of St David’s to seize 
these.83 This privilege was reaffirmed in 1315/16, in the case of the prior of Malton: 
‘that of not being attach’d in their horses and necessary goods and cattales’.84 In 1478, 
John Atwyll seemingly owed money to one John Tailor, who took steps to proceed 
against him.85 Atwyll, however, did not appear in court, because he was in 
Westminster, and unaware of the actions against him. Tailor then arranged for writs to 
be directed to a number of sheriffs, which would probably have led to Atwyll or his 
goods being taken in execution. As a consequence, ‘the said John Atwyll cannot 
freely depart from this present parliament to his home for fear that his body, his 
horses and his other goods and chattels which he needs to have with him might be 
duly arrested in that matter, contrary to the privilege customarily due to all the 
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members usually summoned to the aforesaid parliaments’.86 The Commons then 
successfully petitioned for privilege for Atwyll.87 Hatsell adds two comments on the 
Atwyll case. First, that this was the only one from the medieval period relating to the 
property of a member of the Commons. Second, that the privilege was ‘expressly 
confined to such goods and chattels, as it was necessary the member should have with 
him during his attendance in Parliament, or in returning to his home’.88 That narrow 
distinction was not being applied in the Rolle case, rather it was argued that those 
who were engaged in public life should not be distracted from their duties by the need 
to defend any of their own property.89 A little earlier, ‘seizure of goods’ had been the 
subject of a letter from the Speaker to the sheriff of Hampshire, in 1607: 
Whereas I am informed, that you, or One of you, have, during this Session of 
Parliament, caused a Seizure to be made of certain Goods belonging to Sir William 
Kingswell Knight, One of the Members of the Commons House of Parliament; for 
that the Privilege of Parliament, during the Time of Service there (haply not so well 
known to yourself) reacheth as well to the Goods, as Person, of every Member attendant for 
the Time; I am, by the Duty of my Place, to advertise you thereof, and to advise and 
require you, that you forthwith procure the Restitution of the said Goods unto him, 
according to the said Privilege [my emphasis].90 
Rolle’s case was not simply about asserting privilege for his property; there was also 
the problem of how to restore his property. The Lords had already made a general 
pronouncement about the restoration of goods, in 1628, when the earl marshal 
reported; ‘That the Committee for Privileges met […] to consider of the Four Things 
referred to their Consideration. […] 3. Whether the Goods of a Privileged Person, 
taken in Execution (during the Privilege of Parliament) ought not to be delivered to 
the said Party by Privilege of Parliament?’ Their answer was that: ‘they all Agreed, 
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That the Goods of a Privileged Person taken in Execution, ought to be redelivered and 
freed as well as the Person’.91 Sir John Coke, the secretary of state, saw a need to 
balance the maintenance of parliamentary privilege within a spirit of moderation, but 
Littleton gave a rejoinder: ‘we have moderation preached unto us in Parliament, and 
we have followed it; I would others did the like out of Parliament. Let the parties be 
sent for that violated the liberties of Parliament, to have their doom’. Sir John Eliot 
saw three key issues: ‘1. the right of the particular gentleman; 2. the right of the 
subject; 3. the right and privilege of this House’. Whereas Eliot had wanted the House 
to discuss the business directly, a select committee of no more than twenty members 
was instead established: ‘to take into Consideration the Particulars of the Relation, 
made by Mr. Rolles, wherein the Subject’s Liberty, in general, hath been invaded, and 
to examine the same’.92 At a later point, petitions from key merchants were referred to 
this committee.93 Further, the customers were ‘to be sent for to the House to answer 
their Contempt to the House’.94 
Charles I was, of course, fully aware of the Commons’ concern that their 
privileges had been compromised, and that Rolle was claiming specific privilege, so 
that he needed to act in a conciliatory manner, if he were ever to be granted tonnage 
and poundage. He accordingly set out that if the Commons granted tonnage and 
poundage ‘as my ancestors have had it, my past actions will be concluded, and my 
future proceedings authorized’. He then made clear that he did not take tonnage and 
poundage ‘as appertaining unto my hereditary prerogative […] for it ever was, and 
still is my meaning, by the gift of my people to enjoy it’ [my emphases]. Somewhat 
disingenuously, he then said that he had taken tonnage and poundage pending a 
Commons grant, as an act of necessity, and on the understanding that the Commons 
always intended to vote them to him, prevented only by the constraints of time. He 
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concluded by expressing a wish that the Commons should ‘not be jealous of one 
another’s Actions [and] deaf to all ill Reports or Rumors concerning me, until my 
Words and Actions speak for themselves’.95 The speech seems to have given great 
satisfaction, so that an attempt was made to introduce a new bill for tonnage and 
poundage.96 However, Eliot and Phelips sabotaged this, by proposing that civil 
grievances should be resolved first. There was also a procedural wrangle over whether 
a subsidy bill should come in on the king’s recommendation. However, things then 
moved in a different direction, when Francis Rous (Tregony) argued that the 
destruction of the true religion by Arminianism and popery should be given the 
foremost attention of the House: 
I desire that we may look into the belly and bowels of this Trojan horse, to see if there 
be not men in it ready to open the gates to Romish tyranny and Spanish monarchy. 
For an Arminian is the spawn of a papist; and if there come the warmth of favour 
upon him, you shall see him turn into one of those frogs that rise out of the bottomless 
pit.97  
Similar heat was produced by Sir Walter Earle (Dorset): ‘As for passing of Bills, 
settling Revenues, and the like, without settling Religion, I must confess I have no 
Heart to it: Take away my Religion, you take away my Life; and not only mine, but 
the Life of the whole State and Kingdom’.98 However, the king sent a message ‘that 
he expects Precedency of Tunnage and Poundage’, rather than the Commons working 
up a Remonstrance.99 Even though a few members urged respect for the king’s 
wishes, further discussion of taxation had to wait, as set out in ‘The Commons 
Apology for not passing their Bill of Tunnage and Poundage, and their Desire to 
proceed with Religion’, which was prepared on 29 January.100 It was clear that there 
was a double difficulty in securing a tonnage and poundage bill – the priority 
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accorded to Rolle’s privilege and the restoration of his goods, and the determination 
by some to tackle issues of religion before any other business. Charles replied to the 
Commons’ declaration, asserting his right to have his business placed before the 
House, and urging the Commons to conclude matters relating to tonnage and 
poundage ‘with Diligence’, so as to ‘put an End to those Questions that do daily arise 
between me and some of my Subjects’.101  
However, further developments in the Rolle case now overtook any discussion of 
finance. The committee on the case of the merchants who refused to pay tonnage and 
poundage reported that William Acton, sheriff of London, had prevaricated and 
contradicted himself in his appearances before the committee. The House resolved to 
send for him as a ‘delinquent’, despite his protestations of cooperative intent.102 Crew 
records that Acton, ‘in regard his Abuse appear’d to be so gross, and that he had so 
many times Liberty given to him to recollect his Memory, and he being so great an 
officer of so great a city, he had all the favour that might be, and yet rejected the 
same, and carried himself in a very scornful manner’.103 There was one nice touch: 
although the sheriff was to kneel at the Bar, in reflection of the gravity of his offence, 
‘soe soone as he did kneele, to be wished to stand up agayne’.104 The sentence was 
nevertheless severe: although protesting ‘his Desire to avoid any Offence to any 
Member of the House’, he was called in again, and ordered to the Tower.105 The real 
issue was almost certainly his obstructive delay in processing the replevin for Rolle. 
As was usual when the Commons imprisoned people for contempt, Acton soon 
petitioned for his release. He was told that this would be arranged, following an 
apology by him, and his attendance at the relevant committee, ‘where the House 
expecteth such a clear Satisfaction, both to the Committee, and the House, as he incur 
not any further Censure thereof’.106  
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As bad as anything Acton had done, two further developments were reported by 
Rolle himself: on 9 February, ‘his warehouse hath been locked by one Massey, a 
pursuivant’;107 and Nicholas Shrimpton, a messenger from the attorney general, had 
issued him with a subpoena to attend a Star Chamber hearing into his refusal to pay 
tonnage and poundage. Rolle told Shrimpton that he was a member of parliament, and 
the latter asked if that meant that Rolle refused to accept the writ, to which Rolle 
replied: ‘No, if you will serve it on me’. This was such a clear breach of privilege that 
the attorney general sent Rolle a letter ‘excusing this, by the Mistake of his 
Messenger, and promising the withdrawing of the Information’. This ‘gave occasion 
of smart Debates in the House’ – some saw it as a tactic to divert the Commons from 
debating grievances about religion.108 Eliot spoke against the judges who were 
preventing the merchants retrieving their goods: ‘I conceive, if the judges of that court 
had their understanding enlightened of their error by this House, they would reform 
the same, and the merchants thereby suddenly come by their goods’.109 Sir Robert 
Phelips deployed his rhetorical skills: 
By this information you see the misfortunes of these times, and how full time it was for 
this assembly to meet to serve his maj. and preserve ourselves, and I am confident we 
came here to do both […] Great and weighty things wound deep; cast your eyes 
which way you please, you may see violations upon all sides: look on the liberty of the 
subject; look on the privilege of this house […] if we suffer the liberty of the house to 
wither, out of fear or compliment, we shall give a wound to the happiness of this 
kingdom.110 […] You see we are made the subjects of scorn and contempt.111 
Sir Humphrey May (Lancaster), chancellor of the Duchy, tried to reassure the House: 
‘that this neither proceeded from King nor Council’.112 The Commons were clearly 
angry: they ordered that Rolle had further privilege regarding the subpoena; that 
Shrimpton should be sent for to answer his contempt; that a select committee should 
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examine the matter; and that the clerk in the Star Chamber should be summoned to 
explain by what warrant he had made out the subpoena.113 The committee reported, 
just a day later, that the facts were as submitted by Rolle: the subpoena had been 
issued, but had then been swiftly withdrawn by the attorney general.114 A separate 
committee for tonnage and poundage reported that they had learned that ‘in the Bill 
preferred in the Exchequer, it was expressed, the Merchants did plot, practise, and 
combine against the Peace of the Kingdom’.115 
The legal calendar now gave the Commons a problem. As described above in 
relation to 1606-7, in spring there was often a clash for lawyers in the Commons 
between the parliamentary and the legal calendars, so that they tended to absent 
themselves from the Commons to attend any legal business they had. Over the years, 
many ignored the standing requirement to request leave of absence from the 
Commons. Nevertheless, in 1629 it was decided that no one was to leave town 
without permission.116 One of those thus pressed to remain was William Noye 
(Helston) – a senior, experienced lawyer.117 He had, until then, mostly aimed at 
breaking the deadlock over tonnage and poundage, and avoiding confrontation, ‘by 
proposing fundamentally conservative, declaratory legislation which simultaneously 
recognized the legitimate claims and needs of the crown while protecting the long-
term legal interests of the subject’.118 However, Noye now took an ‘unexpectedly hard 
line, [launching] a vigorous attack on the dubious legal arguments which had been 
deployed to justify collection of the subsidy during the previous three and a half 
years, claiming that these tactics, and the accompanying seizures of merchants’ 
goods, were the principal obstacle to a resolution of the crisis. In his view the correct 
balance of the law had yet again been disturbed, and needed to be restored before 
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normal business could resume’.119 His speech clearly expounded the interlocking 
issues that were exercising many of the Commons: 
We cannot safely give unless we be in possession, and the proceedings in the 
Exchequer nullified, and the information in the Star Chamber, and the annexation to 
the Petition of Right ... I will not give my voice to this until these things be made void; 
for it will not be a gift but a forced confirmation; neither will I give it ... [without] a 
declaration in the bill, that the king hath no right but by our free gift. If it will not be 
accepted, as it is fit for us to give it, we cannot help it. If it be the king’s already, as by 
these new records it seemeth to be, we need not give it.120 
Noye could see the difficulty arising from the rulings of November 1628 that Rolle 
could not use a replevin to recover his goods. Nevertheless, he took the ‘wildly 
optimistic’ view that the barons of exchequer might be persuaded to withdraw their 
judgment, if the cloth that had been seized was in lieu of payment of tonnage and 
poundage, and not some other duty.121 Although May told the Commons that: ‘All the 
proceedings of the King and his Ministers was [sic] to keep the question safe, until 
this House should meet, and you shall find the proceedings of the Exchequer were 
legal’, there were far more speeches condemning the arbitrary nature of the seizure of 
the merchants’ goods. For example, William Coryton said: ‘I conceive it is fit the 
merchants should have their goods before we can think of the bill [for tonnage and 
poundage]’. It was agreed that a message should be sent to the barons of the 
exchequer, asking for a halt in proceedings, as the customers’ affidavits made clear 
that goods were stayed only for duties contained in the book of rates.122 The four 
senior members who were deputed to carry the message represented a spectrum of 
views. Sir Humphrey May was a privy councillor, chancellor of the Duchy, a loyalist, 
and defender of the king’s interests.123 Sir Francis Cottington (Saltash) was a newly 
appointed privy councillor, and would be made chancellor of the exchequer a month 
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later.124 By contrast, Sir Nathaniel Rich (Harwich) was ‘a stickler for procedure and 
legal forms’. He was an opponent of Buckingham, and someone who became 
increasingly alarmed by the threat of militant Arminianism, and the spread of Jesuit 
and papal influence.125 The last was Sir Robert Phelips, a leading orator against 
Buckingham, and opponent of unauthorised means of raising supply. The substantive 
reply, from the ‘Lord Treasurer, Chancellor, and Barons of the Exchequer’, made it 
clear that the goods that had been seized were ‘only for the Duty of Tunnage and 
Poundage, and other Sums compris’d in the Books of Rates’, but that the barons’ 
orders ‘did not determine, nor any ways trench upon the Right of Tunnage and 
Poundage’. Whereas the owners had sought to use writs of replevin, in effect, to 
pre-empt the case being properly argued, the court of exchequer had stayed any such 
replevin, ‘which was no lawful Action or Course in the King’s Cause, nor agreeable 
to his Royal Prerogative’. They did leave it open to the owners of the goods ‘if they 
conceiv’d themselves wrong’d, might take such Remedy as the Law alloweth’.126 
Rushworth records the Commons’ reaction: ‘instead of satisfaction expected by the 
House, [it] was looked upon as a justification of their actions’. The matter was 
referred to a select committee ‘to consider […] whether ever the Court of Exchequer 
held this course before, for staying of Replevins; and whether this hath been done by 
Prerogative of the King in his Court of Exchequer’. Further, the customers and the 
pursuivant (Shrimpton) were to attend the House on 16 February.127 
 There now occurred a significant attempt to establish an extension to privilege, so 
that it applied to petitioners to the Commons. The grounds were that parliament 
retained a curial function, and might need petitioners to appear in person, so that they 
should not be diverted from such a summons by extraneous concerns. Although 
Charles I was to characterise this as a new area of privilege, it had in fact been raised 
in 1624, when the Felt-makers were pursuing a bill in the Commons to secure relief 
against a chancery decree. However, the Master of the Felt-makers was ‘taken by a 
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Serjeant, and committed to the Fleet, 2,000 l. Bond offered, but not accepted’.128 A 
petition was then presented, and the Commons ordered that those who had been held 
were to be freed by the warden of the Fleet, ‘for Prosecution of their Bill, till the same 
be determined by both Houses’. The committee for privileges was asked to consider 
‘whether any of the former Proceedings, in arresting the Felt-makers, during their 
Attendance upon this Court, have impeached their Privilege of this House, and to 
make Report thereof to the House’.129 No further action seems to have been taken at 
that time. However, the question of privilege for petitioners to the Commons received 
fresh attention in 1629, because the customers were still pursuing the merchants, 
buoyed by the barons’ endorsement of the legality of their actions, which in turn gave 
rise to petitions from the merchants to the Commons. As a result, Sir John Eliot tried 
to protect such petitioners, by moving an Order, which specified that ‘a Man having a 
Plaint depending here, shall be privileg’d in his Person, not freed from Suits’.130 Such 
a radical proposal was perhaps too much, so that it was not agreed in that form, but 
sent to a committee to consider the level of privilege available to anyone with a cause 
in parliament. In the meantime, ‘intimation shall be given to the Lord Keeper, that no 
Attachment shall go forth against the Merchants’.131 A few days later, Chambers 
submitted a further petition, additional to that of 28 January, ‘in complaint of a 
warrant newly proceeding from the Council-board for stay of the merchants goods, 
unless they pay the duties that were due in King James his time’. Eliot was 
exasperated: ‘You see, as by the last answer from the Exchequer touching the 
merchants, that the merchants were bound within that Court to sue for their own, and 
now they are debarred from all means of coming by their own goods’.132 Chambers’ 
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latest petition was referred to the committee for the merchants, ‘to take into 
Consideration, what Course is fit to be taken, to put the Merchants in Possession of 
their Goods’.133 
A key question for the committee was whether the customers had seized the cloth 
in their own interest, or on behalf of the king. It was clear that neither Charles nor his 
agents were conceding that the privilege of parliament that members enjoyed for their 
goods applied in cases where a royal commission authorised their seizure. This was 
put forward by two of the customers, Abraham Dawes and Richard Carmarthen, who 
were called in and separately interrogated by the Speaker. Dawes said:  
He took Mr Rolls’s Goods by virtue of a Commission under the Great Seal, and other 
Warrants remaining in the hands of Sir John Elliot: That he knew Mr Rolls to be a 
Parliament-man, and that Mr Rolls demanded his Privilege; but he did understand 
that this Privilege only extended to his Person, and not to his Goods. […] He took 
those Goods for such Dutys as were due in King James his time; and that the King 
sent for him on Sunday last, and commanded him to make no further Answer. 
Carmarthen in turn said that:  
He knew Mr Rolls to be a Parliament-man, and that he told Mr Rolls he did not find 
any Parliament-man exempted in their said Commission; and if all the Body of this 
House were in him, he would not deliver [up] the Goods; if he said he would not, it 
was because he could not.134  
The debate that followed considered the options that were open to the Commons, with 
varying levels of anger: Christopher Wandesford advised against making the 
customers delinquents, preferring to submit a remonstrance to the king. Sir Nathaniel 
Rich (sitting then for Harwich) also urged caution, moving not to proceed at present, 
until a select committee had determined whether the king himself gave the order to 
stay the goods, even though they were the goods of a ‘parliament-man’. Selden was 
far more fiery: ‘If there be any near the King that misinterpret our Actions, let the 
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Curse light on them, not on us, and believe it is high time to right our selves; and until 
we vindicate our selves in this, it will be in vain for us to sit here’.135 Eliot was 
equally strong: ‘We see it is not only for the interest of the goods of a member of this 
House, but also for the interest of this House, if we let this go, we shall not be able to 
sit here. […] The first [step] is whether we conceive these parties to be delinquents or 
no, and to have violated our privileges […] and if they be delinquents, what 
punishment they shall merit’. The House resolved to move into a grand committee, 
suspended ordinary business, and ordered that no member was to leave London.136  
Clarity was now about to be offered on the important question of whether the 
customers were acting on royal authority, specifically in relation to tonnage and 
poundage, or in pursuit of duties that they might take as part of their general 
collection of customs. The answer seemed to come when one of the customers, Sir 
John Wostenholme, complying with an Order from the Commons, ‘delivered a Lease 
of the Customs, under the Great Seal’, which was read out to the committee for the 
customs. This commission set out the royal claim to collect tonnage and poundage 
lawfully, and to imprison refusers on behalf of the crown: 
Whereas the Lords of our Council, taking into consideration our Revenue, and 
finding that Tunnage and Poundage is a principal Revenue of our Crown, and hath 
been continued for these many years; have therefore order’d all those duties of 
Subsidies, Customs and Imposts as they were in the one and twentieth year of King 
James […] and as they shall be appointed by us under our Seal, be levy’d: […] and if 
any Person refuse to pay, then our Will is, that [they shall be committed] to prison 
such [as are] so refusing, until they conform themselves: And we give full Power to all 
our Officers […] from time to time, to give assistance to the Farmers of the same, as 
fully as when they were collected by Authority of Parliament.137 
Wostenholme’s case was forwarded to the committee, with Selden identifying that 
Wostenholme had ‘often confessed that the goods were taken for Tonnage and 
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Poundage’, and that he had given conflicting evidence. Selden’s view was that 
Dawes’ case was similar; whereas Carmarthen had directly shown contempt: ‘if all 
the parliament were in him, he would not deliver the goods’.138 The committee was 
increased by six, including ‘Mr Rolles’, surely the lawyer Henry Rolle, John Rolle’s 
brother. When the committee met, Edward Littleton put forward three strong 
arguments. First, a member should have privilege for his goods, because, if he were 
impleaded, he could not sit in the House: ‘the ground of all privilege is for public 
service for the general good of the Commonwealth, therefore all private interest must 
yield and give place, and the privilege of parliament exceeds and is above all other 
privileges and courts, and Parliament only can decide Parliament privileges, not any 
other judges or courts’ [my emphasis]. This was placing privilege of parliament back 
above any royal commission – the mirror image of the arguments that Dawes and 
Carmarthen had presented earlier. Second, privilege applied during a prorogation, 
sixteen days coming and going: the problem of the dates involved in the Rolle case is 
discussed below. Third, did privilege of goods hold, even against the king? Littleton 
argued that it did, except in cases involving high treason, felony, or breach of the 
peace. Although Sir Robert Phelips and Sir Francis Seymour supported Littleton, the 
chancellor of the Duchy, Sir Humphrey May, argued that ‘no Privilege lieth against 
the King in point of his Duty […] God forbid that the King’s commands should be put 
for delinquency. When that is done his crown is at stake’. Sir John Coke, the secretary 
of state, sought to limit the discussion to the case of Rolle alone, as it was only he that 
was subject to privilege, despite Eliot’s attempt to extend privilege to any who had 
suits in hand in parliament. Noye claimed that ‘these Customers had neither 
Commission nor Command to seize; […] therefore the Privilege is broken by the 
Customers, without relation to any Commission from the King’.139 This is an 
important point: if the goods had been seized only in relation to tonnage and 
poundage, then the king’s earlier statement that he disclaimed any prerogative right to 
tonnage and poundage140 would have the effect of allowing Rolle’s goods to be 
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subject to parliamentary privilege. It was clear that the customers were acting on a 
commission from the king to collect tonnage and poundage, but crucially, there 
seemed to be no direct authority to seize the goods of a member of parliament who 
would not pay the duties. This omission appeared to assist both the friends and 
opponents of the crown: the Commons could punish the customers without 
dishonouring the king. However, was the omission simply a drafting error? Events 
took a fresh turn when Sir John Coke brought an unequivocal message from the king: 
the customers were under his direct orders:  
That it concerns his Majesty, in a high degree of Justice and Honour, that truth be 
not concealed; which is, that what the Customers did, was by his own direct Order 
and Command, at the Council-board, himself being present: And tho’ his Majesty 
takes it well, that the House have severed his interest from the interest of the 
Customers, yet this will not clear his Majesty’s Honour, if the said Customers should 
suffer for his sake.141 
This did indeed display Charles’s sense of ‘justice and honour’, but by refusing to 
state falsely that the customs officers had acted independently, which would have 
absolved him from blame for the seizure of the goods, he threw away the chance of a 
statutory grant of tonnage and poundage, and retrospective permission for what had 
already been collected. The loyalist May encapsulated the issue, once the king had 
admitted that the seizure had been executed on his command: ‘We take this as a high 
point of privilege, and His Majesty takes it as a high point of sovereignty, and 
therefore would not have us think so much of the privilege of this House as to neglect 
that of the sovereignty’.142 The presentation of this argument must be seen as a move 
towards asserting that sovereignty lies with the people, which would underlie the 
future trial and execution of Charles I. The grand committee reported ‘that Mr. Rolls, 
a Member of the House, ought to have privilege of Person and Goods; but the 
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Command of the King is so great, that they leave it to the House’.143 The Commons 
then swiftly resolved: 
1. that every Member of this House is, during the Time of Privilege of Parliament, to 
have Privilege for his Goods and Estate. 2ly, That the 30th of October last, the 5th of 
January last, and sithence, were within Privilege of Parliament. 3ly, That Mr. Rolle 
ought to have Privilege for his Goods, seized the 30th of October last, the 5th of 
January last, or at any Time sithence the said 5th of January last.144 
The matter of dates when privilege applied is important in the Rolle case: the 
contemporary view was that privilege applied for as little as sixteen days, and 
certainly no more than forty days, before and after a parliamentary session. So, Rolle 
had privilege from 26 June 1628, when parliament was prorogued, for at most forty 
days, i.e. ending on 5 August. Although his goods were seized on 30 October, the 
argument was advanced that ‘because the current session had originally been 
scheduled to open on 20 Oct., Rolle had been entitled to privilege for those of his 
goods which had been confiscated at the end of that month’.145 That line may have 
been redundant – as parliament was prorogued, rather than dissolved, there was 
arguably a case that Rolle had privilege anyway for the whole period between the end 
of one session and the start of the next. If the original argument was accepted – that a 
member had privilege for his goods – the further seizure on 20 January was a clear 
breach of privilege, as parliament had been about to resume on that very day.  
The final part of the story of the 1629 parliament now unfolded, when the 
Commons adjourned ‘in some heat’, on 23 February, for what was intended to be a 
single non-sitting day, i.e. to return on 25 February.146 However, Charles I sent a 
message on the latter date, which adjourned the House for a further five days, with all 
committees and other proceedings being put on hold.147 It might seem that the king 
was imposing an additional adjournment as a tit-for-tat response to the Commons’ 
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self-adjournment; on the other hand, he might have been looking for a cooling-off 
period to find a basis for agreement with the Commons.148 An order by the king for an 
adjournment was likely to be provocative, as there was a view, from 1604, that ‘the 
Commons House alone, might, of itself, and by itself, be adjourned’.149 However, any 
lull in proceedings that was intended to help those working on behalf of the crown to 
resolve matters might also have given the opportunity for the ‘parliamentary rights’ 
group to determine their own tactics. On 2 March, when the Commons returned, 
events took a particularly dramatic turn, although the precise sequence of proceedings 
during that day’s sitting does not agree across all contemporary accounts. It is not 
necessary to describe in full detail all the events that occurred, as these are included in 
the diaries and many histories of the period. In summary, when the sitting began, 
Speaker Finch delivered a message that it was the king’s pleasure to adjourn the 
House for seven days, i.e. to 10 March, and that in the meantime the House was not to 
proceed to any business; in other words, not to put forward any protestations, 
petitions, or remonstrances. Normally, that would have been that: the Speaker would 
formally put the motion to adjourn, and would then rise from his chair, with the 
House thereby adjourned. The pretence would thereby be maintained that the House 
had adjourned itself, rather than that the king had adjourned the House. On this day, 
however, the move to adjourn was resisted, the Speaker was held in his chair, and Sir 
John Eliot tried to have a document protesting against a number of alleged abuses 
read out, asserting that ‘In this great question of Tonnage and Poundage, the 
instruments moved at his [the king’s] command and pleasure; he dismays our 
merchants, and invites strangers to come in to drive out our trade, and to serve their 
own ends’.150 After further attempts by Finch to leave, matched by attempts by Denzil 
Holles to have Eliot’s paper read, what became known as The Three Resolutions were 
agreed: 
                                                
148 Ian H. C. Fraser, ‘The Agitation in the Commons, 2 March 1629, and the Interrogation of 
the Leaders of the Anti-Court Group’, Bull IHR, 30 (81) (May 1957), 86-95, p. 86. 
149 CJ, 1, p. 150: 22 March 1604. 
150 True Relation, in Notestein and Relf (eds.), CD 1629, pp. 102-03: 2 March 1629. 
Page 237 
1. Whosoever shall bring in innovation of religion, or by favour or countenance seem 
to extend or introduce Popery or Arminianism, or other opinions disagreeing from 
the truth and orthodox Church, shall be reputed a capital enemy to this Kingdom 
and Commonwealth. 2. Whosoever shall counsel or advise the taking and levying of 
the subsidies of tonnage and poundage, not being granted by Parliament, or shall be 
an actor or instrument therein, shall be likewise reputed an innovator in the 
Government, and a capital enemy to the Kingdom and Commonwealth. 3. If any 
merchant or person whatsoever, shall voluntarily yield, or pay the said subsidies of 
tonnage and poundage, not being granted by Parliament, he shall likewise be 
reported a betrayer of the liberties of England, and an enemy to the same.151  
This was heady stuff: there were to be offences of a capital nature, no less, as well as 
‘an invitation to the public at large to make up for the powerlessness of their 
representatives at Westminster by instituting a taxpayers’ strike’.152 The king then 
tried to send ‘Maxwell (the screech-owl) with the Black Rod for the dissolution of 
parliament, but being informed that neither he nor his message would be received by 
the House, the King grew into much rage and passion, and sent for the Captain of the 
Pensioners and Guard to force the door, but the rising of the House prevented the 
bloodshed that might have been spilt’.153 In fact, Sir Miles Hobart (Great Marlow) had 
taken the key from the serjeant-at-arms, put him out of the House without his mace, as 
he was a very old man, and locked the door while the articles of the threefold 
protestation had been read out, each being ‘allowed with a loud Yea by the House’. 
The House then rose after a two hour sitting. Finch was permitted to leave, and to 
inform the king of ‘the scope of our loyal intention’. So, ‘in much confusion’, the 
House was – from its point of view – adjourned to 10 March.154 The dilemma that 
Finch faced can be set against the greater certainty that Speaker William Lenthall 
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showed, on 4 January 1642, when he defended his office against Charles I in these or 
similar words: 
May it please your majesty, I have neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak in this place 
but as this house is pleased to direct me whose servant I am here; and humbly beg 
your majesty’s pardon that I cannot give any other answer than this is to what your 
majesty is pleased to demand of me.155 
However, in 1629, faced with a clear challenge to his own authority and that of 
the Speaker, Charles issued a proclamation confirming the dissolution of 
parliament on 2 March. This represented the king as wanting to foster better 
understanding, ‘unity and peace’ between himself and the Commons, but that he 
had been thwarted by ‘the malevolent dispositions of some ill affected persons of 
the House of Commons’. It described how the king had intended there to be a time 
for reflection, by adjourning parliament from 25 February to 2 March. However, 
the proclamation went on to say, ‘by the disobedient and seditious carriage of 
those said ill affected Persons of the House of Commons, […] We and Our Regal 
Authority and Commandment have been so highly contemned, as Our Kingly 
Office cannot bear. […] And therefore it is Our full and absolute resolution to 
dissolve the said Parliament’. The proclamation ended by distinguishing between 
those who had acted loyally, and those that ‘have given themselves over to 
Faction, and to worke disturbance to the Peace and good Order of Our 
Kingdome’.156 On 10 March, Charles appeared, to effect the dissolution of 
parliament in person. He praised the ‘dutiful demeanours’ of the Lords, and 
declared to them, ‘and all the World, that it was merely the undutiful and seditious 
Carriage in the Lower House that hath caus’d the Dissolution of this Parliament’. 
He acknowledged that a ‘good Number’ of the Commons were ‘as dutiful 
Subjects as any in the World’, whereas ‘some few Vipers amongst them […] did 
cast this Mist of Undutifulness over most of their Eyes’.157 The verdict of the 
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attorney general, Robert Heath, was that ‘the untoward disposition of a few ill 
Members of the Commons House of Parliament hath given such a just and such an 
unhappy occasion’ for the dissolution. Heath then ‘entered with zest on the 
prosecution of those responsible’.158 Charles himself went into print, to justify the 
dissolution of 10 March, making it clear that he did not accept that privilege 
obtained for petitioners to the Commons, nor that privilege for a member’s goods 
could be invoked where these had been taken to meet obligations to the king: 
We are not ignorant, how much that House hath of late Years endeavoured to extend 
their Priviledges, by setting up general Committees for Religion, for Courts of Justice, 
for Trade, and the like; a Course never heard of until of late: So as, where in former 
Times the Knights and Burgesses were wont to communicate to the House, such 
Business as they brought from their Countries; now there are so many Chairs erected, 
to make Enquiry upon all Sorts of Men, where Complaints of all Sorts are 
entertained, to the insufferable Disturbance and Scandal of Justice and Government, 
which having been tolerated a While by our Father, and our Self, hath daily grown to 
more and more Height; insomuch, that young Lawyers sitting there, take upon them 
to decry the Opinions of the Judges; and some have not doubted to maintain, That 
the Resolutions of that House must bind the Judges, a Thing never heard of in Ages 
past. 
[…] 
And whereas Suits were commenced in our Court of Star-chamber, against Richard 
Chambers, John Foukes, Bartholomew Gilman, and Richard Phillips, by our 
Attorney General, for great Misdemeanours; they resolved, that they were to have 
Priviledge of Parliament against us for their Persons, for no other Cause, but because 
they had Petitions depending in that House; and (which is more strange) they 
resolved, That a Signification should be made from that House, by a Letter, to issue 
under the Hand of their Speaker, unto the Lord Keeper of our Great Seal, that no 
Attachments should be granted out against the said Chambers, Foukes, Gilman, or 
Phillips, during their said Priviledge of Parliament.  
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[…] 
[And] they went about to create a new Priviledge (which we will never admit) That a 
Parliament-man hath Priviledge for his Goods against the King; the Consequence 
whereof would be, That he may not be constrained to pay any Duties to the King, 
during the Time of Priviledge of Parliament.159 
There was now no realistic prospect of a grant of tonnage and poundage, so that 
Charles I decided to rule without parliaments; more than a decade of personal rule 
only ended on 13 April 1640, with the commencement of the Short Parliament. 
Key issues and themes 
Several key issues and themes that have particular meaning and significance can be 
identified from the preceding narrative of the 1629 session. The overarching concern 
was about liberty, privilege and governance, as noted in Sir Robert Phelips’ speech at 
the start of the session: ‘You shall see violations upon all sides: look on the Liberty of 
the Subject, look on the Privilege of this House […] If we suffer the Liberty of the 
House to wither out of fear of Complaint, we shall give a Wound to the Happiness of 
this Kingdom’.160 As well as anger about the way in which Charles I had treated the 
Petition of Right, and worries about religion, concerns were expressed by many 
throughout the 1629 session about perceived assaults on liberty in general, and 
parliamentary privilege in particular, occasioned by the unauthorised collection of 
tonnage and poundage, and the associated seizure of goods belonging to Rolle and the 
other merchants. Counter-arguments were limited, because there were so few privy 
councillors or other loyalists to defend the crown’s position: Sir John Coke, Sir 
Humphrey May, Sir Thomas Edmondes, and Sir Francis Cottington had secured seats 
in the Commons in 1628; Sir Richard Weston, Sir John Savile, Sir Robert Naunton, 
and Sir Julius Caesar did not.161 Nor did it help that Charles I was willing to use 
confrontational language towards the Commons, or at least towards those whom he 
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saw as troublemakers. The overall effect was to give the Commons a cohesive 
institutional confidence that saw them refusing to process any grant of tonnage and 
poundage, while at the same time making repeated protests, and attempts significantly 
to extend privilege – even if such attempts were not always successful. 
Four specific issues in relation to the Rolle case were identified at the start of this 
chapter. The first of these was whether a member of parliament had privilege for all 
his goods. Medieval cases had established the principal of privilege for a member’s 
‘goods and estate’, with a rider that the horses, goods and chattels should be 
‘necessary’ for a member during his attendance in parliament, or in returning to his 
home. That narrow qualification had been extended by the time of the Rolle case, on 
the wider argument that those who were engaged in public life should not be 
distracted from their duties by the need to defend any of their own property. Charles I 
nevertheless made it clear, in his speech at the dissolution, that there could be no 
extension of privilege to cover a member’s goods against the king, as this would 
inevitably mean that such a member could not have his goods sequestrated for failing 
to pay any duties to the king, during the time of privilege of parliament.162 In the 
absence of any effective sanctions for non-payment, he would have a tax holiday 
while he remained an MP. 
The second issue was whether privilege still held during times when parliament 
was adjourned or prorogued. It was uncertain whether Rolle only had privilege 
sixteen days after prorogation on 26 June, or, alternatively, that he had privilege 
before and after the planned resumption on 20 October, which would have meant that 
seizure of his goods at the end of October would have been in contempt of 
parliamentary privilege. If it is assumed that the goods were susceptible to privilege, a 
further seizure of goods, on 20 January 1629, was a clear breach of privilege, as 
parliament had been about to resume on that very day. The Commons were not 
prepared to yield any ground on this issue, resolving that Rolle had had privilege for 
his goods when these were seized on 30 October 1628.163 
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The third issue was whether privilege of parliament applied for petitioners to the 
Commons, as well as to members and their servants. In what represented an attempt 
significantly to widen parliamentary privilege, Eliot had moved an Order that would 
have granted privilege to those who were petitioning the Commons. Although it was 
remitted to a committee for consideration of the level of privilege that should be 
available to those with a cause in parliament, the lord keeper was sent a message that 
no attachment was to proceed against four, named merchants.164 This was an 
important statement of a new principle: that those petitioning parliament had 
privilege, on the grounds that parliament might need them to appear in person, and 
they should not be diverted from such a summons by extraneous concerns. Charles I, 
in his speech at the dissolution, nevertheless challenged this initiative, so that the 
issue remained open.  
The fourth issue had two strands: were those collecting tonnage and poundage, or 
seizing goods in lieu, acting directly on royal authority; and, if so, could 
parliamentary privilege still be invoked to recover the goods? The problem for Rolle 
had not been how to establish his privilege, but how to obtain the restoration of his 
property. In February 1629, the barons of the exchequer ruled that the goods had been 
legitimately seized, in lieu of payment of tonnage and poundage, but this was without 
prejudice as to the question of the legality of the duties. They also ruled that the 
owners of the goods could ‘take such remedy as the law alloweth’.165 It was not clear 
what that remedy might be, other than through the route of parliamentary privilege, 
with it being argued that ‘the privilege of parliament exceeds and is above all other 
privileges and courts, and Parliament only can decide Parliament privileges, not any 
other judges or courts’.166 The counter-argument was that privilege could not obtain 
against the king. However, did their commission authorise the customers to seize an 
MP’s goods? An unequivocal response to this question came from the king: the 
customers were under his direct orders and command.167 This honourable statement 
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scuppered any chance of a statutory grant of tonnage and poundage, and retrospective 
permission for what had already been collected. As Russell observed, the Commons’ 
refusal to grant tonnage and poundage in 1628-9 made the case for continuing 
parliaments increasingly difficult to argue, as they were no longer financially useful to 
the government.168 On the other hand, if Charles had not stated that the customers 
were following his orders, the Commons could have confirmed Rolle’s privilege, 
treated the officials as delinquents, and opened the way for Rolle and the other 
merchants to regain their goods. They would probably have also given the king 
authority to collect tonnage and poundage, most likely with retrospective effect. 
Charles would have secured supply, and a major item in the Commons’ list of 
grievances would have been crossed through. It is also likely that Charles would not 
have decided to dispense with parliaments, as he was to do for the next eleven years.  
The Commons, in nearly the last decision of the 1629 parliament, resolutely 
confirmed that a member was entitled to privilege for his goods and estate, and that 
Rolle accordingly had privilege for goods that had been seized.169 An increasing 
strength of feeling, at least among some leading members, against the alleged assault 
on privileges, rights and liberties, reached its peak in the chaotic, confrontational 
furore of the sitting on 2 March. The Commons now had the confidence boldly to 
incite people not to pay duties and impositions that had not been given parliamentary 
authority, resolving to make it a capital offence, no less, to propose the levying of 
non-parliamentary duties, or willingly to pay such duties. That day’s sitting helped 
change the way in which the Speaker was viewed: not everyone present may have 
supported the extreme, personal attacks on Finch, but there was a noticeable shift, 
which would see each successive Speaker increasingly become the servant of the 
House, rather than simply an intermediary or messenger between king and Commons. 
The work of the Commons might have been about to end for what would be more 
than a decade, leaving some uncertainty about the extended scope of privilege, but an 
air of robust confidence was evident in the demeanour of those who played leading 
roles in that day’s sitting, and were then arrested for having done so. Writing some 
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time later, however, Sir Simonds D’Ewes thought that ‘March the 3rd was the most 
gloomy, sad, and dismal day for England that happened in five hundred years last 
past’, as it led directly to the period of personal rule, with ‘sad effects […] in Church 
and Commonwealth’. D’Ewes broadly supported the king’s approach to securing 
parliamentary approval for the collection of tonnage and poundage, and felt that the 
‘cause of the breach and dissolution was so immaterial and frivolous [since] divers 
fiery spirits in the House of Commons were faulty and cannot be excused’.170 
A fitting summary of the issues that arose from the Rolle case is provided in the 
words of Sir John Eliot: ‘We see it is not only for the interest of the goods of a 
member of this House, but also for the interest of this House; if we let this go, we 
shall not be able to sit here. / The King can not command a thing soe unjust as the 
violacion of our priviledges’.171 
Conclusions 
This chapter has suggested that the Rolle case was far from being a ‘mere dispute 
about privilege’. No secondary sideshow, privilege was now closely bound up with 
grievances, and challenges to the royal authority and prerogative. It was because 
grievances had led to a breakdown in supply for Charles I that Rolle and his fellow 
merchants refused to pay duties that had not been authorised by parliament – even 
though precedents suggested that retrospective authority would have eventually been 
forthcoming. The number of times that Rolle’s case was considered during the 1629 
session provides clear evidence of its contemporary importance. During this period, 
the privileges of both Houses of parliament, together with the safeguarding of the 
royal prerogative, were becoming a matter of public debate and propaganda. The 
Rolle case, even at the time, was seen as having a wider importance than the matter of 
a single member’s property: Eliot asserted that it concerned the rights of Rolle, 
subjects in general, and the rights and privilege of the Commons.172 The primacy of 
parliamentary privilege was asserted, even against the king, albeit that such a claim 
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was resisted. Nor did the Commons submit to reprimands from the king: ‘If we suffer 
the Liberty of the House to wither out of fear of Complaint, we shall give a Wound to 
the Happiness of this Kingdom’.173 Although it has been suggested that the absence of 
old hands such as Sir Edward Coke and Sir Thomas Wentworth left the Commons 
under the influence of ‘hotheads’, with only four privy councillors being members of 
the Commons, care nevertheless needs to be taken to avoid suggesting that most 
members were spoiling for some kind of fight. 
The development of a more expansive, ‘plastic’ privilege shows a certain 
symmetry with the Shirley case of 1604, where the Commons were beginning to 
develop a greater institutional confidence, with a robust certainty, even then, that their 
privileges were ‘ancient and undoubted’, and in accordance with precedents. The 
Commons in James I’s first parliament had shown that they could use their own 
strength to maintain their rights and privileges. The strong line taken in the decisions 
of the Commons on the Rolle case showed a further expansion of institutional 
confidence, whereby privilege of parliament for all of a member’s goods was 
asserted, even against the king, and was said additionally to apply to petitioners to the 
Commons, not just members and their servants. Further, the Commons were prepared 
to incite people not to pay duties, if these had not been authorised by parliament, and 
to condemn those who advised the king that duties could be collected without 
parliamentary approval.  
The 1629 dissolution did, however, leave some issues from the Rolle case 
unresolved. It also led to action being taken against a number of members who had 
been prominent in the events of 2 March. William Coryton, Sir John Eliot, Sir Peter 
Heyman, Sir Miles Hobart, Denzil Holles, Walter Long, John Selden, William Strode, 
and Benjamin Valentine were all arrested within a short period, followed by a 
struggle for bail, and with writs of habeas corpus flying around. The king’s lawyers, 
hamstrung by the Petition of Right, knew that they had to show cause for the 
imprisonment, but were reluctant to allege that it was for words uttered and acts 
committed in parliament, as these might be protected by parliamentary privilege. The 
                                                
173 Parkhurst (ed.), Crew : 1629 Proceedings, pp. 5-6: 22 January 1629. 
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response was to offer bail, but on condition that the person concerned was prepared to 
be bound over. However, most of those who had been arrested refused this offer, on 
the grounds that they would be admitting their guilt, and would in effect be prevented 
from any future criticism of the government, as they would be liable to be rearrested 
if they did not meet the bail condition. Those who had been arrested were, in fact, 
treated in different ways, depending on their age and health, and the gravity of their 
misdemeanours, with Valentine remaining in prison until 1640, although he was not 
closely confined.174 
When parliament again met after eleven years of personal rule, a committee, 
including ‘Mr Rolles’, was established, to consider the breaches of the privilege of 
parliament in respect of the proceedings against the members arrested after the last 
session of the 1621 parliament, and what reparations might be due to them.175 At the 
same time, there was some attempt to reduce the tensions over tonnage and poundage, 
so that the lord keeper, at the start of the short parliament, observed that: ‘Tonnage 
and Poundage his Majesty had taken [since] the Death of his Father, according [to 
the] Example of his Predecessors. – Desired to have it as a Grant from his People; and 
to that End had a Bill prepared, only with one Alteration. In complying with these 
Particulars, his Majesty would graciously accept it’.176 However, as the parliament 
was so short, it appears that no bill making such a grant was actually enacted. It was 
only in November 1640, that some of the old issues were revisited, when a committee 
on the property of the subject was tasked with considering most of the issues that have 
been identified in this chapter: 
The [Commissions, Judgments and Decrees] concerning either illegal Taxes, or the 
Property of the Goods of the Subjects, and the Proceedings thereon; and also, the 
Judgments, Resolutions, and Proceedings in Parliament upon them; and to present 
the State of them to this House, that they may proceed upon them in such a Way, as 
shall be fit to present them to the Lords: And they are likewise to consider the 
Proceedings in Parliament upon the Petition of Right, and the Additions unto it: And 
                                                
174 The subsequent histories of the arrested members are described in Appendix 4 below.  
175 CJ, 2, pp. 53-54: 18 December 1640. 
176 CJ, 2, p. 5: 17 April 1640. 
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they are to consider those Proceedings that were in the Exchequer, since the Death of 
King James, upon the Statute of Tonage and Poundage, granted unto him for Life; 
and the Proceedings upon Replevyings, brought by those that had their Goods 
detained by Colour of that Statute.177 
Those who had collected tonnage and poundage without parliamentary authority 
proposed to the Commons in 1641 that they should pay a fee of £100,000, in order to 
obtain ‘An Act of Oblivion, for what is past’. The Commons’ response was twofold: 
first, they confirmed that all unauthorised collections of taxes, etc. were against the 
law, and that those who made such collections were delinquents.178 Second, they 
agreed on such an Act of Oblivion for those who had collected the duties and now 
voluntary acknowledged their error, against a collective payment of £150,000.179 As 
for tonnage and poundage, a committee was set up in March 1641, to prepare a bill to 
grant the subsidy for three years, with the intention of supporting the navy and the 
defence of the kingdom.180 The bill received a first and second reading on 27 May 
1641, specifying that the duties ‘shall be taken for so long time as the House shall 
think fit, in the same manner as now they are’.181 It then passed all its stages in the 
Commons, and then the Lords in June.182 
Rolle remained a troublesome figure, receiving a second Star Chamber subpoena 
in January 1630, when he was questioned about his speeches in the Commons. He did 
not appear to have been further punished at that time, although his goods remained 
confiscated, so that he did not continue his business after 1629. He was returned for 
Truro in both elections in 1640, and used the Commons platform to pursue his claims. 
In May 1641, the Long Parliament instructed the committee of trade to consider his 
case, and possible reparations. Two years later, the Commons ordered that payments 
should be made to him of £1,517 for the goods arrested, £4,844 as interest on his 
                                                
177 CJ, 2, p. 38: 27 November 1640. There was a supplementary order to the committee: 
CJ, 2, p. 47: 8 December 1640. 
178 CJ, 2, p. 156: 25 May 1641. 
179 CJ, 2, p. 157: 26 May 1641; CJ, 2, p. 161: 29 May 1641.  
180 CJ, 2, p. 107: 18 March 1641. 
181 CJ, 2, p. 159: 27 May 1641. 
182 CJ, 2, p. 178: 18 June 1641; LJ, 4, p. 281: 21 June 1641. 
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remaining capital in 1628, from which date he had refused to trade, and of £500 for 
his four years’ expenses in lawsuits. Further, a fine of £8,641 was levied on the 
executors of the customers, and on Sir William Acton, the sheriff of London who had 
been sent to the Tower for his part in refusing a replevin for Rolle, although it is 
unclear whether Rolle received any of these payments.183 These can be said to be the 
final acts in the Rolle case.
                                                
183 Shaw and Ashton, ‘Rolle’; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, VI, p. 89. 
Page 249 
VII : CONCLUSIONS 
Context 
This thesis has considered the parliamentary privilege of freedom from arrest in 
England, from the accession of James VI and I, and the summoning of his first 
parliament in 1604, through to the dissolution of the parliament of 1628-29. Freedom 
from arrest and other ‘molestations’ developed in the English system from the 
medieval period onwards, alongside freedom of speech in debate and the right of 
access to the sovereign. Initially, it was a means of securing the attendance of all 
those summoned by the king to his ‘high court of parliament’, by protecting members 
of the Commons and Lords in three main areas: outside interference or distractions, 
including physical molestations; processes in civil law, including arrest or detention 
of their person, or the seizure of property; and any requirement to attend a lower 
court, often through a subpoena, as a principal in a case, or as a witness or juror. 
Privilege extended to any servants that were necessary for MPs or peers to discharge 
their responsibilities when parliament was sitting, or when they were on their way to 
or from parliament. It was important to ensure that each member of the Commons 
attended every session of a parliament, so that the views of his ‘country’ or borough 
were represented to the king, and reflected in debates on intended legislation; to 
legitimise any grants of taxation or other types of supply for the king; and so that the 
expectations of the king were in turn fed back to his people.1 There were three main 
qualifications to the privilege. First, privilege did not apply if any arrest was for 
treason, felony, or breach of the peace. Second, privilege only applied when 
parliament was sitting, or when the member was on the way to or from parliament. 
Third, privilege extended, at least in principle, only to those servants whom his master 
specially ‘caused to use and employ’ in relation to his attendance at parliament.  
                                                
1 Unlike the Lords temporal and spiritual, no proxies could be appointed for members of the 
Commons. 
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Key research findings 
The key issue in the early Stuart period was whether understandings about the 
privilege were certain, which in turn suggested a number of questions that have been 
pursued across this research.  
 The first of these concerned the status, scope and operation of parliamentary 
privilege and the royal prerogative, and whether a lack of clarity over their respective 
boundaries led to tensions between crown and parliament. Located within a 
framework of loyalty to the sovereign, the constitutional relationship in the later 
sixteenth century operated in ways that seemed largely settled and mutually 
understood, with little desire firmly to delineate, let alone widen, the scope of either 
privilege, or the royal prerogative. Indeed, as recently as 1999, the risks of defining 
privilege too sharply were identified by a joint committee of both Houses: 
People outside Parliament who are concerned with privilege matters want the law to 
be clear and certain, so that they can forecast with some assurance whether or not a 
given contemplated action is or is not likely to be regarded as a breach of privilege. 
Parliamentary opinion, on the other hand, may want the law to be vague and 
indefinite, so that privilege can be deployed to cover circumstances that have not 
previously arisen.2 
The historic status of privilege was recognised at the start of each parliament, as in 
1604, when there were ‘Five Petitions by the Speaker: Freedom of Speech: Protection 
of Bodies, Servants, and Goods: Free Access, for such Occasions, as the House shall 
have: To admit no Information, without calling him to answer: To pardon his Wants 
and Imperfections’, with the lord chancellor responding: ‘The Petitions made before 
by Mr. Speaker were answered, and granted of Course’.3 Although the petition used 
‘freedom from arrest’ as a blanket term, the essential nature of the privilege was 
wider, in that it covered cases of physical assaults or threats, verbal insults, or actions 
                                                
2 House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, 1999 
Select Committee Report, vol. 3, Memorandum by Mr. Geoffrey Lock, at 
<http://goo.gl/6XXi0>. This statement follows the line taken by Blackstone (see p. 47 
above). 
3 CJ: 22 March 1604 (second scribe); CJ, 1, pp. 146-47: 22 March 1604. 
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that demeaned the dignity of individual members or the House as a whole. It gave 
members and their servants a wide measure of immunity from legal processes, and it 
was later proposed that freedom from molestation of person extended to those having 
business with parliament, for example as petitioners. In a number of the cases 
described in this thesis, the Commons consolidated and extended the ambit of 
privilege, often without direct challenge. 
 The wording used by newly appointed Speakers may have been one of apparent 
supplication, but the underlying feeling was that the Commons’ privileges were in 
reality ‘ancient and undoubted’, with a legitimacy and permanence that had been 
gained through custom and practice. The Speaker’s words were seen as an archaic 
formula that had lost much of its literal meaning: the Commons could not concede 
that they were in reality still petitioning for a continuation of their privileges, as this 
would have opened up a possibility that the crown truly had the power to refuse. 
James I and Charles I, for their part, consistently rebutted the Commons’ 
understanding that the liberties, rights and privileges of parliament were ‘ancient and 
undoubted’, rather seeing them more as a recent, subtle, creeping enhancement, and 
asserting that they existed through royal licence, or ‘grace’ alone. Accordingly, a few 
months after the opening of the 1604 parliament, James I told the Commons that their 
privileges were held, not by right, but by way of ‘donature upon petition’.4 Their 
response was to prepare the (unsubmitted) Form of Apology and Satisfaction. This 
boldly stated that ‘Our privileges and liberties are our right and due inheritance, no 
less than our lands and goods. […] OUR making of request in the entrance of 
Parliament to enjoy our privilege is an act only of manners’, and cautioned that ‘the 
prerogatives of princes may easily and do daily grow; the privileges of the subject are 
for the most part at an everlasting stand. They may be by good providence and care 
preserved, but being once lost are not recovered but with much disquiet’.5 Ill-
definition of the status and scope of parliamentary privilege, including freedom from 
arrest, led to increasingly polemical speeches and declarations from the Commons 
that ‘sundry Liberties, Franchises, and Priviledges of Parliament’ were being 
                                                
4 Tanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents : James I, pp. 220. 
5 Ibid., pp. 217-30, esp. p. 222. 
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threatened. Declarations, petitions, ‘apologies’, and ‘protestations’ might not have 
immediately led to positive responses from the crown, yet their words and themes 
were often referred to in later speeches and documents. On the other hand, despite 
their avowals of reserved rights, both James I and Charles I were prepared 
‘graciously’ to recognise and respect the Commons’ privileges. It might perhaps seem 
that much of the tension between king and Commons could have been avoided, if 
James I had been prepared at some point to concede without qualification that the 
Commons’ privileges were indeed no longer dependent on the royal prerogative. 
However, such a concession would not have been in keeping with James’s views on 
kingship, and, more importantly, would have opened up for question all other areas of 
the royal prerogative. Even if privilege was becoming a particular point of friction 
between a growing number of members of the Commons and the sovereign, this 
nevertheless continued to be on an almost accidental basis, rather than a coherent, 
choreographed attempt to ‘win the initiative’. However, the Commons’ determination, 
often unrealised, to see their grievances – largely relating to privilege, religion, and 
the conduct and influence of royal advisors – addressed before granting supply 
frustrated both monarchs, and led to early dissolutions by both James I and Charles I. 
Charles was particularly exasperated by the Commons’ failure to authorise the 
collection of tonnage and poundage, and to legitimise its collection retrospectively 
from his accession. As a consequence, the privy council advised the crown that it 
could raise funds in an emergency through extra-parliamentary means, accompanied 
if necessary by a degree of coercion. Although the crown seemed to have little 
alternative if the Commons would not grant supply, this was a clear challenge to the 
principle that the crown had to obtain the Commons’ authority for the collection of 
taxes and duties. In response, the Petition of Right of 1628 sought an end to non-
parliamentary taxation, forced billeting of soldiers, imprisonment without cause, and 
the use of martial law. It also set out that the Commons exercised their rights and 
liberties according to the laws and statutes of the realm. It is wrong to suggest that the 
House of Commons was united in its challenge to the king, with moderation still 
favoured, for example, by those members who had been dismayed by Sir John Eliot’s 
combative promotion of the Petition. Although Charles eventually agreed to the 
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Petition, he soon acted in ways that subverted its terms, which further inflamed both 
Houses. 
 A major element of uncertainty surrounded the failure, in early 1629, to secure 
parliamentary privilege for the ‘body and goods’ of John Rolle, which, if it had been 
successful, would have had the effect of confirming that the crown had acted 
unlawfully in collecting tonnage and poundage. The continued detention of the goods 
of Rolle and his fellow merchants led to concerted action, a conspiracy even, to assert 
parliamentary authority. In March 1629, in chaotic scenes in the Commons, Sir John 
Eliot and a small group of other MPs insisted on proposing Three Resolutions, which 
condemned as capital offences, no less: innovation in religion, or the countenance of 
Arminianism or popery; any advice to the king to levy tonnage and poundage without 
parliamentary authority; and any payment of tonnage and poundage without such 
parliamentary authority. The Speaker was held in his chair, so that the proposals could 
be put to the House, and they were then reportedly adopted as if with one voice. 
However, the fact that such inflammatory declarations had been thus acclaimed, that 
the king’s commands for an adjournment had been flouted, and that the Speaker and 
royal servants had been subject to aggressive treatment by some, led Charles I to 
dissolve parliament, and then to have the ringleaders who had promoted these actions 
arrested. Nevertheless, these events showed that uncertainty over privilege, 
particularly the assumed right of members to have their persons and goods protected, 
actually engendered the confidence with which the Commons had moved to advance 
their own authority. The implied question was: ‘Where does sovereignty now lie?’ 
Eliot with others might have replied ‘with the people through parliament’. Charles I 
gave his response by entering into a period of personal rule without parliaments, 
which would last for more than a decade. 
*** *** *** 
The second research question asked whether it was important to maximise the scope 
of the privilege of freedom from arrest, if parliament was to carry out its business 
properly. Did the ad hoc management of individual cases nevertheless have the 
cumulative effect of adding to the authority and confidence of the Commons? 
Privileges, by their very nature, were supposedly immutable, thereby giving them an 
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innate authority, yet there was a clear emerging desire to strengthen, or even to 
expand, their scope, as a response to perceived changes in royal powers and 
prerogatives. Early in James I’s first parliament, the resolution of the Shirley case had 
extended the scope of parliamentary privilege. First, there was a clear decision that 
privilege applied to those who had been elected, but who had not yet taken the oath at 
the start of the parliament. Second, specific and general pieces of legislation 
reaffirmed that arresting officers and gaolers were indemnified against any possible 
vicarious liability to creditors, if an MP was released (‘escaped’), by virtue of 
privilege. Third, and most importantly, the case clearly established that the Commons 
could directly obtain the release of privileged persons. After the hard-won success of 
the Shirley case, there was a developing sense of the importance of privilege cases, 
which were managed with growing certainty. ‘Privilege’ was increasingly treated as 
an entity, encompassing freedom from arrest, as well as a more general rejection of 
arbitrary or absolutist royal powers. As a result, the Commons were able to 
consolidate, and sometimes extend, the ambit of privilege. For example, they 
enhanced the procedure to be followed if privilege was claimed during an 
adjournment, by authorising the outgoing Speaker to use his residual powers to have a 
privileged member freed. In addition, it was decided that breaches of privilege that 
occurred during one parliament could be addressed in a later parliament. The 
Commons were resolute in acting against those who had breached privilege in some 
way or other. However, the punishment of those who had disregarded a member’s 
privilege showed an interesting contrast. On the one hand, any ‘delinquent’ was 
forced to come to the House, made to kneel, hatless, at the Bar of the Commons, an 
experience that was intended to degrade the man and reinforce the standing of the 
House, and he would then often be sentenced to a period of imprisonment. On the 
other hand, the House usually tempered such public exercises of parliamentary 
authority, by allowing the offender to return after a few days, and to make a fulsome 
apology, after which he would be set free, paying fines and costs that were due. The 
Commons’ assiduous preservation of customary privileges came to benefit not just 
individual members, but also the institution as a whole. This period saw regular, 
successful claims for privilege when a subpoena had been issued. Privilege was held 
to apply, even if a member had instructed an attorney, and was therefore not required 
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in court to answer a subpoena personally, on the grounds that he might nevertheless 
be distracted from due attention to matters in parliament. There was, however, 
continuing ambivalence whether the institutional dignity of the House required 
privilege to be applied to prevent a member attending court, if the member wished to 
waive his privilege, and thereby pursue matters to his advantage. This last issue was 
never conclusively determined one way or the other during this period. The Howard 
case placed the authority of the Commons above that of the prerogative courts, and 
exposed the oppressive nature of ex officio oaths. 
 At the same time, the Commons were aware of the limitations of privilege and the 
need to work carefully within the law. For example, it was quite clear that the 
Commons could not unconditionally free someone who might have breached the 
peace, as this was not susceptible to a claim for privilege. However, they could 
remand such a person into their own custody, thereby preserving the veneer of 
privilege. The Commons were prepared to act juridically, either to pre-empt crown 
action against a member, or to defend and extend privilege. They also recognised the 
danger of intemperate language, as when the subject of Eliot’s diatribe in 1624 was 
referred to a committee, where it was quietly lost from sight. Consideration of the 
cases that arose in this period shows that privilege clearly mattered, and there was a 
growing recognition that procedures gave form to privilege, and provided a conscious 
sense of identity for the House.  
*** *** *** 
The third key research area was a consideration of the extent to which the exploitation 
and abuses of the privilege were an unintended consequence of the strengthening of 
the Commons’ authority in matters of privilege. There were three key elements to the 
exploitation of privilege. First, there was a strong sense that safeguarding privilege in 
all its manifestations was more important than safeguarding the interests of a few 
creditors, contrary as this might be to natural justice. The very strength of the 
Commons in asserting their privileges, and the punishments meted out to 
‘delinquents’ that had instituted actions for debt, arrested MPs or had held them in 
prison, clearly limited creditors’ rights. 
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Second, debt in matters of speculative commerce and trade ventures was not 
necessarily seen as abhorrent as it would have been previously, when contracts and 
agreements mainly involved cloth, crops, land, and livestock. In addition, the 
Commons now contained some – by no means a majority – who were less concerned 
with upholding the spirit of parliamentary privilege, or even their own honour, and 
rather more with using privilege to avoid their financial obligations, or to hamper 
legal processes that threatened them. MPs who did run up debts were helped by the 
fact that parliaments were now in being for longer periods, so that their privilege 
obtained over the whole extent of a parliament and for some time before and 
afterwards, which was especially significant in the 1600s and the 1620s. Although 
outlawry or bankruptcy might befall a person with serious financial difficulties, this 
was not necessarily a bar to election and membership of the Commons. There was 
even some feeling that those who were involved in trade, or who made loans had to 
accept the risk of uncertain repayment. Moreover, usury had long been banned by 
Christian and Muslim doctrine, and was associated with non-believers, notably Jews: 
if a creditor did not receive his ‘pound of flesh’, so be it.6 
Third, the definition of which ‘servants’ might avail themselves of parliamentary 
privilege was stretched to a point that came to be recognised as abusive. Earlier, 
privilege for servants had been limited to those who were in ‘necessary’ and ‘menial’ 
attendance on their master, while on the way to or from parliament, or while the 
House was in session. Later, it was accepted that MPs and peers should not be 
diverted from parliamentary business by the possibility of becoming involved in 
supporting a much wider group of people. These could not on any reasonable basis be 
said simply to comprise close, ‘menial’, or ‘necessary’ servants, but now included, for 
example, farm bailiffs, friends, professionals to whom the MP or peer had paid fees, 
or even family members. Such expansion reflected a growing feeling that, even if the 
member or peer was not involved directly in litigation, his mind would be diverted 
                                                
6 ‘In the seventeenth century it began to be argued that interest-taking did not constitute 
usury, as long as it represented the real difference between the value of present and 
future sums of money, and was not mere extortion’: ‘Notes and Queries’, The 
Guardian, undated, at <http://goo.gl/63PY8b>. 
Page 257 
from parliamentary duties, if he had to devote some time to the affairs of this 
extended group of ‘servants’. This exploitation of privilege was exacerbated by the 
simplification, in the early years of the seventeenth century, of the way in which 
protections were provided to servants. Servants could now be provided with a 
pre-emptive certificate of protection signed by their master, which could be produced 
if they were threatened with arrest or detention, in contrast to the earlier requirement 
to involve the Speaker. The value of a protection thereby became sufficiently high as 
to tempt people either to obtain, and to sell on, blank, but genuinely signed or sealed, 
protections, or to counterfeit such protections in their entirety. Nevertheless, despite 
action by the Lords against the sale and counterfeiting of protections for servants, and 
repeated resolutions of both Houses to limit their exploitation, the abuse of 
protections for servants was not fully eliminated until well into the eighteenth century. 
In the early part of this period, there was limited recognition that abuses were 
affecting the reputation of parliament, even though the crown and the lord chancellor 
expressed their concerns. Later, however, both Houses became increasingly aware of 
the negative impact of privilege. This was especially so in the 1620s, when the Lords 
were warned that ‘the Justice of the Kingdom must be preferred before any other 
personal Respect’, and the Commons were told that ‘it is the universal cry of the 
kingdom that we have granted that which is abusive, viz. protections’. The way in 
which the privilege of freedom from arrest was defined and managed for MPs 
themselves facilitated exploitation and abuse for purely personal purposes. Over time, 
one of the most significant effects of these protections was to prevent actions by 
creditors to recover debts from MPs while parliament was sitting, and for a short 
period before and after every parliament. 
Final observations 
This thesis has not isolated itself within a single historiographical position. It has 
followed the empirical approaches across the Tudor and early Stuart periods adopted 
by Elton, for example, and many of the revisionists of early Stuart history, and built 
up the narrative by interrogating the considerable body of evidence in the 
parliamentary records and diaries. It also follows a line that the stability provided by a 
broadly consensual Elizabethan settlement was attractive to many members of the 
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early Stuart parliaments, whose nature was essentially conservative, rather than 
oppositional or revolutionary, at least until the late 1620s, and that this, in turn, 
influenced the way that privilege cases were approached and managed. Russell’s 
views are interesting, with his suggestion, on the one hand, that a conservative, loyal 
House of Commons was dysfunctional and irrelevant to the major problems that had 
to be faced, while, on the other hand, he concedes that the political mood changed, 
particularly through the 1620s, and that the closing events of the 1629 parliament 
were ‘a genuine act of opposition’. This thesis agrees with his finding that monetary 
pressures, rather than any whiggish grand defence of liberties, or Marxist class 
struggles, were at the root of criticisms of the crown. A clear linkage existed between 
issues over the royal finances, including the unlawful collection of tonnage and 
poundage, on the one hand; and the robust promotion of issues of privilege, in the 
light of the seizure of the goods of merchants who had refused to pay tonnage and 
poundage, and the associated privilege claims on behalf of Rolle. It has been well 
argued by ‘post-revisionists’ that there were multiple competing discourses, and that 
constitutional and religious conflict was ubiquitous in the early Stuart parliaments. 
Particular issues around privilege have been picked out as contributing to those 
constitutional clashes – apparent in debates leading up to the preparation of various 
formal statements from the Commons, such as the Apology of 1604, the Petitions of 
1610,7 the Protestation of 1621, the Petition of Right of 1628, and the Three 
Resolutions of 1629, all of which, to a greater or lesser degree, included elements that 
related to privilege issues. A nuanced addition to the historiography has been 
suggested in the shape of the central argument of this thesis, that there was a growing 
confidence in the Commons around an unplanned consolidation and extension of their 
rights, liberties and privileges – even if their views did not always prevail.  
*** *** *** 
Throughout the early Stuart period, a certain ‘elasticity’ in the definition and 
                                                
7 These petitions set out grievances over freedom of speech, impositions, ecclesiastical 
reform, and the high commission: Prothero (ed.), Statutes and Constitutional 
Documents (1913 edn.), pp. 296-307. 
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operation of privilege can be discerned, which allowed existing privileges to be 
applied in new circumstances from time to time. The Shirley case of 1604 had, at 
first, exposed the fragility of the Commons in privilege matters. However, after two 
months’ struggle to free Shirley, a greater institutional confidence could be detected, 
with an emerging certainty that the Commons’ privileges were ‘ancient and 
undoubted’, and based on precedents. The Commons had shown that they could use 
their own strength to maintain their rights and privileges, by reference to custom and 
common law, including the unwritten lex et consuetudo parliamenti. The difficulties 
that such unwritten and imprecise practices created were clearly shown during the 
row over the Commons’ Protestation of 1621. Even so, such spats did not mean 
parliament and king were invariably mutually antagonistic: parliament was there to 
assist the sovereign, and to keep him or her in contact with opinion. Indeed, petitions 
and grievances had been part of parliamentary and crown business from the earliest 
times, as seen in repeated entries in the medieval parliament rolls. By the late 1620s, 
however, privilege had become closely bound up with grievances, and increasingly 
strong challenges to the royal authority and prerogative, which were now a matter of 
public debate and propaganda from both crown and Commons.  
The strong line taken in the reactions of the Commons to the Rolle case showed 
that they were prepared to strive for the primacy of parliamentary privilege, albeit that 
the grounds for such a claim were resisted. Privilege of parliament for all of a 
member’s goods was asserted, even against the king, and was also said to apply to 
petitioners to the Commons, not just members and their servants. Further, the 
Commons were prepared to incite ‘a taxpayers' strike’, if the collection of duties had 
not been authorised by parliament, with the threat of capital punishment for those who 
did pay, or who collected such duties. Such challenges to the royal authority led to the 
dissolution of 1629, the arrest of those MPs who had been at the centre of the 
challenges to royal authority, and a period of personal rule that was to last from 1629 
to 1640. By this time, however privilege matters had clearly contributed to parliament 
acquiring a striking new distinctiveness, authority, and sophistication as an institution 
in the early Stuart period: privilege mattered then and still matters now. 
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APPENDIX 1 : SOME EARLIER PRIVILEGE CASES 
This appendix describes those cases of privilege that occurred up to 1603, and which 
are referred to in the body of the thesis – set out in chronological order. 
1. The Master of the Temple (1289-90) 
2. John de Godessfeld (1340) 
3. Richard Cheddar, servant of Sir Thomas Brooke (1404) 
4. William Larke (1430) 
5. Sir Thomas Parr (1446) 
6. Thomas Thorpe (1453) 
7. Walter Clerk (1460) 
8. Richard Dygon, servant of John Wyke (1467, or 1471) 
9. William Hyde (1474) 
10. Edmund Chymbeham, servant of the duke of Clarence (1468, or 1473) 
11. John Atwyll (1478) 
12. Richard Strode (1512) 
13. George Ferrers (1542) 
14. William Trewynnard (1542) 
15. John Smith (1559) 
16. William Strickland (1571) 
17. Lord Crumwell (1572) 
18. Edward Smalley, servant of Arthur Hall (1576) 
19. Walter Vaughan (1581) 
20. Arthur Hall (1581) 
21. Richard Cooke (1584) 
22. Thomas Fitzherbert (1593) 
23. William Hogan, servant of Queen Elizabeth (1601) 
24. Anthony Curwen, servant of William Huddleston (1601) 
 
1. The Master of the Temple, a member of parliament ex officio, successfully 
petitioned for his ‘distrainable goods’ in the face of an attempt by the bishop of St 
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David’s to seize these, in 1289-90. This established privilege for a member’s goods, 
so that Sir Edward Coke later commented: ‘it appeareth that a Member of the 
Parliament shall have Privilege of Parliament, not only for his servant, as is aforesaid, 
but for his horses, & c. or other goods distrainable’.1  
2. John de Godessfeld was committed to the Fleet prison in 1340 for allowing a 
farm that he held from the king to fall into disrepair. He was released by order of the 
king, because the privilege of Commons’ immunity from arrest had been flouted. 
Bryant identifies this as the earliest known example of the Commons’ immunity from 
arrest.2  
3. Richard Cheddar, a menial servant of Sir Thomas Brooke, was, in 1404, 
‘horribly beaten, wounded, blemished, and maimed by one John Salage otherwise 
called John Savage’.3 The Commons petitioned in respect of the ‘Lords, knights, etc. 
of parliament’ and cited: 
[…] In this present parliament the horrible assault and wounding which has been 
committed against Richard Cheddar, esquire (who had come to this present 
parliament with Sir Thomas Brooke, knight, one of the knights for the county of 
Somerset), and a servant who was with him, by John Salage, otherwise called Savage, 
through which the aforesaid Richard Cheddar has been injured and wounded and is 
in danger of his life. May it please you to ordain a remedy for this matter, and a 
sufficient remedy also for other similar cases, so that his punishment will be an 
example and source of terror to others, to prevent them from committing such crimes 
in the future: namely, that if anyone kills or murders anyone who has come in this 
way under your protection to parliament, it should be adjudged to be treason, and if 
anyone seriously injures or disfigures any such person who has come in this way 
under protection, he should lose his hand. And if anyone wounds or assaults any of 
those people who have come in this way, he should be put in prison for a year and 
pay a fine and redemption to the king. And may it please you of your special grace to 
                                                
1 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 3, which also cites Coke, Fourth Institute, p. 24. 
2 Bryant, ‘Commons' Immunity’, p. 214. 
3 The wording is within the statute associated with the case, Assaulting servants of knights of 
parliament 1403/4 (5 Hen. IV c. 6), in Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, II, p. 144. 
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refrain henceforth from issuing charters of pardon in such cases unless the parties are 
fully in agreement.4 
In the face of a request for such drastic measures, Henry IV’s response endorsed the 
general principle, but provided a more moderate punishment than that requested by 
the Commons: 
Because the deed was done during the time of this parliament, let proclamation be 
made where the said deed was done that the John Salage mentioned in this petition 
should appear and give himself up to the King’s Bench within a quarter of a year after 
the proclamation has been made. And if he does not do this, let the said John be 
convicted of the aforesaid deed, and let him pay the injured party his damages at 
double rate, to be assessed at the discretion of the judges of the said bench at the time, 
or through an inquest if it is necessary, and let him pay a fine and redemption at the 
king’s pleasure. And let a similar thing be done in the future in any similar case.5 
In addition to the grant of the petition, a statute was passed shortly afterwards, 
specific to the case, which set out, in the same terms as the king’s response: ‘That 
seeing the same horrible Deed was done within the Time of the said Parliament’ and 
that a proclamation should be made that Savage should ‘appear and yield him[self] in 
the King’s Bench within a Quarter of a Year after the Proclamation made: and if he 
do not, the said John shall be attainted of the said Deed, and shall pay to the Party 
grieved his double Damages […] and also he shall make Fine and Ransom at the 
King’s Will. Moreover it is accorded that likewise it be done in Time to come in like 
Case’.6 
4. William Larke, servant of William Milrede, was arrested for a debt in the 
substantial sum of £208.6s.8d., and imprisoned in the Fleet, in 1430. A modern 
commentary records that Larke ‘had been unjustly accused by Margery Janyns. It is 
interesting to note that the consent to his release, made by the king on the advice of 
the Lords, and at the request of the Commons, needed the assent of Margery’s 
                                                
4 RP, III, 522-44: January-March 1404. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Assaulting servants of knights of parliament 1403/4 (5 Hen. IV c. 6), in Raithby (ed.), 
Statutes of the Realm, II, p. 144. 
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counsel, although the Lords acted alone to decide on the outcome. The consent also 
made it clear that she should have execution of the judgment against Larke after the 
end of the parliament’.7 There are two views on the decision of the king to withhold 
his agreement (using the standard negative phrase, le roi s’advisera) to the Commons’ 
request for a general privilege ‘in future’ of freedom from arrest, except for treason, 
felony, or breach of the peace. On the one hand, Elsynge confirms that the release of 
the individual was readily agreed, but a royal endorsement of the general principle of 
a wide immunity was unforthcoming, or, perhaps more accurately, otiose, as the 
privilege that already existed: 
An. 8 Hen. 6. the commons petitioning for the discharge of William Lark, arrested in 
execution during the Parliament, and that the king would be pleased also to ordain, 
that no lord, knights, citizens, and burgesses, nor their servants, coming to the 
Parliament, may be arrested during the Parliament, unless it be for treason, felony, or 
breach of the peace, the king granted the first part of their petition, but quant al remnant 
le roy s’advisera [as for the rest, the king reserved his position]. […] To this the answer 
is full, that the latter part of the bill doth comprehend more than it was fit the royal 
assent should be given unto, or more than was, or as this day is, the law of Parliament. 
For it is, that no member, of either house, be arrested or detained in prison during the 
Parliament, save in these three cases [treason, felony or breach of the peace].8 
Coke, in his Fourth Institute, as quoted by Hatsell, sets out that the king refused the 
request for a law encapsulating the privilege, ‘and therefore, the more natural 
conclusion to be drawn, as well from the petition itself as from the King’s answer, 
appears to be that, at that time, the proposition was not acknowledged to be law in the 
extent in which they laid it down’. However, Hatsell suggests, more persuasively, that 
the king’s formula answer perhaps simply reflected the fact that he had given specific 
redress to Larke, and that no further action was indicated.9 
5. Sir Thomas Parr, having suffered an attack, on 14 March 1446, made petition 
to the Commons as follows: 
                                                
7 RP, IV, 357-8: January-February 1430, editorial notes. 
8 Tyrwhitt (ed.), Manner of Holding Parliaments (Elsynge), pp. 216-17. 
9 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 20, and p. 20n. 
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Petition of Sir Thomas Parr one of the knights of the shire in this present parliament 
for the shire of Cumberland that when he, on 14 March in the 24th year of the king 
[1446] was coming towards this said court of parliament, he was attacked by Robert 
Belingham and others, praying the commons of this parliament to pray the king by 
the advice of his lords spiritual and temporal being in this present parliament to 
ordain and enact in this parliament and by authority of the same that a writ of 
proclamation be made in the Chancery and sent to the sheriff of London that 
Belingham and his accomplices [be brought] before the kings Bench by Easter for the 
case to be determined.10 
The Commons also directed a petition to the king, which was more broadly framed, 
but which only received the bland response: ‘Soient l’estatutz faitz devaunt cez heures 
en cest partie, tenuz, gardez et observez, en toutz poyntes [The statutes made before 
this time on this matter should be upheld, kept and observed in all points]’.11 Parr’s 
more specific petition must have been approved, although the parties subsequently 
reached an agreement, for the record of the parliament of February 1449 includes the 
following petition from Belingham, which was itself granted: 
Petition of Robert Belingham, of Burneside, Westmorland, gentleman [… and others 
…] concerning a process ordered against them in the parliament in March 1446 at 
the petition of Sir Thomas Parr, one of the knights of the shire in this present 
parliament for Cumberland, because of their alleged attack on Sir Thomas. They 
were summoned to be arrested, and an act was made against them on 12 April 1446 
in the case of their non-appearance. Although the parties had not made an 
appearance as required, they had now come to an agreement with Sir Thomas, and 
so request that the act should be repealed.12 
6. Thomas Thorpe was Speaker in the parliament of 1453-54. The definition of 
the period for travelling for which the privilege applied became a matter of contention 
in the parliament of 1453-54, although wrapped up in some wider factional issues. 
                                                
10 Petition by Thomas Parr, knight of the shire for Cumberland, TNA SC 8/27/1347: 1446. 
11 RP, XVI, 41: 1446; Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 28. 
12 TNA SC 8/27/1348: counter-petition by Robert Belyngeham (Bellingham), 1449. The 
petition was endorsed ‘Let it be sent to the Lords’: RP, February 1449. 
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When the last session of the parliament opened, the Speaker, Thomas Thorpe, was 
accused by the duke of York of stealing property belonging to him. Thorpe had 
removed some of York’s property from the palace of the Bishop of Durham, 
supposedly on the orders of Henry VI, to meet a fine that had been levied on York. 
However, Thorpe was in a weak position, as a staunch Lancastrian, and a known 
sympathiser of the duke of Somerset, a factional enemy of York. York, however, was 
in the ascendant, at a time when Henry VI was subject to one of his bouts of mental 
illness, and Somerset was in the Tower. Thorpe was arrested for the supposed 
offence, at a time when parliament was prorogued, and fined £1,000 plus £10 costs, 
being placed in the Fleet prison, pending payment of the fine. When parliament 
reassembled in February 1454, the Commons asked the Lords for Thorpe’s release – a 
surprising move, as the duke of York opened the parliament himself. Nevertheless, 
the Commons’ petition recalled the king’s earlier agreement to the petition for 
privileges: 
 Be it remembered that on the said 14 February in the aforesaid year the commons 
made a request […] that they might have and enjoy all such liberties and privileges as 
have been customary and used from of old for their coming to parliament; and it is in 
accordance with the same liberties and privileges that Thomas Thorpe, their common 
speaker, and Walter Rayle, members of the said parliament who were then in prison, 
should be able to go free and at their liberty for the full accomplishment of the said 
parliament.13 
The duke of York made a counter-declaration: that Thorpe’s removal of his property 
from the palace of the bishop of Durham, had led to York to ‘take an action by bill in 
the court of exchequer’. York claimed that Thorpe was a member of the court and ‘he 
ought to be have been impleaded in that court of the exchequer for such cases and in 
no other court’. York also pointed out that Thorpe had ‘willingly appeared and had 
various days to speak at his request and desire, and answered the said bill and action 
and pleaded not guilty’.14 The duke’s counsel put forward several further reasons why 
                                                
13 RP, C 65/102, v-329, cols. a-b, 25: February 1453. 
14 RP, C 65/102, v-329, col. b, 26: February 1453. 
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Thorpe should not be released: the offence had been committed since the parliament 
had been started; the process of law had taken place during the prorogation; he should 
not be released before York had been recompensed in the action; the law should be 
upheld, parliamentary privilege notwithstanding. The commentary on the Parliament 
Rolls notes that the chief justices declared that they could not decide on the point, as 
the privileges of the high court of parliament could only be determined by the lords of 
parliament. However, they added that although there was no general supersedias 
brought to parliaments to end all processes, since, if there were, a plaintiff could not 
get redress, because parliament could not determine actions in the common law. It 
was customary for all, save those accused of treason, or felony, or imprisoned for 
security of the peace, to be released so that they could attend parliament. The Lords 
heard this advice, but considered that Thorpe should remain in prison nevertheless, 
and that a new Speaker should be elected. This was fairly clearly a political decision 
made at York’s behest, and might have been a quid pro quo for the treatment of his 
associate, Sir William Oldhall, Speaker of the 1450 parliament, who had been 
attainted in the second session of the parliament of 1453 at Somerset’s behest.15 The 
Thorpe case had hinged on a view that, as there was no privilege in the time that 
parliament was not in session by way of prorogation, it had accordingly been lawful 
to imprison Thorpe, and, by extension, keep him in prison. In other words, a member 
could not claim release from existing imprisonment, simply because a new 
parliamentary sitting had begun. Further, the Lords could not have wished to cross the 
duke of York.16 Redlich suggests a response to that question: ‘The imprisonment of 
Speaker Thorpe […] may be looked upon as an exceptional outcome of the 
revolutionary feuds of that period’.17 Hatsell views the case as extending the three 
qualifications on the privilege of freedom from arrest, where treason, felony, or 
breach of the peace was involved, to a fourth: ‘condemnation before the parliament’.18 
                                                
15 RP, Henry VI: March 1453, Introduction. 
16 Anon., Privileges and Practice … (1628), pp. 18-19; Roskell et al. (eds.), Commons 1386-
1421, I, pp. 152-54. 
17 Josef Redlich, The Procedure of the House of Commons : A Study of its History and 
Present Form, trans. A. Ernest Steinthal, 3 vols. (London: Constable, 1908), I, p. 22. 
18 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 21. 
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7. Walter Clerk was imprisoned in the Fleet, in 1460, for multiple debts and 
transgressions, including ‘a riot’ and ‘trespass’, and outlawed at the suit of John 
Payne. As in earlier cases, the issue for the Commons was the delay to its business. 
They successfully petitioned the king: ‘to ordain and decree that your chancellor of 
England shall have the power to direct your writ or writs to the keeper of the said 
Fleet prison, ordering him by the same to have the said Walter brought before him 
without delay, and then to set him free, and to discharge the said keeper of him, with 
regard to every one of the things stated, so that the said Walter may attend this your 
parliament daily, as it is his duty to do’ [my emphasis].19 Coke, relating the case to the 
Commons in 1621, records that immunities were again requested for the principals in 
the case: 
The parliament would do nothing. The king could not sue a parliament man [for 
debt], and they would do nothing, and the Clerke was outlawed. […] 39 Hen. VI, 
c. 9,20 the petition to the king praying the Commons that great delay is in Parliament 
by Walter Clark by your Majesty’s suit against the liberties of our House for a fine 
and imprisonment. Please it your Highness in discharging the delay to ordain and 
establish that the Chancellor send out your writ to free Walter Clark from the fine 
and imprisonment with a saving to the king and Robert Bassett and John Payne after 
the parliament and others’ debts, saving our privileges.21 
The Parliament Rolls set out that the Commons conceded that Clerk’s liabilities 
remained, and that he could be rearrested when his privilege ended, ‘as if the same 
Walter had never been arrested at any time for any of the things stated or committed 
to ward’. The petition used language that would be echoed in the Hyde case 
(number 9), to seek indemnification of the sheriff and other officers: ‘your said 
                                                
19 RP, V-373, col. b, 9: October 1460. 
20 No such statute is given in Charles Runnington (ed.), The Statutes at Large... by Owen 
Ruffhead, 10 vols. (London: C. Eyre & A. Strahan, 1786), or Raithby (ed.), Statutes 
of the Realm, possibly reflecting the purge by Edward IV of much of the legislation 
of Henry VI. 
21 The Anonymous Journal, fol. 514r, in Notestein et al. (eds.), CD 1621, II, p. 530: 
17 December 1621. 
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chancellor, the keeper of the Fleet or any other person or persons shall not be harmed, 
injured or grieved in any way because of the said setting free of the said Walter’.22 
8. Richard Dygon, servant of John Wyke, was arrested for a debt to a shearman. 
A writ of 1467 or 1471 describes how the creditor ‘has caused several actions to be 
taken in the names of various men […] that is to say six actions of debt and various 
other actions of trespass, and thereby has had him arrested and keeps him in prison 
and so by great might and subtle imagination is likely there against all reason and 
conscience to abide, for he [Dygon] is of no power to answer all the premises’.23 In 
other words, the creditor was trying to wear Dygon down through multiple suits. 
9. William Hyde was arrested in 1474 for two debts, to the value of £69 and 
£4.6s.8d. respectively. The Commons noted that the arrest had occasioned ‘great 
Delay and Retardation of Proceeding and good Expedition of such Matters and 
Besoignes [business], as for your Highness, and the Common Weal of this your 
Realm, in this your present Parlament were to be done and sped’. This was based on 
the assumption that everyone summoned to a parliament had to be present if it were to 
transact its business. The Commons successfully petitioned that the king should order 
the chancellor to issue a writ to free Hyde, addressed to the sheriffs of London. Their 
petition added the proviso that ‘neither your said chancellor, sheriffs, or any of them, 
nor any other person or persons, shall be harmed, damaged, charged or troubled in 
any way because of the said setting at liberty of the said William Hyde. [… and that 
the creditors] shall have a writ or writs of execution in, of and for the foregoing after 
the dissolution of this present parliament, as fully and effectually as if the said 
William Hyde had never been arrested at any time for any of the above reason’.24  
10. Edmund Chymbeham, a gentleman servant of the duke of Clarence, was 
arrested in either 1468, or 1473, at the suit of John Shukburgh, a London draper. 
Writs to free him through privilege of parliament were issued. It was then alleged that 
Shukburgh ‘seeing that your said supplicant [Chymbeham] would be set free and be at 
                                                
22 RP, v-373, col. b, 9: October 1460. Premises, in legal phraseology: ‘The matters or things 
stated or mentioned previously’: OED Online. 
23 TNA C1/31/16, Petition to the chancellor: 1465x67, 1470x71, in Kleineke, 
Parliamentarians at Law, pp. 66-67. 
24 RP, VI, 156, 55: after June 1474: Third Roll. 
Page 270 
large […] caused one John Plummer to lay suspicion of felony on your said 
supplicant and so they intend to have your said supplicant kept still in prison without 
bail or mainprise’. The petition was endorsed ‘before the lord king in his chancery on 
Tuesday next coming, that is to say 16 February.25  
11. In 1478, John Atwyll seemingly owed one John Tailor £160. Perhaps his 
attendance at Westminster meant that he was unaware of the processes against him, 
because Atwyll did not appear in court. Tailor arranged for writs to be directed to a 
number of sheriffs ‘some of fieri facias and some of capias ad satisfaciendum’. The 
upshot was that ‘the said John Atwyll cannot freely depart from this present 
parliament to his home for fear that his body, his horses and his other goods and 
chattels which he needs to have with him might be duly arrested in that matter, 
contrary to the privilege customarily due to all the members usually summoned to the 
aforesaid parliaments’. The Commons successfully petitioned the king for privilege 
for Atwyll, on the basis of ‘such and as many writs of supersedeas upon this 
ordinance as shall seem necessary to the said John Atwyll, his heirs and executors, 
and each of them, directed to every sheriff or sheriffs of this realm to cease all 
execution to be made or had in that respect’. Tailor was given the right to sue for his 
monies ‘after the end of this present parliament; notwithstanding this ordinance’.26 
This grant of privilege by the king had the effect of resuscitating a privilege that had 
been found in 1315/16: the right of members to their horses, necessary goods, and 
chattels, as a matter of privilege.27 Hatsell adds a gloss that the privilege in respect of 
a member’s goods was ‘expressly confined to such goods and chattels, as it was 
necessary the Member should have with him during his attendance in Parliament, or 
in returning to his home’.28  
12. Richard Strode had put forward bills in the 1512 parliament ‘against the 
damage being done by tinworks to ports and estuaries in Devon, as well as other bills 
“for the common weal” of that county’. This offended the four stannary courts of 
                                                
25 TNA C1/46/269, Petition to the chancellor: 1468, or 1473 before 16 February, in Kleineke, 
Parliamentarians at Law, pp. 64-65. 
26 RP, VI, 191-2: January 1478. 
27 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 50. 
28 Ibid., p. 67. 
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Devon, and Strode was then fined a total of £160.29 He was imprisoned before he 
could travel to Westminster, ‘in a dungeon and a deep pit underground in the castle of 
Lidford [...] and there and elswhere remayned by the space of thre wekys […] one of 
the most annoyous, contagious, and detestablest place within this realm’.30 Three 
things followed. First, Thomas Denys, on whose authority Strode had been detained, 
referred the matter to the king’s council, ‘the supreme authority in stannary 
jurisdiction’, which responded by ordering an inquiry to determine whether Strode 
was guilty, and if so to award a fieri facias against him for the amount of the fine.31 
Second, ‘he took advantage of his status as a subsidy collector to sue out a writ of 
privilege from the Exchequer […] and it was that court which effected his release’.32 
Third, on 4 November, when parliament opened, ‘two writs were issued to Sir Henry 
Marney, the lord warden of the stannaries, and to his deputy or deputies, “by petition 
in Parliament”: the first, a writ of habeas corpus, ordered Marney to deliver Strode 
“safe and sound” to Parliament […] under a penalty of £1,000, while the second, a 
writ of supersedeas, removed the case to the jurisdiction of Parliament, thus 
eliminating all other jurisdictions, whether the stannary courts, the Exchequer or even 
the Council’.33 ‘Strode’s Case’ formally recognised that the Commons and its 
business were privileged against inferior courts of the realm; could act as a court, as 
part of the ‘high court of parliament’; and control their own members.34 Strode went 
on to introduce a bill, which is still in force, and includes the following: 
And that all sutes, accusementes, condemnacions, execucions, fynes, amerciamentes 
[arbitrary fines], punysshmentes, correccions, grevances, charges and imposicions, 
putte or had, or here after to be put or hadde, unto [those] that nowe be of this 
                                                
29 Bindoff (ed.), Commons 1509-1558, III, p. 400.  
30 In the text of The Privilege of Parliament Act 1512 (4 Hen. VIII c. 8), in Raithby (ed.), 
Statutes of the Realm, III, p. 53. 
31 A writ of execution commanding the sheriff to make good the amount of a fine out of the 
goods of the person against whom judgment has been made. 
32 Bindoff (ed.), Commons 1509-1558, III, p. 400. 
33 Ibid. 
34 House of Commons, A Brief Chronology of the House of Commons : Factsheet G3, in 
www.parliament.uk (House of Commons Information Office, 2009), at 
<http://goo.gl/GHmrE>; Mary Frear Keeler, ‘The Emergence of Standing 
Committees for Privileges and Returns’, PH, 1 (December 1982), 25-46, p. 26. 
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present parliament, or that of any Parliament herafter, shalbe for any bill spekyng, 
reasonyng, or declaryng of any mater or maters concernyng the parliament to be 
condemned and treated of, be utterly voyd and of none effecte.35 
13. Ferrers’ Case, of 1542, moved the Commons away from earlier procedure, 
whereby chancery had enforced the privilege of freedom from arrest on behalf of the 
Commons.36 George Ferrers was an MP, and, significantly, a royal servant, who had 
been arrested for a debt incurred as a surety for a third party. The development was 
that the Commons tried to release him, not by petitioning the king for his freedom, but 
by dispatching their serjeant-at-arms, otherwise called the serjeant of the mace, to the 
Counter in Bread Street, to secure Ferrers’ release. The case was cited as a precedent 
in later Commons sittings, and was described in a number of works, including 
Holinshed’s Chronicles.37 An eighteenth-century account sets out that:  
They [the clerks] and other officers of the city were so far from obeying the said 
commandment [to release Ferrers], as after many stout words they forcibly resisted 
the said serjeant, whereof ensued a fray within the Counter-gates, between the said 
Ferrers and the said officers, not without hurt of either part, so that the said serjeant 
was driven to defend himself with his mace of arms and the crown thereof broken by 
bearing of a stroke, and his man struck down.38 
As the account continues, the sheriffs rejected the protest of the serjeant 
‘contemptuously, with much proud language, so as the serjeant was forced to return 
without the prisoner’. When they heard the serjeant’s report, the Commons ‘would sit 
no longer without their burgess’, and a delegation, headed by the Speaker, went to the 
Lords, and protested to the lord chancellor, so that he and the judges in the Lords 
‘referred the punishment thereof to the order of the commons house’. The Commons 
                                                
35 Privilege of Parliament Act 1512 (4 Hen. VIII c.8), commonly known as (Richard) Strode’s 
Act, in Raithby (ed.), Statutes of the Realm, III, p. 53. 
36 The date of the case is sometimes given as 1543, but this is incorrect: see H. H. Leonard, 
‘Ferrers' Case : A Note’, Bull IHR, 42 (106) (November 1969), 230-34; Bindoff (ed.), 
Commons 1509-1558, II, p. 130. 
37 Raphael Holinshed, The Third Volume of Chronicles ... continued to the Yeare 1586 (s.l.: J. 
Harrison, 1587), pp. 955-56, in Neale, Commons’ Privilege of Free Speech, p. 156. 
38 Maseres, Cases and Records, pp. 66-67. 
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then determined to send the serjeant to require Ferrers’ release ‘without any writ or 
warrant for the same [from the lord chancellor] but only as before’. This was on the 
basis that ‘commandments and acts’ of the Commons were ‘to be done and executed 
by their serjeant, without writ, only by shew of his mace which was his warrant’. At 
this point, the sheriffs, having learned how seriously the matter was being taken, 
‘became somewhat more mild, so upon the said second demand, they delivered the 
prisoner without any denial’.39 Clearly still angry, but without any relevant precedent, 
the House committed the sheriff to the Tower, the ‘Clerk, which was the Occasion of 
the Fray’ to a dungeon in the Tower, and the officers of the prison to Newgate.40 As 
Bindoff sets out, ‘the invoking of privilege was believed to involve the loss of the 
creditor’s right and a bill to protect it passed the Commons but received only a single 
reading in the Lords before the prorogation on 1 April, when the matter was referred 
to the Council’.41 More significantly, Henry VIII now took a direct interest in the 
case, and confirmed the privilege of freedom from arrest, and the supremacy of 
parliament as a court. This would please the Commons, without diminishing his own 
authority, and would also reinforce the power of parliament over any putative papal 
authority. Holinshed records the speech: 
The king […] declared his opinion to this effect. First commending their wisdoms in 
maintaining the privileges of their House (which he would not have infringed in any 
point) […] And further, we be informed by our Judges, that we at no time stand so 
highly in our estate royal, as in the time of Parliament; wherein we as head, and you 
as members, are conjoined and knit together into one body politic, so as whatsoever 
offence or injury (during that time) is offered to the meanest member of the House, is 
to be judged as done against our person and the whole Court of Parliament. Which 
prerogative of the Court is so great […] as all acts and processes coming out of any 
other inferior courts, must for the time cease and give place to the highest.42 
                                                
39 Ibid., pp. 67-68. 
40 Petyt, Jus Parliamentarium, p. 237. 
41 Bindoff (ed.), Commons 1509-1558, II, p. 130. 
42 Holinshed, Chronicles, in Tanner (ed.), Tudor Constitutional Documents, p. 582. 
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The king’s words are usually quoted as endorsing the authority of the Commons, 
where a member had been arrested. However, this is not as clear cut as is sometimes 
maintained, since it is clear that Ferrers was also a royal servant, and would thereby 
be privileged, irrespective of whether he was a member of the Commons or not: 
[The king] complained about the delay incurred and claimed privilege for himself 
‘attending upon the business’ of Parliaments and for all his servants ‘attending there 
upon him. So that if the said Ferrers had been no Burgess, but only his servant, yet in 
respect thereof he was to have the privilege as well as any other’.43 
It is easy to agree with Herbert’s interpretation of Henry VIII’s actions, quoted in 
Hatsell: ‘He, whose master-piece it was to make use of his Parliaments, might not 
only let foreign Princes see the good intelligence between him and his subjects, but 
might also keep them all at his devotion’.44 
14. The case of William Trewynnard arose in 1544; this raised, but did not 
resolve, the issue of whether a sheriff was responsible for a debt if a debtor were 
released. Trewynnard was pressed over some land claims, and he had appeared to try 
to avoid these, by seeking election to the 1542 parliament. A writ of exigent 
concerning a particular debt was issued for Trewynnard to answer, capias ad 
satisfaciendum. However, he was granted privilege, and released by the sheriff for 
Cornwall. The original creditor died soon afterwards; after his executors had failed to 
obtain redress against the sheriff, the matter was referred to the lord chancellor. 
Trewynnard’s release had raised the question ‘whether he was [absolutely / finally] 
discharged by the order of the common law ... or no’.45 An anonymous work, 
sometimes attributed to Francis Maseres, commented that  
It seemeth that the party is not discharged from execution for ever, but only for a 
certain time. For it is not absurd or unreasonable that a judgement should be at one 
time executed, and at another executory […] And there is a difference to be made 
where the body of a man that is in execution is set at large by the authority of the law, 
                                                
43 Bindoff (ed.), Commons 1509-1558, II, pp. 130-31. 
44 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 59. 
45 Bindoff (ed.), Commons 1509-1558, III, p. 485. 
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and where it is done without authority by the sheriff’s own will and boldness: for the 
law will save all rights.46 
However, in Trewynnard’s case, as ‘the parties desired to have the matter determined 
without further trouble’, and as Trewynnard ‘ought not in conscience to be discharged 
[from the debt]’, the chancellor ruled that he should pay the executors the relatively 
modest sum of £84.15s.47  
15. In 1559, the case of John Smith was raised: ‘upon a Declaration by Mr. 
Marshe, that he had come to this House, being outlawed, and had also deceived divers 
Merchants in London, taking Wares of them to the Sum of Three hundred Pounds, 
minding to defraud them of the same, under the Colour of Privilege of this House’. 
Although there seemed to be a basis for the allegations, the Speaker nevertheless 
asked if Smith should have the privilege of the House; this was agreed by the narrow 
affirmative vote of 112 to 107.48 Hatsell records Prynn’s query: ‘How honourable this 
vote was for the House, in the case of such a cheating member, carried only by five 
voices, is not fit for me to determine’.49 Moreover, this decision seemed to ignore the 
royal warning to the Commons, given earlier that year, and with Smyth’s case no 
doubt already emerging as a matter of concern, that ‘great heed would be taken, that 
no evil disposed person seek of purpose that priviledge for the only defrauding of his 
Creditors, and for the maintenance of injuries and wrongs’.50 The privilege in 
question was ‘that all the Members of the House, with their Servants and necessary 
Attendants, might be exempted from all manner of Arrests and Suits, during the 
continuance of the Parliament, and the usual space, both before the beginning, and 
after the ending thereof, as in former times hath always been accustomed’.51 
                                                
46 Maseres, Cases and Records, pp. 57-58. 
47 Bindoff (ed.), Commons 1509-1558, III, p. 485. 
48 CJ, 1, p. 55: 24 February 1559. 
49 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 81. 
50 D’Ewes, Lords, p. 17: 28 January 1559. 
51 Ibid., p. 17. 
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16. William Strickland introduced a bill on 14 April 1571 for the ‘reformation of 
[religious] ceremonies’.52 The Treasurer of the Household warned that this touched on 
the royal prerogative, which reserved matters of religion to the crown, so that they 
should not proceed with a bill: ‘if the matters mentioned […] are but matters of 
Ceremony, then it behoveth us to refer the same to her Majesty, who hath Authority, 
as Chief of the Church, to deal herein. And for us to meddle with matters of her 
Prerogative (quoth he) it were not expedient’. Just before the Easter adjournment, 
Strickland was ‘called before her Majesties Council […] and was commanded by 
them to forbear coming to the said House, in the mean season, and to attend their 
further pleasure’.53 Members asked by whose commandment, and for what cause, 
Strickland had been prevented from attending, noting that he was not a private 
individual, but a proxy, specially chosen to represent his area. George Carleton, ‘as 
part of what seems to have been a concerted defence of parliamentary liberties, […] 
posited a novel constitutional principle: that whatever Strickland’s offence, the 
Commons, and not the Crown, had exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over him’.54 
This led to some fiery debate. Some of those who spoke did not accept that freedom 
of speech in the Commons was subject to any qualification, some maintained that the 
royal prerogative did not extend beyond reasonable limits, whereas others argued for 
the absolute nature of the royal prerogative. Another view accepted that the current 
monarch had no malevolence towards the House, but feared that a less benign ruler 
might exploit any abrogation of its privileges.55 As was often the case, precedents 
were sought; these included the case from Henry IV’s time, when a ‘Bishop of the 
Parliament’ was committed to prison by ‘commandment of the King’; and the case of 
the Speaker, Thomas Thorpe, committed to prison in 1454 (case 6 above). In the end, 
the House acknowledged that it had no powers to free a member who had been 
sequestered through the royal prerogative, and decided to petition the queen for 
                                                
52 An action seen by Neale as characteristic of the ‘Puritan Choir’ in the Elizabethan 
parliaments. 
53 D’Ewes, Commons, p. 160: 14 April 1571. 
54 Hasler (ed.), Commons 1558-1603, I, p. 554. 
55 Petyt, Jus Parliamentarium, pp. 255-56. 
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Strickland’s return.56 The depth of discontent in the House, and associated attempts 
by the Speaker to calm matters, can be seen in a brief entry in the Commons’ Journal: 
‘After sundry Motions and Speeches touching the Liberties of the House, and untrue 
Reports made of the House, Mr. Speaker declared, the Queen’s Majesty to have as 
good Liking of the House now, as ever of any Parliament, since her Majesty’s 
Reign’.57 Strickland appeared in the House very soon afterwards.58 A month later, Sir 
Nicholas Bacon clearly had these matters in hand when he reminded parliament that 
there were limitations on what could be discussed, and, perhaps rather chillingly, that 
those who transgressed would, in a chilling word, be ‘remembered’ by the queen: 
Like as the greatest number of them of the Lower House have in the proceedings of 
this session shewed themselves modest, discreet, and dutiful, as becomes good and 
loving subjects, [...] so there be certain of them, although not many in number, who, 
in the proceedings of this session have shewed themselves audacious, arrogant and 
presumptive, calling her Majesty’s grants and prerogatives also in question, contrary 
to their duty and place that they be called unto, and contrary to the express 
admonition given in Her Majesty’s name at the beginning of this Parliament; which it 
might very well have become them to have more regard unto. But her Majesty saith, 
that seeing they will thus wilfully forget themselves they are otherwise to be 
remembered.59 
17. The case of lord Crumwell (or Cromwell) arose in 1572. This showed that an 
arrest, or the issue of a subpoena, was not the only ‘legal process’ that might prevent 
a member of the Commons or Lords from undertaking parliamentary duties. 
Crumwell was accused of not obeying a chancery injunction, and was ‘attached, by 
virtue of a Writ of Attachment, proceeding out of the said Court of Chancery, 
contrary to the ancient Privilege and Immunity, Time out of Memory, unto the Lords 
of Parliament, and Peers of this Realm’.60 The Lords decided that there was no 
justification for such action against Crumwell, by ‘Common Law or Custom of the 
                                                
56 Ibid., p. 256. 
57 CJ, 1, p. 85: 20 April 1571. 
58 Petyt, Jus Parliamentarium, p. 257. 
59 D’Ewes, Lords, Speech of Sir Nicholas Bacon, p. 151: 29 May 1571. 
60 A writ of attachment is a court order to attach or seize an asset, and is executed by a sheriff. 
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Realm, or by any Statute Law, or by any Precedent of the said Court of Chancery’, 
and annulled the writ of attachment. The Lords’ order was, however, conditional, as 
they ordered that their ruling might be overturned, if ‘at any Time during this 
Parliament, or hereafter in any other Parliament, there shall be shewed sufficient 
Matter, that, by the Queen’s Prerogative, or by the Common Law or Custom of this 
Realm, or by any Statute Law, or sufficient Precedents […to permit such an 
attachment]’.61  
18. Edward Smalley was a servant of Arthur Hall. Hall had himself quarrelled 
over dice with one Melchisedech Mallory, in December 1573. In November 1574, 
during an affray in St Paul’s churchyard, Smalley wounded Mallory in the face; 
Mallory sought Smalley’s arrest, and the latter was ordered to pay £100 in damages. 
Mallory died before the matters was settled, but his brother had Smalley re-arrested, 
when the latter claimed immunity from arrest, as the servant of an MP.62 On 
16 February 1576, a committee was appointed to consider the matter,63 and on 
20 February, it was ordered that Smalley should have privilege.64 On 22 February, the 
attorney general of the Duchy, George Bromley, reported that:  
The Committees found no Precedent for setting at large by the Mace any Person in 
Arrest; but only by Writ; and that, by divers Precedents of Record, perused by the 
said Committees, it appeareth, that every Knight, Citizen, and Burgess of this House, 
which doth require Privilege, hath used in that Case to take a corporal Oath before 
the Lord Chancellor, or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of England, for the Time 
being, that the Party for whom such Writ is prayed, came up with him, and was his 
Servant at the Time of the Arrest made. And thereupon Mr. Hall was moved by this 
House, that he should repair to the Lord Keeper, and make Oath in Form aforesaid; 
and then to proceed to the Taking of a Warrant for a Writ of Privilege for his said 
Servant; according to the said Report of the said former Precedents.65  
                                                
61 LJ, 1, p. 727: 30 June 1572. 
62 Hasler (ed.), Commons 1558-1603, II, p. 241. 
63 CJ, 1, p. 106: 16 February 1576. 
64 CJ, 1, p. 107: 20 February 1576. 
65 CJ, p. 14: 22 February 1576. 
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If the Commons at that time were of that opinion, they seem to have ignored the 
precedent of Ferrers, from 1542 (case no. 13, above). Alternatively, it was suggested 
to Hatsell, that the mace could perhaps only be used to free a member, not his 
servant.66 Yet, by 27 February something had changed, because: ‘After sundry 
Reasons, Arguments, and Disputations, it is Resolved, That Edward Smalleye, 
Servant unto Arthure Halle Esquire, shall be brought hither To-morrow, by the 
Serjeant; and so set at Liberty, by Warrant of the Mace; and not by Writ’.67 The 
House then caused the serjeant-at-arms to rearrest Smalley, because he was 
fraudulently avoiding a debt. Hall was ordered by the House to pay the £100. When 
he refused, Smalley was put in the Tower; a bill was introduced to make Hall pay the 
damages, and to expel him; Smalley gave in; and Hall also submitted, but without 
apologising. Hasler concludes that ‘the principle was thus established that the House 
might discipline, as well as protect, the servants of its Members’.68 That was not the 
end of the matter, as Hall was himself subsequently punished by the Commons for 
misconduct.69 
There are two significant features to this case. First, it appears to Hatsell that this 
is the first of what became many cases, where the parties who had procured the arrest 
of a member, or his servant, were themselves ordered to appear before the House, for 
their contempt to the Commons. Ferrers’ case had similar features, but was unusual in 
that he was a servant of the king, and that might have been more significant than his 
membership of the Commons.70 The Commons’ Journal for 1604, in considering a 
number of precedents, cites two key passages in this case.71 
19. Walter Vaughan had been outlawed for debt. In 1581, a ‘small but 
sympathetic’ committee, chaired by the Speaker, supported his membership of the 
Commons, when Vaughan claimed he had not incurred debts on his own behalf, but 
had stood as surety for a friend. He had apparently also repaid at least some of the 
                                                
66 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, p. 90n. 
67 CJ, 1, p. 108: 27 February 1576. 
68 Hasler (ed.), Commons 1558-1603, II, p. 241. 
69 See case 20 below. 
70 Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 121-22. 
71 CJ, 1, p. 195: 2 May 1604. 
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sums owed, so that ‘it was then agreed by the whole House, that he should stand and 
continue, as in his former Estate of the good Opinion of this whole House, sufficiently 
purged and discharged of the said Suspicions before in Question’.72 
20. Arthur Hall(e), Smalley’s master, was later punished on the Commons’ own 
authority, for having written a book which provided a ‘colourful account’ of the 
episode involving Smalley, described above (case 18). This account: 
defaced the Authority of the Lower House [...] and these points touching him were 
resolved. Viz: That he be committed to the Tower, which is the prison for this house 
for a certaine time, and pay a fine to the Queene, and be severed from being a 
member of the house [...] that it be published by order of the house that his booke is 
false, and seditious, and that himselfe be brought into the house, to have this 
judgement pronounced against him by the Speaker, in the name of all the House, that 
the Sergeant bee commanded to convey him to the Tower, by warrant from the 
House, signed by the Speaker, and that all the proceedings be written, read, and 
entered, as other causes of the House are.73 
Hasler describes how, on 14 February 1581, ‘he was committed to the Tower for six 
months, or until he retracted, excluded from Parliament and fined 500 marks. The first 
member to be expelled by the House (though the right had been claimed before), it 
was Hall’s contempt for the Commons, described by him as "a new person in the 
Trinity", which most annoyed the House and accounted for the severity of his 
punishment’.74 
21. Richard Cooke was elected in 1584, but ‘while Parliament was in session a 
subpoena was issued out of Chancery against him at the request of a certain Margery 
Dyke. His claim to privilege was supported by the House, and on 10 February 1585, a 
delegation was sent to the court of chancery to explain the position’. There they were 
‘very gently and courteously heard […] and were answered by the Lord Chancellour, 
that he thought this House had no such liberty of Privilege for Subpœnas, as they 
pretended’. A search was made for precedents. Although Hatsell was unable to 
                                                
72 CJ, 1, p. 124: 8 February 1581. 
73 Anon., Orders, Proceedings, Punishments and Priviledges of the Commons, chap. XIII. 
74 Hasler (ed.), Commons 1558-1603, II, p. 241. 
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discover whether such precedents were found, Hasler suggests that ‘the fact that 
Margery Dyke and her son later apologised to Cooke and to the House indicates that 
these were found’.75  
22. Thomas Fitzherbert was summoned to the privy council in November 1592 for 
offences in administering an estate. By 1593, he owed the queen £1,400, and others a 
total of £4,000. Hasler goes on to describe that Fitzherbert had been outlawed after 
22 judgments against him for debt, so that ‘in this situation he was neither the first nor 
the last to think of the House of Commons as a refuge from his creditors’. He was 
returned for Newcastle-under-Lyme in 1593, but arrested by his cousin, and held in 
custody in Derbyshire, and then London. On 17 March 1593, Fitzherbert and the 
arresting sheriff were brought to the Bar of the House. Found to have been duly 
elected as member, the outlawry notwithstanding, the Commons would nevertheless 
not confirm privilege for him: first, because he was taken in execution before the 
return of the indenture of his election; second, because ‘he had been outlawed at the 
Queen’s suit; and, third, as he was ‘taken in execution neither sedendo in 
Parliamento, nor eundo, nor redeundo’. In fact, Fitzherbert was arrested two hours 
after his election.76  
23. William Hogan, ordinary servant to the queen, was arrested, in 1604, for a 
debt of £50; he claimed privilege, but agreed to pay the debt. The Lords then ordered 
his release, although he had to enter into a surety for the sum in question, and further 
ordered that ‘the Warden of the Fleete should be free from any Trouble, Damage, or 
Molestation, for Discharge of the said William Hogan’.77  
24. Anthony Curwen was a ‘servant and familiar’ of William Huddleston, member 
for Cumberland in the 1601 parliament. Curwen was actually a solicitor who was 
arrested for a small debt, at the suit of Andrew Matthews, a surgeon who had treated 
an injury to Curwen’s hand following a brawl. Curwen then protested that:  
                                                
75 Ibid., I, p. 646; Hatsell, Cases of Privilege, pp. 96-97. 
76 Hasler (ed.), Commons 1558-1603, II, p. 125; Prothero (ed.), Statutes and Constitutional 
Documents (1913 edn.), pp. 127-28; D’Ewes, Commons, p. 518: 5 April 1593. 
77 CJ, 1, p. 195: 2 May 1604. 
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His Master was a Member of this House, and a Knight of a Shire, and that he was 
thereby privileged from Arrest, and wished to be discharged. But Mathews [the 
surgeon], and the Serjeant said, they cared not for his Master, nor his Privilege; and 
said, that he was not priviledged from an Execution. And so being carried to the 
Counter, he told the like to the Clerks, who affirmed likewise, that Priviledges would 
not stretch to Executions, and therefore would not discharge him.78 
Following a course that would be followed in Shirley’s case, the creditor threatened 
the serjeant that ‘if you let him go, I will be Answer’d by you; look you to it’, so that 
the serjeant kept Curwen in custody, notwithstanding the latter’s claim for privilege. 
The Commons were sympathetic to the serjeant, who apologised for any wrongdoing. 
They discharged him, but ordered the creditor to pay a fine for his contempt of the 
privilege of the House. There was then a debate whether Curwen should be 
privileged, or not, but it was felt that the precedents supported him being granted 
privilege.79 Although there was some doubt about the validity of the warrant for his 
release, Curwen was freed: ‘because the Matter was but small, he was delivered 
thereby, rather than so honourable a Court of the Parliament should be further 
troubled therein’.80 
                                                
78 Townshend, Historical Collections p. 324: 14 December 1601. 
79 Ibid. pp. 325-26: 15 December 1601. 
80 As recorded when the case was cited as a precedent: CJ, 1, p. 195: 2 May 1604. 
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APPENDIX 2 : THE EARLY STUART PARLIAMENTS1 
PARLIAMENT OF 1604 – 1610 (James I) 
Alternative title The Blessed Parliament 
Summoned  31 January 1604 
Assembled  19 March 1604 
Dissolved  9 February 1611 
Session Dates 
1. 19 March 1604 – 7 July 1604 
2. 5 November 1605 – 27 May 1606 
3. 18 November 1606 – 4 July 1607 
4. 9 February 1610 – 23 July 1610 
5. 16 October 1610 – 6 December 1610 
 
PARLIAMENT OF 1614 (James I) 
Alternative title The Addled Parliament 
Summoned  19 February 1614 
Assembled  5 April 1614 
Dissolved  7 June 1614 
Session Dates 
1. 5 April 1614 – 7 June 1614 
 
PARLIAMENT OF 1621 (James I) 
Summoned  13 November 1620 
Assembled  30 January 1621 
Dissolved  Dissolved by Proclamation 6 January 1622 
and by commission 8 February 1622 
Session Dates 
1. 30 January 1621 – 19 December 1621 
                                                
1 From Thrush, Commons 1604-29, I, xxxv – liii, passim. 
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PARLIAMENT OF 1624 (James I) 
Alternative title  The Happy Parliament 
Summoned  30 December 1623 
Assembled  12 February 1624 
Dissolved  27 March 1625, on the death of the king 
Session Dates 
1. 12 February 1624 – 29 May 1624 
 
PARLIAMENT OF 1625 (Charles I) 
Alternative title  The Useless Parliament 
Summoned  2 April 1625 
Assembled  17 May 1625 
Dissolved  12 August 1625 
Session Dates 
1. 18 June 1625 – 12 August 1625 
 
PARLIAMENT OF 1626 (Charles I) 
Summoned  26 December 1625 
Assembled  6 February 1626 
Dissolved  16 June 1626 
Session Dates 
1. 6 February 1626 – 15 June 1626 
 
PARLIAMENT OF 1628 – 1629 (Charles I) 
Summoned  31 January 1628 
Assembled  17 March 1628 
Dissolved  Dissolved by Proclamation 2 March 1629 
and by the king in person 10 March 1629 
Session Dates 
1. 17 March 1628 – 26 June 1628 
2. 20 January 1629 – 2 March 1629 
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APPENDIX 3 : CHRONOLOGY OF THE SHIRLEY CASE 
This table gives an outline description of key events in the case of Sir Thomas 
Shirley, dated as if the new year began on 1 January 1604. Source: House of 
Commons’ Journals. 
30 January Writ for debt against Sir Thomas Shirley 
31 January Writs for new parliament 
11 February Warrant for Shirley’s arrest 
17 February Shirley elected 
15 March Arrest of Shirley and imprisonment in Fleet prison 
19 March New parliament meets 
22 March John Shirley raises case; writ of habeas corpus issued but 
warden of the Fleet refuses to release Shirley 
23 March Case further raised by Thomas Wentworth 
27 March Appearance of principals in case; Commons debate; committee 
of privilege established 
5 (or 11) April1 Report from privileges committee presented; Commons order 
Simpson and his yeoman to be committed to the Tower; 
warrant for a writ of habeas corpus reissued 
13 April Simpson and Watkins brought to Bar of House; case argued by 
counsel on both sides 
16 April Consideration of arguments and precedents; leave given to 
bring in first bill to ask sovereign to order Shirley’s release 
17 April Introduction of first bill - ‘Bill for Saving harmless the Warden 
of the Fleet, and for Securing Simpson's Debt, in Sir Tho. 
Shirley’s Case’; committed to privileges committee  
20 April First bill considered at report stage and ordered to be 
engrossed; first reading of ’Bill for the Relief of Plaintiffs in 
Writs of Execution, where the Defendants in such Writs have 
                                                
1 Dated as 5 April in CJ, vol. 1, p. 167, and 11 April by the second scribe. 
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been arrested, and set at Liberty by the Parliament’, which 
became the Privilege of Parliament Act 1603 
21 April Third reading of first bill; sent up to Lords; second reading of 
Privilege of Parliament bill 
26 April Shirley writes to Cecil proposing a solution. Report stage of 
Privilege of Parliament bill – ordered to be engrossed 
28 April Second reading of first bill in the Lords 
 Commons debate; conference with Lords requested 
30 April Third reading of first bill in the Lords 
2 May Further committee to consider precedents 
4 May The House rejects proposal for a petition to king to expedite 
enactment of first bill; further writ of habeas corpus 
7 May The warden of Fleet appears in House – refuses to release 
Shirley – committed to Tower; further writ of habeas corpus  
8 May The warden again appears; the House agrees he should be 
committed to Tower; another writ of habeas corpus; serjeant-
at-arms ordered to go to Fleet to release Shirley; committee 
established to consider precedents to fine those disobeying 
Commons’ orders 
9 May Report on abortive mission of serjeant-at-arms to Fleet prison; 
Commons receive message from king; further debate in 
Commons 
10 May Further debate in Commons; second bill brought in, clears all 
stages and passed to Lords; letter from wife of the warden read 
by Speaker. Lords give second bill first and second readings 
11 May Serjeant-at-arms describes failure of further mission to Fleet; 
warden brought to the House, remained obdurate, and was 
committed to Little Ease dungeon in the Tower 
12 May Second bill amended by Lords and returned to Commons; five 
members of Commons sent on fact-finding mission to Tower 
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14 May Report from five members on visit to Tower, further debate in 
Commons, further writ of habeas corpus ordered; serjeant-at-
arms to take this to Fleet; ‘private’ request to king to intervene 
15 May Speaker reads two letters from warden agreeing to release 
Shirley, who then takes seat 
16 May Commons decide warden should petition for his own release 
17 May Speaker reads letter from warden explaining his actions 
19 May Warden apologises in person to the House 
22 May Serjeant who arrested Shirley freed 
19 June Simpson (main creditor) freed 
20 June Draft of Form of Apology and Satisfaction refers to case 
Summer Privilege of Parliament Act passed. Assent also given to private 
legislation ’securing the debt of Simpson and others and the 
safety of the Warden of the Fleet in Sir Thomas Shirley’s 
Case’. 
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APPENDIX 4 : THE ARRESTED MEMBERS 
This appendix describes the circumstances of each of the members who were arrested 
after the dissolution of 1629. It provides a brief synopsis of their background leading 
up to the events of that spring, and their responses to their arrests, set out in the order 
in which they were released from confinement. The intention is to show that these 
men were not of a singularly oppositional nature, although all were strong advocates 
of parliamentary privileges and rights. Some of them had a history of challenging the 
royal authority; others had, at least for some time in the past, worked with or for the 
crown, or councillors; yet others became reconciled with royalist causes at a later 
point. The descriptions are largely based on those provided in HoP and ODNB. 
Sir Peter Heyman had received land from Elizabeth I shortly before her death. He 
first sat in parliament in in 1621, although he was required to be a member of the 
embassy to the Lower Palatinate in 1622 – this was not an honour, but a mark of royal 
disfavour for his refusal to contribute to the benevolence raised for the defence of the 
Palatinate. In the 1626 parliament, Heyman was one of the members who complained 
at the mismanagement of the war with Spain, and supported the attempt to impeach 
the duke of Buckingham. Following the dissolution, he was summoned before the 
council for refusing to contribute to the forced loan, but escaped imprisonment. His 
offence on 2 March 1629 was to make a direct, personal verbal attack on the Speaker, 
after which he was again arrested, but was released because of deteriorating health in 
late May 1629, at the age of 69.1  
William Coryton entered parliament in 1624. He was a bitter opponent of 
Buckingham, opposed Arminianism in the church, and favoured war with Spain. As 
Reeve describes, ‘believing in the conciliar and legislative authority of parliament, he 
espoused traditional concepts of purging evil counsellors but under Charles I came to 
put pressure upon the constitutional notion that the king could do no wrong’. He 
argued for redress before supply in both the 1624 and 1626 parliaments. Coryton was 
                                                
1 Andrew Thrush, ‘Heyman, Sir Peter (1580-1641)’, ODNB; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), 
Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 683. 
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a leading opponent of the forced loan; along with Eliot, for which he was imprisoned 
in the Gatehouse. His respect for the royal prerogative was qualified, in that he found 
its justification in statute and Magna Carta. He was possibly a ringleader in inciting 
men to refuse to pay the forced loan, so that he was detained in May 1627, and 
committed to the Fleet prison in July 1627. Released from prison in January 1628, he 
continued his confrontational stance towards the king. After the events of 2 March 
1629, he was arrested, pleaded a lapse of memory about events in the Commons, but 
offered information about the Eliot group’s meetings. Like the others, he entered a 
plea of parliamentary privilege when charged in the Star Chamber. Having already 
had a taste of imprisonment, which was explicitly intended to ‘terrify’ a miscreant, it 
may be harsh to say that ‘his courage failed’, but, by late April, Coryton was 
‘abjectly’ petitioning for his freedom, which was granted in June 1629. For much of 
the civil war he was ‘one of Cornwall’s leading royalists’.2  
Sir Miles Hobart, along with Valentine, had not sat in any previous parliaments. 
Although a ‘modest landowner’, Hobart had held no local offices. Once elected for 
Great Marlow, he made little impression, until 2 March 1629, when he volunteered to 
lock the door, thereby preventing anyone from leaving, but also barring the entry of 
the king’s messenger. After his arrest, he refused to answer questions put outside 
parliament that related to his conduct within the Commons. In autumn 1629, he was 
told he might go free, if he put in a bond for good behaviour. Hobart refused this 
offer, but later alleged that he had been unaware of the Speaker’s message for an 
adjournment, or of the arrival of messengers from the Lords and the king. Eventually, 
in March 1631, Hobart was released, dying in the following year, as a result of a head 
injury in a coach accident.3  
Denzil Holles was the second surviving son of the earl of Clare, and apparently a 
scholar of Miltonesque precocity, matriculating at the age of thirteen, graduating at 
sixteen, and already attending Gray’s Inn when fifteen. He sat in the 1624 parliament, 
where he made little mark, and only re-entered the Commons in 1628, for Dorchester, 
                                                
2 L. J. Reeve, ‘Coryton, William (1580-1651)’, ODNB; Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 
1604-29, III, p. 684. 
3 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 722. 
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when he again attracted little attention in the first session. However, in the 1629 
session, he spoke out against the customs farmers who had seized the merchants’ 
goods. On 2 March, Holles along with Valentine had held the Speaker in his chair to 
prevent him from rising and thus adjourning the Lords, for which Holles was arrested 
immediately afterwards. When questioned, he disingenuously claimed that ‘he came 
into the House that morning with as great zeal to do His Majesty service as anyone 
whatsoever’, but ‘finding His Majesty was displeased with him, he humbly desired 
that he might rather be the subject of his mercy than his power’.4 As Morrill 
describes, when offered bail on a bond of good behaviour, which would imply an 
admission of guilt, Holles was one of those who refused the offer. By 29 October 
1629, there was a fudge – Holles’ bail was paid by his father-in-law, and by his 
friend, William Noye, whether with, or without, Holles’ understanding is not clear. In 
January 1630, the attorney general went further and accused Eliot, Holles, and 
Valentine of conspiracy.5 HoP sets out that Holles was ‘one of the five members 
accused of treason by Charles I in January 1642. He took up arms for Parliament, but 
subsequently became a leading supporter of a compromise peace. He was again 
accused of treason by the New Model Army in 1647 and was subsequently secluded 
from Parliament. After living privately for most the 1650s he was raised to the 
peerage after the Restoration, becoming a prominent diplomat and privy councillor in 
the 1660s’.6 
John Selden had a background as a precocious lawyer, and steward to Sir Henry 
Grey, earl of Kent. He also wrote widely on law and the history of the ancient 
constitution, so that: ‘his subsequent pronouncements in Parliament on matters of law 
and precedent were treated with great respect’. He was first elected in 1624, when 
‘upholding the dignity and authority of the Commons was one of Selden’s main 
preoccupations’.7 He was active against Buckingham, and in favour of the various 
remonstrances that were presented to Charles I. By 1629, he was a strong, informed 
                                                
4 Ibid., IV, p. 757. 
5 John Morrill, ‘Holles, Denzil, First Baron Holles (1598-1680)’, ODNB. 
6 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 758. 
7 Ibid., VI, p. 265-66. 
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proponent of parliamentary privileges and rights: for example, he was tasked with 
seeing whether the Petition of Right had been correctly entered in the parliament 
rolls.8 When Rolle’s case was raised, Selden was keen to pursue parliamentary 
privilege for the member’s goods, using his extensive knowledge of the law and 
parliamentary privilege. He saw the case as one that touched on the very purpose of 
parliament: ‘If there be any near the King that misinterpret our Actions, let the Curse 
light on them, not on us, and believe it is high time to right our selves; and until we 
vindicate our selves in this, it will be in vain for us to sit here’.9 As Selden was also 
becoming exercised by the crown’s protection of Arminianists and papists, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that he was prominent in supporting Eliot’s remonstrance 
against misgovernment, and, as a consequence, joining the disruption of the 2 March 
sitting.  
When examined on 18 March, Selden, perhaps ‘terrified’ by his imprisonment, 
denied any clear recollection of the tumultuous events on the day of the dissolution. 
He generally distanced himself from Eliot’s statements, and denied prior complicity 
between them. He was unsuccessfully prosecuted in the Star Chamber, but, in the 
meantime, Selden had sued out a writ of habeas corpus. However, the government 
contrived to delay his release until October 1629, when he was finally offered, but 
refused, bail, on condition that he was bound over for good behaviour. Although he 
was not in fact prosecuted any further over the events in the Commons, he remained 
confined until May 1631, when his old ally Arundel intervened on his behalf to obtain 
his release.10  
Sir John Eliot came from minor gentry, and was first elected to parliament in 1614 
(St Germans), at the age of 21; he did not sit in the 1621 parliament, but was returned 
in 1624, 1625 (Newport in both years), 1626 (St Germans), and 1628 (Cornwall), 
becoming ‘one of the most influential and controversial figures in the parliaments of 
the 1620s’.11 Before the proceedings of March 1629, there had been earlier occasions 
                                                
8 CJ, 1, p. 920: 21 January 1629. 
9 Parkhurst (ed.), Crew : 1629 Proceedings, p. 114: 19 February 1629. 
10 Morrill, ‘Holles’. 
11 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 183. 
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when Eliot was involved in high profile events. Two privilege cases occurred at the 
same time in 1624; one particular to Eliot, the other a matter of principle, raised by 
Eliot. On 27 February 1624, Sir Edward Giles successfully requested privilege for 
Eliot, to stay a trial at the assizes.12 Seemingly, a simple matter of granting privilege 
to a member threatened with legal processes, there is, however, an undercurrent that 
suggests some of the authorities wanted to silence Eliot, thereby affecting the wider 
privileges of freedom of speech and a free legislature. Eliot, present in the Commons 
on 27 February, started a ‘lengthy and unexpected’ debate on such wider privileges, 
characterised as Eliot’s first great coup de théâtre:13 ‘Again to petition his Majesty for 
the Continuance of those Favours our Ancestors have enjoyed’.14 Sir Edward 
Nicholas records in his diary: ‘He [Eliot] would have us to seek to the King for our 
particular sureties, the promise we have had from the King being but in general’.15 
Eliot might have thought his words would resonate with those favouring a restatement 
of privilege, but John Pym realised that a successful parliament depended on avoiding 
such a debate, and commented in his diary that ‘divers were afraid this motion would 
have put the House into some such heate as to disturbe the greate busines’.16 The 
Commons seemed to favour restating the principles of their privileges, in an ‘act 
declaratory’, and, rather wearily perhaps, rehearsed that there had been confirmations 
of ‘Magna Charta thirty times’. They wanted to preserve the confidentiality of what 
was said in the House, by themselves punishing members who offended. Sir Edward 
Coke referred directly to ‘Freedom of Speech the Quintessence of the other Four 
Essences’.17 They decided to ask that the king should not dissolve parliament without 
showing them cause – Sir Robert Phelips noting ‘it is almost a miracle that we are 
now here again assembled’.18 The Commons concluded by establishing a committee 
‘take into consideration the liberties and privileges of the House’.19 It is wrong to see 
                                                
12 CJ, 1, p. 719, in Baker (ed.), Proceedings 1624: 27 February 1624. 
13 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, IV, p. 184. 
14 CJ, 1, p. 719, in Baker (ed.), Proceedings 1624: 27 February 1624. 
15 Nicholas, fol. 27v, in ibid.: 27 February 1624. 
16 Russell, ‘Eliot’. 
17 CJ, 1, p. 719, in Baker (ed.), Proceedings 1624: 27 February 1624. 
18 Nicholas, fol. 28r, in ibid.: 27 February 1624. 
19 CJ, 1, p. 719, in ibid.: 27 February 1624. 
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the Commons as somehow united in presenting a polemical stance – Sir Walter Earle 
records the conciliatory mood of the Commons and its desire to avoid offending the 
king:  
Sir Francis Seymour would have had better assurance given from the King than was 
last and would have had the parties that were restrained to declare whether it were 
for parliament business. But this was not approved of by the House. 
 
Sir Roberts Phelips: he expected not any such proposition […] Foreign parts are 
interested in this parliament, as well as we; good therefore to have respect to [avoid] 
disturbances and diversions. This our assembly is a miracle. Two things are to be 
expected, gratitude and obedience. Think fit to have a committee to consider of the 
best course how to proceed with least offence to his Majesty.20 
In the mid-1620s, Eliot distanced himself from Buckingham, whom he had previously 
supported, and allied himself more closely to William Herbert, third earl of 
Pembroke, who was a powerful enemy of Buckingham. Russell describes how Eliot 
repeatedly claimed that his attacks on Buckingham did not represent any attack on the 
king, and that he was speaking with the loyalty appropriate to a faithful counsellor.21 
However, tasked, along with Digges, with summing up in the impeachment 
proceedings against Buckingham, Eliot went too far – in the king’s view he impugned 
the memory of James I, and the honour of Charles I himself. Eliot and Digges were 
arrested at the door of the House, on 11 May 1626, and sent to the Tower – Digges 
was released after five days, but Eliot was only freed on 19 May. As noted earlier, the 
Commons, decided on the following day, ‘without one negative’, that ‘Sir Jo. Ellyott 
hath not exceeded the Commission given him by the House, in anything passed from 
him in the late Conference with the Lords’.22 Eliot was firm in his protestations of 
loyalty to the king, and ‘shared the complete commitment of his contemporaries to the 
                                                
20 Diary of Sir Walter Earle, fol. 31v, in ibid.: 27 February 1624. 
21 Attacks on ‘evil counsellors’, as a surrogate for their royal master, were a common device, 
later placed within doctrines of ‘ministerial responsibility’, and ‘the king can do no 
wrong’. 
22 CJ, 1, p. 862: 20 May 1626. 
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doctrine of non-resistance’, saying, in the following month, that: ‘no act of the King 
can make him unworthy of his kingdom: it is against the tenet of our religion’.23 He 
returned regularly to a single dogma: ‘the treasure, laws, persons, actions of the 
kingdom, the kingdom itself, suffers under the too great power of one man 
[Buckingham]’.24 Eliot was, with Coryton, a prominent refuser of the forced loan, in 
1626, such that both were imprisoned in the Gatehouse, in 1627. The result was that 
Eliot issued a petition, which, as Russell describes, made a simple appeal to the rule 
of law: 
Eliot ran through the statutes against arbitrary taxation which were later to form the 
basis of the petition of right—Confirmatio cartarum, De tallagio non concedendo [in Magna 
Carta], the statutes of 1340 and 1352, and the 1483 statute against benevolences – 
and appealed to the due process requirements for imprisonment laid down in Magna 
Carta. It was a powerful and emotive argument, which still retains its vitality, and the 
issue itself was raised to a new level of intensity that year in the Five Knights’ case, 
when, in reply to the suing of a writ of habeas corpus, the king asserted that he did 
not need to show any cause for imprisoning people.25 
Eliot’s action did not receive universal support: ‘the deputy lieutenants thought that 
they could not attack the king when they were constantly having to appeal to him for 
ships, powder, and supplies, and when they themselves required power to billet 
soldiers before they rioted, or to impose martial law after they had done so’. Eliot had 
to wait until January 1628 to be released, through a general amnesty preceding the 
calling of a new parliament.26  
In the 1628 parliament, Eliot repeatedly spoke (Russell says 172 times): ‘for the 
ancient glory of the ancient laws of England’, for the ‘propriety of goods’, for the law 
of ‘meum and tuum’, for the cause of any imprisonment to be shown, and for freedom 
of speech in the Commons. The most impressive speech was, perhaps, on 3 June 
                                                
23 Russell, ‘Eliot’; Grosvenor, in Bidwell and Jansson (eds.), Proceedings 1626, III, p. 358: 
3 June 1626. 
24 Whitelocke, in ibid., III, p. 34: 20 April 1626. 
25 Russell, ‘Eliot’. 
26 Ibid. 
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1628, when he raised five main grievances, relating to religion; military 
misadventures; ‘the insufficiency and unfaithfulness of our generals’; ‘the ignorance 
and corruption of our ministers’; and ‘the oppression of the subject’. He urged that a 
remonstrance should be drawn up, ‘all humbly expressed with a Prayer unto his 
Majesty, for the safety of himself, and for the safety of the Kingdom, and for the 
safety of Religion. He concluded with a profession of loyalty: ‘And thus, Sir, with a 
large affection and loyalty to his Majesty, and with a firm duty and service to my 
Country, I have suddenly, and, it may be, with some disorder, expressed the weak 
apprehension I have; wherein if I have erred, I humbly crave your pardon, and so 
submit to the Censure of the House’.27 
Eliot made numerous speeches in the 1629 parliament about the detention of 
Rolle’s goods, which urged the preservation of the liberties of the kingdom, as 
embodied in the Commons, and the avoidance of cautious approaches. For example, 
on 10 February, he said: ‘The happiness of the Kingdome consisteth in the 
preservation of their Liberties and those are contracted in this House. Our Lenity 
[mildness] causeth this violation: and our faire procedinge maketh our Liberties the 
Subject of scorne and contempt’.28 Eliot also spoke against the judges who were 
preventing the merchants retrieving their goods: ‘I conceive, if the judges of that court 
had their understanding enlightened of their error by this House, they would reform 
the same, and the merchants thereby suddenly come by their goods’.29 A week later, 
he repeated his warnings about the danger of failing to protect privileges: ‘We see it is 
not only for the interest of the goods of a member of this House, but also for the 
interest of this House; if we let this go, we shall not be able to sit here’.30 He rejected 
the argument that the customers had been acting on the king’s orders: ‘the King can 
not command a thing soe unjust as the violacion of our priviledges’.31 Eliot was, 
however, often the member who reported from the committee examining the 
complaint of the merchants, and may thereby have been unfairly seen as the chief 
                                                
27 Rushworth, Historical Collections, I, pp. 591-92: 2 June 1628. 
28 Grosvenor, in Notestein and Relf (eds.), CD 1629, p. 186: 10 February 1629. 
29 True Relation, in ibid., pp. 60-61: 12 February 1629. 
30 True Relation, in ibid., p. 85: 19 February 1629. 
31 Grosvenor, in ibid., pp. 237-41. 
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critic of the crown and the courts in the continuing restraint of the merchants’ goods, 
when he was merely speaking as his committee wished.32 
These unwelcome pronouncements were overshadowed by what happened on 
2 March 1629, when Eliot played a big part, and was unsurprisingly arrested 
immediately after the dissolution. As described by Russell, and HoP, when 
questioned, Eliot refused to account for his actions on the grounds that he would 
himself be breaching parliamentary privilege, by communicating what had happened 
in the Commons without their authority; and that offences committed there were 
examinable only by the members themselves. Eliot presented himself as following the 
same line as Socrates, in refusing to respond to his refusers. The judges declined to 
dispute this argument, and the Star Chamber action was dropped in June 1629. 
Charles then moved Eliot and others from the custody of the marshal of king’s bench, 
and thus out of the jurisdiction of the court, and had them confined in the Tower by 
his own warrant, in the custody of the lieutenant. Eliot sued for a writ of habeas 
corpus in late June, and in September the government decided to offer him bail, but 
only if he agreed to be bound over for good behaviour, a condition that Eliot rejected. 
He was then charged with sedition and conspiracy, along with Holles and Valentine. 
The defendants rejected the court’s jurisdiction over acts committed in parliament, 
and refused to plead – ironically, Charles I was also to refuse to recognise the 
legitimacy of the tribunal at his own trial. Eliot’s self-acknowledged dilemma was 
that if he did not submit he would incur the censure of the court, but if he did, his act 
would be considered ‘a prejudice to posterity’ and ‘a danger to Parliament’. 
Therefore, he would be silent, just because his duty was to parliament. These ideas 
were summarised in his paper, An Apology for Socrates, written in the Tower.33 
However, on this occasion the judges concluded that the three men’s silence 
constituted an admission of guilt. On 12 February 1630, Eliot was fined £2,000, and 
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sentenced to imprisonment until he acknowledged his fault.34 By March 1632, he was 
displaying the symptoms of tuberculosis, and he died in the following November, 
aged forty. In an act of vindictiveness, Charles I refused to release the body for burial, 
writing on the petition of Eliot’s son: ‘Let Sir John Eliot be buried in the church of 
that parish where he died’.35 
Walter Long held several offices in Wiltshire, and was first elected to parliament 
in 1625. HoP suggests that he was perhaps one of those who sought election to evade 
creditors: he had borrowed heavily to meet the debts associated with his inheritance of 
an estate in the early 1620s. He made little impression as a member at that time. Nor 
did his financial worries end: ‘my occasions do press me speedily to make money and 
nothing which I have is likely to yield me money so speedily as this [the sale of his 
Wiltshire manor]’.36 In the 1626 parliament, Long increasingly aligned himself with 
the anti-Buckingham members, although he supported the grant of three subsidies and 
three fifteenths to the king in the debate of 27 March. His first big contribution came 
in defence of Eliot and Digges, when they were imprisoned after summing up in the 
Buckingham impeachment proceedings:  
The imprisonment of these gentlemen grieved me as much as any. […] I have heard 
of a precedent in 2 Henry IV when upon such an occasion the Commons showed the 
king that no Member should be committed but for felony or treason, and that spoken 
in his hearing. That Buckingham is cause of all this, for all our interruptions have 
happened when his business has been in handling. These gentlemen [Eliot and 
Digges] were employed in the examining of these offences of the duke. Their papers 
are taken and seized on, we know not whether all the proofs are gone. We ought to 
make such a Remonstrance there in this infringement of our liberty, that we have our 
Members and their papers; to preserve our honour, and maintain what we have 
done.37 
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35 Russell, ‘Eliot’. 
36 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, p. 157. 
37 Grosvenor, in Bidwell and Jansson (eds.), Proceedings 1626, III, p. 244: 12 May 1626. 
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In the debate to decide whether to pursue a remonstrance against the detentions, Long 
argued that it should be ‘enlarged, and therein to desire His Majesty to punish those 
who have made him break his royal word, which was that we should have full liberty 
of speech’.38 During the remainder of the 1626 parliament, Long continued his attacks 
on Buckingham, and criticised Charles I’s demand for a speedy grant of supply. Long 
was punished: he was removed from the Wiltshire bench; he was obliged to pay a 
punitive privy seal loan, although this was not pressed. As noted earlier, he was 
pricked as sheriff, along with Sir Edward Coke, Sir Thomas Wentworth, Sir Robert 
Phelips, and Sir Francis Seymour, in an attempt to neutralise particularly difficult 
opponents.39  
Long was returned to parliament in 1628, notwithstanding the ban on sheriffs 
being elected, and took a prominent position against mismanagement of foreign 
affairs and military campaigns, innovations in religion, and arbitrary government. 
There was also a particular matter of privilege: on 30 June 1628, shortly after 
parliament was prorogued, he was sued in the Star Chamber, essentially for 
neglecting his shrieval duties by coming to Westminster. In late October the attorney 
general outlined the charges and demanded that Long be subpoenaed, but Long had 
probably left London for the country by this time, for on 4 November, Sir Valentine 
Browne reported to Eliot that Long was away and ‘intends not to be found’.40  
In the 1629 session, Long complained that ‘a prosecution hath been against him 
in the Star Chamber for sitting in this House the last Session, he being High Sheriff of 
Wiltshire, and being chosen burgess of Bath in Somersetshire’.41 He opposed the 
pressure to grant tonnage and poundage speedily, and spoke against the tolerance 
given to catholics. However, it was his words during the sitting of 2 March that 
brought Long particular disfavour. He incited people to not pay tonnage and 
poundage, declaring that: ‘[any] man that shall give away my liberty and my 
inheritance (I speake of the merchants), if any of them shall pay Tonage and Pondage 
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freedom of speech. 
39 Thrush and Ferris (eds.), Commons 1604-29, V, pp. 158-59. 
40 Ibid., V, p. 159. 
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without gift by Parliament I shall vote him that does it to be a capitall enemeye to the 
Kingdome’.42 Long was selected for punishment after 2 March, but fled to Wiltshire; 
a proclamation called for his arrest for sedition and ‘crimes of a high nature’. Long’s 
uncle, William, ‘abused [the king’s messenger] with reviling speeches’ before 
throwing a full chamber pot over his head, ‘at which he [William] and his wife much 
rejoiced’. On 6 May, Long unsuccessfully applied for a writ of habeas corpus. On the 
following day, when examined by attorney general Heath, he argued that his 
parliamentary privilege meant that he should not be pressed to answer for what he had 
said or done in the House. He was kept in prison until February 1630, when he was 
fined 2,000 marks by the Star Chamber, and ordered to be remanded in the Tower for 
‘his presumption in quitting the personal service of sheriff whereunto he was obliged 
by oath, to play the busybody in Parliament’. He remained in prison until July 1633.43  
William Strode was a member of a Devon family; his father, Sir William Strode, 
controlled one seat at Bere Alston, the borough for which William the younger sat 
from 1624 onwards.44 In the 1626 parliament, Strode became increasingly aligned 
with critics of Buckingham, and those who found fault with the regime. His critical 
stance hardened during the 1628 parliament, with at least 34 recorded speeches, often 
on religion – reflecting his puritan background, so that: ‘Like Eliot, Strode supported 
Sir Thomas Wentworth’s proposal, on 28 April for drafting a bill to enshrine the 
liberties of the subject, and on 1 May emphasized the importance of using this 
measure to curb arbitrary imprisonment. Later that day the king made clear his 
opposition to this strategy, by demanding to know whether the Commons would rely 
wholly upon his royal word to protect and uphold the subjects’ liberties’. This led 
Strode to back calls, on 2 May, for a remonstrance justifying the Commons’ actions, 
as well as, on 3 June, calling for a further remonstrance concerning the ills afflicting 
the nation.45  
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Initially quiet at the start of the 1629 session, Strode backed Selden and Eliot in 
calling for the recovery of goods confiscated from merchants, not least John Rolle, 
although he questioned the value of directly punishing the customs farmers. At the 
same time, Strode was concerned about the tolerance of papists. It is unsurprising that 
Strode played a very vocal role during the events of 2 March, when he intervened as 
soon as the Speaker refused to countenance the reading of Eliot’s paper that called for 
a remonstrance. Strode demanded that Eliot’s paper be read, ‘that we may not be 
turned off like scattered sheep, as we were at the end of the last session, and have a 
scorn put upon us in print’. He then called on other members to show their support by 
standing up, and when the Speaker still resisted, he rounded on him fiercely: ‘You 
have protested yourself to be our servant, and if you do not what we command you 
that protestation of yours is but a compliment. If you be our servant you must obey us 
for the scripture saith: "His servant you are whom you obey"’. Summoned the next 
day to appear before the privy council, Strode initially evaded arrest. When 
apprehended, he refused to answer to any court, except parliament itself, and applied 
persistently for bail. However, when bail was finally offered, he was one of those who 
refused to be bound over, and he remained incarcerated until January 1640, when he 
was released in a conciliatory gesture prior to the meeting of the Short Parliament.46  
Benjamin Valentine came from an obscure background, and had little fortune. He 
did not serve as an official in local politics, but, in 1613, he became a servant of the 
royal favourite, Robert Carr, earl of Somerset. He became part of a west country 
nexus that was overseen by the Herberts, which included Sir John Eliot and William 
Coryton. Valentine only entered parliament in 1628, as one of the members for St 
Germans, succeeding Eliot. In the remonstrance debate of 1628, Valentine 
characterised Buckingham as a public enemy, and in 1629, he was one of the 
members calling for the punishment of the customs officers who had seized the 
merchants’ goods. On 2 March, he joined Holles in holding the Speaker in his chair, 
for which he was brought before the privy council, on 4 March 1629, but refused to 
answer any questions on the grounds of parliamentary privilege. He then sued for a 
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writ of habeas corpus on 6 May, seeking bail. In October 1629, Valentine refused to 
be bound over to keep the peace and was remanded to prison. The men seen as 
ringleaders in the event of 2 March – Eliot, Holles, and Valentine – continued their 
protest, thereby forcing the crown to try them for seditious conduct and speeches in 
parliament. They then entered a plea against jurisdiction, maintaining that only 
parliament could judge them, but in vain. However, Valentine was found guilty, on 
12 February 1630, along with Eliot and Holles, fined £500, and sentenced to 
imprisonment during the king’s pleasure. Valentine refused to accept the competence 
of other courts to rule on events in parliament. An unrepentant Valentine remained in 
prison until 1640, although he was not closely confined, and was able to visit Eliot at 
the Tower until the latter’s death in 1632.47  
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